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Abstract 
This research concerns the role of public deliberation in monetary valuation of the 
environment. The objective is to evaluate the potential for value pluralism of an 
emerging methodology known as ‘deliberative monetary valuation’ (DMV). The 
research includes a series of theoretical discussions and an empirical case study. 
 Recent attempts to redesign environmental valuation surveys are reviewed. The 
theory of deliberative democracy is explained and compared with another intellectual 
current influencing the development of DMV, i.e. the science of analytic deliberation. 
Current practice is critically assessed to identify major problems. It is argued that 
capacity for value pluralism does not grow with giving privilege to alternative values. 
The crux is the excess of predisposed definitions and judgements. Using deliberative 
methods to repair or reject the economic conception of value is problematic. Public 
deliberation plays an emancipatory role of exposing the contested and makes room for 
different frames of reference of valuing public goods. DMV is an inquiry into the level 
and quality of WTP articulated under value difference. Deliberative elements serve to 
ensure that the valuation processes be reflective and self-critical, on the part of the 
valuing agents and also the researcher. The practice lacks pluralistic potential as the 
method has been used to reinforce an established or alternative conception of value. A 
discourse-based approach is proposed which defines deliberative WTP as an 
‘agreement to pay’ to emphasize its interactive nature and varying ethical composition. 
The case study involves an experimental deliberative forum on the climate change 
policy of Australia. Twenty four ordinary Australian citizens participated in a one-day 
workshop to discuss a range of carbon pricing issues, including emission trading and 
carbon tax. Discussions were audio-recorded and responses to questions about climate 
change and emission mitigation, including a willingness-to-pay (WTP) request, were 
assessed. Results show little normative consensus on subjective values, but an initial 
agreement on preferences. Alternative perspectives became more accessible to 
participants. The improving discursive communication was related to the invocation of 
a communicative device that played a rhetorical function. Division was respected 
although a qualitative convergence on WTP decision was not precluded. Plurality of 
perspectives was preserved without compromising the capacity for making collective 
decision. In this light, the stated WTP is understood as a political or social agreement 
evolving from conflict and contradiction. An ‘agreement to pay’ is illustrated.  
 This proposed conception of DMV returns economics to politics. The kind of 
‘economic’ valuation is a topical and not theoretical one, invariably about money and 
values yet allowing varying possibilities of theorization. Seeking monetary expressions 
is not unacceptable provided economic frame is not privileged. A pluralistic economic 
order requires unconstrained, self-critical disciplinary norms being actively embraced. 
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INTRODUCTION AND REVIEWS 
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CHAPTER 1  
SYNTHESIZING VALUATION AND 
DELIBERATION 
 
 
1.1 THE DELIBERATIVE TURN IN ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 
Ecological economics emerged in the 1980s in response to the limitations of 
neoclassical economics and its applications to environmental policy, planning and 
management (Costanza 1991, Spash 1999, Røpke 2005). The discipline explicitly 
addresses irreducible uncertainties and complexities, recognizes values underpinning 
science, and encompasses the multiplicity of legitimate perspectives and commitments. 
With these characteristics it has been described as a ‘post-normal’ science, in contrast to 
the ‘normal’ economic science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, Funtowicz and Ravetz 
1994). The new mode of science challenges the positivist tradition of neoclassical 
economics and policy sciences. Many ecological economists aspire to promote 
pluralistic policy formulation processes in which communication between decision 
makers, experts and the public is no longer vertical and linear and becomes circular and 
egalitarian (Maxwell and Randall 1989). A rising theme within the field is participatory 
planning and management of natural resources and its implications to economic 
valuation. 
 Ecological economists tend to question the liberal, ‘cowboy’ models of economics 
for their failure to respect biophysical realities and poor treatment of alternative values 
attached to the natural environment (Martinez-Alier, 1987; Daly, 1996; Spash, 1999; 
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Söderbaum, 2008). Many of them see better prospect from engaging in participatory 
research, particularly the use of deliberative methods and the idea of deliberative 
democracy (Zografos and Howarth, 2008). They find themselves increasingly aligned 
with the deliberative turn in democratic theory beginning in the 1990s. Prior to that turn, 
the democratic ideal was seen mainly in terms of aggregation of preferences or interests 
into collective decisions through devices such as voting. Under deliberative democracy, 
the essence of democratic legitimacy is sought ‘in the ability of all individuals subject to 
a collective decision to engage in authentic deliberation about that decision’ (Dryzek 
2000 p. 1). One of its core requirements is reflection upon preferences:  
Deliberation as a social process is distinguished from other kinds of 
communication in that deliberators are amenable to changing their judgements, 
preferences, and views during the course of their interactions, which involve 
persuasion rather than coercion, manipulation, or deception. (Dryzek, 2000, p.1) 
Deliberative democracy can provide better means than its liberal counterparts for 
reconciling moral conflicts without unnecessarily compromising values. The task 
demands mutual justification from citizens for the collectively binding laws and the 
associated consequences to be acceptable to all. Key principles include reciprocity, i.e. 
‘the capacity to seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake’ (Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996, p. 52-53) and the public use of reason. 
The relevance of deliberative democracy has increasingly been recognized by 
leading ecological economists such as Niemeyer and Spash (2001), Vatn (2005), 
Norgaard (2007), and Zografos and Howarth (2008), giving impetus to a new mode of 
inquiry known as ‘deliberative economics’. Ecological economists in the wake of the 
deliberative turn tend to see science and democracy intertwined (Söderbaum 2000, 
Norgaard 2007, Söderbaum 2008, Kesting 2010). As Norgaard (2007, p. 381) argues, ‘it 
helps us see that the boundaries between science and democracy are more broadly 
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ambiguous and socially enforced.’ In addition, there is an enthusiasm to search for 
consensus or convergence on moral foundations that support ecological sustainability 
(Faber et al. 1996, Wilson and Howarth 2002, Venkatachalam 2007, Douai 2009). 
Douai (2009, p. 277), for example, suggests that a socio-ecological economics is based 
on the assumption that ‘politics is a space of convergence between different values’.  
 Following this trend, environmental valuation, which is a core research programme 
of ecological economics, is under a new stage of development yet struggling at 
crossroads.  
 
1.2 THE IDEA OF DELIBERATIVE VALUATION 
Value can be defined as ‘an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state 
of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of 
conduct or end-state of existence’ (Rokeach, 1973, p. 5). Stated value has been used to 
indicate perceived importance assigned to something, including tangible goods and 
intangibles like processes and ideas. There are many different ways of appreciating 
public goods with many forms of sentiments attached, consequently yielding plural 
values. This has posed serious challenge to the conventional economic valuation which 
strives for some sort of generalization through a cardinal summary measurement. 
Monetary valuation is a core research theme in economics. Neoclassical 
economists assume that individuals are utility-maximizing and prepared to sell the 
environment for the right price. Monetary valuation of the environment is based on 
assessment of hedonic preference intensity expressed in the markets. Among a range of 
economic techniques, the contingent valuation method (CVM) has risen to prominence. 
The CVM constructs a hypothetical market where individuals are confronted with a 
trade-off between a particular environmental good or service and money. It is a stated 
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preference approach involving direct inquiry into individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP), 
or willingness to accept compensation (WTA).  
Ecosystems valuation, which extends this market-based theory, has been the 
subject of persistent criticism for its narrow value ethic and poor representation of 
human psychology (Sagoff 1988, Vadnjal and O'Connor 1994, Vatn and Bromley 1994, 
Spash and Vatn 2006, Gowdy 2007, O'Neil et al. 2008, Spash 2008a, Spash 2008c, 
Spash et al. 2009). Supporting theories are couched in utilitarian terms exclusively and 
thus compatible with value monism, in contrast to pluralism. Value pluralism refers to 
the advocacy of maintaining a number of distinct values irreducible to each other. It is a 
normative concept, whereas plurality is factual. Anderson (1993) has defined two 
conceptions of value plurality. A ‘good’ may be something that is appropriately valued, 
or a bearer of a bundle of qualities that meet certain standards or requirements. In one 
view, values are plural to the extent in which the goods under valuation are the proper 
objects of multiple evaluative attitudes, such as pleasure and respect; the opposite 
monistic view allows only one sensible way of valuing. On the other, the goods are able 
to meet diverse evaluative standards; the opposite monistic view requires that the 
diverse standards be reduced to a single ground or explained in terms of a single 
good-constituting property.  
Within the field of ecological economics there is a ‘post-CVM’ movement. It has 
become the key site where alternatives to the CVM, or stated preference approaches 
more generally, are developed and tested in an attempt to capture plural environmental 
values more properly. These are built upon a range of interrelated concepts, theories or 
techniques including multi-criteria evaluation (Martinez-Alier et al. 1998, Munda 2006, 
Proctor and Drechsler 2006, Stagl 2006), experimental economics (Gowdy and Mayumi 
2001, Gowdy 2007), social constructivism (Söderbaum, 2000; Douai, 2009; Vatn, 2009), 
social psychology (Kumar and Kumar, 2008; Spash et al., 2009), post-positivism 
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(Norton and Noonan 2007), and discourse ethics (O'Hara 1996, Wilson and Howarth 
2002). One promising candidate that potentially can link them up is deliberative 
monetary valuation (DMV).  
DMV combines elements of economic valuation with deliberative processes 
(Jacobs 1997, Niemeyer and Spash 2001, Howarth and Wilson 2006, Spash 2007, Spash 
2008b). The procedure of assessing environmental values in monetary terms is preceded 
by a deliberation amongst the valuing individuals, who form small groups to share 
information and raise concerns about a proposed environmental change. Typically they 
are given additional information and opportunities to discuss prior to stating a WTP or 
WTA. By enlightening individuals through participatory processes DMV can raise 
prospect for preference transformation and inclusion of non-utilitarian values. 
 DMV has been theorized and practised under two schools of thoughts. One is 
dominated by heterodox economists, philosophers and political scientists, who take 
issues of ethics and alternative values more seriously. The other consists of decision 
scientists and mainstream economists who focus on cognition and information issues 
without appealing to a morally critical intent. Both are known to be important to 
advancing the practice of environmental valuation, but they come into conflict in some 
aspects and this remains unexplored. On the other hand, critics have raised many issues 
in relation to the feasibility of combining processes. Within mainstream economics there 
are concerns as to the quality of the economic estimates. These broadly concern the 
problems with small-group participatory initiatives, such as the lack of statistical 
representation, strategic behaviour and conflict within groups (Powe 2007). Within the 
heterodox school there is a belief that public participation is at variance with monetary 
valuation. The latter has been dominated by utilitarian calculations which rest on a 
consumer frame of reference. Some authors therefore argue that it is incompatible with 
participatory processes, which ought to recognize citizen-type collective reasoning and 
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take into account the issue of value incommensurability, which refers to the fact that 
some distinct values are not reducible to each other or a common measurement of value 
(O'Connor 2000, Söderbaum 2000, O'Neill 2007, Vatn 2009). The deliberative turn in 
environmental and ecological economics brings forth varying opportunities and 
challenges awaiting clarifications.  
 
1.3 THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 
These concerns indicate some deep and persistent difficulties confronting deliberative 
economists. Group-based valuation approach has been identified as fulfilling two 
objectives, namely, preference construction and public involvement (Powe, 2007). They 
involve different means and ends: the former is a matter of science striving for rational 
decisions whereas the latter democracy embracing alternative rationalities. Where 
deliberative economics means any stronger bonding between science and democracy, 
one important question in need of clarification is the tension between the scientific and 
democratic facets of ecological economics. This study attempts to address this issue by 
studying the deliberative turn in environmental valuation. 
 Another disciplinary principle in dispute concerns the ethical consensus or 
convergence, or as some DMV practitioners put it, the emphasis on citizen frame. 
Consensus and pluralism seem to point in opposite directions. Signs of conflict have 
been observed in recent ecological economics papers. For example, Venkatachalam 
(2007, p. 556) complains that the pluralistic scope of the discipline has been ‘too vast’, 
‘focusing on too many areas’, and that the ideological divide between disciplines has 
made ‘hurdles for inter-disciplinary research’. Baumgärtner et al. (2008, p. 391) state 
that methodological pluralism ‘requires a unified basis’. If ecological economists are 
committed to the entreprise of pluralism, deliberative value assessments heading for a 
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consensus would be held into suspicion. Similarly, for those who are critical of DMV, if 
monetary valuation inherently offers no hope to pluralism, then there would be little 
ground for a sustainability economics either. The overarching goal of pluralism begs 
clarification. This study attempts to answer questions concerning the potential of DMV 
in accounting for plural values while allowing a consensual decision to be made.  
 This study is significant by addressing these knowledge gaps and proposing a 
range of new perspectives crucially related to the future of DMV as an alternative or 
complement to the stated preference approaches. More broadly, it identifies the deeper 
implications of the deliberative turn as the rising prominence of deliberative methods 
has exposed all sorts of questions about the conflicting commitments of ecological 
economics. Through exploring DMV this study is expected to shed light on the 
positioning of deliberative economics and, more generally, ecological economics. In 
addressing these objectives it is guided by the general research question ‘Can DMV 
satisfy the requirements of value pluralism?’  
 This research question is followed by the following specific research questions 
representing two main themes: 
1. How do the researchers who contribute to the development of DMV deal with the 
problem of value pluralism? 
a. What does a pluralistic valuation approach require? 
b. What is the role of deliberative elements in monetary valuation? 
c. Is the current practice of DMV in raising or reducing pluralistic potential? 
2. How do individuals’ monetary expressions change with their held values and 
preferences upon deliberation? 
a. What kind of consensus is produced in a divided group? 
b. What is the possible driver of the formation of the consensus? 
c. How can the resulting monetary expressions be explained in terms of the 
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observed consensus? 
d. What are the implications to the science of DMV in terms of value pluralism? 
 
The first theme pertains to the theories of environmental valuation and DMV in 
particular. An important theoretical issue that has to be addressed in the first place 
concerns the requirements of value pluralism (1a). There is a questionable assertion that 
public deliberation, being a political activity, is inherently conducive to value pluralism, 
because individuals are exposed to a wide range of viewpoints. History has shown that 
participatory engagement does not guarantee recognition or tolerance of alternative 
viewpoints. The real limiting factor needs to be identified. Different deliberative 
approaches can then be assessed in this light (1b). Deliberative processes that have little 
value pluralistic potential may be serving some purposes and possessing properties that 
vary from those with higher potential. These varying purposes and properties allow us 
to see what define the pluralistic potential of deliberative processes, and thus why 
deliberative elements can and cannot raise the capacity of monetary valuation in 
capturing the multitude of values (1c). The promise of DMV then needs to be qualified. 
Nonetheless, this also provides grounds for a normative theory of DMV that is 
compatible with value pluralism to the extent that the ‘can’ arguments are plausible. The 
requirements of this theory should be attainable and allow an empirical investigation.  
The second theme supports the forgoing theoretical discussion with a case study, 
which involves a deliberative forum about climate change policy undertaken in 
Australia. A pluralistic DMV allows individuals articulating monetary expressions, 
preferably in the form of group agreement, while preserving their value differences. Yet, 
not many DMV practitioners have explicitly and appropriately addressed the 
requirement that DMV is destined for a kind of consensus which at the same time 
accommodates disagreements at a different level. This point can be substantiated and 
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observed by characterizing the actual variations in held values and stated preferences of 
the participants in a DMV exercise (2a). Granted that these variations are valid and 
make sense of the normative theory, the novelty of this conception allows reasonable 
doubts from the perspectives of established scientific understanding or even common 
sense, e.g. does it make sense for a climate sceptic to agree to pay for greenhouse gas 
mitigation? Reasons need to be provided to render such observations legitimate (2b). 
Based on these findings, the DMV results can be characterized and assessed for 
compatibility with the proposed DMV theory and its alternatives (2c). Plausible 
arguments and reasonable observations supporting this theory may offer new insights 
into the use of deliberative methods for environmental valuation and its theoretical 
implications (2d). However, more questions are raised in the formation of this new 
conception. For example, can DMV be seen as an economic technique? What is the 
balance between its scientific and democratic elements? Behind the idea of DMV lies a 
more fundamental conflict confronting ecological economics. 
 
1.4 THESIS OUTLINE 
The first half of this thesis (Chapters 2 to 5) provides a review and discussion on 
theories, while the second (Chapters 6 to 9) describes and reports the case study that 
supports it. Chapter 2 presents a prologue of the deliberative turn. It outlines the major 
limitations of stated preference approach and the remedial and alternative measures that 
have been proposed to modify or replace it. A typology is developed followed by an 
evaluation against the requirements of value pluralism. Chapter 3 presents the 
conceptual basis of this study. It is based on the theory of deliberative democracy that 
has contributed to the deliberative turn. Core principles and features are discussed at 
length. Chapter 4 lays grounds for a comparison to address the science-democracy 
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conflict. It introduces the idea of analytic deliberation that also has strong influence on 
the development of DMV and explains the ways in which it differs from deliberative 
democracy. Chapter 5 contains the core arguments guiding the empirical inquiry. It 
offers a critical review of the DMV literature to identify limitations of the current 
practice and knowledge gap that need further exploration. Two major approaches of 
DMV are questioned and a discourse-based approach is proposed as an alternative.  
 Chapter 6 sets up the theoretical context of the empirical inquiry which aims to 
assess the compatibility of actual DMV outcomes with the discourse-based approach. 
Propositions and expectations that require empirical support are outlined. Chapter 7 
describes the case study undertaken to address this issue. It introduces the policy 
background with a focus on the controversies over emission trading and carbon tax and 
the organization of the deliberative forum. Chapter 8 reports main findings, which are 
examined in terms of the political ideals characterizing the discourse-based approach. It 
explains the policy preferences of the forum participants and provides a political 
interpretation of WTP responses, particularly those who initially refused the WTP 
request. This chapter seeks to reconcile pluralism and consensus in the context of DMV 
research. Chapter 9 extends the analysis by exploring possible explanations for the 
findings reported. It seeks to identify factors contributing to the observed consensual 
outcomes, based on a qualitative analysis of transcripts which recorded the group 
discussions.  
Chapter 10 offers a general discussion on the ways in which this research varies 
from the previous literature. I challenge a few established perspectives about 
environmental valuation and outline a better shape of DMV that is amenable to value 
pluralism. The thesis is then concluded by shedding light on the future of DMV and, 
more generally, deliberative ecological economics. 
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CHAPTER 2  
RETHINKING ENVIRONMENTAL VALUATION 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
Accepting the analytic vision that values are plural means that different ways of 
articulation could be considered acceptable. Practitioners who endeavour to redesign the 
larger project of environmental valuation differ remarkably in the ways in which they 
interpret the failure of the conventional approach and the nature of the communal value 
of the environment. To further complicate the story, the idea of public deliberation, 
recognized as part of the solution, is also contested. As many conceptual variables have 
come into play, streams of practice are being developed with varying objectives, 
standards and expected outcomes. Consequently this results in a wide range of remedial 
or alternative strategies for value articulation. Thus the post-CVM movement is 
fundamentally pluralistic.  
In this chapter I set up a typology for an evaluation of practice. The post-CVM 
development of stated preference valuation is characterized. This will be useful for 
evaluating my DMV approach against its alternatives and can help clarify the 
significance of deliberative method. Given my broad definition of value plurality as 
discussed in Chapter 1, it is necessary to cover a wide range of emerging value concepts 
and valuation models, including those that retain some standard economic elements. 
The first section that follows introduces two conceptions of environmental value, which 
are couched in utilitarian and deontological terms respectively. Next, I briefly show how 
the practitioners of environmental valuation understand the issues about alternative 
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values differently. I then review and categorize those novel valuation approaches that 
have been proposed or tested over the years, by weaving pieces of perspective about the 
current science of valuation into a more comprehensible, coherent discourse. The fourth 
section discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the identified approaches. 
 
2.2 NORMATIVE BASIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUE 
2.2.1 Utility 
Underlying the conventional approach of economic valuation is the utilitarian theory of 
value. Utility can be defined in terms of maximizing net pleasure or happiness. 
Valuation is then treated as an assessment of human perception of well-being. This view 
is inherited from the tradition of welfare economics and embodies the philosophy of 
utilitarianism, which refers to the idea that the moral worth of an action is determined 
solely by its usefulness in maximizing utility. It is a subsidiary of consequentialism 
under which moral worth is a function of outcomes. 
In modern orthodox economics, something is of value to the extent that some 
individual is willing to pay for an expected utility gain, or to accept a compensation for 
suffering an expected utility loss. Value is indicated by the level of WTP to secure a 
good, or WTA to abandon it. The notion is derived from the ways that people make 
choices in markets. Scarcity of resources mandates choice, so that individuals have to 
give up something in exchange for the goods preferred. Equilibrium price is determined 
when an individual buyer is indifferent between giving up an additional unit of 
alternative opportunities or resources for an additional unit of the goods preferred and 
keeping these alternatives, and the seller is in a comparable situation. Therefore, value is 
always relative to other goods that might be acquired using money as a numeraire and 
arises only when individuals exercise choice; it is regarded as a result of a particular 
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choice rather than the cause of it (Bromley and Paavola, 2002).  
Valuing the environment involves measuring people’s preferences in relation to 
environmental goods or services. Neoclassical economists believe that the value of 
unpriced environmental goods can be adequately revealed in a properly constructed 
hypothetical or appropriate surrogate market (Freeman, 1993; Pearce, 1993; Garrod and 
Willis, 1999; Bateman et al., 2002). They have developed a range of valuation 
techniques, including stated preference approaches. Monetary valuation of ecosystem 
benefits based on these approaches requires respondents making choice resembling a 
real tradeoff between a change in the level of environmental goods or services in 
question and other goods represented by the purchasing power of money. A hypothetical 
scenario is constructed where the environmental change is portrayed as a commodity 
supply change and the individual is instructed to think like a consumer. One of the most 
widely used stated preference methods is the CVM (Mitchell and Carson, 1989; 
Hanemann, 1994; Bateman et al., 2002). It requires direct inquiry into the WTP, or 
willingness to accept compensation (WTA), of the concerned individuals for an 
environmental quality or quantity change, usually through questionnaire. The monetary 
values elicited are then aggregated and taken as the economic value equivalent of the 
environmental change for use in subsequent cost-benefit analysis (CBA).  
The main advantage of the CVM is the potential for capturing indirect use value in 
addition to direct use value. The direct use value category comprises those uses directly 
contributing to or supporting production or consumption. Indirect use values are 
normally associated with maintaining an option to use an asset in the future, the desire 
to make an asset available to future generations, and the mere existence of an asset. 
Under this conception expressed value for nature is couched in instrumental terms and 
not independent of human being, i.e. weak anthropocentrism (Norton, 1984; Pearce, 
1998). Motivational basis is nevertheless not restricted to pure self-interest; preferences 
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built upon egoistic altruism, which is based on self-regarding concern for the welfare of 
others, may also be regarded as relevant. Either way, these values are assumed to arise 
from utilitarian, or more generally, consequentialist beliefs. Over the last two decades, 
however, much contention has arisen from an alternative view broadly concerning 
rights. 
 
2.2.2 Principles and rights 
Value may be expressive and manifested as an act to defend some principles or rights. It 
may be motivated by moral obligations or social norms concerning how things ought to 
be in society (Sagoff, 1988; Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992; Vadnjal and O'Connor, 1994; 
Vatn and Bromley, 1994; Holland, 1997; O'Neill and Spash, 2000; Spash, 2000, 2006; 
O'Neil et al., 2008; Lo and Jim, 2010a, b). Principles belong to a form of civic virtues 
more commonly found in civil society than markets and are different from the utilitarian 
conception. Environmental value of this sort rests on human’s responsibility in relation 
to nature and future generations, and can be couched in terms of biocentrism and 
genuine altruism based on selfless concern for the welfare of others. 
This category of value has been described in various terms, yet consistently 
indicating incompatibilities with standard economic theory. For example, some 
philosophers believe that these values are intrinsic constituting assignment of status to 
goods (Anderson, 1993). The value of a good depends on the extent in which it is 
evaluated according to appropriate criteria (Anderson, 1993; Holland, 1997), rather than 
depending on consequences. According to Holland (1997), value is a kind of judgement, 
such as whether hunting is morally wrong or not, which would inevitably conflict with 
alternative views. This is in contrast to statements of preference which do not conflict, 
such as tastes. Goodin (1992) doubts that preference is the key constituent of value. He 
contends that environmental value concerns the history and process of nature’s creation 
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and exists dependently on human’s consciousness but not material interest. 
Human geographers have also defined the value of nature in ways varying from the 
orthodox economic approach. A historical-cultural account is substantiated by Tuan 
(1974). He considers the value of nature as an expression of loyalty to land and suggests 
that the sentimental attachment to place may emerge from the experience of nature’s 
intransigence, which might bring little utilitarian satisfaction to the people concerned. 
The environment may be seen as a cultural metaphor or a source of social pride 
contributing to individual or group identity and it is the integrity of such a symbolical 
linkage that matters (Burgess et al., 1988; Clark et al., 2000; Noёl et al., 2000; Lo, 
forthcoming b). Accordingly, the economic criteria of assessment, which rest on 
marginal utility analysis, may be regarded as inappropriate. 
Behavioural psychologists have provided empirical evidence on the different 
properties of environmental values. For example, they find that stated values about 
public goods are quantity insensitive, i.e. do not substantially increase with quantity of 
goods offered, and are akin to an intended moral contribution expressing attitude and 
affection (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992; Kahneman et al., 1999). Based on similar 
findings, Baron and Spranca (1997) indicate that such ‘protected values’ derive from 
deontological prohibitions of certain harmful or wrong actions and resist trade-offs. All 
of these understandings imply that value precedes choice, in contrast to standard 
economic assumptions. 
Concerns over the environment might represent a political or social attitude 
defending a just entitlement or right (O'Connor, 2000; O'Neill and Spash, 2000). These 
are broadly understood as a community-regarding commitment expressed by individuals 
acting as citizens representing the larger society and exercising a political choice 
(Sagoff, 1988; Blamey, 1995). A radical form of these values, which may be triggered 
by discontent over power imbalance, procedural injustice or cultural conflict, resists 
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trading-off or buying-in, because this may crowd out the embraced civic virtues in 
relation to resource planning and management (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Claro, 2007). 
Such considerations involve an evaluation of the rightness of actions upon the 
environment. Environmental value is then not just a carrier of sentimental attachment to 
land, but also reflects a judgement on political or social order based on held principles.  
Accordingly, a range of alternative motives has been proposed to explain the value 
statements in CVM surveys. A general observation is that value orientations are a 
function of altruism and social norms (Stern et al., 1999; Stern, 2000; Ojea and Loureiro, 
2007; Spash et al., 2009). Stated WTP for environmental change has been statistically 
found to be associated with rights-based beliefs (Spash, 1997; Kotchen and Reiling, 
2000; Spash, 2000, 2006). It is suggested to be an indicator of behavioural intention to 
protect the inviolable rights of nonhuman species rather than to maximize utility, 
leading to a view that the economic explanations exclusively based on consequentialism 
do not suffice (Spash et al., 2009). Attitudes toward valuing the environment are related 
to the perception of fairness of the valuation process or the provision of the public 
goods. Procedures and practices perceived to be unfair or unjust are associated with 
negative attitudes leading to protest responses in CVM experiments, suggesting a 
significant role for procedural fairness in valuing the environment (Jorgensen and Syme, 
2000; Jorgensen et al., 2001; Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2006). A related set of motives 
pertains to trust, ascription of responsibility and decisiveness. Negative effects on the 
likelihood and willingness to pay may come from distrust in political agency, scientists 
or other members of community, a tendency to ascribe environmental responsibility to 
other parties, and a perceived inability to make a difference (Blamey, 1998b, a, c).  
Capturing this category of value proves to be a difficult task for the CVM and 
stated preference approaches in general. Rights-based values are incommensurate with 
the utilitarian ones, making their reduction to a monetary numeraire problematic 
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(Vadnjal and O'Connor, 1994; Clark et al., 2000; Aldred, 2006; O'Neill, 2007; Spash, 
2008a, c). In view of preference incompleteness and the observed role of social norms, 
it has been suggested that environmental valuation should be understood and redesigned 
as a process of social construction to enable information exchange, allow preference 
transformation, and capture value diversity (Schkade and Payne, 1994; Jacobs, 1997; 
O'Connor, 2000; Spash et al., 2005; Vatn, 2005; Spash and Vatn, 2006; Powe, 2007). 
However, these problems and proposed solutions have been subject to different moral 
judgements and technical definitions. Practitioners are consequently divided as to what 
kind of alternatives or remedies are needed. 
 
2.3 THE VARIETY OF EXPERT RESPONSE 
What has been shown above is the existence of value plurality, yet this is a controversial 
concept, especially in economics. Hard-core economists dismiss the deontological 
arguments for being not practical in terms of policy impact (Pearce, 1998) and being 
irrelevant to economics (Milgrom, 1993). Some authors doubt ontological pluralism and 
discredit plural values. They rebut arguments for alternative valuation methods on the 
grounds that those ‘irrational’ expressions are not non-economic (Cooper et al., 2004), 
that intrinsic values are substitutable (Price, 2000), and that the minority protest 
behaviours do not constitute a sufficient reason to abandon the conventional CBA (Orr, 
2007). These views maintain that the evaluative capacity of the standard economic 
approach is not severely impoverished by presuming value commensurability.   
Some economists admit, with qualifications, the limitations of stated preference 
approaches, yet only at a methodological level. Hanley and Shogren (2005) and 
Bateman et al. (2008) aver that the main problem is people’s preferences deviating from 
the economic model. They seek to conform to standard economic theory and suggest 
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that people have to be educated to correct their uninformed, undiscovered preferences. 
Unstable stated values are considered an economic problem to be fixed by preference 
construction (Powe, 2007). These relatively more sympathetic economists generally 
support economic orthodox and hold no critical moral intent in economics. 
In contrast, behavioural psychologists and decision scientists explicitly 
acknowledge the failure of consumer theory. Yet, some of them, like the economists, 
appear reluctant to recognize the non-economic observations as morally legitimate. 
Baron and Spranca (1997, p. 15) believe that rights-based responses stem from a desire 
for the consequence that is ‘contaminated’ by some ‘imagined means’ of achieving it, 
and ‘might be incorrect’ because they reflect values and emotions expressed in the 
wrong way. The failure to make instrumental choices is seen to be a cognitive problem 
due to individuals’ inability to comprehend or reluctance to face the required welfare 
tradeoffs (Gregory et al., 1997). Value conflict is regarded as reducible; it is a matter of 
technical incommensurability, which ‘refers to the issue of representation of multiple 
identities in descriptive models’ (Munda, 2006, p. 91). Among this group of researchers 
there is a tendency to understand moral controversies in technical terms.  
Heterodox economists and political theorists who are more socially oriented hold 
a more salient moral intent on behalf of the valuing agents. Value incommensurability is 
regarded as an ethical reality to be respected. Different values are inherently only 
weakly comparable so that it is inappropriate to reduce everything to a monetary metric 
(Martinez-Alier et al., 1998; Vatn, 2009). Non-economic ethics and motivations are 
considered another aspect of life to be recognized and protected in their entirety rather 
than to be changed to fit into some economic ideal. An ontologically more pluralistic 
conception of value is espoused.  
This initial characterization of scientific treatment illustrates the variation in 
hypotheses about the nature of value plurality. The hard-core economists favour the 
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status quo, while the more sympathetic ones accept minimal methodological 
adjustments. The psychologists advocate crafting people’s psychology without attacking 
the moral basis of neoclassical economics, whereas the social pluralists explore 
alternatives beyond the neoclassical ambits. These positions and their interaction have 
produced a variety of remedial measures and new approaches to advance value theories 
and elicitation techniques. Examples can be grouped into three categories and are 
portrayed in the following section.   
 
2.4 THREE ALTERNATIVE OR REMEDIAL APPROACHES  
Every inquiry of environmental value comprises three basic elements, namely, object 
(the valued), subject (the valuing agent), and evaluative framework. Accordingly three 
pluralistic approaches can be identified from the post-CVM movement. Attempts to 
capture a wider range of values typically involve reorientation of more than one of these 
elements. Combinations with different emphases have produced a range of valuation 
models and techniques spreading along the monism-pluralism continuum. In most cases, 
they operate in more than one strategic level.  
  
2.4.1 Functional diversification 
Functional diversification is justified by the view that the ability to capture the full 
range of nature’s value is constrained by its inherent physical complexity. Some of its 
contributions are not readily recognizable and estimable, due to human’s limited 
knowledge. Much of the early attempts have focused on the flows of tangible resource 
properties, immediate productive or consumptive benefits, and short-term ecological 
changes, at the expense of the diversity of contributions. They fail to encompass the 
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entire ecological dynamic and intangible properties, notably ecosystem’s irreversibility 
and resilience (the capacity to recover from disturbance due to natural or anthropogenic 
causes), and the interdependency of ecological functions and values (Barbier et al., 1994; 
Chavas, 2000). Since such primary or ‘glue’ values are not included in the calculation of 
total economic value, aggregating the total values of a given ecosystem’s functions fails 
to account for the multiple values it generates (Turner et al., 2003). A primitive form of 
these perspectives could lead to a qualified defence of Pearce’s (1998) dictum 
‘demonstration and capture’. According to this view, the success of a value inquiry 
depends on how much the ‘true’ state of ecosystems is comprehensively and objectively 
captured.  
Of prime importance is a comprehensive informational basis. In de Groot et al.’s 
(2002, p. 394) standardized framework, the ‘first step’ towards an ecosystems valuation 
‘involves the translation of ecological complexity (structures and processes) into a more 
limited number of ecosystems functions’. It is proposed to ‘make comparative 
ecological economic analysis possible’ by identifying and defining ‘the fullest possible 
range of 23 ecosystem functions’(de Groot et al., 2002, p. 393). The framework 
contributes to the ecosystems valuation literature not by diversifying evaluative 
perspectives, but by combining it with ‘a comprehensive data base of ecosystem 
services and values’ (de Groot et al., 2002, p. 407). Central to this approach is an 
objective, factual basis of analysis and a broad definition of ecological goods or 
services.  
Functional relationships are a key element in Lockwood’s (1997) ‘integrated value 
theory’. The theory concerns the functional and instrumental relationships between 
three classes of end valuable entity, namely, human beings, non-self-aware biological 
organisms, and inorganic components of ecosystems. These entities and their functional 
relationships give meaning to the various modes of value expression and provide a basis 
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for ‘moral considerability’. Non-economic values ascribed to natural areas are then 
justified theoretically in functional terms. Lockwood (1997) believes that value 
assessment can be advanced by an explicit recognition of such functional realities and 
interdependencies.  
This approach constitutes a weak form of pluralist theory that defines the range of 
values primarily in terms of the object of valuation. It concerns value multiplicity, a 
concept that emphasizes the multi-faceted contributions of the valued items. The 
primary problem of economic valuation is deemed to be that some critical qualities of 
ecological goods or services are unvalued and missing from the conventional treatment. 
The objective of functional diversification is to ensure a dimensionally more 
comprehensive assessment, by introducing such unvalued or missing components and 
encompassing a wider range of functional attributes or good-constituting properties of 
the valued items, including the less visible ones such as an ecosystem’s resilient 
capacity and the ecological role of a species along food chains. Acts of valuing are 
understood as an accounting exercise about some objective realities - ‘valuing the 
characteristics of a system’ (Barbier et al., 1994, p. 119). This account generally accords 
with Anderson’s (1993) secondary conception of value plurality, discussed in Section 
1.2. 
Functional diversification accentuates the importance of informing the valuing 
agents of the right aspects of the items to be assessed. A common methodological 
recommendation is improve the ways in which information about the impacts of the 
environmental change at issue is communicated, and its quality. Turner et al. (2010, p. 
79) attempt to ‘identify a place for monetary valuation within the pluralistic approach’. 
The challenges to economic valuation identified concern the underestimated properties 
of biophysical structure and processes, including spatial explicitness, nonlinearities in 
benefits, and threshold effects, etc. One of the suggestions for recognizing value 
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plurality involves a ‘scoping exercise’, which employs ‘spatially explicit models of any 
given ecosystem service’ (p. 81) and may benefit from the use of GIS (geographical 
information system) which is regarded as ‘a valuable tool in valuation’ (p. 91). The 
general remedial strategy proposed, called ‘sequential decision support system’ (p. 83), 
has no explicit social or moral components, but an emphasis on improvement in 
knowledge and understanding of the ecosystem complexity and interrelationships. 
Deliberative methods also have been employed to address the issue of limited 
knowledge or information, as later discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
2.4.2 Positional modification 
The methodological focus of positional modification is the individual. It seeks to 
include the right people or to enlighten the right perspectives from which the ecological 
goods or services are evaluated. The standard economic approach is deemed to be 
flawed because of its unrealistic assumptions about the motivation and competence of 
the valuing agents, i.e. being rational utilitarians. The constituency adopted by this 
approach is morally improper and/or cognitively incapable of performing the required 
evaluation. Two groups of advocates can be identified according to the relative 
importance given to these two elements.  
To those authors who stress the lack of evaluative capacity, the failures of the 
stated preference approaches rest more on the valuing agents than the economists who 
employ the techniques. Gregory (2000) is convinced that unaided individuals perform 
poorly in articulating their values. The operational objective of his ‘value integration 
survey’ is to activate the consumer mode of thinking for an environmental valuation 
task. Consumer sovereignty is reflected in the survey instructions which encouraged the 
participants to consider a car purchase decision as an analogy (Gregory, 2000, p. 160). 
Lienhoop and MacMillan (2007, p. 213-214) term their approach a ‘Market Stall’ 
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approach, which is grounded on the belief that ‘The interaction with other people 
presents an environment that seems to better meet the needs of consumers’. A more 
radical treatment involves replacing lay people for experts. Mann (2004), for example, 
advances a technique called the ‘Expert Valuation Method’ (EVM) as an alternative to 
CVM. In EVM, the right people are defined not as consumers, but a group of scientists 
or local experts who have ‘considerable practical experience’ and are thus more 
competent to understand and assess the scientific implications concerning the ecological 
goods or services under valuation. These attempts seek to specify and reinforce a 
subjective scope or frame of reference for the evaluation required. 
 To others, the failures have more to do with economists. They are more 
concerned about ethics and question the conventional economic approach for unduly 
assuming that individuals are necessarily utility-maximizing. Acts of valuing are 
envisaged as social acts with social meanings (O'Neill and Spash, 2000). The variations 
in public attitudes give rise to value plurality. This account resembles Anderson’s (1993) 
primary conception of value plurality. Positional modification of this type aims for a 
qualitative conversion of evaluative attitude to the right one. Alternative ways of value 
expression are introduced by activating or inhibiting certain personal or group 
characteristics or attitudes. In practice, this is achieved by experimentally controlling or 
selecting subjects of inquiry, or valuing agents, in a way that can adequately reflect the 
communal nature of the environment. To address the non-exclusivity of the use of 
environmental resources, the modification typically involves a shift in evaluative 
standpoint from private to public interest, and individual to social rationality. It is 
practised as a demarcation strategy to cope with the value incommensurability problem. 
‘By ensuring all respondents adopted the same point of view (as citizens rather than 
consumers)’, Martínez-Espiñeira (2006, p. 194) believes, the problem of ‘aggregating 
apples and oranges’ - an analogy of the incommensurability problem - could be avoided. 
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The intrinsic nature and irreducibility of the value of natural wealth have contributed to 
a sceptical view that the economic realm and the utilitarian conception of value are 
irrelevant to the social modes of environmental valuation (Douai, 2009). Like the other 
group, these authors specify a subjective scope on behalf of the valuing agents, yet 
towards a different end. 
These critics of economic orthodoxy tend to advocate an impartial stance. Brown 
(1984, p. 237) argues that: ‘The appropriateness of an assigned value for use in a 
resource allocation decision depends on the degree to which its use in the decision 
enhances the resource owner’s welfare.’ The value should be determined in a context 
where the welfare of those who actually own the valued resource, or are entitled to its 
benefits, is recognized. This suggests that relevance or legitimacy depends on who are 
valuing, or for whom it is subject to valuation. Brown (1984, p. 245) urges for 
extending Rawls’s (1971) ideal of ‘veil of ignorance’, which could be realized by 
inhibiting private interests, to all public resource decisions including environmental 
valuation.  
Drawing on Rawls’s theory of justice, Costanza (2000) champions the notion of 
‘fairness-based values’, which can be elicited by individuals thinking as a member of 
the community, rather than as individuals. Brown et al. (1995, p. 258-259) expect each 
deliberating individual ‘to act as society’s representative’, and recommend that those 
individuals who have ‘compelling personal interest’ should be excluded from the 
deliberation. This is echoed by Sagoff (1998, p. 221) who is of the opinion that the 
individuals ‘might be asked to deliberate not so much about the welfare effect of an 
environmental policy on them individually’ but for society as a whole. The citizen frame 
has been experimentally tested by Martínez-Espiñeira (2006) and Mill et al. (2007), 
whose subjects were asked to state a WTP on behalf of the society. The whole point is to 
change the position from which they evaluate the environmental change in question. 
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Functional diversification and positional modification deal with the object and 
subject of evaluation respectively and are complementary to each other. Combined 
approaches sometimes come with a reconfiguration of the structure of value-articulating 
framework dealing with the issue of evaluative framework. 
 
2.4.3 Structural reconstruction 
Structural reconstruction involves a fundamental change in the micro-political structure 
of the institutions where values are articulated. Advocates emphasize the failure of the 
standard economic approach to allow effective reflection upon various values. Particular 
restrictions on the norms and terms on which people interact with the environment have 
reached the point where their creativity and critical competence are compromised. 
Structural reconstruction seeks to emancipate the micro-political sphere that influences 
value formation and expression. Individuals participating in a valuation process are 
enabled to deliberate on and pursue their own forms of valuing. The key is to place the 
actual valuation processes, as well as the theoretical activities of the researcher, in a 
non-coercive, interactive and egalitarian dialogue where alternative ethical standards 
and assessment criteria are not actively excluded. Rather than specifying a value 
category to pursue, such pluralistic theories ‘do not attempt to enforce a universal 
vocabulary upon the discourse of environmental value’ (Norton and Noonan, 2007, p. 
66). 
This approach explicitly acknowledges the notion of ‘value of diversity’ 
(O'Connor, 2000). Acts of valuing are construed as not only an expression of attitude, 
but an outcome of a critical encounter with competing perspectives or criteria, leading 
to a value judgement. A key assumption is that public value is formed within processes 
of social interactions and does not exist prior to these interactions (Pritchard et al., 
2000). The prospect for preference transformation is enhanced, but it is sought not from 
27 
 
external ideals. Structural reconstruction is reconstructive in the sense that it concerns 
the various competences of individuals and norms of interactions, and the categories of 
opinions and expressions are assumed to be contingent upon the operant dispositions of 
the subjects rather than being specified by the researcher (Dryzek and Berejikian, 1993). 
The appropriateness of an assigned value depends on the extent to which the processes 
of assembling and articulating preferences are procedurally fair and capable of 
supporting individuals ‘in expressing their values in ways they find to be sound’ (Spash 
and Vatn, 2006, p. 387), based on their own language and criteria of assessment. The 
definition of value and terms of articulation both remain reasonably open. No 
assumption is made as to what kind of values would be found prior to the inquiry 
(Norton and Noonan, 2007). The search for public value embraces the deontological 
ethic but does not attempt to marginalize utilitarian calculations (Martinez-Alier et al., 
1998; Spash, 2007).  
There is a more critical stance toward preoccupations held by the researcher. An 
example is ‘discourse-based valuation’, which is proposed as an application of the 
concept of discursive ethics to ecosystems valuation (O'Hara, 1996, 2001). Discursive 
ethics concerns authentic communication among individuals and presupposes no norms 
other than practical reason and seeks ethical quality from mutual recognition and 
acceptance (Dryzek, 1990). The concept entails not only a reconstruction of the 
dispersed ‘lifeworld’, but also a deconstruction of established hierarchies. Conventional 
scientific rationality has contributed to coercive professionalism and hegemony with 
obstinate barriers to change. The ability of humankind to deal with ecological 
uncertainties and their social implications requires a decent degree of reflexive potential. 
Discourse-based valuation seeks to minimize institutional rigidity that could 
compromise the openness of ecosystems valuation, by demanding a democratization of 
the conventional technocratic, exclusive valuation methodology. The frame of reference 
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for such a value theory is sought from within the discourse rather than being imposed 
from an external source. The role of the value researcher is restricted. A monetary 
valuation approach based on such perspectives would involve an inquiry of meaning 
and a search for mutual agreement on economic contributions at a societal or individual 
level. It is further elaborated in Chapter 5.  
An example of structural resconstruction which has gained more widespread 
application, includes a subclass of multi-criteria evaluation (Munda, 1995; 
Martinez-Alier et al., 1998) and its deliberative extensions (Söderbaum, 2000; Proctor 
and Drechsler, 2006; Stirling, 2006). It is regarded as a democratic institution not only 
because of the participatory opportunities provided, but also the explicit juxtaposition of 
conflicting assessment criteria on equal footing with systematical evaluation. There is 
no requirement for a cardinal measurement, which reduces all value dimensions 
concerning ecological goods or services into one and raises issues of compromising 
irreducible values. Multi-criteria evaluation captures the notion of ‘weak comparability’ 
of values and allows transparent and equitable treatment of diverging interests and 
validity claims. (Munda, 1995; Martinez-Alier et al., 1998). People’s dealings with 
nature are changed under this approach, as the various value dimensions are no longer 
deemed as commensurate and assessed against a set of universal standards. In theory, 
therefore, the two distinctive bases of value introduced earlier, i.e. utilitarian and 
deontological, could coexist and be taken into account without priority implicitly 
assigned. Nonetheless, the merits of multi-criteria evaluation are limited to the extent to 
which scientific rationality is given excessive emphasis. Martinez-Alier et al. (1998) 
have pointed out that some multi-criteria evaluation approaches have failed to meet the 
pluralist requirements. Examples are discussed at length in Chapter 4. 
 
2.4.4 Summary and comparison 
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Key features of the three approaches are summarized in Table 2.1. For functional 
diversification, the entity of main focus is the object of valuation, or substance. This 
includes ecological elements or processes whose multiple roles are interrelated and 
complex, and undervalued due to lack of understanding. Other and more 
good-constituting properties then need to be introduced to the valuing agents. Positional 
modification focuses on constituency, involving individuals and their perspectives. The 
intent is to improve their ability to handle complex information, and/or isolate certain 
moral dispositions. Specifying and generalizing a subjective scope of evaluation is 
deemed necessary to deliver a transformative experience. Structural reconstruction may 
subsume the above two approaches, but it necessarily rests on an institution whose 
significance increases with the degree of value diversity and presumptions as to the 
status of various values are minimized. It thus dispenses with a built-in normative 
hierarchy and allows for varying possibilities for theorization. While structural 
reconstruction leaves open value definition, functional diversification and positional 
modification operate under a given definition of value. 
 Functional diversification runs in line with an information-deficit model of 
learning. It seeks to improve the information support provided to the valuing agents and 
ensure an objective and comprehensive understanding of the items under valuation. 
Under positional modification, value-articulating institutions are defined in terms of a 
desired path of reasoning to which the valuing agents would be bounded. Appropriate 
perspectives are defined, quarantined and then facilitated experimentally to ensure that 
the otherwise unaccounted concerns and aspects of the items under valuation receive 
due consideration. Structural reconstruction is reflexive and allows the guiding theories 
of valuation to evolve, depending upon the critical interactions between various 
normative positions, including the researcher’s own preferences. A basic step is to 
juxtapose conflicting values or criteria and encourage comparison and re-evaluation in 
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moral as well as epistemic terms leading to value reconstruction. 
Although most authors tend to recognize the intellectual merits of functional 
diversification and positional modification, I consider structural reconstruction as a 
necessary condition for value pluralism. Arguments are presented in the next section. 
 
Table 2.1 Key conceptual elements of the three pluralistic valuation approaches 
 Functional 
Diversification 
Positional 
Modification 
Structural 
Reconstruction 
Ontology Substance (object of 
valuation) 
Constituency 
(subject of valuation) 
Institution 
(evaluative 
framework) 
Justification Complexity of object Complexity of object 
/ value incommensu 
-rability 
Value of diversity / 
value incommensu- 
rability 
Site of variation Good-constituting 
properties 
Subjective scope of 
valuation 
Theory of value and 
valuation 
Definition of value 
category 
Given Given Open 
Required 
institutional capacity 
Informative potential Transformative 
potential 
Reflexive potential 
Learning model  Information deficit Focused reasoning 
and enlightenment 
Critical interaction 
(extending to 
researcher) 
Practical strategy Supply information 
of better quality 
Activate appropriate 
perspective 
Juxtapose conflicting 
values or criteria  
Expected outcome Multi-dimensional 
understanding 
Designated 
transformation of 
value 
Reconstruction of 
value 
 
2.5 INCOMPATIBILITIES WITH VALUE PLURALISM 
All valuation methodologies are value-laden (O’Hara, 1996; Tacconi, 1998; Söderbaum, 
2000). An important question is to what extent this compromises the capacity for 
capturing plural values. Problems arise when the merits of institutions for articulating 
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these values are conditioned upon some degree of value convergence. The strategies of 
functional diversification and positional modification either remain indifferent to, or 
seek to inhibit, actual value conflicts, and operate within a given institution predisposed 
to a particular moral tradition. Critical examination of preference and value might be 
prematurely closed. 
 
2.5.1 Conflict avoidance 
Public value is derived from collective life. Its social qualities emanate from the 
interactive process of communication, encounters of persons, confrontation of interests, 
ideas and experiences, reciprocal learning, and all these occur under the influence of 
social norms, rules and institutional constraints (O’Connor, 2000). Value statements are 
conferred meanings based on people’s appreciation of the good as well as dissatisfaction 
with the bad. Their encounters with, and responses to, their alternatives and normative 
constraints, shaped by personal circumstances, contribute to discourse within which 
people make sense of the world by virtue of every other subjective position existing in 
the collective sphere. Formation of public value is thus a conflict-ridden process. If 
public value is understood as an intended action, it is a kind of inter-action between the 
homogeneous views within a discourse and the heterogeneous others outside. Public 
goods are commonly owned and shared among society’s members, such that any single 
action directed at them is just one integral part of a collective whole. The interactive 
dynamic glues and gives meaning to the whole, so that mere aggregation of individual 
values, or actions, is not congruent to their mutually reinforcing integration. Just as 
social action is always a response to another action or inaction, public value is the 
coexistence of particulars functioning coherently with and dependently on their 
alternatives or rivals. In other words, ‘an environmental value requires its antithesis for 
definition’ (Tuan, 1974, p. 102).  
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A defensible approach to the valuation of public goods requires a social context 
(O’Connor, 2000; O’Hara, 1996, 2001; Spash and Vatn, 2006). It should be designed as 
an evaluation activity that allows an encounter between diverse perspectives. Functional 
diversification seeks to advance the science of evaluation by promoting individual 
rationalization supported by comprehensive information, rather than social construction 
through exposing differences. For instance, de Groot et al. (2002) ascribe environmental 
value only to various ecosystem contributions. Their framework is silent on the 
mediating role of social norms operating at the interpersonal level. A valuation exercise 
accordingly designed does not depend on the level of actual social learning and the 
extent to which the valuing agents are socially informed. Similarly, positional 
modification does not require an authentic social setting for preference construction, 
although it recognizes the role of social construction and social norms. Sagoff (1988, 
1998) seeks to isolate citizens values from the consumer ones. The homogenous group 
of valuing agents created would be freed from the reality of value disagreement that 
characterizes plural societies. Preferences are transformed under a controlled social 
setting where an alternative discourse is inhibited. It involves merely a social 
construction of a singular value.  
Both functional diversification and positional modification do not engage the 
valuing agents with diverse relationships and competing viewpoints. The individuals 
would not be required to explain their exercising a particular set of value judgements or 
assessment criteria to others to whom the evaluation results apply. That is, they are 
under no obligation to offer justification for the personal decision concerning common 
goods that would lead to shared consequences. This is likely to impede the development 
of mutual respect and recognition which is pivotal to the coexistence of different values 
in plural societies.  
Structural reconstruction includes interactive elements. Good social relations 
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could bridge diverse values and interests in a harmonious state. Such bridging value is 
as significant as the functional value emanating from good-constituting properties and 
personal held value, for its coordinating role in the cultivation of value towards public 
goods which are broadly understood as a dynamic construct. It is qualified as a 
legitimate contributing factor of valuation.  
Besides, individuals need a direct response from the natural world or its human 
representatives, at an equal communicative level, rather than within anthropocentric and 
self-selective institutions, such as markets, to which human impacts on it may not be 
comprehensible (Dryzek, 1995). However, nature cannot directly respond to human 
actions in socially meaningful ways. Human beings need to rely on the responses of 
‘social others’ to validate their actions on the environment. The most important aspect is 
neither the identity of the social others nor the perspectives they set forth, but rather the 
opportunities for mutual validation by those representing the other ‘worlds’. Using the 
human form of interaction may still be considered unfair to the non-human world 
unintelligible to it. Nonetheless, it is fairer than the non-interactive type because the 
opportunities for social validation allow contestation and rejection within an authentic 
interactive process rather than within one’s own mind, which is more likely to be 
constrained by individual circumstances. Norms of social interaction may also 
discourage expression of individual interests, but this would not severely threaten the 
promise of pluralism so long as the effect is not enforced by an external party in a 
coercive fashion. In this sense, the ‘publicness’ of environmental value is conferred not 
by its substance or constituency, but the democratic legitimacy of the value-articulating 
institution. 
 
2.5.2 Embedded judgements 
Value-articulating institutions play a normative role by predefining the relevance, 
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validity or legitimacy of values. This may constitute the biggest impediment to the 
entreprise of pluralism to the extent that these embedded judgements are 
self-reinforcing. Functional diversification and positional modification either seek 
changes within existing value-articulating institution or propose a new one geared to a 
favoured end. This is ambivalent, as the ways to address value pluralism are specified in 
accordance with a particular set of end values defined in terms independent of the 
dynamic of value formation. The success of these approaches depends on the extent in 
which the favoured moral end is advanced.  
This resembles a problem raised by Goodin (1992), who is convinced that the 
Green theories of value and agency are logically separate. The former are ecocentric 
whereas the latter operate, first and foremost, at the level of individual human agents. 
The viability of political agency causally depends on how much human interest is 
satisfied, but not the process-based Green values. Logically, as well as causally, 
individual human agency comes first (Goodin, 1992). Thus, any Green theory of values 
that regards the prevailing political agency as essentially unproblematical is indefensible 
(Dryzek, 2000). It is unproductive to internalize ecocentric perspectives and imperatives 
without adopting Green ideas about how to reform political structures and processes 
accordingly. 
Consider economic theories as a specific form of institution and hence a theory of 
political agency. The approach of functional diversification is indifferent to the kind of 
institution through which green values are enfranchised and relevant actions are 
determined. Only the source and content of the supplied information is diversified. 
Holding the value and agency separate favours the status quo, since existing human 
agency is protected and legitimized by vested interests. Thus, functional diversification 
works well with the conventional forms of valuation survey. Under de Groot et al.’s 
(2002) framework, for example, all types of values generated by the defined ecosystem 
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functions are said to be compatible with at least one standard economic technique. 
Similarly, Turner et al. (2010, p. 79) hold a preference for cost-benefit analysis ‘suitably 
adjusted for equity concerns’. The adopted value-articulating institutions remain 
inherently anthropocentric and the outcome bound to be an economic construct, 
regardless of the perceived functional diversity. Redefining values only implies or 
concedes that the established institutions are either environmentally benign or 
unproblematic. Such an inquiry, albeit being open to multiple values, might end up with 
a monist treatment, as they would eventually be adapted to the economic standards. 
Consequently only isolated successes under green capitalism could be achieved. A value 
theory that is indifferent to institution runs a risk of being wrested to serve the 
preoccupations of the theorist. The approach of functional diversification alone is too 
passive to specify what is to be valued. 
Positional modification is confronted by the same problem, albeit to a lesser extent. 
Adopting an alternative evaluative attitude does not guarantee a pluralistic articulation. 
To activate a particular mode of evaluative attitude requires a controlled setting in 
favour of a particular constituency. The favoured evaluative attitude is most salient 
when its alternatives are deactivated. Success of positional modification thus depends 
on a polarization. Those institutions that foster a citizen mode of thinking are 
characterized by their inhabiting the consumer mode or a denial of its relevance. This 
provides an incentive to make monistic claims. Citizens-value theorists are tempted to 
launch an attack over the consumer theory in order to get established. The lower the 
diversity of values a theory embraces the stronger the case for its uniqueness and 
differentiation from its competitors. Being causally dependent upon a particular position 
being strengthened, such a theory would therefore benefit from adopting a narrower 
scope. Eventually it would become an anti-economic theory with limited pluralistic 
potential.  
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Moreover, positional modification relies on the researcher making a judgement 
about the relevance, validity or legitimacy of various value positions. The solution to 
the problem of ‘aggregating apples and oranges’ (incommensurability) is to make the 
choice on behalf of the valuing agents, e.g. all being asked to adopt a citizen mode. 
They are construed as merely a reacting agent and are not expected to contest the 
imposed frame, leaving little reflexive potential on the part of the researcher. Changing 
the subject’s ways of valuing according to the researcher’s preference is not a 
democratic evaluation practice defensible in terms of pluralism. The approach of 
positional modification alone is too active to pre-empt a subjective scope of evaluation. 
Structural reconstruction seeks to reformulate value theory as well as agency 
theory. Diversifying value inputs is not sufficient; the barrier ultimately comes from the 
researcher’s preconceptions. Egalitarian communication is practised at two levels, 
namely, valuing agents and value theorists. The theoretical foundations on which a 
value-articulating institution is built must be pluralistic and the processes through which 
it is constructed privilege no substantive qualities of values. ‘Categorically charged’ 
institutions are self-reinforcing: the more alternative value categories are inhibited, the 
more successful they are. Practically, it is impossible to include all types of values; a 
more fruitful way is to repudiate institutions that seek to actively exclude any. The 
structural approach captures plural values by deconstructing hierarchies of any kind. 
The above discussion suggests that mere recognition of value incommensurability 
does not constitute a sufficient condition for a pluralistic value theory. Technical 
incommensurability is recognized by functional diversification and, in some cases, 
positional modification, and moral incommensurability underpins the more socially 
oriented approach of positional modification. However, both of these approaches do not 
acknowledge the lack of conclusive value criteria. The institutions they seek are 
‘categorically charged’, implying a prior choice about value category, typically 
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involving citizen vs. consumer mode, and utilitarian vs. non-utilitarian ethic. Value 
plurality is acknowledged, but so is a value hierarchy. Strongly pluralistic intent thus 
becomes a barrier.  
A normative value theory committed to known moral ends is far from pluralistic. 
The importance of a pluralistic institution should be negatively related to the capability 
of determining the priority of one value category over its alternatives. Morally, as well 
as logically, a particular categorical preference cannot be a sustainable justification for 
the use of a pluralistic institution. The case for functional diversification and positional 
modification is grounded in such a commitment. Contra Douai (2009) claims that 
environmental values are, in no circumstances, of an economic nature I argue that no 
pluralistic value theory is justifiable on exclusively economic or anti-economic grounds. 
A fundamentally deliberative approach to environmental valuation is important because 
the researcher’s preoccupations are the real threat to the endeavour of value pluralism. It 
can play an emancipatory role exposing not just differences but preoccupations hidden 
from conventional techniques.  
 
2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Attempts to capture plural values are classified at three conceptual levels. The 
functional approach involves changes mainly in terms of the substance of valuation. The 
methodological focus is wider and appropriate functional considerations. Good 
techniques are those that recognize the multi-dimensional properties of nature and 
remedial policy options. Since this approach does not challenge the constituency and the 
normative structure of value-articulating institution, the status quo is likely to be put 
under protection. The positional approach entails changes mainly in terms of 
constituency and is sometimes used in conjunction with the functional approach. A 
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diversity of people’s perspectives, expertise or experiences is embraced within a 
particular scope of value specified by the analyst. The valuing individuals are 
encouraged or selected to speak for the same constituency. Both approaches rest on 
given value-articulating institutions with built-in judgements on the relevance, validity 
or legitimacy of particular value positions and dimensions. This creates a set of 
pre-emptive rules of inclusion or exclusion that do not allow individuals to embrace 
alternative criteria that go beyond the specified institutional boundaries. Any moral 
claim with which the theorist or analyst disagrees do not count.  
Under these approaches the case for pluralism is not defensible. Underlying the 
notion of value pluralism are the reality of value conflict and a lack of a conclusive 
meta-principle to determine the merits of normative requirements. Value-articulating 
institutions dedicated to outranking a particular substantive moral end, or closing 
another, are counteractive. What is required to change is the scope, attitude or mode of 
valuation on the part of the valuing individuals according to some specified criteria 
theoretically justified as appropriate. The favoured ethical imperatives are treated as a 
constant, whereas the preferences of individuals are variables. Some researchers remain 
confident in the existing economic institutions, whereas others adopt an alternative 
approach competing opposite to the conventional economic philosophy. Both propose 
new value theories as a means to a given moral end. Neither runs short of conclusive 
judgement on values.  
Establishing a pluralistic institution upon any one pole of a dichotomy is doomed 
to failure. The problem is that it would work better with monistic arguments in order to 
be established upon a differentiation from its alternatives. This happens to be the current 
approach by which value multiplicity is recognized and instituted, eventually placing a 
smaller bunch at an advantage. The sufficient condition for pluralism is, ultimately, not 
the ability to recognize multiplicity and difference, but the inability to make conclusive 
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choices among the differing many. The ability to outrank one category suffices the 
fundamental requirement of monistic institution, irrespective of how many categories, 
and how much distinction, are identified.  
A theoretically consistent theory of plural values affirms the need for providing 
opportunities where alternatives to an established position could make a compelling 
case. Hardly any pluralistic programme would be defensible if, theoretically, the 
established is not refutable and under no circumstances do its alternatives stand a 
chance of being accepted as a basis of action. Normative value theory at the third level 
seems more appealing. It requires a democratization of the ways in which values are 
assessed and theorized. The nature of stated money values is understood in terms of 
their providers who are empowered to speak for themselves, rather than in terms 
specified by the researcher. Of importance to this exploration is the involvement of 
authentic subjective value profiles to allow a contestation of various real discourses 
grappling with a public decision about the environment. A pluralistic approach to 
monetary valuation is, therefore, one where no design barrier to access is put on the 
affected or interested parties; where the articulating institution is structurally pluralistic, 
requiring that the theorist’s preoccupations based on some ideal subject be unfolded and 
granted no privilege, or at least, be made redeemable; and where the conferred meaning 
and category of the stated value are presumed to be contingent, to be sought from the 
language of the valuing individuals and not arbitrarily given by the theory. 
The DMV approach I am arguing for is mounted on the third level, although there 
are various alternatives located at the other two levels. The divergence ultimately stems 
from the two intellectual currents influencing the deliberative turn in environmental 
valuation. The first one, deliberative democracy theory, is discussed in the next chapter, 
followed by the second one in Chapter 4 
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PART II 
DELIBERATION IN THEORY 
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CHAPTER 3 
TWO INFLUENCING CURRENTS (I):  
THE IDEA OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Participatory opportunities can be enhanced by making deliberative elements of value 
assessment more explicit. The use of deliberative elements, however, may be merely 
mechanical, without taking thorough consideration of the philosophical substance 
underpinning the deliberative strand of democratic theory. Conflicts in normative 
requirements may arise as a result. The stated preference approaches bear resemblance 
to the liberal models of democracy characterized by preference aggregation. While, the 
emerging deliberative models of democracy rest on a different set of requirements, this 
does not insinuate that the two are opposites. As a corollary, it may be premature to 
deny DMV, or more generally deliberative economics, of any pertinence to its neoliberal 
sources. The theory of deliberative democracy has deeper paradigmatic implications 
than have been identified by DMV practitioners, as its relationship with the traditional 
economic ideals is not strictly dichotomous. This chapter prepares the terrain for the 
critical review in Chapter 5 which addresses the idea of DMV in the context of 
ecological economics.  
The next two sections provide a brief account of the historical development of the 
notion of deliberative democracy and its roles in contemporary society, respectively. It 
is followed by an exhaustive discussion on the principles and features of the theory of 
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deliberative democracy, and its significance to the project of DMV. Several forms of 
deliberative forums are then illustrated. 
 
3.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND ANTECEDENTS 
The emphasis of deliberation and the public use of reason can be traced back to the 
works of ancient Greek and classical theorists. Aristotle grounded practical reason in 
collective and construed rationality as a matter of collective interaction. Yet, the 
Aristotelian political virtue was aristocratic, limited to a small and homogeneous 
community. The aristocratic account remained robust in the elitist political discussion 
prevailing in eighteenth century in Europe. Nonetheless, some classical theorists at 
around the Enlightenment, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, saw the 
potential of political virtues based on a commonality of interests, values and convictions 
sought in citizens’ collective life. The communicative account of political life and the 
ideal of free use of public reason are considered to be definitive in the Enlightenment 
project. Conceptions of political legitimacy and the common good were set in the 
context of public interaction (Bohman and Rehg, 1997).  
John Stuart Mill advocated in nineteenth century the imperative of ‘government by 
discussion’. The notion is regarded as a source of deliberative democracy, but like 
Greek democracy is restricted to the better educated (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). 
Despite this citizen communication came to be decisively joined to democracy in the 
writings of some early twentieth-century theorists such as John Dewey, the deliberative 
conception of democracy was overwhelmed by the liberal theories until the late 1960s. 
Prospects for popular participation and citizens’ agreement on a universal common 
good were held in suspicion by the pessimistic realism about politics in the traditions of 
Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter. Political theorists and economists in the middle 
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twentieth century who recognized political elitism and competitive pluralism were 
generally suspicious of public deliberation. They reduced politics to a market theory and 
viewed democratic process as a power struggle between competing interests rather than 
a genuine search for the common good. In this opinion, citizens are politically 
uninformed and manipulable; they have diverse interests such that there is no such good 
acceptable to all. This view downplayed public deliberation and moral justification 
undertaken by citizens and their representatives (Bohman and Rehg, 1997; Elster, 1997; 
Thompson, 2008). Contemporary defenders of deliberation cast doubt on these 
economic conceptions and believe that democracy is to be found neither from an 
unmediated popular will nor the rent-seeking activities of stakeholders. 
The notion of deliberation was given a stronger public orientation in the late 
twentieth century, and the theory of deliberative democracy took definite shape since 
the 1980s. The notion of deliberation received a more thoroughly democratic foundation 
in the hands of Jürgen Habermas, whose deliberative politics is firmly grounded in the 
idea of popular sovereignty (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). Nonetheless the 
contemporary deliberative democrats hold into suspect the Rousseauian, communitarian 
variants of democracy (Bohman, 1996). Communitarians recognize the moral virtues of 
homogenous political community and espouse a version of public deliberation as a way 
to transform citizens’ individual interests towards a shared, general will of the larger 
community (this view is received by some ecological economists such as Pelletier (2010) 
who defines deliberative democracy in communitarian terms).   
A ‘deliberative turn’ in democratic theory began at around 1990 (Dryzek, 2000, 
p.1).The contemporary deliberative democrats (e.g. Bohman, 1996; Gutmann and 
Thompson, 1996; Dryzek, 1990, 2000) criticize the communitarian variants for the 
possibilities of giving rise to unreasonable oppression of diverse moral values by 
enforcing a general will which is not readily plausible in contemporary pluralist 
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societies. They emphasize the imperative of democratic justification and attempt to 
resolve the difficulties revolving around the conception of deliberative democracy by 
clarifying the conditions on which the epistemic as well as moral qualities of the public 
can be retained or cultivated. The proponents recommend open deliberation under a 
principled, substantive set of practice. The normative goal of this proposal is:  
to show that a theory of deliberative democracy can recognize pluralism and 
complexity and still defend the democratic ideals of the autonomy and 
sovereignty of citizens. (Bohman, 1996, p. 14) 
Democratic deliberation involves more than exposing policymaking to public scrutiny 
and discussion; it involves a discourse-based communicative process mediated through 
public reasoning.  
The rise of deliberative democracy owes to the key social changes in our age. The 
next section explains its importance and advantages over its liberal counterparts in 
coping with the contemporary challenges. 
 
3.3 ROLES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 
The idea of deliberative democracy emerged against a background of risk society (Beck, 
1992) compounded by increasingly intractable conflicts between cultural and moral 
beliefs. It has been manifested as a response to the limitations of aggregative democracy, 
which involves aggregation of the preference of individual voters. The liberal models of 
democracy prevailing today emphasize satisfaction of citizens’ preferences seen as 
given and unquestionable. Preference aggregation through voting is given a central role. 
Being insensitive to reasons and extreme scientific uncertainties, this approach is poorly 
placed in resolving complex environmental problems and deep moral conflicts. 
Preference politics and economics are built upon the assumption that the 
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individual has complete knowledge about her own preference. Known social 
preferences allow decision makers to exercise instrumental rationality – the capacity to 
devise, select, and effect good means to clarified ends (Dryzek, 1987a, b). Instrumental 
rationalists believe that complex ecological problems are decomposable into smaller 
pieces and resolvable by further advancing technologies. When ecological uncertainties 
are considerable, however, their ability to cope with contingencies and model 
preferences is overwhelmed. Effective means refining strategies can only work with 
well-bounded ends and demand adequate knowledge about these ends. Instrumental 
rationality fails insofar as the latter are not forthcoming. Larger ecosystems respond to 
human industrial activities and intervention in various unpredictable ways, which 
remain highly uncertain despite scientific advance. Conservation strategies designated 
to present ends may turn out to be non-adaptive or even maladaptive to the 
unforeseeable and unintended secondary and tertiary chain effects (Dryzek 1987a, b; 
Beck, 1992). Ecological surprises and the changing social realities pose limits to 
instrumental manipulation as it is invariably constrained by present state of knowledge 
and assumptions.  
Pluralistic societies are characterized by the existence of diverging and irreducible 
values. Fundamental value disagreements involve incompatible principles and cannot be 
readily overcome (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004). Conventionally, aggregative 
institutions like voting are used to settle such conflict, often unsatisfactorily, by 
reducing moral choices to a preference calculus. Choice is justified by the mere fact of 
having a preference, and collective well-being is envisaged as the sum of the free 
choices of individuals. There is, however, little hope for resolving public good problems 
that involve diverse interests. Aggregative institutions give priority to the needs of the 
greatest number at the expense of minority, partial concerns, regardless of their 
reasonableness and mutual acceptability. Representation of repressed or emerging 
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groups may come without real influence.  The increasing plurality of the contemporary 
society casts doubt on the conventional wisdom. 
Deliberative democracy offers two sets of organizing principles as a response. Any 
rationality for effective dealing with extreme complexities must be open to modification 
and supplement, and not be deterministic and ideologically constraining. Deliberative 
democracy approximates ‘holistic experimentation’ which entails continual exploratory 
trial and testing of to our imperfect knowledge about the world (Dryzek, 1987b, p. 206). 
It operates as an ongoing process of holistically coordinating various elements and 
interactions associated with complex problems, rather than decomposing complex 
problems into subsets to be dealt with uncoordinated individual measures in a piecemeal 
fashion. The hope is that deliberative policy designs could develop the adaptive capacity 
of the society to respond to contingencies and changing realities.  
 
3.4 PRINCIPLES AND FEATURES 
3.4.1 Theoretical foundations 
The theory of deliberative democracy is rooted in two conceptions of political ideals, 
namely, communicative rationality and public reasoning. Collectively binding decisions 
can be considered democratically legitimate to the extent in which the decisions survive 
the requirements of communicative rationality (Habermas, 1984; Dryzek, 1990). 
Communicative rationality stipulates a set of criteria oriented toward the linguistically 
constituted intersubjective understanding coordinated through discussion among 
members of the community (Habermas, 1984). An action is communicatively rational to 
the extent that it is characterized by the reflective and intersubjective understanding of 
the deliberating individuals on values, beliefs and preferences. Communicative 
rationality departs from instrumental rationality by contributing to the collective 
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generation of judgments on normative principles rather than merely selection of means 
to ends (Dryzek, 1990). The interaction that promotes normative judgment and 
reflection should be one of between subjects rather than between subject and object; so, 
it must be a social process. In addition, this interaction should be free from deception, 
strategic behaviours and domination through exercise of power (Dryzek, 1990).  
Another conceptual root is the political ideal of ‘public reason’ (Rawls, 1993, 
1997b, a). In this case, deliberation should promote the principle that ‘outcomes are 
democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned 
agreement among equals’ (Cohen, 1989, p.22). Since the notion has received varying 
levels of support from deliberative democrats and is central to my critiques of the DMV 
literature, it is exhaustively discussed in the next section.  
 
3.4.2 Reason-giving and reciprocity 
From its inception, reason-giving has been the first and foremost requirement of the 
deliberative conception of democracy (Cohen, 1989; Dryzek, 1990; Bohman, 1996; 
Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 1996; Rawls, 1997a; Bohman, 1998; Dryzek, 
2000; Thompson, 2008). Substantive qualities of a decision are sought in the 
reasonableness of citizens’ validity claims rather than the intensity of their preference. 
As Cohen (1989, p. 24) put it,  
the mere fact of having a preference, conviction, or ideal does not by itself 
provide a reason in support of a proposal. While I may take my preferences as a 
sufficient reason for advancing a proposal, deliberation under conditions of 
pluralism requires that I find reasons that make the proposal acceptable to others 
who cannot be expected to regard my preferences as sufficient reasons for 
agreeing. 
Collectively binding laws and policies are justified by the adequacy of reasons that their 
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proponents give to other citizens. Mutual justification among equal and free citizens is 
thus the essence of deliberative democracy. 
Public deliberation is no longer loosely defined and receives a different role that is 
not merely supplementary to voting. Cohen (1997) speaks of ‘public reasoning’ in 
favour of ‘public discussion’, putting the former as the centre of political justification. 
He contends that any view of democracy will take public discussion as important to 
pool information against a background of asymmetries in its distribution. But 
deliberative democracy requires that citizens be prepared to be moved by reasons that 
may come at odds with their own preferences and interests. This may require they either 
to change them, or to defend their own in good faith. To this end, democracy is realized 
not by aggregation of preference, but their justification and transformation (Aldred, 
2002; O'Neill, 2007).  
The transformation should be mediated through the virtue of reciprocity on the 
part of the citizens. The idea of reciprocity is articulated by John Rawls as ‘public 
reason’ that every citizen is expected to recognize prior to entering into the deliberative 
forum. A reason is public to the extent that it could be reasonably accepted by all other 
citizens: 
A citizen engages in public reason, then, when he or she deliberates within a 
framework of what he or she sincerely regards as the most reasonable political 
conception of justice, a conception that expresses political values that others, as 
free and equal citizens might also reasonably be expected reasonably to accept. 
(Rawls, 1997b, p. 773) 
The content of public reason is given by a family of conceptions of justice and not 
bound by a single one. The forms of permissible public reason are always several along 
with the variations in social realities from time to time. It is the criterion of reciprocity 
that limits the forms of public reason.   
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Rawls (1993, 1997b) claims that there is no definitive shape to the reasonable 
conception of justice. Public conception of the common good is formed by citizens’ 
exercising arguments that are attuned to a set of political values. He defines political 
values as a) the values of political justice, including the values of basic rights, liberties 
and opportunities; and b) the values of public reason, including the guidelines for public 
inquiry and political reasonableness (Rawls, 1993). To Rawls, a reasonable politics is 
one of ‘orderly contest’ among citizens within a constitutional context. The use of 
public reason is reserved to constitutional affairs and basic justice issues and restricted 
to formal political institutions, such as supreme courts.  
The issue is that only one type of reason could survive these formal political 
institutions. Different reasons proposed by citizens are expected to converge to one: 
there are many non-public reasons and but one public reason. Among the 
non-public reasons are those of associations of all kinds: churches and 
universities, scientific societies and professional groups……This way of 
reasoning is public with respect to their members, but non-public with respect to 
political and to citizens generally (Rawls, 1993, p. 220).  
Rawls’s conception of reason has a conformity intent; it permits only those terms of 
cooperation acceptable to all ‘citizens generally’. Those that appeal to the well-beings 
of members of such public organizations, or ‘non-public’ in his own terms, rather than 
the society as a whole, do not count (Rawls, 1993, 1997a, b).  There is little room for 
reasons in favour of what he called ‘background culture’ which is not of the larger 
society’s interest. The Rawlsian public reason is thus singular, or plural only in a narrow 
sense.  
This liberal constitutionalist conception poses non-negligible limitations on 
informal forms of value expressions and the diversity of moral arguments admissible to 
the debate. Such a deliberative democracy is likely to exclude those on the margins of 
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society who do not, or refuse to, fit the liberal paradigm of personhood or liberal 
assumptions about publicly reasonable communication (Dryzek, 2000). The scope of 
social cooperation is severely impoverished when deep conflict persists (Bohman, 1996). 
There are multiple public standpoints whose reasonableness is independent of 
constitutional essentials. Under the singular conception, however, citizens are expected 
to come to agreement for the same set of publicly accessible reasons. Accordingly, 
publicly reasoned decision is construed as a consensual choice based on convergence of 
values. This may undermine the capacity of respecting plural values when the 
‘non-public’ and ‘public’ reasons come into deep conflict. Bohman (1996, p. 84) thus 
proposes that public reason should be conceptualized not as a constraint to deny or 
avoid moral conflict, but as a basis of cooperation. 
Gutmann and Thompson (1996) substantiate this notion of reciprocal cooperation 
by taking reciprocity as a civic virtue and a moral basis for action under disagreement. 
They emphasize a sense of mutuality that citizens should bring forth and develop during 
the course of deliberation. Reciprocity calls on citizens to continue to seek fair terms of 
cooperation, even in the face of disagreement on moral values. It requires deliberating 
individuals to affirm the moral status of their own political positions and acknowledge 
those they oppose (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996). The practical aim is to minimize the 
range of their disagreement through a creative search for common grounds on which 
different conceptions of justice or values become mutually recognizable. Mutual respect 
rather than conformity is encouraged. The civil demeanour of ‘agreeing to disagree’ is 
recognized. 
While Rawls employs public reason as a political rule to preclude the entry of 
‘non-public’ reasons, Gutmann and Thompson’s (1996, 2004) approach to reciprocity is 
compatible with continuing moral disagreement among reasonable non-public claims. 
Their approach seeks agreement on how to deliberate publicly when citizens 
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fundamentally and reasonably disagree, rather than on how to purge disagreement. 
‘Deliberation cannot make incompatible values compatible’ (Gutmann and Thompson, 
2004, p. 11). The whole point is, therefore, how to live with irreconcilable disagreement. 
The basis of action agreement is built upon respecting reasonable differences amongst 
many. Irreducible conflict is recognized to a greater extent than the Rawlsian purely 
political approach. 
This tradition of deliberative democracy recognizes both reasonable agreement 
and disagreement (Bohman, 1996; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Dryzek, 2000). 
Public deliberation may then be considered a plausible way to resolve conflict in 
morally and culturally diverse communities. Wider public inclusion then makes sense. 
 
3.4.3 Representation 
In a deliberative democracy, all those actors actually or potentially affected by the 
decision, or their representatives, should have the opportunity and ability to participate 
in the deliberation. There should be no barrier of access to those affected if the decisions 
are to be imposed on them. This principle is not only a standard of justification, but also 
provides those affected with reason and motivation to comply with the decision made 
(Cohen, 1989; Bohman, 1996). Deliberation succeeds to the extent that the deliberating 
individuals develop a sense of commitment and have influence on the outcome. 
Political equality and autonomy should be granted to the deliberating citizens. 
They should be set free to deliberate in a non-coercive fashion and are given the same 
civil rights, freedom of speech and equal voice in the process of deliberation. They 
should be empowered and authorized to speak with reasons about the decision without 
being constrained by the authority of prior norms or third parties (e.g. state agencies).  
This idealized picture, however, may be discouraged by the reality of human 
interaction. To deliberate meaningfully, individuals must possess a certain level of the 
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communicative competence, i.e. the ability to use language to communicate with others. 
Habermas’s (1984) communicative action is linguistically constituted. A 
communicatively rational deliberation depends on the citizens’ ability to master four 
competencies: cognitive competence to employ logic, linguistic competence to form 
sentences, pragmatic competence to make validity claims, and interactive competence to 
engage in discussion (Webler, 1995). They have to be able to reflect on and articulate 
their values, preferences and experiences, be open to alternative definitions of reality, 
and listen to others’ arguments. The fact that not all normal citizens are 
communicatively competent suggests that inherent barriers to participation exist. Those 
individuals who are less able to systematically and logically organize their verbal 
expressions, such as the least educated, may be put at a disadvantage.  
Representation is another issue of concern. Should a deliberative forum be 
organized in ways that maximize statistical or political representativeness? Crosby 
(1995) is convinced that it should consist of a group of randomly selected people to 
represent a ‘microcosm’ of the population. Group composition should give a simulation 
of what the population would decide if every member of the community were allowed 
to participate. Behind each deliberating individual is a larger group with similar 
interests which is characteristic of them. Renn et al. (1995) suggest, cautiously though, 
that random selection would ideally assure all values and preferences of those affected 
to be given an equal opportunity of being heard.  
In theory, people who are not selected should be satisfied that their interests will 
be protected because there essentially is a guarantee that another person with 
similar interests will be selected. (Renn et al., 1995, p. 353)  
Reasons for statistical representation have been questioned on both validity and 
normative grounds. Firstly, the small group size (normally 10-20) can hardly be 
demographically representative whatever selection method is employed. As Renn et al 
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(1995) acknowledged, it is technically impossible to mirror all the socioeconomic 
characteristics of a community. Those present may also fail to cover all the perspectives 
they are expected to speak for, due to the diversity of views within the demographic 
groups they stand for (Smith and Wales, 2000). The real benefits of statistically based 
methods are then limited (Aldred and Jacobs, 2000; Jorgensen, 2009).  
Secondly, the key entities that populate the political world are discourses, not 
persons. Socioeconomic simulation does not guarantee that deliberation will capture the 
differentiated character of interaction that characterizes the political world of a given 
social issue (Dryzek, 2001). It is the interaction between competing conceptions of the 
good that shapes politics. The solid form of these conceptions is termed as ‘discourse’, 
which can be thought of as a shared means of making sense of the world (Dryzek, 2000). 
According to Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008, p. 481): 
A discourse can be understood as a set of categories and concepts embodying 
specific assumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions and capabilities. It 
enables the mind to process sensory inputs into coherent accounts, which can 
then be shared in intersubjectively meaningful fashion.  
Examples include sustainable development and market liberalism. Discursive 
representation has been proposed by some deliberative democrats as an alternative 
where representation by persons falls short of political realities (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 
2008).  
Contemporary social conflicts are characterized by collision of discourses. Many 
environmental NGOs have made real impacts on policymaking but do not have an 
identifiable constituency; they do not represent individuals, but a coherent set of beliefs, 
or discourses (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). Nonhuman species and future people are 
inherently absent from deliberation and none of us is any one of them. Renn et al.’s 
(1995) justification for random selection loses force because no such ‘another person 
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with similar interests’ exists. Environmentalists are not entitled to such ‘similar 
interests’; they nonetheless subscribe to and act on the discourses concerning interests. 
A discourse may have no constituency but must have reasons acceptable to its 
subscribers. 
The notion that discourses provide frames for speaking renders problematic the 
logic of socioeconomic representation. Discourse is composed of discursive selves, not 
individuals. A given social conflict can be conceptualized as a political world consisting 
of an array of different discourses. Any particular discourse may have no resonance to 
the whole of any individual. An individual may subscribe to more than one discourse 
and are divided in multiple political worlds. The different discourses an individual 
subscribes to may not be reducible to a single entity; some ‘secondary’ discourses may 
get diluted if discourse is not the basis of selection. The entirety of individuals is 
adequately represented only when the discursive self1 gets its full shape (Dryzek and 
Niemeyer, 2008). Individuals enter into a political world in the form of their discursive 
selves and it is these discursive selves that actually shape this political world. 
Socioeconomic representation, however, erroneously treats the entirety of political 
world as embedded in a demographically representative group of individuals. There is 
no guarantee that the entirety of discourses is represented. The fact that individuals have 
‘fluid positionings instead of fixed roles’ (Harré and Gillett, 1994, p. 36) makes 
representation by persons unduly restrictive and takes the deliberation far from the 
essence of the conflict. Composition of deliberating group ought to capture the ‘divided 
selves’ to the entirety assembled as discourses which can fully capture the picture. In 
this light, Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008) suggest that participants of formal group 
                                                 
1
 According to Harré and Gillett (1994, p. 25), cited in Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008), the discursive mind 
is multifaceted as the individual inhabits ‘many different discourses each of which has its own cluster of 
significations’ and ‘most of us will fashion a complex subjectivity from participation in many different 
discourses’. The mind itself is situated at the intersection of such discourses constituted by languages, 
which in turn also shape the mind. 
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deliberations should be selected systematically to map the constellation of discourses 
relevant to the issue of concern based on their representativeness in terms of agreement 
with these discourses, using techniques such as Q methodology (to be introduced in 
Chapter 8).  
This logic of representation pulls the debate down to a normative line beyond the 
‘who’ question. It suggests that the aim of public deliberation and deliberative 
democracy in general is not to extrapolate or construct a general group view, but to 
enable a critical encounter between various discourses. Contestation is therefore a key 
feature.  
 
3.4.4 Contestation 
Constructive contestation of values and knowledge should be promoted in a deliberative 
democracy. This crucially affects the ways in which deliberative forums are structured 
and deliberative outcomes are interpreted. Liberal democracy presumes existence of 
self-contained and self-verifiable choices, and so does not see reflection upon 
preference as necessary. People have, for example, the rights to vote for any candidate 
in an election without providing any substantive justification. Preference is therefore 
justified for its own sake. Contestation is considered unnecessary or even 
counterproductive.  
The theory of deliberative democracy rejects such a conception of politics. It 
focuses on the systems where citizens disagreeing with each other interact, more than 
their isolated inputs to the existing systems. A politics of the environment then sees 
creation of non-anthropocentric institutions as more important than institutionalization 
of non-anthropocentric values. Ecological communication, proposed by Dryzek, (1995, 
p. 18), involves ‘egalitarian interchange at the human/natural boundary’, focusing on 
‘human dealings with the natural world’ – neither within the natural nor human world. 
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The key to this mode of democracy is ‘to downplay ‘centrism’ of any kind’ (Dryzek, 
1995, p. 18). An ecologically benign democracy goes with citizens testing their 
proposals about the use of natural resources to the acceptance of other citizens holding 
fundamentally different dispositions and preferences. Mere existence of values, 
convictions and preferences does not mean acceptance. 
Critical engagement by deliberating individuals is implied by the virtue of 
reciprocity. Accepting the principles of reciprocal reason precludes treating discursive 
communication as mere inclusion of discourses. Advocates recognize the advantage of 
including alternative values, but many, particularly economists and decision scientists, 
do not take the notion of contestation seriously. Their account falls short of the 
epistemic dimension of deliberative democracy that hinges on the ability to sort good 
arguments from bad, not just to bring all reasons into play (Dryzek, 2000). The 
inclusion principle is a condition for discursive contestation in the search for reciprocal 
understanding. Only when values, convictions and preferences are confronted is 
reciprocity required. Giving reasons is important in circumstances where other 
individuals may disagree. Including an individual who has no potential rival would add 
little to a discursive deliberation. 
Deliberative democracy confers a new political import to ‘public opinion’ (Dryzek, 
2000). Traditionally it is defined by liberal democrats simply as citizens’ choices. In a 
deliberative democracy it is understood as an outcome of contestation of discourses. 
The basis of the public will is established on the intersubjective communication across 
discourses, in favour of internal communication within one’s constituent discourses. 
Public opinion, therefore, exists in the discursive interaction among people, not within 
any one of them. Democratic institutions no longer serve the function of transmitting 
public opinion to the state only, but also construction of it.  
There are practical concerns that public deliberation may become excessively 
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competitive and adversarial; mutual respect may then hardly be established among 
citizens leading to stalemate and poorly informed decisions (Burgess et al., 2007; 
Thompson, 2008). Antagonistic voices could be precluded by the selection of 
deliberative venue. Deliberative democrats have different views on this issue. 
 
3.4.5 Deliberative venue  
On a liberal constitutionalist conception, the ideal venue for deliberative democracy is a 
formal institution associated with government, such as a supreme court. As the leading 
figure in this camp, Rawls (1997b, p. 771-2) declares that his idea of ‘well ordered 
constitutional democracy’ should be ‘understood also as a deliberative democracy’. The 
right procedure is that the exercise of public reason be restricted to constitutional affairs 
and matters of basic justice and deliberation be undertaken in constitutional framework 
and formal political arenas (Rawls, 1993, 1997b). The defining deliberative activity is 
personal reflection in light of a family of values of basic justice and ‘guidelines for 
public inquiry’ including reciprocal reasoning (Rawls, 1993). Solitary thinking by legal 
elites suffices.  
Socialization is given more weight by Gutmann and Thompson (1996) and Dryzek 
(2000). Solitary thinking on justice is invariably bound to one’s own rationality and 
knowledge. There is no exchange of arguments; actual acceptance or rejection of 
arguments is thus not forthcoming. Whether the conclusions could withstand actual 
public criticisms is questionable. Instead, deliberation has to ‘create a situation of social 
interaction where people talk and listen to each other, enabling each person to recognize 
their interrelation with a social group’ (Dryzek and List, 2003, p. 9). The advantage over 
hypothetical agreement is that:  
it encourages citizens to face up to their actual problems by listening to one 
another’s moral claims rather than concluding (on the basis of only a thought 
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experiment) that their fellow citizens would agree with them on all matters of 
justice if they were all living in an ideal society (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 
p. 16) 
Perspectives are further divided on the role of the civil society. Gutmann and 
Thompson (2004) make a modest claim that deliberative principles should be reserved 
to governmental institutions with civil society providing a ‘rehearsal space’ for political 
deliberation. Following the liberal principles, they are wary of extending deliberative 
mandate to civil society partly because it could ‘threaten the freedom of citizens and the 
associations they choose to form’ (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, p. 33). They agree 
that deliberation is desirable in civil society, but hold that ‘truly voluntary associations’ 
like churches and colleges should be less subject to its demand. Since these associations 
are less public and their effects are less far-reaching holding less power over people, 
compliance with publicly defensible standards is a less important issue. Deliberation 
should remain an educational function to equip citizens to deliberate in politics.  
Preference about deliberative venue has influence on the forms of arguments 
permitted. Formal political institutions tend to discourage emotional and radical 
responses. The liberal constitutionalist account favours rational considerations and 
ordered expressions. Rhetoric may end up with emotional manipulation and 
exaggeration, but some deliberative democrats are sympathetic to the use of rhetoric 
(Dryzek, 2000; O'Neill, 2007; Dryzek, 2010). ‘Rhetoric facilitates the making and 
hearing of representation claims spanning subjects and audiences divided in their 
commitments and dispositions’ (Dryzek, 2010, p. 319). O’Neill (2007) believes that 
rhetoric and emotional appeals are not deaf to reason and may be constituted by rational 
judgments and beliefs that warrant a place in the debate. These should therefore not be 
banned provided that they do not serve strategic action and are amenable to rational 
justification (Dryzek, 2000).   
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3.4.6 Consensual outcome 
Consensus has been widely recognized as an ideal outcome of public deliberation. 
Nevertheless, deliberative democrats are divided on the basis by which action 
agreement is reached, producing two schools of thought, i.e. consensus and pluralist 
democrats (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). Consensus democrats are wary of the value 
plurality in contemporary societies precluding the formation of collectively binding 
decisions and tend to prize consensus reached through realizing a comprehensive 
common good. They recognize that a comprehensive common good is not readily 
attainable given the reality of irreducible conflicts, but regard the failure to achieve it as 
a sign of defects to be remedied. These include those who ‘identify with the republican 
tradition or with communitarianism in political theory’ (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, 
p. 26), such as Pelletier (2010).  
Pluralists, on the other hand, believe that erasure of political disagreement built 
upon conditions of collective life may be undesirable and seek consensual basis of fair 
terms of cooperation in the face of persistent moral pluralism. There is much variation 
within this tradition.. For instance, Rawls’s (1993) ‘overlapping consensus’ requires that 
consensual decisions be supported by moral reasons that respect the liberal ideals of 
justice. Some democrats, such as Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008), are unconvinced, 
because this idea demands prior agreement on the priority of some set of substantive 
values, such as liberalism, which may not always be available. Habermas’s (1996) 
‘rational consensus’ promises norms of communicative action to be impartially 
grounded. He believes that rational discussion is likely to produce public unanimous 
agreement. Rational consensus requires each participant’s rationally motivated 
conviction which makes their uncoerced, autonomous ‘yes’ indispensable (Rehg, 1994). 
Habermas ties his discourse ethics to a principle of universalization, according to which 
a norm is valid only if: 
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All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests 
(and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative 
possibilities). (Habermas, 1990, p. 65, emphasis original) 
This principle specifies a rule for an impartial testing of norms for their moral 
worthiness and is highly demanding. There is much confidence in the capacity of the 
argumentative rationalization in realizing truly consensual agreement.  
Consensus idealized as agreement both on action and reason, or unanimous 
agreement, has been noted to be hardly achievable in practice. Cohen (1989, p. 23) 
states that:  
ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus……Even 
under ideal conditions there is no promise that consensual reasons will be 
forthcoming. If they are not, then deliberation concludes with voting, subject to 
some form of majority rule. 
Criticisms anticipated, Cohen (1989) stresses that this notion is different from arbitrarily 
aggregating preferences because citizens who vote have been committed to finding 
reasons that are persuasive to all. Political legitimacy defined as such is sought in the 
procedures of the prior deliberative activities rather than voting itself (Dryzek and 
Niemeyer, 2006).  
To the pluralists, plurality is a reality to be respectfully accommodated and 
supported by the virtues of civility. They believe in a thin conception of the common 
good that it is not always desirable and feasible to seek a comprehensive common good 
because moral disagreements may be inherent in human life. Moral disagreements 
cannot be overcome without some forms of compromise (Gutmann and Thompson, 
1996; Young, 2000). Instead, the deliberative project should aim at finding good ways 
of living with them. Rather than promoting cooperation under value convergence, 
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pluralist democrats seek cooperation under differences that cannot be reasonably 
rejected (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004).  
The pluralist account grounds agreement on fair terms of cooperation on respect 
for reasonable differences cultivated in unconstrained dialogue by citizens who hold 
multiple values encountering each other’s viewpoints. Gutmann and Thompson (1996) 
land a different basis of consensus: 
Even with regard to political decisions with which they disagree, citizens are 
likely to take a different attitude toward those that are adopted after careful 
consideration of the relevant conflicting moral claims and those that are adopted 
only after calculation of the relative strength of the competing political 
interests……Deliberative democracy seeks not consensus for its own sake but 
rather a morally justified consensus. Citizens strive for a consensus that 
represents a genuinely moral perspective, one they can accept on reciprocal 
terms. They usually continue to disagree, often intensely, on many political 
relevant matters. (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 41-42) 
This kind of idealized consensus is ‘morally justified’, rather than ‘rationally motivated’. 
It is one that a sympathetic individual might approve for compelling reasons offered in a 
reciprocal manner, but might reject for violating personal preference. Political 
legitimacy is conferred by the substance of the kinds of claims that warrant mutual 
respect and recognition.  
While Cohen (1989) and Habermas (1996) endorse consensual agreement for ideal 
procedures, Gutmann and Thompson speak of consensus in terms of its moral content 
and define its virtues in terms of reasonable disagreement. To the former, reasonable 
pluralism should end in reasonable consensus, whereas to the latter it could be 
reasonable ‘dissensus’. Social cooperation under dissensus may indicate achievement of 
a ‘workable agreement’, which seeks agreement on a course of action yet for different 
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reasons (Eriksen, 1994; Dryzek, 2000). The idea of workable agreement has been linked 
to the concept of ‘meta-consensus’ by Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006). It will be used to 
assess the case study and explained in Chapter 6. 
  
3.4.7 Second-Order Theory 
Opportunities for deliberation have been recognized as the defining feature of the theory 
of deliberative democracy. Another key feature, which links up the conceptual elements 
discussed above and which I emphasize throughout this thesis, is its nature as a 
second-order theory. According to Gutmann and Thompson (2004), first-order theories 
seek to resolve moral conflicts by rejecting alternative theories and principles. Examples 
include utilitarianism and libertarianism. Each theory claims to be the single theory 
capable of resolving conflicts, but does so in ways that deny or exclude its rivals from 
consideration. They succeed to the extent to which they resolve conflict consistently on 
their own terms. For these theories, therefore, moral integration is a singular conception. 
Taken together, however, they are more likely to intensify the problem of value conflict 
than get it resolved.  
In contrast, deliberative democracy, as a second-order theory, is non-exclusive and 
accommodative. Second-order theories are about other theories as they provide ways of 
dealing with the claims of conflicting first-order theories and do not affirm or deny their 
validity (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). They make room for moral conflict to be 
resolved by some predetermined standards but do not reject in a priori moral principles 
expressed by first-order theories. They succeed to the extent to which they can justify 
their proposed resolutions and the moral disagreement that remain to all who will live 
with them. Another example is known as aggregative conceptions of democracy. 
The core principles of first-order theories are justified on a single conception of 
justice. They assume that citizens subscribe to a particular end or require them to 
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change their moral beliefs accordingly. Second-order theories, on the other hand, govern 
their interaction by providing a set of standards and rules of conflict resolution. Citizens 
are required only to follow these standards and rules, and there is no prescription on 
which moral end to go, as these theories do not presuppose a particular conception of 
justice. Thus democratic deliberation does not necessarily aim to induce citizens to 
change their first-order values; it is rather to encourage the different values to live with 
each other even if they are mutually incompatible (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996).  
Critics might, however, question the practical relevance of these idealized facets 
of deliberation. The variety of actual deliberative initiatives is an indication of variation 
from the ideals. This variation, as I will argue, reflects a dilemma confronting ecological 
economists engaging in the deliberative turn. I reserve this argument to the following 
chapters, and here I move from ideals to practice to provide some background to my 
observations presented later. 
 
3.5 FORMS OF DELIBERATION 
Attempts to resolve social conflict through deliberation can be characterized at two 
levels. One appears in the civil society and is formed largely by spontaneous order 
stimulated by current social controversies. New social movements, for example, are a 
real-world approximation of democratic deliberation (Dryzek, 1990). The second one is 
formed by design for policy advisory or research purposes. It is professionally 
constructed and oriented to a particular social issue. Only the second type of 
deliberation is relevant to the present study. Four of them are introduced below, namely, 
consensus conferences, deliberative polls, deliberative multi-criteria analysis, and 
citizens’ juries. 
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3.5.1  Consensus conferences 
Originally developed in Denmark, consensus conferences are a specific model of direct 
public participation used primarily to assess controversial technological issues (Joss and 
Durant, 1995; Einsiedel et al., 2001). The objective is to provide a platform for the 
general public, experts and politicians to formally communicate to examine the social 
impacts of technological developments, which they rarely have an opportunity to 
discuss together (Grundahl, 1995). A consensus conference typically consists of a group 
of 12-15 lay citizens designated to identify key issue areas, cross-examine experts, and 
then arrive at a consensus position to be presented to policymakers and the rest of the 
general public (Einsiedel et al., 2001). It is usually conducted over two to three 
preparatory weekends and a conference session. Throughout the last decade, there have 
been various attempts in different countries, such as Canada and Australia, on topics 
like food biotechnology. 
The dialogue between lay citizen panel and experts is a key feature of consensus 
conferences. Technological advances involve great complexities and uncertainties about 
the consequences. Experts and policymakers want to seek citizens’ advice on the public 
adaptability to introduction of new technologies. Confronted with a technically complex 
issue, the public, on the other hand, need expert explanation at an understandable level. 
This technique functions as a series of cross-sectoral seminars promoting exchange of 
information, learning and interrogation to assure informed decisions by each party (e.g. 
experts, government officials, and the public). It aims for an integration of scientific 
information and various social values leading to a consensual recommendation 
(Einsiedel et al., 2001). Despite including moral issues, consensus conferences do not 
act primarily as a moral debate which focuses more on mutual recognition than 
consensus. Every effort is made to attain the greatest consensus and minority opinions 
are allowed only when the differences of opinion are very wide (Grundahl, 1995). As a 
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result, consensus conferences appear poorly placed to deal with deep conflict. 
 
3.5.2  Deliberative polls 
Deliberative polls survey several hundreds of citizens who are given an opportunity to 
listen to and question experts or politicians, and discuss and think through a policy issue. 
It is essentially a post-deliberation opinion poll to record individual views of citizens 
after (and before as well) they are exposed to various political viewpoints. The strongest 
advocate of this technique, James Fishkin (1991, 1995), describes deliberative polls as 
having ‘prescriptive force because they are the voice of the people under special 
conditions where the people have had a chance to think about the issues and hence 
should have a voice worth listening to’ (Fishkin, 1991, p. 4). A group of randomly 
selected citizens (e.g. 500) gather to hear political leaders debating a current policy 
issue and question them. Repeated opinion polls are conducted to investigate the 
changes in the citizens’ views. Deliberative polls are applied more commonly to 
political issues than those of science and technology. 
Deliberative polls provide a snapshot of public opinion with an emphasis of the 
citizens’ transformative experience. Political equality is a key concern. Deliberative 
polls attempt to simulate what the larger public would think by including a sizable, 
demographically representative group of citizens. Exposed to different political 
perspectives, the individuals are expected to become civically informed and have their 
preferences changed beyond self-interest. The primary purpose is to capture a 
transformed public view rather than to reach an informed consensus between groups. It 
is like a mass lecture with voting. 
The claim that deliberative polls can avoid the difficulty of handling conflict is 
dubious. The technique suffers the same problems as aggregative democracy because of 
the procedure of preference aggregation. Public view is defined by majority rule, based 
66 
 
on intensity of preference and not reason. This is likely to suppress reasonable minority 
voices. In addition, it is a third party (analysts or sponsors) that balances competing 
opinions and values, and formulates policy recommendation as a result. Citizens remain 
passive in the argumentation process and are not given the opportunity to exercise the 
type of political judgement required of deliberative democracy (Smith, 2003). 
 
3.5.3  Deliberative multi-criteria analysis 
Deliberative multi-criteria analysis (DMCA) is a family of policy appraisal techniques 
combining psychological decision-aid and deliberative components. Attempts have been 
made with nuanced variations in design and in names, such as deliberative multi-criteria 
evaluation (Procter and Drechsler, 2006), deliberative mapping (Burgess et al., 2007), 
and deliberative ordinal multi-criteria approach (Zendehdel et al., 2008). DMCA makes 
use of a structured evaluation design that breaks down the cognitively exhaustive task of 
risk assessment into smaller parts and presents the decision problem in a 
multidimensional fashion. Major steps include problem framing, option identification, 
criteria elicitation, and option evaluation. The primary goal is to ease the difficult tasks 
through a particular decision pathway.  
About a dozen citizens (or stakeholders or specialists) form a group to discuss the 
issue with expert inputs and relevant information provided by the project team. The 
deliberative component has group members sharing their knowledge and values raising 
the prospect for public reasoning. The decision-aiding component, on the other hand, 
tends to be scientific and expert-driven, and is supported by quantitative, 
computer-aided real-time analysis of group inputs about criteria weighting and option 
performance. DMCA thus requires the group members not only to talk and share, but 
also to rank-order and/or assign importance ratings to different options. It is well-suited 
for public assessment of technological risks and has been applied to controversial 
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medical issues such as organ transplantation. 
DMCA is rooted in behavioural decision research. It acknowledges and makes 
explicit reference to the logical thought process that individuals enter when coming to a 
decision (Proctor and Drechsler, 2006; Zendehdel et al., 2008). Some of the applications, 
such as Gregory et al. (1993), generally follow the multiattribute utility theory (MAUT) 
to clarify values and preferences by simplifying the assessment tasks such that the 
individuals, under guidance, can make sense of their true preference level for each 
criterion. The role of public participation is to make sure that the policy appraisal is 
supported by comprehensive, multi-faceted considerations.  
DMCA is claimed to be more democratic for its deliberative component (Procter 
and Drechsler, 2006; Stirling, 2006; Burgess et al., 2007; Stagl, 2007). Yet it is open to 
manipulation when the evaluative activities and procedures are entirely determined 
purposively by the sponsor or project team based on a set of behavioural assumptions, 
or worse, vested interests. The citizens are expected to follow every step required by a 
scientifically rational decision framework and then respond by stating their choices 
within a specified range of measurement. Citizens’ influence is limited to preference 
expression. A structured DMCA design risks limiting individuals to a particular decision 
route, leaving limited room for alternative ways of reasoning.  
 
3.5.4  Citizens’ juries 
Citizens’ juries (CJ) were developed by Ned Crosby in the U.S.in the 1970s. The 
technique is generally similar to the form of legal juries, requiring a small group of 
citizens (10-15) to meet for several days to discuss a public issue. The jurors are given a 
specific ‘charge’, typically involving selection of a policy arrangement from a range of 
options provided. They are provided relevant information in printed form and, like 
hearings, listen to expert witnesses from different stakeholder groups, including industry 
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and NGOs. In addition, a variety of activities are provided to the jurors, such as lectures, 
panel discussions, watching videotape and field tours. They scrutinize the information, 
cross-examine the witnesses and discuss the issue in group under neutral facilitation. 
The findings and recommendations of the CJ group are publicized and submitted to the 
commissioning authority. Compared with other deliberative techniques, CJ offers a 
more balanced combination of information, scrutiny, deliberation and independence 
(Coote and Lenaghan, 1997). CJ is flexible in design and has been applied in a variety 
of public policy issues. It is particularly suitable for environmental planning which often 
involves a variety of moral and technical dimensions (Smith, 2003).  
Unlike deliberative polls, the jurors of a CJ are empowered to review and approve 
the report of recommendations. This ‘citizen report’ is considered as an official 
document submitted to the commissioning authority, which is normally required to 
respond on any follow-up. The citizens play a more active role in the formulation of the 
specific policy issues. CJ is more than a communication platform for different parties 
and, in some cases, has real influence on policymaking. Another key feature is that CJ 
works better on value questions than technical issues (Crosby, 1995). It can be operated 
as a value debate among the jurors to discuss their competing values and preferences 
relevant to the issue. So the jurors are expected to judge, not just express or clarify 
values. CJ process should be made autonomous and free from coercion. The outcome is 
presumed to be both informed and just.  
CJ is nonetheless a demanding task for lay citizens as they are expected to 
participate in a variety of activities, make value judgments on controversial issues and 
provide formal policy recommendations. They are given a relatively high degree of 
autonomy in this process which means that professional guidance is minimized. 
Compared with DMCA, the less structured design of CJ suggests that its success relies 
much on the skills of the facilitator and the competence of the jurors.  
69 
 
3.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Under the theory of deliberative democracy, public values articulated in a citizen 
deliberation can be re-conceptualized in several ways. First, it is expressed in terms of 
reason and judgment embedded in language, not preference revealed by choice. Also, it 
captures the subjective landscape of a political world rather than the demographic one. 
Third, it is formed in the context of interaction of discourses, not solitary thinking of 
individuals. Lastly, it could produce an outcome of ‘dissensus’, and not necessarily of 
consensus. 
The idea that deliberative democracy is a second-order theory has particularly 
important implications to the project of DMV, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
Briefly, a deliberative monetary value might not be perceived as trading off values 
where economic preoccupations are not enforced and the conception of value is left 
open-ended. This conceptualization is important to rescue DMV from the hands of 
critics who cast doubt on the oppressive task of reducing plural values to single 
monetary figures. The nature of environmental value elicited from DMV, expressed in 
monetary terms or not, should then be assumed to be indeterminate prior to deliberation 
and provisional thereafter. As a second-order theory, DMV is not predisposed to a moral 
domain for its outcomes. This brings forth a tough question: whether DMV could be 
considered an economic technique anymore, or, more generally, whether deliberative 
economics as a political-economic hybrid has any bearing on ‘economics’. I will re-visit 
this issue in the Chapter 10. 
Now I turn to the other current that has given impetus to the hybrid. The different 
forms of deliberation covered in the last section have crucial distinctions in normative 
terms. In particular, the pursuit of analytical robustness characterizing DMCA appears 
to threaten the promise of democratic emancipation underlying the enterprise of CJ. The 
democratic turn in environmental valuation research has an analytic counterpart.  
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CHAPTER 4 
TWO INFLUENCING CURRENTS (II):  
THE SCIENCE OF ANALYTIC DELIBERATION 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Apart from the political theorists and heterodox economists, critics of the neoclassical 
approach of environmental valuation include decision scientists and behavioural 
psychologists (Peterson et al., 1988; Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992). A few of them, 
such as Daniel Kahneman, are influential in the environmental and ecological 
economics communities by establishing alternative models of economic behaviour. 
Some are involved in developing deliberative methods for valuation amenable to human 
psychology, in contrast to democratic imperatives. Environmental economists 
influenced by these two intellectual traditions have to different extents, articulated 
different DMV strategies. The variation raises a fundamental question that lies at the 
heart of the CVM / DMV debate: are the problems with the stated preference 
approaches a technical or moral issue?  
Those decision scientists and psychologists who tend to explain the problems in 
technical terms see preference engineering as a key component of the remedies needed. 
More cognitive aids are deemed to be necessary and the utilitarian ethics underpinning 
the economic tradition is reinforced rather than questioned. Further participant 
empowerment is suspected in favour of tighter experimental controls. These 
requirements stand at variation with the democratic principles discussed in Chapter 3, 
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suggesting a tension within the field of DMV research which is extended from both. To 
establish a comparative basis for the DMV review presented in the next chapter, this 
chapter offers an elaboration of the normative elements and assumptions underpinning 
what I refer to as the analytic strand of thought on DMV. Discrepancies are from its 
democratic counterpart is highlighted. 
 
4.2 PRINCIPLES AND FEATURES 
This section reviews the key elements of the analytic approach to public deliberation. 
Researchers designated as taking the analytic approach can be found from diverse 
backgrounds. The most prominent from the monetary valuation field are Robin Gregory, 
a decision scientist, and his associates2 , who are critical of the CVM and have 
contributed to the DMV literature. Their monetary valuation studies are clearly 
descended from their group-based non-monetary environmental assessments. Their 
work also shows a sharp contrast with the democratic approach to deliberation. It is 
therefore taken as the main focus of this chapter. 
   
4.2.1 Assumption 
Decision scientists believe that the cognitive ability of individuals in making complex 
decisions is fairly limited. For example, McDaniels et al. (1999, p. 498) state: 
‘individuals (either lay or expert) will often not make informed, thoughtful choices 
about complex issues involving uncertainties and value tradeoffs’. People are regarded 
as performing poorly in handling unfamiliar choices and technical information, which 
may create a high level of stress blocking rational decision-making routes (Arvai et al., 
2001). Expression of values is described as being often based on only a subset of 
                                                 
2
 Their works include, but not limited to, McDaniels et al. (1999), Arvai et al. (2001), Gregory et al. 
(2001), Gregory (2002), Gregory and Failing (2002), Gregory et al. (2005) and Failing et al. (2007). 
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available information (Gregory et al., 1993). For example, ‘some persons might select a 
single, most-important dimension and rank the alternatives on this one measure alone, 
and others might try to think about previous decision situations that were similar and 
remember what they did in those more-or-less analogous cases’ (Gregory et al., 1997, p. 
241). Cognitive barriers are used to explain failures in clarifying multiple and 
conflicting values.  
At the core is a belief that good choice-making necessarily depends on a good 
thinking process. Thus Gregory (2002) suggests that participatory initiatives fail simply 
because participating individuals refuse to recognize the complexity of the value 
dimensions and are not equipped to address the necessary trade-offs. For example he 
states: 
most risk management public-involvement initiatives provide insufficient help to 
participants in thinking through their own values, evaluating the quality of 
impacts information, or assessing the trade-offs that characterise alternatives. In 
short, they fail to encourage the more deliberative, constructive type of 
decisionmaking response that is called for. (Gregory, 2002, p. 484) 
Researchers then describe bias as arising when individuals appeal to heuristic reasoning 
processes that are easily influenced by contextual or task-related factors (McDaniels et 
al., 1999). Irrational or inconsistent choices (e.g. protest bids) are then attributed to 
cognitive failures that prevent people from selecting options that would best serve their 
preference. 
A utilitarian conception of values is an integral part of this approach. The MAUT 
is applied, which assumes comparability and transitivity of preference relations, and 
allows complete substitution between subjective states. Unlike neoclassical economics, 
the analytic approach moves beyond choice and involves its fundamental structure and 
underlying motives. McDaniels et al. (1999), Arvai et al. (2001) and Gregory et al. 
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(2001) all make explicit reference to Keeney (1992)’s theory of ‘value-focused 
thinking’. This theory suggests that consideration of values precedes that of available 
alternatives when individuals make decisions. This construes value as a standard of 
hedonic satisfaction and ultimately aims to satisfy people’s wants in an instrumental 
manner: 
Value-focused thinking essentially consists of two activities: first deciding what 
you want and then figuring out how to get it……With value-focused thinking, 
you should end up much closer to getting all of what you want. (Keeney, 1992, p. 
4) 
In contrast to this approach, value could be construed as a ‘judgment’ rather than 
‘interest’ (Holland, 1997). Judgment concerns ‘what ought to be’ whereas interest ‘what 
we want’. An individual could make their judgment on something regardless of 
immediate interest, but would only want it if it is in their interest. Keeney (1992) seems 
to embrace ethics and the idea of ‘value judgments’, but the endorsement is largely 
limited to judgment on personal preferences, such as job choice (p. 4). Preferences do 
not conflict; only judgments do (Holland, 1997). If ‘what you want’ included subjective 
judgment over other people’s well-beings, it would be a question of ‘what ought to be’. 
‘Ought’ questions entail the virtue of justification to others, whereas ‘want’ questions do 
not. 
Gregory et al. (2001) and Failing et al. (2007) regard the conventional 
requirements of agreeing on values and seeking consensus as untenable, due to the 
irresolvable conflict between competing viewpoints. However, a pragmatic treatment is 
deemed to be necessary to identify an acceptable course of action. The suggestion is to 
construct a common hierarchy where incommensurate values become indirectly 
comparable (Gregory et al., 1993; Gregory, 2000). Social cooperation is then meant to 
be built upon the assumption that there is a state of affairs that all people would accept 
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as universal. Deliberation then involves seeking agreement on truths. Thus Failing et al. 
(2007, p. 49) state: 
From the perspective of deliberative processes, we argue that it is at least in 
practice if not in theory, futile to assume the existence of universally “right” 
values. On the other hand, it is productive to assume that a true state of nature 
exists, and that reasonable people could reach agreement on a hypothesis or a set 
of hypotheses that have the greatest probability of accurately representing that 
state.  
Value disagreement is considered as a matter of perception rather than principle. It 
is attributed to the different ways in which individuals interpret information, rather than 
‘differences in underlying values’ (Gregory, 2000, p. 157). Value integration then 
becomes possible by making different dimensions ‘transparent’ and leading individuals 
to the ‘commonality of their beliefs’ (Gregory, 2000, p. 157). The means to achieve this 
is simplification. A common language of values is employed to lessen individuals’ 
cognitive burdens by reducing the dimensionality of values to a comprehensible 
summary. As Gregory (2002, p. 478) explains: 
a decision is simplified because one dimension of value (now the same for the 
two choices) can be ignored as it no longer helps to distinguish between the 
options.  
Examples include ‘the number of air miles you would give up to get a $100 cost saving 
on your next ticket, or the number of vacation days you would relinquish to receive a 
higher salary at work’ (Gregory, 2002, p. 478), both involving a personal consumption 
choice. 
Deliberation is given a supplementary role. Communication is circumscribed by 
and serves science: ‘[to] fill the important missing links in individuals’ fragmentary 
scientific understanding’ (Gregory et al., 2005, p. 9). Democratic imperatives give way 
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to decision-scientific standards. As McDaniels et al. (1999, p. 509) state: 
In our view, risk management decision processes can be made more 
“democratic,” as the title of this piece [Democratizing Risk Management] 
suggests, but only with a clear structure and a decision framework focusing on 
values, meaningful technical information, tradeoffs, and insight.  
The strong scepticism to unaided deliberation contributes to this view. The idea of 
redeeming popular participation by employing group deliberation is ridiculed. Gregory 
et al. (2001, p. 418) put it this way:  
there appears to be a naive assumption that a simple cure for the shortcomings of 
unaided individual decisionmaking processes is to work with people as a group, 
thereby ensuring that a wiser choice emerges from the group discussions…A 
rich body of psychological literature supports the contrary hypothesis, that group 
participation often encourages people to conform, even if the influence of others 
leads to erroneous choices…These findings give little confidence that either 
self-designed or semi-structured consensus decision processes are likely to 
develop responsive approaches to clarifying objectives as a means to creating 
well-informed policy choices. (Gregory et al., 2001, p. 418) 
The argument is that unaided collective thinking cannot help counter individuals’ 
cognition problems, because it is vulnerable to the tendencies to establish entrenched 
positions and to adopt common perspectives leading to ignorance of contrary 
information (McDaniels et al., 1999). Self-designed, autonomous deliberation by lay 
people about environmental risk is described as ‘a recipe for disaster’ (ibid, p. 500). 
There is little room in the analytic approach for an autonomous public to take issue with 
or modify the frame of analysis: ‘the scope of their role falls well short of a license to 
redesign the process’ (ibid, p. 500).  
Group participants are expected to play only a passive role, i.e. simply to report to 
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the elected or appointed decision-makers who are seeking advice from the process about 
what alternatives the various stakeholders can support. More generally, the objective of 
public involvement is stated as to provide insight to decision-makers, rather than to 
resolve a dispute. The decision analysts believe that ‘one should never allow public 
involvement processes to actually set policy. Presumably that role should be reserved 
for legitimate government agencies or elected representatives’ (McDaniels et al., 1999, 
p. 499). This clearly suggests a hierarchy in which the public or stakeholders are 
subordinate to the elites. 
 
4.2.2 Strategy 
Value-articulating institutions are constructed as a kind of ‘tutorial’ (Gregory et al., 
1993), where analysts ‘look for trouble’ such as ‘false fluency’, which refers to 
respondents claiming that they understand a problem better than is actually the case 
(Gregory et al., 2005, p.13). The process seeks to mirror the ways in which individuals 
‘naturally think’, which is assumed to be weighing-up benefits and costs systematically 
(Gregory, 2000, p.153). Expert instructions are provided to help participants go through 
a professionally designed learning scheme which imitates human’s natural cognitive 
process. The general strategy is to help participants break down their entangled value 
considerations into several dimensions. The starting point of assessment is their own 
held values and then to proceed through to weighing-up required costs and benefits, 
leading to a choice that best fits given objectives. Since this calculative process requires 
systematic thinking, while few individuals are natural systematic thinkers, the analysts 
believe that it must be led by decision experts.  
Under the analytic approach, deliberation is used to facilitate self-exploration. It 
aims to foster the weighing of benefits/costs and arguments in a mental dialogue. For 
example, in a study by Greogory the participants were asked individually about their 
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value dimensions with the reminder: ‘value dimensions are of different importance to 
different people. We want to know what is important to you’ (Gregory, 2000, p. 160, 
emphasis original). The decision steps of the ‘structured decision-making process’3 
outlined in Failing et al. (2007) can in principle be undertaken by solitary individuals. 
Communication as a group is not essential. 
It is suggested that preferences should be corrected. Analytic deliberation is meant 
to enable a constructive dialogue among participants, creating a ‘legitimate forum’ 
(Failing et al., 2007). The notion seems to be consistent with the idea of deliberative 
democracy. Yet, it requires that the individuals while making decision articulate clear 
distinctions between treatments of facts and values (Gregory et al., 2005). Failing et al. 
(2007) do not shrink from restricting their approach to fact-based dimensions. They 
claim that the aim is not to pit one validity claim against another, but ‘expose 
differences, and understand the contribution of each to a full understanding of the 
system under consideration’ (Failing et al., 2007, p. 55). This suggests that the main 
activity is demonstration, rather than contestation. Participants are free to use affective 
and emotional expressions (Gregory, 2002), but ‘competing hypotheses’ have to be 
justified on an ‘evidential basis’ (Failing et al., 2007). Priority is given to expert 
knowledge. Validity claims made by lay participants are compared with expert beliefs to 
reveal ‘the critical gaps in lay understanding, thereby disciplining claims about the 
adequacy of lay comprehension’ (Gregory et al., 2005, p. 9, emphasis added). Failing et 
al. (2007, p. 57) admit that the communications are constrained by demanding that the 
participants articulate their concerns in accordance with a structured decision scheme 
with clear references made to scientific data concerning probabilities and consequences.  
Analytic deliberation is oriented to practical tasks. Value disagreements are 
                                                 
3
 ‘the core elements of which include defining objectives and measures of performance, identifying and 
evaluating alternatives, and making choices based on a clear understanding of uncertainties and 
trade-offs’ (Failing et al., 2007, p. 51) 
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acknowledged, but fundamental value contest is deliberately avoided. In a report of a 
water use planning issue, Failing et al. (2007, p. 56) suggest that: 
On the values side, participants often enter a deliberative process highly 
polarized. Asking for value statements such as “what's more important, drinking 
water quality or ecological health?” or “how do you feel about toxic waste?” is 
unlikely to lead to anything but divisive positioning. A key role of knowledge in 
a decision-oriented process is to distinguish among the relative merits of 
proposed actions. Unless participants are focused on the practical task of 
deciding not just the positivist question of what is, but also the normative 
question of what to do about it, it is possible to spin endlessly in technical and 
philosophical debates that prove ultimately to be largely irrelevant for 
management.  
Analytic deliberation is devoted to clarification of facts and a search for practical 
solutions. ‘Normative’ questioning is understood in a pragmatic way, i.e. ‘what to do 
about it’. This offers an alternative interpretation of the earlier democratic pledge by the 
same group of researchers that local knowledge and cultural values have to be critically 
assessed. By critical, they actually mean objective scrutiny based on evidences and facts 
rather than moral merits. A good analytic deliberation is defined in terms for its capacity 
of deepening participants’ understandings. The focus is on ‘analysis’, suggesting an 
orientation to the technical and informational dimensions.  
 
4.2.3 Procedure and validation 
Analytic deliberation involves a schematized process of clarifying uninformed values 
which needs ‘technical guidance’ (Gregory, 2002, p. 476). All procedures are designed 
for making ‘unavoidable’ value tradeoffs. Gregory (2002) argues that making value 
tradeoffs is psychologically challenging due to the multiplicity of value dimensions, 
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uncertainty about consequences, and unfamiliarity about the evaluation context. Yet the 
tension can be eased, without transgressing the emotional or moral bounds of 
individuals, by addressing them head-on. Trade-offs are deemed as not inherently 
irresolvable, provided that they are adequately clarified and made explicit by following 
the value-focused model (Arvai et al., 2001).  
The optimism can be explained by the analysts’ understanding of values. First, 
value is understood in technical terms as an expression of wants, which can be 
expressed in various formats. Conflict is attributable to the use of incompatible formats, 
or unlike attributes. An example given by Gregory (2002, p. 486) is the choice between 
incremental levels of ‘more guns or more butter’, which is seen as a ‘confusing type of 
choice’. Alternative attributes should be adopted as the expression formats are 
considered independent of the real utility function. Thus natural and constructed metrics 
are suggested for easing trade-offs. Rights-based beliefs are understood as a result of 
exercising ‘simplistic decisions rules (e.g., any loss, however small, of a valued 
resource is prohibited)’ to ‘escape’ from hard trade-offs (Gregory et al., 2005, p.11). 
Such trade-offs can evoke affective responses when individuals adopt these rules, and 
may create confrontations between the individuals. Cognitive aids are used ‘to defuse 
such confrontations’ by ‘stabilizing’ emotions (ibid, p.11).  
Second, value belongs to the personal domain. Making informed value trade-offs 
are accordingly viewed as a solitary affair largely based on individual introspection. 
Gregory’s (2002, p. 467) solution, i.e. ‘addressing people’s concerns head-on’, deals 
with internal conflict within one’s own mind. Deliberating individuals are required to 
justify their trading-off morality or principles only before themselves. They succeed 
when they feel satisfied, regardless of whether or not the choice would be actually 
justifiable or acceptable to the affected others. These authors might defend analytic 
deliberation as having group discussion elements to make room for this. However, as 
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revealed throughout all their works, group discussion plays merely a supplementary role 
of facilitating information sharing and exposing differences. Mutual justification is not a 
necessary requirement to get a policy option passed, and utility points are assigned as an 
individual decision. The critical decision moment is to a large extent free from mutuality. 
The toughest issue is avoided, namely, addressing one’s choice in terms of the 
worldview of one’s rivals. 
In analytic deliberation, values are elicited using a disaggregation procedure. A 
complex issue is broken down into several dimensions each linked to an end objective, 
such as ecological health, which are then further reduced to a set of means objective, 
such as fish and wildlife conservation. By considering their more tangible constituents, 
the analytic approach aims to make the hard-to-define spiritual and cultural values 
recognizable and include them into evaluation. Then, participants may be asked to 
individually express their preferences by assigning ‘importance points’ to each 
performance measure. According to Gregory and Slovic (1997), this can make possible 
conversion of perceived importance of one dimension in terms of another one, and the 
use of such a natural or constructed metric as a neutral unit can avoid provocative forms 
of value expressions such as the monetary value. Participants are not directly asked to 
substitute their held values for something incompatible, but indirectly so. Failing et al. 
(2007, p. 57) believe that this treatment can avoid ‘the unnecessary controversy’ 
involved in trading-off protected values. Psychologically, expressing importance is less 
challenging than evaluating a loss. The analytic procedure seeks to make trade-offs 
more explicit by framing them in a different way.     
The overall importance for each option is calculated by aggregating the 
importance points assigned. The levels of aggregate preference for all the policy 
alternatives then become visible and comparable. The analytic approach facilitates 
learning to compare and make choice through focused calculative procedures presented 
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in a decision-friendly way. These procedures mainly serve and regulate individuals 
instead of groups. 
Arvai et al. (2001) assess the quality of a deliberative decision according to three 
dimensions: participants’ satisfaction, diversity of issues discussed, and improvement in 
knowledge. The first and third dimensions are assessed by the participants while the 
second the research team. Either way, these measures operate at the individual level. By 
these assessment standards, it is possible for a process of analytic deliberation to be 
judged as effective, even if it merely involves solitary thinkers provided with adequate 
decision supports and relevant information. Assessment of communicative dynamic is 
not given priority despite the process being called ‘risk communication’. Another 
measurement is time consistency of preferences. Properly aided deliberations could 
change values and preferences, and preferences ideally would remain roughly stable 
after the process. Again, the assessment focus is individual rationalization. 
Another set of assessment criteria for process validity concerns the extent in which 
accepted standards of decision analysis, which policy debates often lack, are met 
(Gregory et al., 2005). McDaniels et al. (1999) stress that decision quality depends more 
on a right decision framework than right people or right information, suggesting the 
importance of procedural scientific-ness over fairness. The other assessment criteria 
offered by McDaniels et al. (1999, p. 507-9) pertain to quality of recommendations and 
cost-effectiveness. A good public participation initiative is one that can provide useful 
insights to decision-makers and satisfactorily meet the given objectives at reasonable 
cost. 
4.3 CONTRASTING WITH DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION  
Table 4.1 summarizes and compares the core features of the analytic and democratic 
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approaches to public deliberation. Analytic deliberation involves an expert-led learning 
process for engineering preferences by providing cognitive aids. Participants in need of 
education are required to adjust themselves to the expectations of the science. Under the 
rubric of democratic deliberation, participants are idealized as autonomous political 
agents charged to assess the merits of alternative proposals. They are given more room 
to reorganize the deliberative processes and, in effect, execute some of the deliberative 
principles. 
Analytic deliberation aims at facilitating instrumental considerations, seeking 
logically consistent, systematical and efficient ways of value elicitation. In democratic 
deliberation, mutual recognition is regarded as a meaningful outcome. Although 
deliberative democrats favour a set of political ideals, it is not destined for a 
comprehensive moral end, from which a course of action in relation to resource 
allocation could be logically deduced from various options. There is little presumption 
of universal acceptance beyond basic rights. To the contrary, the analytic-deliberative 
approach takes utility maximization as such an end. Furthermore, value plurality is 
handled in different ways. Behind analytic deliberation is the philosophy of value 
reductionism, i.e. decomposing decision into smaller elements for isolated consideration. 
The democratic deliberative approach is not necessarily incompatible with moral 
integration, but it is far from a necessary criterion of good decision-making. Differences 
in perceptions of reality are not to be reduced for the sake of pragmatic needs. 
Reasonable differences are an acceptable outcome. 
These differences indicate inconsistent elements between the two deliberative 
approaches. Three interrelated inconsistencies are identified, concerning the organizing 
principle, value pluralism and evaluative focus, respectively.  
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Table 4.1 Comparison of Analytic and Democratic Deliberation 
1. Assumption Analytic Deliberation Democratic Deliberation 
Policy challenge 
  
Cognitive inability of individuals Irreducible moral conflict 
Conception of value 
- Ontological foundation  
- Dimensionality 
- Comparability 
- Source of value 
disagreement 
 
 
Monistic 
Multiple 
Strong 
Different ways of information 
interpretation 
 
 
Pluralistic 
Multiple 
Weak 
Competing ethical 
principles 
 
Participatory democracy 
- Role of democracy 
- Relationship with science 
- Role of the public 
 
 
Secondary 
Aided by science  
Provide insights 
  
 
Primary 
Scrutinize science  
Provide insights and/or 
make decisions 
2. Strategy   
Analogy 
Imitation 
Organization 
Reflection 
Primary goals 
 
Tutorial 
Natural cognitive processes 
Expert-led 
Introspective 
Correct preference; deepen case 
understanding  
Dialogue 
Political/social interactions 
Participant-oriented 
Inter-subjective  
Contest preference; deepen 
mutual understanding 
3. Procedure and Validation 
Degree of behavioural 
intervention 
Decision steps 
 
Value elicitation  
- Treatment 
- Formal expression pathway 
 
Assessment criteria 
- For participants  
 
 
- For procedure and outcome 
 
High 
 
Clarify values, think broad, make 
rational tradeoffs  
 
Disaggregation and aggregation 
Via natural or constructed 
metrics  
 
Self-assessed levels of 
satisfaction and knowledge gain; 
internal stability of preference 
Procedural scientific-ness; 
quality of recommendations. 
 
Low 
 
Justify values, think broad, 
determine acceptability 
 
Holistic assessment  
Via speech 
 
 
Level of reciprocity; inter- 
personal consistency of 
preference 
Procedural fairness and 
openness; meta-consensus 
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4.4 ASSESSING DEMOCRATIC POTENTIAL  
4.4.1 The Fallacy of Impartial Deliberation 
Impartiality demands that reasons given by the individuals be acceptable to anyone who 
is similarly situated in morally relevant respects. Impartiality differs from reciprocity 
because it ‘demands that reasons be impersonal, requiring citizens to suppress or 
disregard their partial perspectives and individual projects’ (Guttman and Thompson, 
1996, p. 54).  That is, 
Impartialists can recognize the existence of moral disagreement…but they 
regard it as a sign that moral reasoning has failed. At least one of the reasoners 
has erred, one or more have not carried the reasoning far enough, or else the 
problem itself is beyond the capacity of mortals to resolve. In the face of 
disagreement, impartiality tells us to choose the morally correct view and 
demonstrate its correctness to our fellow citizens, who, if they are rational, 
should accept it. (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 59) 
Deliberating citizens must give reasons that would be justifiable from an impersonal 
perspective. The goal of this process is to establish a comprehensive moral view 
applicable to all. Other citizens are then bound to accept value claims as reasonable so 
long as they meet the doctrine. The function of deliberation becomes demonstrating 
conformity by all citizens to that moral doctrine. There is no requirement for mutual 
justification or debate. 
Based on utilitarian compensation the analytic approach enforces an impartiality 
principle and therefore displaces the need for actual communication. Deliberative 
opportunities have been used to advance case-related knowledge comprising ‘fact-based 
inputs (what is) and value-based inputs (what ought)’ (Failing et al., 2007, p. 50). It is 
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believed that value questions need clarification rather than refutation: 
Exploration of value-based knowledge (priorities and preferences) on the other 
hand, must focus on seeking clarification and understanding rather than 
corroboration or refutation…The quality of a value claim will be related to 
clarity, consistency and explicitness. (Failing et al., 2007, p. 50) 
The idea that normative questions about public goods, which affect the well-being of 
other people or species, can be satisfactorily answered merely by clarifying knowledge 
content is doubtful. To settle such a ‘what ought’ question, an individual has to either 
justify their claims or refute those of others. The question is a matter of judgment rather 
than preference (Holland, 1997). Convincing justifications or refutations must go with 
reasons which in principle could be rejected even if sufficiently clarified. Clarifying 
attempts not prepared to be challenged belong to a preference-type question, rather than 
a ‘what ought’ question. If a clarifying attempt requires acceptance from a second party, 
it would become a kind of justification and turn the discussion to a value debate.  
Yet, analytic deliberation is actually a programme of demonstration, although 
‘justification’ is stated as needed at various points. The principle of impartiality requires 
a process of demonstration whereas reciprocity requires deliberation (Gutmann and 
Thompson, 1996). It relies on objective evidence and factual information to enable the 
individuals to see which policy option is the best according to the universally acceptable 
criteria. Analytic deliberation fits squarely into this notion. This is evidenced by its 
emphasis on evidential basis and clarification, and scepticism to opening philosophical 
debates and unnecessary controversy (Failing et al., 2007). Further proofs are evident in 
those general statements in favour of objectification of value expressions and scientific 
rationalization of public participation. 
There is little room for value debate and the normative question of ‘why to do’. It 
is then dubious to employ democratic vocabularies such as ‘justifying knowledge 
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claims’, ‘to debate…competing claims’, ‘normative judgment’, ‘legitimate forum’, and 
‘constructive dialogue…about values’ (Failing et al., 2007). ‘Justification’ has been 
understood as justifying the knowledge content of validity claims (demonstrating), 
which differs from justifying value content. The former accepts knowledge upon perfect 
validation in objective terms, whereas the latter could still reject knowledge despite 
validation. Under such an approach, to make an impartial public decision, 
policy-makers need no more than collecting the most credible evidence and 
demonstrating it to the public. This is all the justification required. There is no moral 
need for mutual justification and actual discussion. The merits of analytic deliberation 
diminish with the intensity of fundamental social conflict. This indicates a departure 
from the concept of deliberative democracy to which the opposite applies. 
Democracy without value debate is problematic. With commensurability assumed 
and value debate avoided, what the analysts would need is simply a well-designed 
questionnaire and a computer, not group deliberation. Where deep moral conflict is at 
issue, analytic deliberation can hardly produce feasible agreements without 
compromising some democratic principles. Crafted along the line of a hard science it 
threatens to excessively limit the range of values being articulated.  
 
4.4.2 The Engineer Mentality and the Meta-democratic Problem 
A function of analytic deliberation is exposing differences. However, not all positions 
are reasonable so that some of them should be excluded through democratic processes. 
Deliberative democracy demands that discursive space be sufficiently open and seeks 
reconciliation within deliberation. Analytic deliberation offers no decision principle that 
is exercised within deliberation to identify and exclude unqualified proposals. 
Otherwise the deliberating individuals would have been allowed to reject other people’s 
claims on acceptable grounds. Instead, they are led to merely learn from each other. 
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Learning could be an uncritical experience without contesting each other’s claims. Thus 
value contest is not encouraged and the ‘tutorial’ is used as analogy. 
The emphasis on an evidential basis could be regarded as such a decision principle. 
However, its formulation and execution is external to the deliberative process from 
which political legitimacy is sought. Value claims must be made measurable and 
articulated in universally acceptable and objective terms. The definition of these terms 
is circumscribed by the scope of decision science. Following Keeney (1992), Gregory 
and Failing (2002) devise a value-articulating framework based on three criteria, namely, 
measurability, operationality and understandability. The strategy is not to empower 
participants to determine acceptability, but to determine acceptability on their behalf by 
limiting the discursive space a priori. Diverse perceptions of reality are reformulated in 
accordance with the predefined rules. Such rules or instructions were adopted by Failing 
et al. (2007), but appeared to be constraining from the perspective of their aboriginal 
respondents4. 
A defensive response is that uninformed, ignorant public may fall captives of 
interested stakeholders or agencies (Gregory et al., 2005). Gregory et al. (2005, p.7) add 
that ‘To create a better-informed public, the managers of deliberative processes must 
circumscribe the potentially relevant facts and set priorities among them’. However, 
informing (forming) public will in this way too is open to manipulation. Manipulative 
intent might be hidden behind alleged scientific rigour. It is not uncommon that 
scientists supported by industrial or political organizations with vested interest are 
caught for selectively defining irrelevance and arbitrarily setting priorities in favour of a 
preferred agenda that could guarantee continuous support (Spash, 2010b). The top-down 
analytic approach is predisposed to a particular social state and problem definition 
which ought to be subject to a democratic process. This raises a meta-democratic 
                                                 
4
 These respondents ‘rejected the notion of placing a value on heritage sites and making “trade-offs” 
about a resource of such deeply spiritual value’ (Failing et al., 2007, p. 56) 
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problem.  
Analytic deliberation embraces, in Anderson’s (1993) terms, a secondary 
conception of value plurality which captures diverse authentic standards of evaluating 
qualities of goods. However, it falls short of a primary one based on a plurality of 
evaluative attitudes by which goods are sensibly valued in different ways. This 
conception pertains to the extent in which goods are appropriately valued and may be 
independent of their meeting any authentic evaluative standard. With ‘why’ and ‘ought’ 
questions avoided, analytic deliberation fits well to the opposing monistic view that ‘all 
goods are the proper objects of a single evaluative attitude’ (Anderson, 1993, p.4). 
Alternative evaluative modes are restricted. The reduction to a mono-criterion decision 
may unnecessarily strip-off some culturally specific ways of organizing value 
‘language’ and preclude individuals from expressing ethical propositions based on 
moral conviction and emotion (Satterfield, 2001). Anecdotal and rhetorical forms of 
expressions are put at a disadvantage. 
Expert cultures could pose threats to value pluralism (Spash, 2009). Failure to 
democratically elicit values limits the plurality expressed. Failing et al. (2007, p. 50) 
claim that some but not all science is reliable. Being strong advocates of decision 
science, presumably they believe that their science is reliable. This gives license to 
applying restrictions to the agency of participants in validating the selected frame of 
analysis, let alone taking issue with the decision experts. The limited procedural 
flexibility has led to selective inclusion of agendas. To the contrary, deliberative 
democrats hold that both deliberative design and even principles are redeemable in their 
own terms and that outcomes remain indefinitely provisional and revisable (Dryzek, 
1990, 2000). Value pluralism is considered a concept to be defined in a public context 
on a continual basis. The schematized analytic-deliberative framework requires values 
be expressed in a particular shape compatible with some scientific predispositions.  
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Science itself offers a way by which to value things. Circumscribed within the 
scope of decision science, the range of values articulated is predetermined, 
paradoxically, by one kind of value meant to be openly debated. The incremental 
movement from one science (neoclassical economics) to another (decision science) 
offers minimal potential for value pluralism. 
 
4.4.3 Subject-centred Evaluation 
A subject-centred view of public deliberation is tightly linked to serving the values and 
interests of individuals and groups (Renn et al., 1995a). An option is chosen for its 
ability to satisfy the dominant values and interests. Renn et al. (1995a, p. 7-8) contend 
that people’s values and interests are nearly always diverse, so participatory process 
must have losers by any evaluative criteria. Philosophically, then, no evaluation could 
be justified over another. This view sees public participation as a zero-sum game. In 
practice, it is hard to not recognize certain justice principles as legitimate, such as 
equality and efficiency. Forcing people to accept one side only is likely to lead to a 
vicious cycle of conflict. It is better to interpret some social goals as demanding balance 
and recognition, such as religious pluralism and multiculturalism. These goals could be 
‘satisfied’ only by simultaneously satisfying the preferences of competing groups, 
which seems unattainable given resource constraints. A better evaluative focus concerns 
people’s interaction in which recognition of shared values and reasonable differences 
are realized. A subject-centred view gives little credit to the role of inter-subjective 
communication in seeking fair terms of social cooperation.  
Analytic deliberation promises informed individual thinking processes, whereas 
social interaction plays a minor role. Efforts at aiding decision are based on the 
satisfaction of values and interests of the individuals to the greatest extent. This makes 
little room for the virtue of mutual respect that could lead participants to recognize or 
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agree on a course of action for reasons that deviate from their personal values or 
interests. The idea of a ‘workable agreement’, based on varied values and interests and 
coordinated through communicative norms, is not taken as a criterion of ideal 
deliberative outcome. Choices divorced from one’s well-clarified objectives would be 
discredited as a product of cognitive failure. A successful workable agreement might 
then be relegated to an inferior solution, because the decisions of at least some of the 
participants deviate from their own values and interests.  
Value conflict is resolved ultimately not by striving for mutual acceptance or 
recognition, but indirectly by deriving an algorithmic solution from an aggregation of 
individual decisions. Attainment of inter-subjective understanding is not taken as a 
criterion of success. With the algorithmic solution rationally arrived at, a deliberation 
might be judged as successful, irrespective of the extent to which diverging participants 
appreciate rival viewpoints and mutually respect each other.  
Merely enabling disagreeing individuals to speak and express their preferences 
does not constitute a sufficient condition for deliberative democracy. Of more 
importance is the capacity to listen, which is crucial to respecting irreducible diversity 
out of empathy. Gregory et al. (2001) admit that analytic deliberation does not aim for 
conflict resolution. Where deep moral conflict is at issue, such a calculation-oriented 
deliberative approach might reach a rational decision without giving the affected 
individuals adequate respect and motivation to genuinely cooperate and contribute to a 
collective action. The inadequacy of inter-subjective encounters may deplete the moral 
qualities which are essential to a democratic state.  
 
4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The analytic approach to deliberation seeks to strengthen the scientific rigour of group 
decision-making processes. The starting point is the pathologies of public deliberation, 
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including the incompetence of individuals expressing preferences, the ambiguity 
involved in unconstrained dialogue, and the wishful thinking of democratic theorists 
and philosophers. In other words, this approach primarily aims to correct problems 
associated with democracy. Science (decision science) is being used to rescue 
participatory democracy, rather than the other way around which is seen as a potential 
contribution of deliberative democracy. The notion of analytic deliberation is therefore 
separated from its democratic counterpart.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, a sound value theory that is conducive to value 
pluralism rests on a structural reconstruction of the ways in which things are valued. 
Neither variation in the valuational substance nor perspective alone suffices. 
Deliberative democracy warrants credits for raising prospect for a new structural 
relation to the natural environment and society through a communicative rationalization 
of political and social order. Analytic deliberation seeks to advance instrumental 
rationality with a more sophisticated scheme of value elicitation. The underlying 
philosophical system, however, remains unchanged, if not being reinforced. A value 
theory under this tradition has limited pluralistic potential. Nonetheless, monetary 
valuation of the environment has suffered from individuals lacking competence to 
provide internally consistent monetary expressions. Decision analysis therefore has a 
pragmatic role to play where a great deal of ecological complexities are at issue. 
I have shown that the territories where deliberative democrats and decision 
scientists lay their claims about public deliberation differ in many important aspects. 
Despite this variation, the current practice of DMV has been grounded on both. 
Practitioners have come to realize that both value pluralism and analytical robustness 
are crucial to redeem the stated preference approaches. The dilemma facing DMV is 
then that its two intellectual sources come into serious conflict. The practice has been 
split into two streams. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DELIBERATIVE MONETARY VALUATION (DMV): 
COMBINING ECONOMICS AND POLITICS  
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Deliberative monetary valuation (DMV) is an exemplary product of the deliberative 
turn in environmental valuation. It involves valuing the environment in monetary terms 
through some deliberative procedures. The body of literature has grown rapidly during 
the past few years with variations in assumptions and designs. Unfortunately, the 
proliferation turns out to be a deliberative ‘rush’. Some DMV applications have been 
criticized for engaging in rhetorical use of deliberative methods to repair and revalidate 
state preference methods to justify neoclassical economic approaches (Spash 2008b, 
Jorgensen 2009). While this failure has its root in the second current (analytic 
deliberation), those DMV initiatives drawn on democratic theories are far from flawless. 
The two intellectual currents have contributed to a divergence in the practice of 
DMV. While there is much in conflict, some conceptual limitations are shared. In this 
chapter I not only provide a descriptive account of the practice, but also seek to 
substantiate the earlier critique by elaborating on a larger body of literature and lay 
grounds for a conceptual re-orientation. It is a response to the concerns raised and 
proposals in relation to the role of DMV and the import of the monetary value 
determined. The first section gives an overview of the project. I then show the 
conceptual variations in the earlier attempts and their limitations in light of a theory of 
deliberative democracy. An alternative conceptualization is outlined in the third part. 
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5.2 OVERVIEW OF PRACTICE 
In DMV, the procedure of quantifying environmental values in monetary terms is 
preceded by a dialogue or deliberation amongst the valuing agents. Participating 
individuals form small groups to share information and raise concerns about a proposed 
environmental change. They are typically supported and guided by practitioners or 
researchers and given opportunities to discuss prior to stating a WTP, or WTA. The 
deliberation may be concluded with voting or a unanimous consensus. The value 
obtained is meant to be of potential use in project appraisal, cost-benefit analysis or 
other formal decision processes. Design varies but deliberative sessions usually last a 
few hours and may be repeated over several days. 
A great variety of intellectual traditions is involved in the development of DMV. 
From the first theoretical discussions in the 1990s, the method attracted attention from a 
range of disciplinary experts including not only mainstream and heterodox economists, 
but also social psychologists, decision scientists, applied philosophers and political 
scientists. The key aspects of the existing DMV studies are summarized in Table 5.1. 
The notion was first proposed with explicit reference to democratic theories by Jacobs 
(1997) and Sagoff (1998). Decision scientists, notably Gregory et al. (1993) and 
Gregory and Slovic (1997)5, have also participated in the movement, yet from a 
behavioural psychological point of view. Later attempts are typically influenced by both 
perspectives to varying extents. 
  
 
 
                                                 
5
 This chapter is based on their group-based monetary valuation studies. There seems to be some 
overlapping with the last chapter. But this is just because these studies share the same scientific system 
with those (non-monetary) risk assessment exercises reviewed earlier. This clear resemblance reflects 
their intellectual linkage, which is what I want to point out. The overlapping has been minimized by their 
drawing on different sets of publications, although it can hardly be completely avoided. 
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Table 5.1 Summary of the key aspects of previous DMV studies 
Author 
Author's 
Academic 
Background* 
Major 
Theoretical 
Account** 
Representation 
of Interest / 
Perspective^ 
Primary 
Decision Rule / 
Expected 
Outcome 
Forms of WTP 
Proposed / 
Adopted^^ 
Case 
Study 
(Y/N) 
Study 
Area Study Topic 
Payment 
Vehicle 
Gregory et al. 
(1993) 
Decision 
scientist 
Decision science; 
social 
psychology 
Consumer Individual 
statement 
Charitable 
contribution 
N    
Brown et al. 
(1995) 
Economist; 
psychologist 
Ethics Public Consensus Arbitrated social N    
Jacobs (1997) Economist Deliberative 
democracy 
Any relevant Voting Arbitrated social N    
Sagoff (1998) Philosopher Deliberative 
democracy; 
ethics 
Public Consensus Charitable 
contribution, fair 
price, and 
expressed social 
N    
Ward (1999) Political 
scientist 
Deliberative 
democracy 
Public Consensus or 
'dissensus' 
Arbitrated social N    
Gregory (2000) Decision 
scientist 
Decision science; 
social 
psychology 
Consumer Individual 
statement 
Charitable 
contribution 
Y Oregon, 
U.S. 
Old-growth 
forests# 
Household 
expenses 
Gregory & 
Wellman (2001) 
Decision 
scientist; 
economist 
Decision science; 
social 
psychology 
Any relevant Individual 
statement 
Expressed social Y Oregon, 
U.S. 
Estuary planning Public funds 
Niemeyer & 
Spash (2001) 
Political 
scientist; 
economist 
Deliberative 
democracy 
Any relevant Consensus Not specified N    
Macmillan et al. Economist Welfare Consumer Individual Charitable Y Scotland, Goose Tax 
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(2002) economics statement contribution U.K. conservation 
Wilson & 
Howarth (2002) 
Economist Deliberative 
democracy; 
ethics; social 
psychology 
Public Consensus Arbitrated social N    
McDaniels et al. 
(2003) 
Decision 
scientist 
Decision science; 
social 
psychology 
Not specified Individual 
statement 
Charitable 
contribution 
Y Canada Fisheries 
production 
Electricity costs 
James & 
Blamey (2005) 
Economist Deliberative 
democracy; 
welfare 
economics 
Any relevant Voting Arbitrated social Y Australia National park 
management 
Levy 
Philip & 
Macmillan 
(2005) 
Economist Welfare 
economics 
Consumer Individual 
statement 
Charitable 
contribution 
Y Scotland, 
U.K. 
Wildlife 
conservation 
Tax 
Álvarez-Farizo 
& Hanley 
(2006) 
Economist Welfare 
economics 
Consumer 
(session 1); 
public (sessions 
2 & 3) 
Individual 
statement 
(sessions 1 & 
2); voting 
(session 3) 
Charitable 
contribution 
(sessions 1 & 2); 
fair price 
(session 3) 
Y Spain Water quality 
improvement 
Household 
expenses 
Howarth & 
Wilson (2006) 
Economist Deliberative 
democracy; 
social 
psychology; 
welfare 
economics 
Public Consensus Arbitrated social N    
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Macmillan et al. 
(2006) 
Economist Welfare 
economics 
Consumer Individual 
statement 
Charitable 
contribution 
Y Scotland, 
U.K. 
Green energy & 
endangered 
species 
conservation 
Electricity costs 
& annual 
subscription to a 
trust fund, 
respectively 
Urama & Hodge 
(2006) 
Economist Welfare 
economics 
Consumer Individual 
statement 
Charitable 
contribution 
Y Nigeria River basin 
restoration 
Annual 
subscription to a 
trust fund 
Lienhoop & 
Macmillan 
(2007) 
Economist Welfare 
economics 
Consumer Individual 
statement 
Charitable 
contribution 
Y Iceland Wilderness 
conservation 
Electricity costs 
Spash (2007) Economist Deliberative 
democracy; 
ethics 
Any relevant Consensus or 
'dissensus' 
Arbitrated social N    
Spash (2008) Economist Deliberative 
democracy; 
ethics 
Any relevant Consensus or 
'dissensus' 
Arbitrated social N    
Álvarez-Farizo 
et al. (2009) 
Economist Welfare 
economics 
Public Individual 
statement 
(sessions 1 & 
2); voting 
(session 3) 
Charitable 
contribution 
(sessions 1 & 2); 
fair price 
(session 3) 
Y U. K. & 
Spain 
Radioactive 
contamination 
Tax; daily living 
cost 
Dietz et al. 
(2009) 
Psychologist; 
sociologist 
Deliberative 
democracy;  
social 
psychology 
Any relevant Individual 
statement 
Charitable 
contribution 
Y U. S. Greenhouse gas 
emissions 
reduction 
Not specified 
Ito et al. (2009) Economist Welfare 
economics; 
deliberative 
Not specified Individual 
statement 
(sessions 1 & 
Charitable 
contribution 
(sessions 1 & 2); 
Y Japan Wetland 
restoration 
Tax 
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Notes: 
*
 For the first and second authors only. This is a general description though since many of them work across disciplines. 
**
 Based on my interpretation, although it is sometimes specified by the authors. Typically, these papers covered most of the relevant theoretical accounts to 
varying degrees. Those listed in this column are perceived to be at work. 
^ The type of interest or perspective that the deliberators are expected or encouraged to represent during deliberation, or one that is understood by the authors 
as factors at work (for empirical studies) 
^^ Based on the four categories presented in Table 5.2. Here the WTP is classified according to the processes in which it is formed, based on our interpretation. 
The original authors may not agree with the classification. 
#
 The valued goods were policy options which consisted of a bundle environmental and non-environmental goods.
democracy 2); voting or 
consensus 
(session 3) 
fair price 
(session 3) 
Jorgensen 
(2009) 
Psychologist Deliberative 
democracy;  
social 
psychology 
Any relevant Consensus or 
'dissensus' 
Not specified N    
Robinson et al. 
(2009) 
Economist Welfare 
economics 
Public Individual 
statement 
Charitable 
contribution 
Y Australia Water quality 
improvement 
Levy 
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A more solid structure than the earlier attempts has been formulated by Howarth 
and Wilson (2006) and Spash (2007). DMV is proposed as a discourse-based valuation 
approach that captures concepts from economics, politics, social psychology, and ethics, 
and is established upon a wider range of assumptions concerning human values and 
behaviours than the CVM (Howarth and Wilson, 2006). It combines economic and 
political processes in valuing the environment (Spash 2007). The standard economic 
approach of environmental valuation is couched in terms of a microeconomic model 
where individuals are construed as utility-maximizing consumers engaging in a market 
transaction and an exchange value is intended. (Figure 5.1). DMV, on the other hand, 
involves a political process where individuals express various concerns and reflect upon 
preferences within a social setting (Figure 5.2). Participatory opportunities are provided 
to enable preference transformation and internalization of non-economic values.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Table 5.1, empirical attempts proliferate since the early 2000s and 
have been dominated by economists. Still, some of them are not restricted to the 
conventional economic models. Decision scientists and social psychologists have a 
strong presence, although the former rarely appeal to the democratic ideals. As far as the 
preferred experimental features are concerned, those economists who are influenced by 
Figure 5.1 The economic process of valuation  
Source: Spash (2007) 
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the democratic theories are divorced from their welfare-economic counterparts. Support 
for consumer-type perspectives largely come from economists. Most of the theoretical 
works appreciate the consensual, aggregated social WTP approach. Of which, those who 
are sceptical to the likelihood of achieving genuine consensus have explicitly 
recognized reasoned disagreement, or ‘dissensus’, as an acceptable outcome. To the 
contrary, the majority of the empirical studies are built upon individual valuation and 
the contribution model, whereas none adopts the democratic ideal of consensus. It is 
then natural to use tax or household expense as the payment vehicle. Study topics 
included a wide range of environmental issues. Until recently, few were conducted in 
non-English-speaking countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding the prospect of ‘the best of both worlds’ (Spash, 2007), there are 
doubts as to the appropriateness of DMV in providing valid benefit estimates for 
economic analysis. Concerns are couched in terms of, to name a few, statistical 
representation and stability of response (Powe, 2007), failure to deal with necessary 
tradeoffs (Orr, 2007), WTP question format (Aldred 2005), and poor communication 
skills of participants (Turner et al., 2010). DMV is also questioned on philosophical 
grounds for unnecessarily reducing plural values into a single metric which invariably 
violates the incommensurability of ethical values (Vatn, 2005; O’Neill, 2007). In 
Figure 5.2 The political process of valuation 
Source: Spash (2007) 
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general, this philosophical critique means that ensuring procedural openness and a 
cognitively sound decision structure does not change the fact that DMV remains a kind 
of economic valuation and as such reduces plural values into a single metric, i.e. dollar. 
Ethical considerations are compressed and non-economic values are forced into the 
economic frame or excluded, with little room left for concepts such as inviolable rights. 
Critics contend that there is no hope for the endeavour of rights and equity so long as a 
money value is assigned. For example, Vatn (2005) points out that DMV is based on a 
contradiction, because: 
It mixes collective reasoning and consensus building over principles and norms 
with individual trade-off calculations. It combines a VAI based on capturing 
incommensurability with one that is focused on commensurability. It mixes a 
VAI directed towards the ‘We’ with one based on an ‘I’ perspective.  (Vatn, 
2005, p. 361) 
Such scepticism seems warranted. However, as will be argued, the issue here is not I 
versus We perspectives but rather the imposition of impartiality and the prevalence of a 
utilitarian philosophy underlying DMV. 
 
5.3 FROM DISCIPLINARY FAILURE TO MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
SYNTHESIS 
The development of DMV by multiple disciplines has contributed to some variety in 
conceptual models.  The variations are broadly attributable to two widely discussed 
limitations of stated preference approaches to environmental valuation.  First is a 
concern I refer to as the internal critique expressed by economists that individuals 
confront too difficult a task when being asked to value an environmental change in 
monetary terms during a relatively short interview or survey (e.g. 15 to 20 minutes).  
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Typical arguments are the lack of time to reflect or engage in arbitrage (MacMillan et al. 
2002, MacMillan et al. 2006, Robinson et al. 2009) and respondents’ inadequate 
cognitive capacity to understand the welfare tradeoffs being requested under such 
circumstances (Gregory and Slovic 1997, Gregory 2000, McDaniels et al. 2003).  
Individuals who are then classified as giving ‘irrational’ response, as a consequence, are 
regarded as falling short of standard economic assumptions underpinning stated 
preference approaches. Among practitioners expressing such positions there is a belief 
that people should behave more economically. 
Second is what I term the external critique. This is a concern by both economists 
and non-economists that stated preference approaches restrict the type of values which 
an individual is able to express.  For example, respondents may be forced to act as 
consumers rather than citizens (Sagoff, 1988), or those adopting rights-based rationales 
may be treated as protestors or expressing irrational lexicographic preferences (Spash 
2000, Spash 2008a). Under this critique, stated preference approaches overlook 
concerns over procedural justice, non-utilitarian ethics and the role of social norms, 
because they are built upon the assumption of monetary commensurability, (Jorgensen 
et al., 2001; Spash et al., 2009). Standard economic assumptions then fail to properly 
capture the plural values held by individuals concerning a collective choice about the 
environment. There is a belief amongst DMV advocates expressing such positions that 
economics should embrace plural values or be qualified by alternative values. 
 There are thus two contrasting ways to justify the idea of DMV: one questioning 
the capacity of individuals, and the other questioning the economic frame. Those 
practitioners who put more weight on people’s limited cognitive abilities tend to run 
DMV as a tutorial or educational workshop to improve the face validity of their results.  
Those who regard values as being excluded emphasise institutional design, procedural 
fairness and the articulation of alternative ethical basis for values.  This is not 
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necessarily a sharp dichotomy and as will be shown later there are some shared basic 
perspectives.   
This distinction is in addition and complementary to the value classification of 
DMV studies presented by Spash (2007, 2008b) (Table 5.2). This explains social value 
under standard stated preference techniques as typically calculated by asking 
individually focused valuation questions of respondents, who decided as individuals. A 
DMV exercise designed to address the internal critique does not need to withdraw from 
the methodologically individualistic economic frame and the procedure of preference 
aggregation. However, the group process involved makes individual values into 
‘charitable contributions’. Methodological individualism could also be maintained to 
derive a recommended aggregated value or an ‘expressed social WTP/WTA’. 
 
Table 5.2  Forms of value expression in DMV 
 Terms in which WTP specified 
Value provider Individual (disaggregated value) Social (aggregative value) 
Individual in a 
group setting 
Charitable contributions Expressed social WTP/WTA 
Group Fair price Arbitrated social WTP/WTA 
Source: Spash (2007, 2008b) 
 
In contrast, a DMV addressing the external critique is likely to appeal to group 
procedures and break with strict methodological individualism. Influenced by the idea 
of deliberative democracy, the process requires individuals openly communicating with 
each other. The standard economic practice is called into doubt and replaced by political 
processes which include group decision-making. This leads to either a ‘fair price’ or an 
‘arbitrated social WTP/WTA’, depending upon whether the value is at an aggregate 
level or not.  
This variety in problem definition allows a clear distinction to be drawn in terms of 
the WTP category favoured by different DMV advocates, as shown in Table 5.3. The 
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practitioners are split into two groups: one advocating ‘charitable contributions’ whereas 
the other ‘arbitrated social’. The former is dominated by decision scientists and 
mainstream economists with a focus on empirical exploration, whereas the latter 
includes a group of heterodox economists informed by political theories exploring 
theoretical content. This indicates a gap between theory and practice reinforced by the 
long-standing conflict between mainstream economists and heterodox economists alike. 
The variation suggests that two currents are at work influencing the development of the 
method. It has also contributed to the multiple ways of understanding the monetary 
value expressed in a deliberative setting. More broadly, it has indicated the diverging 
approaches to ‘deliberative economics’. 
 
Table 5.3  Recent DMV studies classified 
Charitable contributions Expressed social WTP/WTA 
Gregory et al. (1993); Sagoff (1998); 
Gregory (2000); Macmillan et al. 
(2002); McDaniels et al. (2003); 
Philip & Macmillan (2005); 
Álvarez-Farizo & Hanley (2006); 
Macmillan et al. (2006); Urama and 
Hodge (2006); Lienhoop and 
Macmillan (2007); Álvarez-Farizo et al. 
(2009); Dietz et al. (2009); Ito et al. 
(2009); Robinson et al. (2009)  
 Sagoff (1998); Gregory and Wellman 
(2001) 
Fair price Arbitrated social WTP/WTA 
 Sagoff (1998); Álvarez-Farizo & 
Hanley (2006); Álvarez-Farizo et al. 
(2009); Ito et al. (2009)  
 Brown et al. (1995); Jacobs (1997); 
Ward (1999); Wilson and Howarth 
(2002); James and Blamey (2005); 
Howarth and Wilson (2006); Spash 
(2007, 2008b) 
Extending Spash (2008a) Tables 1and 2 
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However, the earlier theoretical explorations of DMV fail to make such a clear 
distinction. In fact, some seek to synthesise different intellectual traditions to establish 
an aggregative enterprise. Wilson and Howarth (2002, p. 432), for example, argue that 
DMV is ‘derived from a convergence of arguments from economics, social psychology, 
decision science, and political theory’. DMV is understood as a unifying institution. The 
competing conceptions about the role of the valuing agents (the public or stakeholders) 
and the inquirer (scientists or social scientists) are not explored. This neglects the 
conflict between the traditional classification of economics and psychology as 
conducting a scientific discourse, whereas politics and ethics are regarded as normative. 
The former tends to construe individuals as an object for predefined scientific treatment, 
rather than the latter’s approach to the individual as a subject within self-defined social 
processes. Aggregating these traditions is far from straightforward.  
Another questionable assertion is that public deliberation, being a political activity, 
is inherently conducive to the pursuit of value pluralism, as individuals are exposed to a 
wider range of viewpoints (Jacobs, 1997; Howarth and Wilson, 2006; Vatn, 2009). A 
value pluralistic view recognizes and seeks to maintain multiple ways of valuing. While 
the opposite monistic view characterizes neoclassical economics, it too is present in the 
literature of political theory and philosophy. The criticism against some deliberative 
democrats who advance a singular conception of values (see Dryzek, 2000) suggests 
that organized participatory processes may end up with closing-down alternative values 
(Stirling, 2006). History has shown that participatory engagement does not always 
guarantee pluralism. 
This means the literature on DMV needs to be distinguished on two contrary 
grounds. First, there are contrasting approaches arising from the internal and external 
critiques. Second, there are unexposed problems facing all approaches because of some 
commonly held methodological positions. I first further explain the distinction between 
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the contrasting approaches before analysing the literature in terms of common 
organising principles. 
 
5.4 TWO CONTRASTING APROACHES OF DMV 
5.4.1 Preference economization 
Decision scientists and some resource economists favour an analytical form of 
deliberation which leads to preference construction in accordance with economic 
principles. The primary objective is to ease respondents’ cognitive burdens. Adequate 
information and time to think and discuss are provided to tackle what are regarded as 
the problems arising from individuals’ limited imaginations and calculating abilities. 
Behavioural psychological literature indicates that individuals do not hold informed, 
stable and pre-existing preferences (Peterson et al. 1988, Kahneman and Knetsch 1992, 
Kahneman et al. 1999), and often fail to meaningfully express their entangled values 
(Gregory et al., 1993; Gregory and Slovic, 1997). Monetary valuation of ecosystem 
goods and services can then be seen as an excessively demanding task. Protest and 
‘irrational’ responses are explained in terms of cognition problems resolvable by 
preference engineering (Gregory, 2000; Hanley and Shogren, 2005).  Practitioners then 
aim to implement a process whereby preferences are clarified, constructed and 
articulated in a cognitively rational manner. Strictly structured, informative group 
discussion is then regarded as a method for lessening the impact of impediments to 
WTP elicitation, such as bounded rationality. 
The underlying problem diagnosis makes no philosophical arguments. Full 
commitment to this scientific-behavioural view protects some fundamental economic 
principles, including value monism. DMV is then devised to ensure more rational 
choice making by correcting ill-constructed preferences. Respondents can be guided 
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through a structured thinking process designed in accordance with MAUT (Gregory et 
al., 1993; Gregory, 2000; Gregory and Wellman, 2001).  Under this formulation, they 
express preferences for each attribute by assigning weights, which can then be used as a 
basis for translating environmental values into equivalent money terms.  Another 
stream of thought simply supplements stated preference approach with additional 
information and time, opportunities to share knowledge, and occasionally a citizen-type 
frame of reference (Macmillan et al., 2002; Robinson, 2002; Philip and MacMillan, 
2005; Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006; Macmillan et al., 2006; Urama and Hodge, 
2006; Álvarez-Farizoa et al., 2007; Lienhoop and MacMillan, 2007; Álvarez-Farizo et 
al., 2009; Robinson et al., 2009).  A modified exchange value is intended, and 
deliberative engagement is minimal, although in fact the process produces charitable 
contributions (Spash, 2008a). This divergence is neglected because of the way in which 
the valuation problem is framed. 
Cognitive issues are considered as central to this preference construction approach. 
The starting point is individuals’ inability to measure values in monetary terms rather 
than inherent incommensurability. ‘Irrational’ behaviours commonly documented in 
valuation studies are relegated to a first-party problem, i.e. it is the individuals who fail. 
Uninformed respondents need professional guidance to clarify values and this is 
supported by additional information and time for thinking. Moral dispute over values is 
irrelevant or unimportant because everything is assumed reducible to the cognitive 
difficulties. There is no need to subvert the economic frame; only better science is 
needed, i.e. decision analysis and consistency with economic theory.  
Valuing agents cannot then be left to themselves. For example, Gregory and 
associates are highly sceptical of unaided value articulation. They offer a strictly 
structured valuation approach involving re-engineering of agents’ mind in accordance 
with a given evaluative model (Gregory et al., 1993; Gregory and Slovic, 1997; Gregory, 
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2000; McDaniels et al., 2003). The evaluation tasks are designed to streamline personal 
heuristic reflection supported by group discussion. Moreover, it is believed that 
subjective values must be properly articulated using a quantifiable scale. Gregory and 
Slovic (1997) and Gregory (2000) suggest that the perceived importance of, say, 
preservation of old-growth forests, can be measured by the respondents assigning ‘value 
points’ to one arch of critical habitat. Value points are also assigned to a specified 
amount of money. Comparing the two sets of value points, which now become a 
common unit, allows translation of the value attached to forest preservation into money 
value. This procedure operates under the assumptions that the valued items are divisible 
without affecting their perceived importance and the values attached to them are 
commensurable. This group of researchers has designed their group-based monetary 
valuation surveys in ways that resemble their risk assessment initiatives reviewed in 
Chapter 4. 
Some economists are preoccupied with some orthodox economic perspectives 
(MacMillan et al. 2002, Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley 2006, Urama and Hodge 2006, 
Álvarez-Farizoa et al. 2007, Álvarez-Farizo et al. 2009). The purpose is stated as 
achieving a more robust exchange value. In most cases, the core valuation tasks are 
framed as a consumer-type decision-making process. One obvious outcome is arbitrary 
exclusion of protest responses which include those failing to genuinely consider the 
required economic tradeoffs, presumably because these confound the standard economic 
explanations (Spash, 2008b). A consumer frame is also sustained by Gregory (2000) 
who directly asked the participants to think about a market analogy (car purchase) as a 
demonstration. 
The attempts of these economists are oriented to an information-deficit model. 
Robinson (2002, p. 97) employs citizens’ jury to address the ‘problems of information 
bias’ observed in conventional valuation studies. Likewise, Urama and Hodge (2006) 
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are satisfied with their educational participatory workshop for overcoming the 
‘challenge’ of information provision. The rhetoric bears some resemblance to Gregory’s 
strategy of easing human’s cognitive burdens by making information provision and 
learning more efficient. They believe that the principal problem is respondents lacking 
information to clarify their preference. The whole DMV experiment is designed to feed 
the valuing agents with adequate information and encourage personal reflection. The 
role of group discussion is trivial – helping participants ‘to learn what they want to 
know’ for making rational decision (Macmillan et al., 2002, p. 57). The processes are 
then in line with Gregory et al.’s (1993) suggested student tutorial analogy.  
The economic preference construction approach emphasizes value elicitation at 
the individual level. Group discussion support individuals in making their choice rather 
than the other way round. This approach seeks to induce instrumental considerations by 
focusing participants on the possible practical consequences of their prospective choice, 
and enforce an intra-personal integration of values by making individuals more 
conscious and informed of the relevant knowledge relating to that choice. Public values 
are sought from the focused thinking on public interests, but the ideal deliberative WTP 
remains as an economic construct. This approach nurtures rational economic men. 
 
5.4.2 Preference moralization 
DMV theorists from a wide range of disciplines identify the principal problems of 
environmental valuation as inadequate opportunities for expressing values and 
inappropriate attention to non-economic considerations, including social norms, rights 
and procedural fairness (Vatn and Bromley 1994, Clark et al. 2000, Jorgensen et al. 
2001, O'Neill 2007, Spash et al. 2009).  Various attempts have been made to draw on 
political theories to establish more ethical, open and fairer value-articulating institutions 
(VAIs) (O’Hara, 1996; O'Neill, 2007; Vatn, 2009).  Of particular interest to this group 
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has been the theory of deliberative democracy.   
 Preference moralisation follows this tradition by giving more credence to 
legitimacy issues, civic engagement, and social learning (Brown et al., 1995; Jacobs, 
1997; Sagoff, 1998; Ward, 1999; Niemeyer and Spash, 2001; Wilson and Howarth, 2002; 
James and Blamey, 2005; Howarth and Wilson, 2006; Spash, 2007, 2008b). A social 
process is constructed in which participants bring forth a variety of perspectives, and 
debate and reflect upon their preferences. There is a strong emphasis on the interactive 
aspects. Participants are expected to exercise the virtue of reciprocity and appeal to the 
‘force of the better arguments’ in a group process aiming for consensual outcomes. This 
approach actively pursues collective reflection on public interests beyond personal 
considerations.  
Participants would typically have more freedom in agenda setting and calling 
expert witness than under preference economisation. After hearing expert presentations 
and discussion, participants provide a WTP estimate in the form of a value for society or 
individual contribution.  In either case, some form of group agreement is desired, 
although minority positions are not excluded a priori. In general aggregated values are 
sought leading to arbitrated social WTP/WTA is preferred (see Tables 5.1 and 5.3).  A 
democratic process, and not merely an economic estimation, is sought.. 
Value convergence under preference moralization (e.g., Ward, 1999; Sagoff, 1998; 
Brown et al. 1995; Wilson and Howarth, 2002) is couched in terms of public interests. 
There is a thread of argument that deliberation should be limited to we-perspectives. 
Sagoff (1998) argues against the usual practice that environmental valuation 
experiments are designed to elicit consumer preference based on I-perspectives. Instead, 
‘a deliberative, discursive, jury-like research method emphasizing informed discussion 
leading toward a consensus based on an argument about the public interest’ is 
recommended (Sagoff, 1998, p. 213). In such a context, individuals might be asked to 
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deliberate without emphasising the welfare effect on individuals (Sagoff, 1998). Sagoff 
(1998), however, has ignored the fact that individuals often play the dual role of citizens 
and consumers simultaneously. Such a distinction is unrealistic and unnecessary. 
In this regard, consider Brown et al.’s (1995) proposal in which representation of 
private or partial interests is completely excluded. The ‘overriding objective’ of their 
jury selection procedure is to avoid including those who have ‘compelling personal 
interest’: ‘If a potential jurist’s personal interest in the outcome is such that he or she is 
not likely to be willing or able to see and fairly consider the collective good, that person 
should be excluded.’ (Brown et al., 1995, p. 256)  Since all the jurors are required to 
act as society’s representatives and set aside personal interests, such a strategy can 
quickly become reason-blind.  
Ward (1999) generally follows the same line when prohibiting personal 
evaluations in a citizens’ jury: ‘Jurors are not asked to express their personal evaluations 
but their judgements about what environment quality is worth to society as a whole.’ 
(Ward, 1999, p. 79)  Despite this, he then asks people to defend their personal 
evaluations in a ‘properly functioning citizens’ jury’: ‘jurors would be forced to defend 
their personal evaluations because others would use these as evidence for making their 
own collective evaluations under extended sympathy.’ (Ward, 1999, p. 91)  The first 
statement renders the second logically redundant: if a participant is not allowed to 
express their personal evaluation there would be no reason to defend it. Elsewhere in the 
paper Ward (1999) accepts that participants appeal to personal childhood memory when 
deliberating on heathland preservation. Unfortunately he then again contradicts himself 
by suggesting that participants should not be asked to express what the environment is 
worth to them as individuals (Ward, 1999, p. 91). Such authors appear ambiguous 
towards the program of capturing public interests. 
Wilson and Howarth (2002, p. 436) too suggest that participants should be 
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encouraged not to ‘take a narrow or group-interested standpoint’, quoted from Rawls 
(1971, p. 360). These authors are inattentive to the inconsistency between the Rawlsian 
approach and the different tradition of discursive democracy (another major strand of 
deliberative democracy theory). Espousing Rawls’s ideal of ‘original position’ which 
promises singular values undermines the capacity of DMV to maintain value plurality 
(Spash, 2007). 
While the ideal outcome value is singular as if it is articulated by a group of 
‘Rawlsian men’. Public values are sought from a conditionally open debate which 
focuses on collective well-beings exclusively.For this approach of DMV, the 
deliberative WTP obtained is informed by both facts and values. Unlike the constructed 
preference approach, debate on fundamental values is encouraged. The WTP manifests 
as a political construct for Sagoff, while it tends to be both political and economic for 
Howarth and Wilson.  
The general aim of those advocating a preference moralisation approach is for 
consensus (Sagoff, 1998; Ward, 1999; Wilson and Howarth, 2002; Howarth and Wilson, 
2006). They consider appeals to public interest as a means to overcome differences 
between multiple comprehensive doctrines like those required of the Rawlsian public 
reason. Seeking consensus in the light of public interest is to seek moral support from a 
shared tradition that is assumed to be acceptable by all parties involved. The feasibility 
of reaching consensus is self-justified by such an assumption. However, moral 
disagreement often arises from precisely the absence of a shared tradition. People 
subscribe to different ethical views and live in different traditions, sometimes 
simultaneously, i.e. act as both a consumer and citizen. This partially contributes to the 
incommensurability problems grappling with the stated preference approach. To ask all 
people to stop thinking as consumers is to silence that conflict altogether. That is, to 
impose such public-interest frames might unrealistically remove the fundamental 
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conditions of moral disagreement that deliberation is designated to address. 
Consumer-type respondents may still reasonably protest against the citizen frame. 
Silencing conflict cannot make a valuation theory free from the dilemma, irrespective of 
the type of values crowded out. 
 
5.5 PROBLEMATIC ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES 
Deliberative democracy affirms the role of mutual justification in pluralistic societies. 
This demands that proposed value claims be, at least in theory, ‘rejectable’ on their 
merits. Such a position is challenged both by the impartialist perspective common 
amongst preference moralisation approaches and the prevalence of utilitarianism 
common to both this and preference economisation approaches. 
 
5.5.1 Impartiality  
The impartial stance is reflected for example in Brown et al.’s (1995) participant 
selection strategy. In their ‘value jury’, facts are preceded by values as a deliberative 
focus. They link Harsanyi’s impartiality to Rawls’s (1971) ‘original position’, and argue 
for selecting participants who are capable of acting as agents of the larger public. The 
recommended selection criteria include: free of significant personal conflict of interest, 
willing and able to understand the issues and consider them objectively; possess 
adequate level of maturity, intelligence and education (Brown et al., 1995, p. 255-256). 
These criteria, however, prove to be excessively demanding. Logically, it excludes lay 
citizens and those holders of values who are affected by the decision involved. 
The observation that Brown et al.’s (1995) approach of value jury is ‘firmly rooted 
in the principles of discursive democracy’ (Howarth and Wilson, 2006, p. 8) is 
unwarranted. For their recommended jury selection strategy and the philosophy behind, 
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it actually bears more resemblance to the Rawlsian approach than discursive democracy 
(see Dryzek, 1990, p. 43; (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008). Howarth and Wilson (2006) 
appreciate Gregory’s (2000) deliberative strategies. However, as Chapter 4 has shown 
(see also Lo, forthcoming a), Gregory’s analytic approach is qualitatively different from, 
and at times competing with, its deliberative-democratic counterpart. The former is 
characterized by an expert culture and technocratic orientation, and therefore cannot 
survive some key democratic imperatives such as participant empowerment. 
Howarth and Wilson (2006) attempt to demonstrate cross-disciplinary relevance. 
They draw on Dryzek’s (1990, 2000) discursive democracy, which emphasizes 
contestation of discourse and condemns hierarchy following the tradition of critical 
theory. But their deliberative ideal of ‘aggregation by mutual consent’ subscribes to the 
normative model of liberal democracy advocated by, among others, John Rawls. The 
Rawlsian approach is hinged on a set of ‘superior’ political ideals functioning as a 
singular conception of values; acceptance of which would weaken the moral need of 
actual deliberation by citizens (Dryzek, 2000; Bohman, 1996). This makes their DMV 
model unfit to the critical strand, which challenges the idea of impartialist pre-accepted 
universal appeal (Dryzek, 2000).  
 
 
5.5.2 The Prevalence of Utilitarianism  
Utilitarianism appears in the context of DMV as a common moral doctrine which is a 
specific form of the imposition of impartiality. It clearly underlies the value system of 
those analysts who are strongly committed to meeting pragmatic policy needs.  
Gregory and associates have applied the MAUT to a group CVM process (Gregory et 
al., 1993; Gregory, 2000).  Those practitioners theoretically grounded in decision 
science attempt to make valuing agents thoroughly think through each key dimension of 
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an issue and systematically construct and express their values. The outputs are then 
mathematically combined to form a summary measure. The final calculation is based on 
‘expected utility’; a single utilitarian value structure is embraced. As Gregory et al. 
(1993, p. 188) state: 
The eventual goal is to find a single hierarchy of values that all the shareholders 
can agree is complete. The values hierarchy must also be built with due concern 
for the form of the utility combination rule.  
The nature of values as perceived by these decision scientists can be traced back to the 
value-focused model sketched by Keeney (1992), in which values are understood as 
‘what we want’. 
Other DMV preference construction practitioners place a strong emphasis on the 
psychology of information processing, while operating under an orthodox economics 
framework. Some are keen to deny or hide the validity of non-utilitarian responses 
which are commonly found in conventional CVM studies (Spash, 2008b). 
Álvarez-Farize et al. (2007, 2009), for example, seek the ‘committed value of a citizen’ 
but are reluctant to give credit to rights-based dimensions, probably because this would 
cast doubt on their favoured utilitarian framework. Such perspectives are remainder to 
being ‘things’ which fall under the valuers’ economic preference in an undefined way. 
Thus, they state: ‘the willingness to pay will not only include those things that favour 
individuals, but also those that favour the community’ (Álvarez-Farize et al., 2009, p. 
790). The ‘Market Stall’ approach adopted by Macmillan et al. (2002, 2006), Philip and 
Macmillan (2005) and Lienhoop and Macmillan (2007) is designed to lead people to 
think like consumers making purchase decisions in real markets. This approach is not 
called citizens’ juries because, as Macmillan et al. (2002) explain, it attempts to 
combine (only) the ‘desirable features’ of citizens’ juries – presumably referring to the 
opportunities of discussion and information sharing – with economic valuation. 
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Non-economic considerations are precluded by removing the ‘undesirable’ features. 
The philosophy of utilitarianism can also be found in Gowdy and Parks 
(forthcoming), who argue that deliberative valuation is consistent with findings from 
contemporary welfare economics. A contribution of research into group processes, as 
they see it, is to ascertain situations that give humans utility.  They conclude that 
individuals are the best judges of what is best for themselves and endorse Bentham’s 
utilitarian principle of the ‘greatest good for the greatest number’ as a basis of 
environmental policy-making. The theory seems at odds with the principles of mutual 
justification (which seeks approval from other citizens) and granting minority voices 
equal deliberative status.  
The proposal of Ward (1999) is stated to be based on Harsanyi’s utilitarianism. His 
normative ideal requires that individuals put themselves into others’ shoes, extending 
their sympathy to others’ interests. So long as a natural entity has interests that people 
would empathize with, a utility function can be ascribed to it. Such utility functions 
‘reflect the idea that it best serves interests if expected utility is maximized’ (Ward, 1999, 
p. 90). Those interests admitted to citizen deliberation must be impersonal, as indicated 
by the preference for citizens to engage in the ‘norms of impartial debate’ (Ward, 1999, 
p. 79). 
Deliberatively elicited monetary values are interpreted by James and Blamey 
(2005) with a welfare-economic framework. While these authors are sympathetic to the 
idea of deliberative democracy, they pursue an ‘economic interpretation’ of the elicited 
values in terms of a social welfare function and social optimality. Although they 
consider a citizen-type frame of reference more appropriate than a consumer one, it was 
relinquished to a ‘purchase model typically assumed in environmental economics’, in 
order to make the WTP estimates compatible with traditional CBA (James and Blamey, 
2005, p. 238). Yet this does not preclude them from suggesting that a citizen perspective 
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was sustained.  
Howarth and Wilson (2006, p. 11) define the deliberative groups’ maximum WTP 
for increased environmental quality as ‘the level of W [group payment] for which the 
group would be indifferent between implementing the proposed project and maintaining 
the status quo’. They note that the WTP is based on a standard utility function that 
summarizes preferences, beliefs and moral judgments and is not limited to a person’s 
individual well-being or consumer preferences. Yet this does not preclude them from 
linking it to a maximization rule. Public deliberation is envisaged as a ‘fair negotiating’ 
process in which individuals engage in a search for maximization of group well-being.  
Deliberative democracy does not exclude utilitarian calculation. However, if 
individuals holding diverse values are presumed and/or encouraged to follow a single 
comprehensive ethic, e.g. utility maximization, what is the point of debating values?   
 
5.5.3 Crowding out deliberative democracy 
Utilitarianism offers a single inclusive end as the proper home to all moral claims. The 
axiom of utility maximization challenges the pursuit of a deliberatively democratic state. 
Maximizing aggregate well-being leads to a neglect of partial and minority interest 
positions for which a reciprocal perspective must make room (Gutmann and Thompson, 
1996). Such interests, however reasonable, are always marginalized by the 
maximization rule. This means the imperative of reason-giving fails to function properly. 
If a deliberative group is designated to make a decision that would guarantee a 
maximum social utility, participants would only need adequate supply of information 
and a process of corroboration, not reasoned debate. The moral role of DMV would be 
reduced to a pedagogical one emphasizing information exchange and clarification. 
Dryzek (2000) attacks Rawls’s (1997b) theory of public reason on the grounds that 
it could be undertaken by a solitary thinker, so that there is no need for actual 
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deliberation. Arguments that must be couched in terms potentially acceptable to all 
citizens require only personal reflection - setting aside material self-interest and 
weighing of arguments in mind. Accordingly, the best individuals to exercise public 
reason would not be ordinary citizens, but intellectual elites. The participant selection 
strategy recommended by Brown et al. (1995) would undermine the moral need for 
citizens to deliberate. As the logic goes, the best combination of deliberators would 
consist of, say, philosophers, economists, scientists, judges, etc. Those lay citizens who 
have to live with the decision made would be excluded. This unambiguously violates 
the basic principles of deliberative democracy.  
Group deliberation is needed to introduce reasons that do not inherently possess 
universal appeal and to expose them to the possibility of being reasonably rejected. 
Unlike impartiality, the principle of reciprocity does not categorically exclude partial 
interests that can be connected to a generalizable domain and so necessitates actual 
deliberation.  
Those who deliberately insert a specific preconception of public interest into their 
model are trapped in the same problem as the Rawlsian public reason which seeks 
potential acceptance from all members of society in light of liberal values. Since the 
reason is singular, it is destined towards a particular end wherever it is exercised; no 
interactive process is necessary to enable it to produce its conclusions (Dryzek, 2000). 
Thus James and Blamey (2005) correctly point out that if the participants act fully as 
citizens exercising the Rawlsian veil of ignorance and have perfect knowledge of 
relevant circumstances, limited representativeness would no longer be a problem. More 
precisely, in a such case authentic representation of idiosyncratic perspectives would 
indeed be meaningless, because all participants are bound to relinquish their specific 
concerns to an impartial stance. Although participants may discuss which sets of public 
interest to be privileged, downplaying partial interests by design would undermine the 
118 
 
arguments for invoking a communicative reasoning.  
The Rawlsian public reason is something that citizens must adopt before debate 
(Dryzek, 2000). Yet, Wilson and Howarth suggest that the most appropriate 
value-articulating methodology is one that mirrors the Rawlsian ‘procedurally based 
public forum in which people are brought together to debate before making value 
judgments’ (Wilson and Howarth, 2002, p. 434, emphasis added). This view seems to be 
removed from the essence of the notion of public reason. Value debate is of little 
necessity if the reason has been endorsed as an overriding frame of reference. Authentic 
communication on a universally justifiable moral end is redundant as the reason sought 
is exogenous to it.  
Under an orthodox MAUT approach, a multicriteria problem is replaced by a 
monocriterion one (Munda 1995). Like neoclassical economics, it cannot succeed 
without ‘tacitly asserting an individual dominant perspective and performance data set’ 
(Stirling 1997, p. 194). Philosophical debate avoided, group discussion is then assigned 
a supplementary role, serving to raise participants’ comfort and pool different evaluative 
judgements (McDaniels et al. 2003). Clarification of values, rather than justification, is 
the true purpose. This approach targets individuals’ cognitive failure, requires the use of 
impersonal expressions of values and regards demonstration of benefits and costs as key. 
Thus it fits squarely with the notion of impartiality. The whole project could be 
satisfactorily undertaken without actual discussion. 
Any democratic principle predicated upon a preoccupied singular conception of 
values cannot be sustained in light of deliberative democracy. Deliberative valuation 
predisposed toward a utilitarian frame is not defensible. Couched in such terms, it 
would only result in a distorted notion of value pluralism. 
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5.6 PROSPECT FOR VALUE PLURALISM 
What the literature reviewed has shown is that a researcher’s preoccupations might lead 
to excessive intervention in the deliberative processes or even manipulation of outcomes 
(whether intended or unintended). Under both economisation and moralisation 
approaches, individuals are either required to strengthen their economic beliefs or 
transform attitudes toward a particular moral end.  The proposed experimental controls 
appear to violate the requirement of value pluralism, which affirms the need for 
maintaining alternative values.  An alternative conceptualization is then needed. 
 
5.6.1 Expert Prejudgement and Bounded Reasoning 
The foregoing DMV approaches raise the prospect for value pluralism but resort to an 
accepted ethical tradition.  Deliberation of this sort is subject to restrictions on 
reasoning.  The prospects for value pluralism are questionable if researchers 
deliberately downplay some reasons by design or force those not normally used in a 
given context into the deliberative forum. Worse is that some of the methodological 
preoccupations, such as ‘no personal interest’, should have been but are not open to 
debate as one of the candidate reasons. Research designs shape values as they are built 
upon some philosophical foundations. Debating values and beliefs but protecting the 
researchers’ own from challenge is untenable from a deliberative democratic viewpoint. 
This leaves the project of facilitating reasoned pluralism undefined and undefended. 
Economic preference construction strives to induce instrumental reasoning and 
focuses more on preference than reason. Cognitive failure amongst valuing agents is 
taken as the ultimate, overriding reason justifying the professionally aided deliberation. 
Other incompatible value positions have to be compromised to be considered. Firmly 
holding to the exclusively expert-led approach, Gregory and associates openly and 
firmly decline participants’ autonomy in favour of a scientific deliberative design: ‘the 
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scope of their role falls well short of a license to redesign the process’ (McDaniels et al. 
1999, p. 500). On this point decision scientists and economists are united. Powe (2007, 
p. 166), an economist who reviews the practice of DMV and leans towards preference 
economisation approach, believes that ‘it may be considered inappropriate for the 
results from public consultation to directly determine the policy outcomes’. The 
economists’ customary exclusion of ‘irrational’ responses also indicates a desire to 
protect some of the tenets of the neoclassical economic theory. 
Exclusive we-perspective, whether utilitarian or other, is reason-blind. By 
restricting the deliberative space to considerations of public interest, the preference 
moralisation approach should be suspected for prejudging the problem at issue. The 
classic citizen-consumer dichotomy formulated by Sagoff (1988, 1998) is not very 
helpful for understanding environmental values in terms of green consumerism. 
Participant selection strategy preferred by Brown et al. (1995) might even silence 
potential protest against this treatment. Social utilitarian approaches like James and 
Blamey (2005) and Howarth and Wilson (2006) are committed to consensus-oriented 
deliberation for elicitation of informed economic value judgments. There is, however, 
no reason to expect that a deliberative WTP generated in accordance with 
communicative rationality is bound to conform to orthodox economic constructs. 
Dietz et al.’s (2009) treatment is less restrictive than these others. They consider 
environmental valuation as asking an essentially political question that is open to 
various philosophical conceptions of values. They carefully avoid predefining the 
deliberative outcome as a utilitarian construct. Deliberative WTP is seen as ‘emerging 
from a social dialogue about, among other things, whether to define value in terms of a 
utilitarian calculus or in some other way’ (Dietz et al. 2009, p. 330). Thus the extent to 
which the value-articulating process should be framed in ways consistent with 
economics is an open question rather than taken for granted, as Niemeyer and Spash 
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(2001) and Jorgensen (2009) suggest. A procedure of anonymous tabling of reasons was 
used in Dietz et al. (2009) (also in James and Blamey, 2005). Each participant wrote 
down a list of reasons in relation to global warming and proposed one reason at a time. 
The proposed reasons were recorded and posted around the meeting room visible to all. 
The facilitator then asked for verbal comments on the listed reasons and prompted 
discussion. The process was repeated until all reasons were discussed. This approach 
enabled orderly argumentation over all concerns raised, and free articulation of reasons 
and their revision. It placed little restriction on the types of reason and forms of 
expression, making it conducive to communicative reasoning and less manipulative than 
Gregory’s (2000) approach. The authors conclude that the deliberating individuals acted 
like policy analysts by taking more consideration of the specific policy attributes. 
A theory of DMV would be unsustainable if it prejudges the nature of the 
outcomes according to one of its candidate values, or its implied values are exempted 
from being challenged from within the deliberation by participants. Such prejudgement 
means practitioners act as both a juror and a judge shift between roles at various points. 
When designing and explaining the project, they act as a juror to insert values; when 
defending this, they act as a judge to override alternative interpretations or apply 
exemption. While valuing agents are asked to reflect upon their preferences, there is 
little reflection on the part of practitioners. ‘Practitioners do not evaluate the fairness of 
their procedures nor examine whether individuals believe that their own and others 
WTP is relevant to their conception of the problem at hand.’ (Jorgensen, 2009, p. 251)
 The pursuit of pluralism is dubious if values and beliefs are led, according to the 
analysts’ predisposition, to converge along one of the first-order values that ought to be 
openly discussed. There is no hope for fairness by unfairly expelling rivals. 
At the same time, the theory of deliberative democracy is by no means 
value-neutral. Contrary to the view that the theory is no more than a procedural ethic, it 
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has both substantive and procedural elements (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Dryzek, 
2000). Nevertheless, its core principles do not postulate a generalized moral end from 
which substantive operational norms could be deduced leading to a course of action in 
relation to resource allocation, nor does it define value pluralism on the basis of one of 
the competing values. In addition, the requirements of the theory are indefinitely open 
to rejection and revision where publicly reasonable (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 
2004; Dryzek, 2000).  
 
5.6.2 Agreeing to Disagree: Questioning Theory 
On the premise that monetary value is inherently an economic construct, some 
practitioners appeal to the procedural benefits of public deliberation. As public 
deliberation can internalize equity issues and enhance procedural fairness, it is 
conducive to broadening the democratic basis of the economic estimation (James and 
Blamey, 2005; Wilson and Howarth, 2006). On the same premise, others endorse public 
(or stakeholder) deliberation for allowing richer and higher-quality information content. 
It is used to meet higher economic standards (Macmillan et al., 2002; Gregory, 2000; 
Urama and Hodge, 2006). Many are sympathetic to both.  
Holding this premise unchanged, however, neither the procedural ethic nor the 
analytic substance can survive the normative critiques. The premise is a pre-reason 
embedded in conventional stated preference approaches that the analysts believe to be 
true and good for society. The analysts act as if a deliberating agent, either implicitly or 
explicitly, and justify the premise a priori to the deliberating individuals, based on 
which their respective reasons could be scrutinized. Constructed as an economic 
institution, monetary valuation of public goods always concedes trading-off morality 
given that this notion is part of the norms of economics. Most importantly, this is 
manifested as an undemocratically justified and unredeemable reason. 
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DMV then faces the problem of being interpreted as a first-order theory. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, first-order theories operate by rejecting rival theories and 
principles, whereas second-order theories function to govern the interaction between 
first-order theories without granting a priori judgements on their merits (Gutmann and 
Thompson, 1996). As far as irreducibility of plural values is concerned, a DMV framed 
by any first-order theory is doomed to failure. Deliberative democracy accepts solutions 
on the basis of reasoned differences and allows ‘workable agreement’, in which 
participants agree on a course of action for different reasons (Eriksen, 1994; Dryzek, 
2000). An ideal deliberative process mediated by the principles of reciprocity should 
proceed with participants cultivating mutual respect and recognition over each other’s 
ethical perspectives provided that they can be justified as reasonable. Participants are 
not rigidly required to agree on the principles of the alternative perspectives in specific, 
but accept them, if justified, as a legitimate basis of decision-making. Mutuality in 
reasoned argumentation is crucially important to this endeavour. 
Incommensurability of values cannot be resolved by simply informing preferences 
or opening up the valuation process to a variety of perspectives. The theory of 
deliberative democracy entails a re-orientation of the interactive structure, and not 
merely of the substance of valuation. The epistemic status of monetary valuation has to 
be left open. The key is to downplay privilege of any substantive value - and open its 
own for rejection – on the one hand; and to allow reasoned disagreement, on the other 
(Dryzek, 1990, 1995, 2000; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004). An ideal form of 
DMV should belong to no first-order theory and generate mutual agreement reached on 
the merit of each reasonable value claim. 
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5.7 DISCOURSE-BASED APPROACH 
A DMV approach predisposed to a particular set of motivational criteria is problematic. 
Under neoclassical economics WTP is defined as invariably a function of expected 
utility change. It has to be redefined to reflect the pluralistic nature of the project of 
DMV. My approach is termed as ‘discourse-based approach’, following O’Hara (1996, 
2001)6 (see also Lo and Spash, under review). 
DMV primarily involves the individuals collectively searching for and defining an 
institution acceptable for valuing the environment in monetary terms, rather than pricing 
it under a perfectly predefined institution.  Held values are construed broadly as 
reasons raised by the individuals to justify a course of action, and the process of 
valuation is akin to seeking fair terms of cooperation on an individual/group payment 
decision. The elicited deliberative WTP should be understood as a collectively bound 
‘workable agreement’ embodying the ideal of ‘what is to be done while differing about 
why’ (Dryzek, 1990, p. 43). A deliberative WTP, formed on the basis of reciprocity 
between two individuals who hold different moral beliefs, might be influenced by at 
least two motivational criteria.  These are reflected in the contrast between willingness 
and agreement. 
To one individual, the monetary expression might be motivated by her own interest, 
and/or recognition of the other’s claim in view of the legitimacy of her cultural tradition 
and/or ethical beliefs. She might, however, still disagree in specific on the substantive 
principles held by the other. Based on mutual understanding and respect, this kind of 
agreement does not require or presume uniformity across participants or perfect 
agreement on norms (Dryzek, 1990). It merely involves sharing of subjective 
                                                 
6
 ‘Discourse-based valuation’ has been adopted by Wilson and Howarth (2002) as well. Yet it is used as a 
way somewhat at odds with the idea of discursive democracy (Dryzek, 1990, 2000). Here I refer to 
O’Hara (1996, 2001) only to highlight its theoretical root in discursive ethics. 
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experiences (inter-subjectivity). Without subscribing or surrendering to each other’s 
perspectives, the deliberating individuals might articulate WTP as a second-order 
agreement, which does not constitute trading off their personal moral beliefs against 
others’ (Gutmann and Thonpson, 1996, p. 93).  
The deliberative WTP would no longer entirely represent a money payment for 
common interest, because the two individuals might fail to consider the other’s interest 
as acceptable in specific. It is better described as, at least partially, an ‘agreement to pay’ 
following the notion of workable agreement. A person might be willing to pay to obtain 
or do something she considers as good or right. The evaluation could be done by a 
solitary thinker given adequate information and a hypothetical transaction opportunity. 
The idea of willingness to pay does not capture the essence of the deliberative ideal of 
inter-subjectivity, as it is primarily motivated by and ends in one’s own values.  
On the other hand, a person might grant agreement on behalf of those she 
represents for something challenging to her own personal preference, so long as the 
reasons are compelling. This mutual justification process cannot be carried out by 
solitary thinking, but only by an interactive process pursuing inter-subjective 
understanding. Unlike willingness, engaging in some interpersonal connection or social 
relationship with those who are the objects of mutual justification is a necessary 
condition for agreement. A person might be willing to contribute to a course of action 
without other people’s consent, but agreement always implies mutuality. The former is 
linked to personal interest (broadly defined as including utility, rights, or any other 
ideals considered to desirable), whereas the latter also applies to causes outside of 
personal interests. An ideal deliberative WTP is distinguished from the conventional one 
for the requirement that its ethical legitimacy has to be validated not just in the privacy 
of one’s mind, but also to the acceptance of a second party. This means only 
group-determined WTP makes sense as a representation of democratic and pluralistic 
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process, i.e. fair price or arbitrated WTP/WTA. 
Another property of a deliberative WTP is that its substantive meaning is 
envisaged as contextually contingent. What it means is always seen as an empirical 
question, rather than a pre-definable postulate. Pre-defining it according to standards 
exogenous to deliberation would imperil the pursuit of communicative rationality. The 
economic conception of values should be given no privilege, or the meaning would 
become dictated. The imperative of mutual justification demands that this and other 
conceptions be open to rejection in the valuation process. In principle, the WTP could 
be explained by any one. Participants are encouraged to bring forth a variety of values 
and beliefs and debate on them based on their merits. It is difficult to predict, and 
undesirable to prejudge, which set of values will contribute or explain the outcome. The 
natural dynamic is largely unknown prior to deliberation and all value claims have the 
chance of being rejected. Plus the context varies by case. To give a universal definition 
to deliberative WTP is impossible and unnecessary. 
Vatn’s (2005) critique quoted earlier in this paper is defensible if the valuation 
inquiry is entirely underwritten by a neoclassical economic framework. However, his 
arguments (see also Vatn, 2009) are weakened when communicative and economic 
rationalities are seen not as a dichotomy.  Actually they are not mutually exclusive. 
The epistemic status of monetization is amenable to the rationality of the concerned VAI. 
Communicative rationality is the extent to which an action is characterized by reflective 
and inter-subjective understanding of competent actors on values, beliefs and 
preferences. As an inter-subjective discourse, it does not and should not preclude 
individual citizens from exercising utility maximization rules. Rejection of the 
dominance of economics should not be conflated with rejection of economics. The 
political ideal requires individuals to question or defend the case for monetary valuation, 
but does not by definition accept or deny it on their behalf. It is not defensible to restrict 
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public deliberation to we-perspectives and communitarian norms. 
Valuing the environment is not inherently unacceptable provided that it is framed 
to the satisfaction of this higher-order rationality. Utility maximization rules and market 
rationality could be accepted upon mutual agreement among all the participants of a 
discursive process (Dietz 1994). The assertion that these economic imperatives are 
invariably incompatible with the rationality of public deliberation effectively renders the 
deliberative rules exogenous to the communicative process from which political 
legitimacy is acquired, i.e. it is not legitimate on its own terms. Such preoccupations are 
essentially no more different from those rejected earlier in this paper. Alternatively, the 
key should be to subordinate the economic rationality to the regulation of 
communicative reasoning and calibrate the discursive design to preclude any 
manipulative or coercive treatment privileging a particular comprehensive doctrine. 
Making the reason-giving process open, free and critical (e.g. Dietz et al., 2009) is 
normatively more appropriate than professionally ‘guiding’ it along a decision-scientific 
rationality (e.g. Gregory, 2000). The social meaning of assigning money value has to be 
set free. 
DMV is not meant to be an exclusive economic construct, nor a rights-based one. 
At least it should not be predefined as tied to any one value orientation or philosophy, 
otherwise DMV cannot address incommensurability. Deliberative institutions cannot 
make incompatible value positions compatible, but they can help them live peacefully 
and respectfully together. As an institution, DMV contributes to the assigning of social 
import to the act of valuing and the money values elicited. The assigned meanings act as 
terms of cooperation and are not fixed; they are what the deliberative institutions should 
seek. There is no need to rigidly envisage the social act of paying always as a trade-off. 
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5.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The method of DMV is being developed under two different traditions. Arguments for 
more democracy have produced a version that takes ethics and alternative values more 
seriously and favours group-determined WTPs. Arguments for more science have 
created one that seeks to modify the traditional economic conception of values without a 
morally critical intent and favours individual WTPs. In the former case, a weak 
conception of deliberative democracy has been taken to overturn economics, while in 
the latter, implicitly reinforce it. A strong deliberative democracy does neither, but 
dismantles the dominance of economics. DMV theories and experiments that privilege 
or marginalize by design any single category of values should be held in suspicion. 
There should be more emphasis on inter-subjectivity as much as the informational 
content of the value obtained. It is proposed that DMV should seek the values of public 
goods not simply from expressing and/or aggregating values or preferences. It is 
re-conceptualized as a mutual agreement as a result of an interactive process enabling 
contestation of discourses.  
 As far as value pluralism is concerned, the two approaches share a key limitation. 
That is, they both seek to enforce a constrained form of rationality as a criterion or 
explanation for the elicited value represented in monetary terms. Any deviation from the 
specified standards is likely to be regarded as irrational or inappropriate. Alternatives 
values, convictions and beliefs can hardly be sustained under these approaches where 
these dispositions come into conflict with the theoretical expectations underlying the 
value-articulating framework concerned. Neither, therefore, actually embraces a 
structural reconstruction and has adequate pluralistic capacity. 
 Reconstructing the ways in which a stated value is conceptualized is one possible 
way to redeem the project of DMV. This requires a radical treatment: decoupling the 
understanding of agreement on a WTP decision from individual preference where 
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appropriate. The last sections have provided theoretical justifications. The second half 
of this thesis is intended to shed empirical light. 
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PART III 
METHODOLOGY 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE EMPIRICAL DIMENSIONS OF DISCOURSE- 
BASED APPROACH AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The notion of a workable agreement introduced in the previous chapter has a seemingly 
counterintuitive component. That is, an individual may agree on a course of action to 
which she personally has serious doubts. Among the various issues DMV practitioners 
are grappling with, this one is chosen as the core theme of the empirical section of this 
thesis. It is related to a key problem common to both of the two DMV approaches which, 
as argued in Chapter 5, may undermine the promise of this strand of research, where 
value pluralism is taken as an overarching objective of environmental valuation research. 
Justifications for the discourse-based approach as a more promising alternative can be 
established through investigating the emergence of a workable agreement. A systematic 
characterization of its emergence and the related political ideals can provide insights 
into the nature of DMV outcomes and the prospect for value pluralism. 
 This chapter links the theory to practice by explaining how these ideas are applied 
to an empirical inquiry. Next the theoretical context is outlined on which the inquiry is 
base. The ensuing section elaborates how the expectations and requirements of the 
different models of DMV (i.e. preference economization, preference moralization, and 
discourse-based) are relevant to the inquiry, particularly in terms of the notion of 
workable agreement. The last section presents some research questions. 
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6.2 THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
Economic valuation following the neoclassical tradition is based on a consumer model. 
Pricing the environment is experimentally constructed as an economic activity. Thus 
neoclassical economists endeavour to extract a modified economic value from the 
constructed preference approach. Those who are critical of the method doubt that it 
could guarantee economic qualities (Price, 2000; Powe, 2007). They argue that WTP for 
an environmental change is invariably an economic construct and should be made more 
so. Common to both sides is a belief that a stated value should literally reflect the 
entirety of individual preferences as they stand. 
 Advocates of the preference moralization approach seek to elicit an economic 
value amenable to value pluralism. The stated economic value, they believe, would have 
greater pluralistic potential where the political processes involved are open to a range of 
ethical perspectives. Critics of DMV doubt that political processes are compatible with 
economic valuation. Merging processes is deemed to be problematic because the stated 
economic value inherently cannot represent citizen perspectives (Vatn, 2005, 2009). 
Again, common to both sides is a belief that a stated value, be it economic or not, 
should literally reflect the variety of social preferences as they stand. 
Let me first respond to the critics, who in effect assume a dichotomy between 
economics and politics. The established view that monetary valuation of the 
environment involves an economic and not political process is flawed. WTP responses 
prove to be politically motivated (Blamey, 1998; Jorgensen et al., 2001). The favoured 
apolitical, purely economic values are an artefact that contradicts the actual plurality of 
values. Capturing public values in neoclassical economic terms is itself part of a larger 
political process. It is political and should be treated as such - but in a more democratic 
way.  
The opposite view - that merging economic and political processes is inappropriate 
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- does not take the actual political economy seriously. Take carbon taxes and emission 
trading as an example. These are market-based instruments embodying the concept of 
carbon pricing. To determine an acceptable level of carbon tax or emission cap, 
decision-makers need to be informed about people’s WTP. If WTP elicitation has little 
political relevance, one should never have public deliberation on carbon pricing at all. 
Cost-benefit analysis has certainly been a subject of political debates. These two groups 
of critics have also ignored the fact that not all individuals are hostile to economic 
valuation, and they could reasonably complain about the repudiation of economic 
approaches. Isolating such economic inquiries raises issues about premature closure of 
conflicts that a democratic deliberation is supposed to deal with. 
In most circumstances, a single solution cannot settle competing objectives without 
any compromise. Consensual outcomes are rarely comprehensive enough to fully 
account for all types of values raised. While the neoclassical economists alike are 
satisfied with capturing only one category of value, the sympathetic heterodox 
economists are not really close to value pluralism either. Pluralistic societies are 
characterized by individuals having competing interests and expectations. No single 
form of value could capture their wishes to their entirety. Any expectation that a 
deliberative WTP should act as a word-for-word representation of the diverse 
dispositions would render the project of DMV a failure.  
The key problem confronting both the neoclassical economists, and heterodox 
economists and other value pluralists actually pertains to the largely unquestioned 
objective of ‘capturing reality’, or capturing values as expressed - the conventional 
underlying practice of ecosystem valuation as well as some of its heterodox 
counterparts. Under this approach, monetary valuation is a search for a single 
monotonic indicator. The conception does not work in pluralistic societies. The ability 
to indicate held values diminishes as their diversity increases. Construing WTP as an 
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indicator would ultimately be trapped in a contradiction where unlimited combinations 
of values are possible, making ‘indication’ meaningless7. Granted that these are limited, 
a single cardinal scale remains poorly placed to capture idiosyncratic or anecdotal forms 
of expression. Translating plural values into a particular form is more a daunting task 
than ever. This critique is nonetheless not limited to the concept of WTP, but also many 
other forms of deliberative outcomes. It is fairly strange and unrealistic to envisage a 
collective decision mutually agreed by deeply divided groups as a representative 
outcome fully and equally projecting everyone’s wishes.  
The demanding concept of value indication or translation constitutes a barrier to 
the pursuit of value pluralism. A normative theory of DMV should tolerate coexistence 
of competing values. In DMV, multiple reasons might underpin a WTP decision 
construed as an agreement to pay. The decision, however, might be far from a logical 
outcome of some of these reasons. A collective decision on payment for climate 
mitigation, for example, might be supported by two groups of individuals holding 
competing concerns, such as climate sceptics and non-sceptics. It might then be 
underpinned by the dichotomous beliefs that human-induced climate change is 
evidenced by science and that, counterintuitively, it is not. Striving for consensus on 
such a collective action while demanding close association between one’s values and 
preferences could only yield two outcomes: no consensus, or consensus under perfect 
value agreement, which is unlikely under deep conflict. Neither makes room for 
effective action-oriented cooperation without perceived compromise. The traditional 
criterion is not a benchmark of this research. An agreed WTP decision might make 
sense of particular sets of values held by individual agreeing parties, but not necessarily 
                                                 
7
 Indicating numerous unknown variables is indicating nothing. Each individual holds a bunch of values 
and no one knows how adequate their translation into a monetary expression has been. WTP would then 
become an empty concept and the notion of ‘valuing something’ would become dubious as the 
‘something’ cannot be meaningfully defined. Although it is possible to give a definition in an ex ante 
fashion and in an inductive way, it proves to be increasingly difficult to mount multiple, divided values on 
a single scale, whatever is the scale.   
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all others. A modest degree of deviation might indicate a realization of the deliberative 
democratic principles. This assertion allows an empirical exploration of the expectations 
and requirements of the discourse-based approach of DMV, in contrast to its alternatives 
as discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
6.3 EXPECTATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS 
6.3.1 Workable Agreements and Meta-Consensus 
As explained in Chapter 5, a discourse-based DMV should produce outcomes, including 
a WTP decision - preferably an ‘arbitrated social WTP’,(see Chapter 5) - that are 
theoretically consistent with the idea of a workable agreement. A workable agreement, 
involves individuals agreeing on a course of action while disagreeing on reasons that 
support it (Eriksen, 1994; Dryzek, 2000). It does not demand consensus on values, but 
recognition of the legitimacy of the reasons offered by other individuals. In DMV, the 
individuals seek mutually acceptable solutions to issues like the use of a pricing 
mechanism, the format and perhaps the level of payment, and allocation of raised funds. 
Agreement on subjective values, however, is not a requirement. Subjective conformity 
may compromise prospects for value pluralism. Although DMV is open to value 
transformation, striving for convergence would ultimately bring the use of deliberative 
methods into question. More appealing is to understand transformation as enhancement 
of sharing of subjective states (values) without erasing value differences. In that case, 
engagement in subjective states on the part of the deliberating individuals would 
fluctuate, yet producing no net change in group outcome. To illustrate, Table 6.1 shows 
the changes in subjective values of two hypothetical individuals. After deliberation the 
individuals become more sympathetic to each other’s position (levels of engagement 
increase from 0 – 50). Mathematically these movements cancel out each other, 
producing a combined effect of no net change (the average levels of engagement remain 
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50) Agreement couched in such terms is not based on reduced diversity, but enhanced 
reciprocity at work. Enhanced mutual respect goes with some degree of conflict 
retained. 
 
Table 6.1 Idealized movements in level of engagement in two value sets 
 Pre-deliberation Post-deliberation 
 
Value Set 1 Value Set 2 Value Set 1 Value Set 2 
Individual A 100 0 50 50 
Individual B 0 100 50 50 
Average 50 50 50 50 
 
A workable agreement involves changes in values as illustrated in Table 6.1 
coupled with an agreement on stated preferences. The desired form of agreement is 
described as a ‘meta-consensus’ by Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006), who believe that this 
concept can reconcile the seemingly opposing ideals of consensus and pluralism. 
Meta-consensus embraces value pluralism at a simple level while seeking consensus on 
values, beliefs and preferences at meta-level (Table 6.2). Individuals tend to have a high 
degree of agreement on the legitimacy of basic values at abstract level and the main 
difference among them is the relative priority of values. Consensus requires normative 
uniformity in terms of the latter. To the contrary, normative meta-consensus does not 
demand that citizens conform to others’ legitimate values nor agree on the priority of 
values. It requires agreement on the recognition of the legitimacy of a value. The shift to 
meta level contrasts the conventional conceptions of consensus which seeks agreement 
at preference level (Niemeyer and Dryzek, 2007). The types of consensus prized by 
Cohen and Habermas would produce consensual choice through preference 
convergence. Under Dryzek and Niemeyer’s (2006) treatment, pluralism and consensus 
could be reconciled in a less demanding way that supports ‘justice as recognition’. In 
this sense, the idea also differs from Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ approach by not 
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requiring normative uniformity towards basic liberal values. 
 
Table 6.2 Types of consensus 
 Element of Preference Construction 
 Held Value Belief Preference 
Type of 
Consensus 
Normative consensus 
(Agreement on the values 
that should predominate) 
Epistemic consensus 
(Agreement on belief 
about the impact of a 
policy) 
Preference consensus 
(Agreement on 
preference for a policy) 
Meta-Cou
nterpart 
Recognition of legitimacy 
of disputed values 
Acceptance of credibility 
of disputed beliefs 
Agreement on the nature 
of disputed preferences 
Adapted from Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006) 
 
Collective actions formed on the basis of meta-consensus feature in coexistence 
with different perceptions of reality. Public deliberation should seek social cooperation 
among diverging groups in a pluralistic society and a creative search for collective 
decisions that respect all legitimate basic values. The role of deliberation is ‘to uncover 
existing meta-consensus obscured by the strategic actions of partisans who try to 
delegitimate the values held by their opponents’ (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2006, p. 639). 
Recognizing opponents’ legitimate values means that the resulting agreement on actions 
might vary from one’s first preference. Normative meta-consensus is thus a basic 
component of a workable agreement. 
Note that the terminology used in Table 6.2 differs from the standard definitions 
adopted by neoclassical economists. They contend that value is preceded by preference 
and equated to price which could be objectively observed. The social and economic 
psychological literature has revealed various forms of casual relationship between held 
values, beliefs and preferences (e.g. Stern et al., 1995; Stern, 2000; Spash, 2006). A 
common understanding is that value is more fundamental than and precedes preference 
(and also belief). This assertion is generally followed to the extent in which the 
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relationship is conceptualized at the individual level and seen as an empirical 
observation. The theory outlined in this section is understood as a normative one and 
does not aim to address the casual linkage between these elements. Moreover, for 
simplicity, I do not distinguish between value and belief. They are understood broadly 
as constituting normative discourse, i.e. a coherent body of assumptions, judgements, 
and dispositions about the issue of concern, as explained in Chapter 3, and hereafter 
referred to generally as ‘subjective value’. 
Changes in subjective value at the inter-subjective level (between individuals) 
expected under the discourse-based approach are characterized by some variations from 
the general understanding, or expectation, under the preference economization and 
moralization approaches. The choice of a different terminology implies an important 
conceptual and normative distinction between these approaches. 
 
6.3.2 Inter-Subjective Consistency 
Preference economization is devoted to enhancing the capacity to meet clarified values. 
Advocates believe that a WTP response to a stated preference survey is bound to be an 
economic construct. Any ‘irrational’ response should be corrected in accordance with 
the standard economic assumptions by activating consumer considerations. The same 
logic also applies to the specific model of analytic deliberation depicted in Chapter 4, 
which aims to help individuals clarify their held values and make an informed decision 
that could meet these values. A choice that logically deviates from the clarified values is 
considered irrational. 
Advocates of the preference moralization approach believe that the WTP response 
should be elicited in terms compatible with public interest by activating citizen 
considerations. Although they seek to create an ethical basis of values and preferences 
that is competing with the economization approach, they similarly expect a consistency 
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between value and preference. That is, a WTP provided by an individual who adopts a 
citizen mode of thinking is assumed to be a non-economic construct – at least 
something not in the economic traditional . Thus preference consensus is desired along 
with the group requirement of impartial judgement, as the consistency would otherwise 
fail to be maintained. This is the core premise of positional modification (see Chapter 2), 
i.e. inducing the desired sort of preference by adopting a single model of value.  
Such consistency is not essential for the achievement of a workable agreement. A 
workable agreement allows differences in subjective values to persist under converging 
preferences. A group decision about a public issue that fails to relate to some group 
members’ clarified values may be considered acceptable from the perspective of 
deliberative democracy, provided that the requirements of meta-consensus are met. 
Observations on the relationship between subjective values and preferences can be used 
to assess the plausibility and relevance of the discourse-based approach in an 
experimental setting. These observations can lend support to the argument raised earlier 
that such a variation from other deliberative approaches may provide better prospect for 
value pluralism. 
The relationship between subjective values and preferences can be empirically 
tested by using the methodology and concept of ‘inter-subjective consistency’ 
developed by Niemeyer (Niemeyer, 2007; Niemeyer and Dryzek, 2007). The concepts 
suggests that a good deliberation should result in agreement on the relevant domains of 
reasons and preferences on the part of deliberating individuals. The individuals should 
be capable of identifying all relevant perspectives dictated by meta-consensus into their 
reasoning, whether or not they reach agreement at preference level. Accordingly, the 
outcome of an ideal deliberation should reflect ‘the extent to which the individual 
positions resulting from deliberation reflect the integration of all the concerns present in 
meta-consensus’ (Niemeyer and Dryzek, 2007, p. 507). The concept of inter-subjective 
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consistency is suggested as a benchmark to assess the quality of deliberation. 
Deliberating individuals may have different reasons and preference orderings when they 
make a collective decision. According to Niemeyer (2007), however, if inter-subjective 
reasoning is in action such that all relevant reasons receive consideration from all 
members of the deliberative group, it will create a situation where those who agree with 
the same set of reasons also agree at the preference level. That is, those pairs of 
individuals with similar values and beliefs should have similar preference orderings. 
This reflects the situation where individuals may disagree with each other for 
inter-subjectively consistent reasons (Niemeyer, 2007). 
There is a clear tension between the two possible ends of deliberation (workable 
agreement and inter-subjective consistency) although they are both suggested to be an 
ideal of deliberative democracy. While inter-subjective consistency requires either 
agreement or disagreement at both levels, a workable agreement seeks agreement only 
at one level (Table 6.3). Thus Niemeyer and Dryzek (2007) admit that the condition of 
inter-subjective consistency precludes ‘incompletely theorized agreements’ (Sunstein, 
1995), a concept seen by Dryzek (2000) as a synonym for a workable agreement.  
Incompletely theorized agreements, or workable agreements, lack ‘theorizable’ 
content. This means that theoretical generalization of the underlying epistemic or moral 
principles is not possible or difficult. This is because of their ‘absence of any attempt to 
ground them in shared principles, so actors can consent for completely different reasons’ 
(Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2006, p. 643). Such agreements do not have internally 
consistent backing from moral principles. Since the observations of such agreements are 
grounded in competing explanations, they provide a weak conceptual basis for 
generalization toward a single theory of values. The paucity of necessary moral content 
for theorization nevertheless can preserve plural values, although the analyst may fail to 
assign an appropriate moral category to these observations in an attempt to produce a 
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theory. This inability to generalize the moral content of an ideal deliberative outcome, 
such as ‘agreement to pay’, is a key feature of the discourse-based approach elaborated 
in Chapter 5.  
 
Table 6.3 Possible combinations of agreements at value, belief and preference levels 
  Subjective value 
 
 
Preference 
 Agreement Disagreement 
Agreement Inter-subjective 
consistency 
Workable agreement 
Disagreement Strategic rationality Inter-subjective 
consistency 
 
The concept of inter-subjective consistency may be viewed as broadly compatible 
with the preference economization and moralization approaches as far as the DMV 
model is geared to a singular conception of value. In DMV preferences are expected to 
converge toward a form of monetary expression (especially for arbitrated social 
WTP/WTA). An increasing inter-subjective consistency is thus desirable. Although the 
concept does not necessarily require instrumental rationality, it can greatly benefit from 
an enhancing instrumental reasoning developed as a result of deliberation. Being 
specific examples of positional modification, the two approaches are destined for a 
concurrent and consistent transformation at both subjective value and preference levels. 
Consistency between individuals is required or implied. 
As such, the notions of inter-subjective consistency and workable agreement are 
important to the study of DMV. They draw a distinction between motives and choice at 
the subjective value and preference levels, and specify a politically ideal, normative 
relationship between them. A DMV exercise can be assessed against these benchmarks 
in terms of its linkage to the idea of deliberative democracy. The normative quality of 
the DMV results and their compatibility with the preferred discoursed-based approach 
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can then be ascertained. 
 
6.3.3 The Expected Role of Rhetoric 
As shown in Table 6.3, workable agreement is not the only conceptual alternative to 
inter-subjective consistency. Inconsistency may stem from the use of strategic reason 
which is not a recognized component of the theory of deliberative democracy. 
Appropriate explanations have to be given to any observed consensus or agreement in 
order to characterize their role in a deliberative process and establish their normative 
status. One possible factor that is capable of facilitating the formation of workable 
agreement is the invocation of rhetoric.  
Rhetoric can involve arguments, emotions, vivid metaphors, creative interpretation 
of evidence, arresting figures of speech, irony, performance, etc. (Dryzek, 2010). Social 
cooperation in the face of deep moral conflict can be facilitated by invoking a particular 
sort of rhetoric, called ‘bridging rhetoric’ (Dryzek, 2010). It can enable communication 
between differently situated actors by recognizing the situated character of its audience. 
‘Effective rhetoric persuades rather than proves’; it involves invoking ‘premises that are 
either held by or can be made to appear plausible to a particular audience’, thus its 
currency is particular rather than universal appeal (Dryzek, 2010, p. 322). This form of 
rhetoric is suggested to be conducive to the kind of communication required by the 
theory of discursive democracy (Dryzek, 2000, 2010; Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). It is 
regarded as an opposite to the Rawlsian public reason, a defining concept of the 
preference moralization approach. 
 Formation of a workable agreement could benefit from the use of rhetoric which 
helps represent a discourse to those not initially subscribing to it. A desirable sort of 
rhetoric can play the role of bridging – reaching people with different social 
characteristics and political perspectives (Dryzek, 2010). The task required is to 
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represent a discourse in ways that enable partisans of an alternative discourse to discern 
their shared dimensions. Shared terms of social cooperation may then be identified. 
Members of competing discourses can engage in joint problem-solving on the basis of 
such terms, without the requirement of relinquishing the different ‘situatedness’ of 
discourse to a universal domain. Plural values are then more likely to be preserved in 
collective decision making. 
Consider for example the frequent invocation by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. of the 
values embedded in the United States Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights. 
These appeals were designed in part to remind white Southerners of their shared 
membership in a normative tradition within which claims for racial justice could then be 
processed peacefully (Dryzek, 2010). The reference to the basic idea of human rights 
embedded in a rights-based political system gave him access to both the civil rights 
discourse on his side and the liberal universalism in his white audience. Another 
example that can illustrate the notion of differential grounds of shared recognition is a 
speech by a nineteenth-century African American woman, Sojourner Truth. Speaking at 
the first annual meeting of the American Equal Rights Association in 1867, she pointed 
out that ‘There’s a great stir about colored men getting their rights, but not a word about 
the colored women; and if colored men get their rights, and not colored women get 
theirs, you see the colored men will be masters over the women, and it will be just as 
bad as it was before’ (Logan 2004, p. 36). Truth aligned her discourse of ‘colored’ 
women’s rights with women’s rights generally. Discursive compatibility then became 
discernable as the language could reach her white women audience who were concerned 
about women’s rights, as well as those on her side who saw the rights of the ‘colored’ 
addressed. Access to both discourses was gained while allowing varying bases of 
acceptance. 
 The importance of bridging rhetoric lies in its greater capacity than rationalistic 
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arguments of bringing policy debates towards meta-consensus upon which concrete 
actions can be built within the scope of value pluralism. Understanding the ways in 
which bridging rhetoric affects the communication among deliberating individuals is 
conducive to explaining how cooperative capacity is strengthened as a result of the 
deliberative process and how this makes sense of the deliberative model. A study of the 
use of rhetorical language in deliberation is therefore instrumental to the 
characterization of deliberative WTP construed as an ‘agreement to pay’ outlined in the 
last chapter. Based on the ideas depicted in this section, an intensive study of DMV 
results is proposed. 
 
6.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The operational objective of the empirical study, presented in the following chapters, is 
to characterize the results from a DMV exercise and assess its variations from the 
expectations under other DMV approaches, in terms of the concepts of workable 
agreement and meta-consensus. The findings will support an interpretation of the group 
agreement formed, including any remarkable change in WTP decision constituting an 
improving agreement to pay. The analysis involves an assessment of the extent to which 
these variations can be meaningfully understood within a specific model of deliberative 
democracy, as described in Chapter 3. 
 The empirical investigation is based on data collected from a citizens deliberation 
on carbon pricing in Australia and was undertaken for this study. Specific research 
questions that guided the inquiry include: 
1) To what extent does the group deliberation promote agreement to contribute 
financially to a course of public action on the part of those participants who 
initially refuse to pay? 
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2) How do participants’ expressed values change? Do the values diverge or 
converge between participants?  
3) Do the subjective states of participants remain stable and how do their 
subjective states relate to each other? 
4) Is there any ‘workable agreement’ formed among participants? What is the 
main factor contributing to its formation or failure to form an agreement? 
5) How can changes in willingness to pay, or agreement to pay, be understood 
in light of this evidence? 
 
6.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The critical review of literature presented in the previous chapters raises an 
important theoretical problem concerning the methodology of DMV. That is, 
adopting an evaluative framework that contains prejudgements on values is not 
conducive to the pursuit of value pluralism. It is proposed that, in the context of 
DMV, an agreement to pay does not require a priori assumptions about the moral 
category it belongs to, and that it could be supported by multiple categories, 
including those that do not logically point to such an intended action. Under this 
conception, DMV could produce information or facilitate decision making on WTP 
without compromising the ideal of value pluralism.  
 This conception forms the core premise of the discourse-based approach of 
DMV and differentiates it from other approaches discussed in the Chapter 5. 
Unlike these alternatives, it does not require consistency between individuals in 
terms of subjective values and preferences. Achievement of a workable agreement 
is regarded as desirable, which does not demand convergence in subjective values 
and can be facilitated by invoking bridging rhetoric. Evidence for bridging rhetoric 
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and workable agreement can then be used to ascertain the compatibility of the 
DMV results with the discoursed-based approach. A case study is conducted to 
explore the issue in this light. Details are provided in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CASE STUDY: A CITIZENS DELIBERATION  
ON CLIMATE CHANGE  
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
An underlying assumption of DMV is the existence of alternative values and irreducible 
value conflict that traditional valuation techniques fail to deal with. Clear difference 
between normative dispositions is a necessary condition for a study designated to 
explore the notion of workable agreement. This means that an empirical inquiry to 
address the research problems outlined in the previous chapter should feature 
discernable deep conflict in opinions. As a DMV study it should also involve pertinent 
topics about payment for environmental services and WTP elicitation tasks.  
In Australia, there is ever growing contention over the issue of human-induced 
climate change, particularly its carbon pricing policy. It has drawn considerable 
attention from the public all across the country and contributed to major changes in 
political leadership, due to its global significance and the huge costs that would be 
required for the country to undertake mitigation and adaptation measures. Climate 
scepticism has been a key driver of the political resistance to take actions on climate 
protection and remains a significant minority group in the Australian society. Involving 
climate sceptics in a deliberative forum along with non-sceptics can provide a lively 
debate featuring clear conflict to meet the purposes of the present study. The focus on 
carbon pricing instruments, such as carbon tax, also allows a topical discussion on a 
range of financial payment issues that are relevant to the economic dimensions of DMV. 
This chapter introduces the case study designed to offer empirical support to 
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address the theoretical problems identified in the preceding chapters. It is based on an 
experimental deliberative forum on carbon pricing issues in Australia. The next section 
provides details on the recent climate change policy initiatives, the policy debate and 
climate politics in Australia. It is followed by a description of the deliberative forum and 
method of data collection  
 
7.2 POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE DEBATE IN AUSTRALIA 
7.2.1 Changing policy, shuffling leadership  
In the late 1980s, the Australian government led by Prime Minister Bob Hawke was 
ready to respond to global climate change. The government’s commitment was 
significant and progressive, thanks to gathering international momentum surrounding 
the issue and growing concerns by Australian scientific community and the public, 
coupled with the personal commitment of Hawke to environmental issues (Bulkeley, 
2001; McDonald, 2005). The official enthusiasm was soon cooled down by the 
subsequent Keating government. Keating’s centerpiece of Australia’s response to 
climate change was the National Greenhouse Response Strategy, which was excessively 
reliant on voluntary industrial actions for achieving non-binding national targets of 
greenhouse emissions abatement. The government became more concerned about the 
economic impacts arising from emissions reduction and sought to retreat from the 
earlier commitment.  
From the mid-1990s Australia saw growing political and sectoral resistance to 
more stringent emissions reduction. A conservative coalition government, led by John 
Howard, was in office during 1996-2007. Howard’s leadership acquired notoriety for 
declining international cooperation and substantial domestic measures for addressing 
global climate change (Christoff, 2005; Hamilton, 2007; Rootes, 2008; Curran, 2009; 
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Stevenson, 2009). The cabinet resistance was flagged in many ways, notably by refusing 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and resisting official carbon pricing. The Howard 
government questioned the science of climate change and strongly opposed legally 
binding targets on emissions reduction. Armed with economic models provided by the 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Howard’s climate 
scepticism centred on the economic argument that ratifying the Kyoto would put the 
Australian economy at significant risk, leading to decline in GDP and job losses. 
Australia’s energy policy during this period was moved towards ever more explicit 
support for fossil fuel and energy-intensive manufacturing industries (Christoff, 2005; 
Hamilton, 2007). There was much reliance on voluntary actions by the industry.  
By 2007, Howard had lost popularity partly due to his sceptical position. Kevin 
Rudd, the then Opposition Leader of Labour party, picked up on the issue and promised 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The Labour party, joined by all eight state and 
territory-level governments, appointed Ross Garnaut, a senior Australian economist, to 
head a large effort to make recommendations on Australia’s climate policy. Following a 
landslide win in the 2007 national election, the Labour government promptly fulfilled 
the promise and set a target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 60% of 2000 levels 
by 2050.  
 Garnaut released a final report, known as Garnaut Climate Change Review, at the 
end of September 2008. The report contained a detailed assessment of the impact of 
climate change on Australia. It recognized the severe and costly impacts of uncontrolled 
emissions growth on the country’s agriculture, infrastructure, biodiversity and 
ecosystems, and predicted that without mitigation, there would be a 92% decline in 
irrigated agricultural production in the Murray-Darling basin, the main food producing 
area, and catastrophic destruction of the Great Barrier Reef (Garnaut, 2008). Garnaut 
concluded that rapid progress on climate change mitigation is necessary and outlined 
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the level of mitigation necessary to achieve a global target of stabilizing greenhouse gas 
concentrations at 550 ppm.  
A key policy initiative proposed by Garnaut was an emission trading scheme (ETS) 
for providing incentives for emission mitigation (Garnaut, 2008). The Rudd government 
responded by issuing a white paper that outlined a preferred target of a 5% reduction in 
2000 greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, to be increased to 15% in the context of global 
action (Department of Climate Change, 2008). In the white paper, the government 
officially proposed an Australian ETS, known as Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
(CPRS), which would cover around 1,000 major polluters in the energy, transport and 
waste sectors in Australia and be introduced in 2010. 
An ETS involves setting an emission cap and selling emission permits at freely 
fluctuating prices. An emission permit is an instrument with established property rights. 
Under an ETS, the government creates a new market where firms have to buy a permit 
for each tonne of greenhouse gas they emit. The total number of permits issued by the 
government each year is limited. Firms that reduce their emissions can either buy fewer 
permits or sell their surplus. Businesses therefore have an incentive to reduce emissions 
in order to cut costs and stay competitive, but they decide if it is cheaper to reduce 
emissions or buy permits. The trading mechanisms, according to standard economic 
theory, could guarantee economic efficiency in emission mitigation (Spash, 2010). 
Effective emission abatement also hinges on transferring part of the revenues raised 
from these permits to related research and development activities. In fact, Garnaut 
strongly urged the government to set aside 20% of the revenue for this purpose and 
avoid exemption of individual industries to maximize coverage.  
The CPRS, however, was fraught with special treatments. The Australian economy 
heavily depends on its mining industry, which is energy-intensive and thus vulnerable to 
rising carbon prices. Over the years the governments and major parties in Australia have 
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had a sympathetic ear for the industry and associated lobbying groups (Curran, 2009; 
Carson et al., 2010). The industry has significant input in shaping policy direction. 
Without exception, the proposed ETS has been a target of intensive lobbying activities 
supported by the major emitters. Against this background the proposal was carefully 
trimmed. Under the CPRS, the Australian government would provide free permits to 
trade-exposed energy-intensive industries, such as aluminum smelting and cement 
production. It would also return the $A11.5 billion8 earned from selling emission 
permits to major emitters as compensation to minimize impacts on the economy 
(Department of Climate Change 2008). Again inconsistent with Garnaut’s 
recommendations, the CPRS would include an initial exemption of the transportation 
sector for the first three years of the scheme to allow households to adjust to the 
prospect of higher fuel prices. Free price variation would be restricted by an initial 
government-administered price cap set at A$10 per permit in the first year, rising to $40 
subsequently (Department of Climate Change 2008, Ch. 8, p. 37). 
Critics were far from satisfied. The amount of compensation and subsidies to be 
available to the major polluters was too generous, effectively rewarding major polluters 
for their contribution to climate change (Spash, 2010). Garnaut himself criticized the 
white paper giving too much support for businesses and being severely distorted by 
lobbying from vested interest groups (Pietsch and McAllister, 2010). The price cap 
provision might also compromise the potential for economic efficiency (Jotzo and Betz, 
2009). Furthermore, the CPRS has a very complex design; this raises concerns as to 
public transparency and potential for manipulation by powerful vested interests (Spash, 
2010).  
Public response to the proposal was initially generally positive in 2008. This 
support, however, started to wane in 2009 as the global financial crisis hit the economy 
                                                 
8
 Australian Dollar to US Dollar: 0.93 (September 2010) 
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(Howes, 2009). The government was forced to delay the start of the scheme to 2011, 
along with a lower carbon price cap, more compensation to the industry and more free 
permits. The CPRS failed to satisfy other major parties, particularly the new Leader of 
the Opposition. The Greens did not accept the lenient targets set out in the proposal, 
whereas the opposition Liberal party was highly concerned about the potential 
economic impacts. The CPRS was not passed by the senate in December 2009. In April 
2010, the then Prime Minister Rudd decided to delay the implementation of the scheme 
until the end of 2012. 
The search for remedies, alternatives and complements to the ETS continues. 
There is support for a better designed ETS. Jotzo and Bertz (2009) suggest that access 
to international permit trading opportunities is important for the success of an ETS and 
Australia should dismantle the obstacles to bilateral linking with similar schemes, 
including the proposed price cap.  
The most prominent alternative is carbon taxes. A carbon tax is an environmental 
tax that is levied on the carbon content of fuels. It can be implemented by taxing the 
burning of fossil fuels - coal, petroleum products such as gasoline and aviation fuel, and 
natural gas - in proportion to their carbon content. Accordingly, a carbon tax increases 
the competitiveness of non-carbon technologies by raising the relative price of the fossil 
fuels, thus helping to protect the environment while raising revenues. A carbon tax is 
usually imposed on firms, but would eventually affect all the prices in the economy due 
to the pervasive character of greenhouse gases. Pricing carbon this way would not 
guarantee a set target of emissions reductions achieved. Advantages of carbon taxes 
include lower administrative costs, lower potential for industrial manipulation, and 
more certainty for businesses (Humphreys, 2007; Spash, 2010). In January 2010, the 
Australian Greens proposed a de facto carbon tax at a rate of $23‐24 per tonne emission, 
to be implemented within the framework of the CPRS by limiting the price of emission 
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permits at a specific level. Proposed compensation to polluting industries is reduced.  
Voluntary carbon markets have been considered by the Australian government as a 
complement. Accreditation is not required to sell carbon credits in voluntary markets. In 
Australia, only some of the voluntary programmes are accredited under a government 
protocol. The government's efforts to regulate Australia’s fledgling carbon offset market 
hinge on its National Carbon Offset Standard came into effect on 1 July 2010 
(Department of Climate Change, 2009). The Standard is intended to provide national 
consistency in the regulation of voluntary carbon offsets and to enhance consumer 
confidence in the voluntary market, by providing guidance on what constitutes a 
genuine voluntary offset credit, setting requirements for the verification and retirement 
of such credits, and providing principles for calculating the emissions of an organization, 
product or service which could be offset. However, a compliance scheme like ETS is 
likely to displace voluntary contributions. This raises concerns as to the actual 
complementarity (Reeson, 2009).  
The political environment in 2010 was unprecedentedly tough. The Prime Minister 
of Australia, at the time, Kevin Rudd, lost public support in part due to the ETS 
withdrawal, and relinquished his office in June The Leader of the Opposition, who 
opposed to the ETS scheme, almost succeeded in seizing power in the subsequent 
federal election which concluded with a hung parliament. In response, the incumbent 
Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, managing to form a minority government appeared 
cautious of resurrecting the ETS. In July 2010, she called for a high-profile ‘citizens’ 
assembly’ to seek public advice on climate change policy. The public’s views, 
nevertheless, are as divided as in the politics, as I show in the next section. 
 
7.2.2 Changing public support, diverging opinions 
Public concerns about the economic impacts of radical actions for climate protection are 
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rising. According to the annual Lowy Institute Poll (Figure 7.1), in 2006, 68% 
Australians agreed that global warming is a serious and pressing problem and 
immediate actions are needed regardless of significant costs. These figures contracted  
to 60% in 2008 and 48% in 2009. Young Australians and females were slightly more 
likely to hold this view. In addition, those who thought that the effects of global 
warming will be gradual so that gradual measures that are low in cost are acceptable 
rose from 24% to 32%, reaching 39% in 2009. Only 7% did not accept actions that 
would put the economy at risks prior to consensus on the negative impacts of global 
warming. About 8% and 13% shared this view in 2008 and 2009 respectively. The Poll 
report notes nevertheless that this shift in opinion does not mean that Australians no 
longer recognize the importance of the issue of climate change. The majority (76%) of 
Australians agreed that climate change ‘is a problem’ (Hanson, 2009, p.13).  
Public preferences for the ETS are divided. Pietsch and McAllister (2010) found 
that the ETS was supported by the majority (58%) of the Australians. Although 29% 
strongly favoured the scheme, 22% strongly opposed it (Figure 7.2). Of those who 
described themselves as very well informed about climate change, those who strongly 
supported it are equaled by those who strongly oppose it (both 31%). In both cases, 
strong opponents outnumbered milder opinions, suggesting a significant minority within 
the population against the ETS. There is a tendency for a polarization in attitudes, which 
has been accelerated by the successful knowledge diffusion from climate change 
sceptics and industrial lobby groups. The authors, however, stressed that the strong 
opponents may include those who accept the evidence of human-induced climate 
change but doubt that the proposed ETS is the right policy instrument to address it. 
Moreover, Pietsch and McAllister (2010) noticed that most of the respondents had a 
definite view either for or against the ETS, possibly as a result of the extensive media 
coverage and public debate over the last few months (2008 - 2009) which provided 
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them sufficient information to form a view promptly.  
   
Figure 7.1  Public opinions on options for dealing with global warming (per cent of 
level of agreement) 
Survey question: ‘What the countries of the world, including Australia, should do about 
the problem of global warming?’  
Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2009 (Hanson, 2009) 
 
Another national survey corroborated the previous findings that Australians 
generally recognize the importance and urgency of the issue of climate change (Carson 
et al., 2010). Respondents had a slight preference (51.4%) for redistributing revenue 
from a greenhouse gas mitigation scheme to low income households and seniors rather 
than reducing the GST (Goods and Service Tax). They were almost evenly split on 
whether the scheme should initially exempt the transport sector (Carson et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless they expressed a fairly strong opposition about giving special treatment to 
energy-intensive sectors even intensive sectors, even when told that this could minimize 
job disruptions. Furthermore, the Australian public affirmed the idea that devoting a 
substantial fraction of revenue from marketable permits to energy-oriented R&D is of 
long-term national interest. The majority (60%) believed that Australia should adopt a 
scheme with more than a 60% reduction in greenhouse gases even if this would incur 
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higher costs. Carson et al.’s (2010) survey included a trinary choice between achieving 
emission reductions using tradable permits, taxes or technology standards. Results 
indicated an overwhelming preference for technology standards (57.7%), over permits 
(25.1%) or taxes (17.2%). Support for taxes, nonetheless, rose to 22.5%, when the 
respondents were given more information about these different mechanisms. 
 
Figure 7.2 Public support for the emissions trading scheme proposed by the 
Australian government (in %) 
 
Source: ANUpoll September 2008 (Pietsch and McAllister, 2010) 
 
Intended financial contributions appeared to be slightly lower than what would 
have been incurred under the CPRS. The Treasury’s econometric estimation suggested 
that the CPRS would cause a one off spike in inflation of 1.0-1.5%, resulting in an 
average increase in household spending of $6-7 per week (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2008). According to the Lowy Institute Poll, Australian people were generally willing to 
pay to help solve climate change. Yet, the majority (52%) would contribute no more 
than $20 per month on electricity bills (Figure 7.3). Although 19% would pay more than 
that, 21% were not prepared to pay at all. It is noted that people aged 60 years or older 
were the least willing to pay to tackle climate change and only 7% were prepared to pay 
$21 or more extra per month compared with 31% of respondents aged 18-24. 
157 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Willingness to pay to help solve climate change.  
 
Survey question: ‘One suggested way of tackling climate change is to 
increase the price of electricity. If it helped solve climate change how 
much extra would you be willing to pay each month on your electricity 
bill?’ 
Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2008 (Hanson, 2008) 
 
Today in Australia climate change issues remain highly contentious. There is a 
continuing struggle over the priority of climate protection, and over emission trading vs. 
carbon tax. Climate sceptics are perhaps as many as climate activists.. The controversial 
idea of ‘citizens’ assembly’ proposed by the Prime Minister Julia Gillard was officially 
dumped less than three months later after it was announced, in favour of a multiparty 
climate change committee, as part of a deal with the Greens to form a minority 
government. The present study is based on a similar initiative conducted one week after 
her announcement.  
 
7.3.  A CITIZENS DELIBERATION IN CANBERRA 
7.3.1 Overview 
A deliberative forum on climate change policy was held in 31st July 2010 at the CSIRO 
Discovery Centre, Canberra, Australia. The one-day event started at 9:30am till 4:30pm. 
It was sponsored by the CSIRO and organized by myself with support from several 
CSIRO social scientists, under the programme title of ‘Australian Climate Policy 
Forum’. Objectives of the forum were to evaluate current government efforts, consider 
the future of Australian emission mitigation policy and assess its potential economic 
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implications. Activities included group discussions and expert presentations about 
global climate change. Twenty four ordinary citizens participated in the workshop. 
Remuneration was provided at the rate of A$50 per person in the form of gift coupons. 
 
7.3.2 Participant recruitment 
Participants were recruited from around the Canberra region via random mail. The 
recruitment was initially undertaken by another ANU team under the project ‘Climate 
Change and the Public Sphere’ which involved a deliberative process on a similar topic. 
About 150 of those who were not invited to the programme of that other project due to 
limited vacancies were later contacted via email and invited to the present one. A 
‘Project Outline’ was attached to the email to describe the project (Appendix A.1.1). 
About 28 of those expressed interest. All of them were then asked to respond to a short 
questionnaire administered through email, which gauged their basic socioeconomic 
information and initial views about three approaches for emissions mitigation, namely, 
emission trading, carbon tax and voluntary offsetting (Appendix A.1.2). These 
information provided basis for participant selection, which was intended to capture the 
whole spectrum of views across all age groups and education levels. Participation was 
confirmed via email about two weeks prior to the workshop. Two individuals eventually 
withdrew. 
The number of interested individuals did not permit a rigorous selection. Twenty 
four were invited out of the 28 who expressed interest and two withdrew and replaced. 
This means there was little room for selction and eventually only two individuals were 
declined. This created a group of highly motivated individuals with firmly held beliefs, 
which means that dispute was more likely to occur. Another consequence was an 
unrepresentative demographic. More males (15) were in attendance than females (9). 
Most were middle-aged and educated working professionals. (Table 7.1). The 
homogeneity might be a result of the relatively narrow local demographic profile and 
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the failure to reach a larger population of potential participants. Thus, younger 
generations and working class were underrepresented. Twenty lived in Australian 
Capital Territory, mainly Canberra, and four New South Wales, mainly Goulburn. 
 
Table 7.1  Forum participants’ background 
Group 
No. * 
Name** Gender 
Education 
Attainment 
Age 
Group 
Occupation State^ 
1 John Male University degree 18-25 Student ACT 
1 Brian Male Postgraduate  >55 Company director NSW 
1 Cynthia Female Postgraduate 46-55 Management consultant NSW 
1 Ian Male University degree > 55 Public servant ACT 
1 Ross Male University degree 46-55 Patent examiner ACT 
1 Claire Female University degree 46-55 Community coordinator ACT 
1 James Male University degree > 55 Retired ACT 
1 Mark Male University degree > 55 Retired ACT 
2 Elaine Female Postgraduate > 55 Enterprise architect ACT 
2 Phillip Male Postgraduate > 55 Police officer ACT 
2 Howard Male Postgraduate 26-35 Environment officer ACT 
2 Stephanie Female Postgraduate 46-55 Public servant & 
consultant 
ACT 
2 Dan Male Postgraduate > 55 IT professional ACT 
2 Wilson Male University degree > 55 Retired ACT 
2 George Male University degree 18-25 Student ACT 
2 Alan Male University degree > 55 ICT executive ACT 
3 Helen Female Postgraduate 36-45 Policy advisor ACT 
3 Florian Male Postgraduate 46-55 Journalist NSW 
3 Liana Female University degree > 55 Tutor ACT 
3 Kate Female University degree > 55 Retired ACT 
3 Kevin Male Postgraduate > 55 Media officer NSW 
3 Nancy Female Postgraduate > 55 Retired ACT 
3 Mike Male Leaving certificate > 55 Retired public servant ACT 
3 Sarah Female Postgraduate 36-45 Geophysicist ACT 
*  Discussion group number. 
** Names have been arbitrarily assigned to preserve participant anonymity. 
^  ACT: Australian Capital Territory; NSW: New South Wales 
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7.3.3 Programme 
Figure 7.4 provides a sample of the programme sheet. Four specialists were involved as 
invited presenters. The specialists were selected, based on their expertise and relevance 
to the theme of the workshop, to provide the participants information and knowledge 
related to specific topics, and an opportunity to raise questions about these topics in 
front of experts. The first seminar in the morning was delivered by Mark Stafford Smith, 
Science Director of the CSIRO Climate Adaptation Flagship, on the science of climate 
change, its impacts on Australia and possible adaptive strategies. It was followed by 
Steve Hatfield-Dodds, Assistant Secretary in the Department of Climate Change and 
Energy Efficiency, Commonwealth of Australia, who presented on the economic 
implications of climate change and policy responses. After the first section of group 
discussion among participants, Hayley Stevenson, a political scientist at the ANU, 
provided an overview of the international climate politics with a focus on the Kyoto 
Protocol and Clean Development Mechanism. The last seminar covered the economics 
of emission trading and carbon tax. It was delivered by Andrew Reeson, Research 
Scientist at the CSIRO, and focused on the mechanisms of these different policy 
approaches and their strengths and weaknesses. The presenters were allocated 30 
minutes, however the final presentation was allotted 45 minutes to respond to queries by 
workshop participants and provide more detailed information suited to the participant 
deliberation that followed the presentations.   
Opportunities for group discussion were arranged between the expert 
presentations and constituted the main focus of the event. The main theme concerned 
with the proposed carbon pricing and clean energy financing arrangements in Australia. 
Participants shared experiences, exchanged views and raised questions to the invited 
specialists. The deliberative process was split into three sessions. Assigned discussion 
topics were structured around the main theme and ranged from general to specific 
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aspects, including the need for more national commitments, the preference for different 
carbon pricing instruments, to the acceptable level of financial contributions at the 
personal and society’s levels (described below). Duration ranged from 30 to 40 minutes 
each. Group consensus was not a requirement. Three tables were arranged and the 
participants were allowed to freely choose one for discussion (same set of discussion 
topics for all participants). Each of the three small groups consists of eight participants. 
They were encouraged to reshuffle, although all stayed at the same table throughout the 
programme. Three CSIRO social scientists facilitated the discussion. Indicative 
questions that guided the discussion were detailed in the ‘Notes for Facilitators’ 
(Appendix A.1.3). In each session, a worksheet was provided to all participants to 
provide some background information about the discussion topic and simple tasks to 
assist the group deliberation (see Appendix A1.4 - 1.7). 
The first session served a ‘warming-up’ purpose and was titled ‘Concern about 
Climate Change’. It was intended to spark a debate on the roles of Australian 
governments, citizens and other relevant parties in dealing with climate change. 
Participants began by defining the problem at hand and expressed their views about 
general issues, such as Australia’s responsibility in greenhouse gas mitigation, the 
performance of the government and importance of emission mitigation comparing to 
other policy areas, etc. The debate started with participants reading and discussing a 
news article on the Prime Minister’s announcement on the proposed ‘citizens assembly’ 
(Appendix A.1.4). Each of them also received Worksheet 1, which helped focus the 
discussion on specific subtopics by providing two simple ranking exercises about 
national priority and responsibility attribution respectively (Appendix A.1.5). The small 
group discussions finished in 20 minutes. In the remaining 10 minutes the three groups 
joined together to exchange opinions under facilitation. Each nominated one group 
member to share the views of the group he or she represented. 
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Figure 7.4 Sample of programme sheet 
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‘Carbon Pricing’, which was central to the current debate in Australia, was the 
theme of the second session. This session was devoted to an open discussion on the 
merits of the four possible carbon pricing arrangements, namely, emission trading, 
carbon tax, voluntary carbon offsetting, and no action (‘no carbon pricing on human 
activities is needed’). The four options were briefly described in Worksheet 2 (Appendix 
A.1.6). This session immediately followed the expert presentation on emission trading. 
The presenter, Andrew Reeson, joined the groups occasionally to clarify technical issues 
and answer relevant questions. Indicative questions included: ‘Do you accept the idea of 
carbon pricing?’, ‘What do you know/feel about the proposed CPRS’, and ‘Is carbon 
tax better than emission trading?’. Intended subjects of these questions (i.e. individual 
or society) were open to participants’ own interpretation, except those specifically 
concerning personal experiences. There was no attempt to insert a citizen frame. Twenty 
five minutes were reserved for the small group discussions. Again, the debate was 
opened up to all groups in the remainder of this session.   
The third session had a more focused theme, i.e. ‘Financing Low-emission Energy 
Technologies’ and involved issues of WTP. Participants considered a range of WTP 
issues based on a semi-hypothetical scenario. The Australian Government announced in 
May 2010 that its Clean Energy Initiative (CEI) would be expanded (in addition to other 
existing initiatives), where $5.1 billion would be spent over 10 years (2009-2019) in 
research and development of low-emission energy technologies. Participants were told 
that the CEI complements the Government's expanded Renewable Energy Target, i.e. by 
2020, 20% of Australia's electricity supply is to come from renewable sources. 
Worksheet 3 provided some background information to the participants, including the 
2010/11 budget of the Australian government and the share of energy supplied from 
renewable sources in different countries (Appendix A.1.7). 
The guiding questions that followed constituted the hypothetical component. The 
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central issue here was how much the participants would be willing to pay for emissions 
mitigation through such a government programme. An indicative $35 per person per 
year was stated as a reference point, which was calculated by dividing the required $5.1 
billion by working age population. The first set of guiding questions explored the 
individuals’ concerns about the adequacy of the proposed funding amount (i.e. is $5.1 
billion or $35 enough) and motives. Other questions examined the variation in their 
WTP decisions under various possible policy circumstances, such as if only 15% target 
would be guaranteed, if global financial crisis would return, if only one-third of 
Australians would be required to pay. These questions represented controlled variations 
in the hypothetic scenario in terms of anticipated outcome of payment, macro-economic 
condition, and distributional justice. The purpose was to understand how these 
variations would affect the individuals’ WTP decisions. All these questions assumed 
payment via a tax. If time permitted, some of the issues were raised again under a 
different frame, where the money would be collected by energy companies through 
increased energy prices and the companies could use the raised funds at their discretion 
(resembling ETS). Additional questions covered trust issues, intention to contribute in 
the absence of official target (resembling voluntary offsetting) and the importance of 
global agreement. This session was limited to small groups. 
 
7.3.4 Data collection 
Data were collected in two ways. First, the group discussions were tape-recorded. The 
tape recordings produced a series of transcripts which formed the basis of the analysis 
of deliberative dynamic. Second, the participants completed a questionnaire at the 
beginning and the end of the workshop (Appendix A.1.8). The questionnaire was 
divided into three parts. The first part involved respondents ranking the mentioned four 
carbon pricing options (i.e. ETS, carbon tax, voluntary offsetting, and no carbon 
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pricing), from most preferred to least preferred (exclusive choice). In the later analysis 
this is taken as the policy preference of the participants. In the second part, they stated, 
in an open-ended format, a maximum monthly WTP in Australian dollar for emission 
mitigation for the next five years.  
The final task of the questionnaire was based on 22 statements, which captured 
current opinions flowing around the actual debate about climate change and related 
policy issues. These statements spread across three main themes, namely, perceived 
importance of climate mitigation, expected role of the government and markets, and 
potential implications of official carbon pricing. Examples included ‘Additional costs to 
households should be avoided’, ‘We do not yet have consensus on the science of climate 
change and so should not take action to reduce greenhouse emissions’, ‘Market-based 
approach should be used to ensure efficiency’, ‘Direct regulation is more effective than 
any form of carbon pricing’, and ‘Our climate policy should be able to affect other 
countries’ decisions on emissions reduction’. Each of the statements was assessed on the 
basis of a nine-point scale (from strongly agree to strongly disagree). They were 
subsequently analyzed using Q method (introduced in the next chapter) to provide 
information on the respondents’ subjective values (and beliefs). A pilot test was 
administered to 6 individuals to ensure clarity and relevance of the survey questions.  
 
7.4 SUMMARY 
A case study was designed and organized by the author to lend empirical support to 
address the theoretical problems identified in the preceding chapters. It involved an 
experimental deliberative forum on the climate change policy of Australia and was 
conducted in Canberra, Australia. Twenty four citizens took part in a one-day workshop 
focusing on issues around the ETS and its alternatives. Activities include group 
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discussions among these individuals and presentations by four policy specialists and 
scientists. Audio recordings of the discussions provided a basis of analysis. Data were 
also collected from a questionnaire administered immediately before and after the main 
programme. The questionnaire gauged the participants’ preference about four carbon 
pricing options, WTP for emissions mitigation, and values and beliefs assessed by 22 
statements concerning various issues about climate change. These data are reported in 
the following chapters. The next chapter offers evidence on the emergence of a 
workable agreement and is based on the participants’ responses to the questionnaire 
survey. The audio recordings are then analyzed in Chapter 9 to examine the actual role 
of rhetoric in the deliberative process. 
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CHAPTER 8 
OBSERVED VALUE AND PREFERENCE 
TRANSFORMATION 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
DMV seeks consensus at a preference level (e.g. a group-determined social WTP or 
agreement to pay as an individual contribution) and attempts to preserve pluralism at a 
value level. These ideals seem to point in opposite directions. Prospect for concurrent 
fulfilment as a goal of DMV has been subject to doubts. I argue in Chapter 6 that if we 
hold the normative position that subjective values and preferences need consistency 
within and between individuals, then a value-articulating institution that strives for 
agreed solutions might risk compromising value plurality. For any stated preference 
associated with competing value categories would be relegated to an irrational response. 
Attempts to elicit plural values in monetary terms would then always imply a 
contradiction. This constitutes the key limitation of the preference economization and 
moralization approaches of DMV. Preference consensus and value pluralism have to be 
reconciled to make the project of DMV defensible.  
This chapter empirically tests the idea that deliberating individuals may agree on a 
course of action while disagreeing on reasons. Survey data collected for this research 
provide a basis for assessing the impact of deliberation in terms of value and preference 
transformation. The operational objective is to examine to what extent changes in stated 
preference are in proportion to changes in subjective values,, by applying the concepts 
introduced in Chapter 6. A technique called Q methodology, which has been employed 
or proposed as relevant to the study of subjective values (Dryzek, 1990; Niemeyer and 
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Dryzek, 2007), was used to analyze the data. The next section describes this technique.. 
It is followed by a detailed report on the variations in the individuals’ subjective states, 
preference rankings and stated WTPs as a result of the deliberation. 
 
8.2 Q METHODOLOGY 
8.2.1 Methodological assumptions 
Q methodology was invented by the psychologist William Stephenson during the first 
half of the 20th century (Stephenson, 1935). It provides a systematic and rigorously 
quantitative means for the scientific study of human subjectivity while minimizing 
researcher bias (Stephenson, 1953; Brown, 1980). Q has been used in a broad range of 
fields, including political psychology, social psychology, sociology, and political 
science.  
Subjectivity is a person’s point of view on any matter of personal and / or social 
importance. Its components parts of a phenomenon have status only within the context 
of the whole (Brown, 1980). It can only be defined in terms of the participant’s frame of 
reference, and not the survey analyst’s. So the key to a Q study is to relinquish 
modelling of data to the respondent to preserve the integrity of the participant (Robbins 
and Krueger, 2000). Usual forms of opinion survey (i.e. R methodologies) involve an 
imposed reality; a participant’s point of view is sought from his or her responses to scale 
items constructed purposively by the analyst. Agreement on a scale stimulus makes 
sense in terms of the analyst’s prior definition of the constructed scale. An external 
frame of reference is applied. 
The investigative focus of Q is a person’s communication of his or her point of 
view within an internal frame of reference (McKeown and Thomas, 1988). The meaning 
is given by the participant’s organizing his or her point of view in relation to a 
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self-assembled internal structure. In Q, every response is understood within the context 
of its relationship with the other responses. The meaning and significance of each 
response depends on its association with the self-constructed frame of reference of 
which it is a part. Moreover, each individual’s location only exists and makes sense by 
virtue of every other subjective position found in the ‘concourse’ (the complete volume 
of discussion on a particular topic). A discourse identified by Q exists always in 
response to other discourses.  
Q methodology does not engage in typical scientific measurement. Typical survey 
requirements do not apply. Predictability, for example, is irrelevant. Subjective opinions 
are unprovable and make sense on their own terms; no outside criterion apply. Thus the 
concept of validity is of little relevance (Brown, 1980). Q methodology does not attempt 
to measure anything objectively (Addams, 2000). Nor does and can it seek causal 
explanation of individual actions. It seeks explanation as to the patterns of viewpoints 
and attitudes appearing in different Q sorts. 
Moreover, Q makes no claim of demographic representation. Unlike R methods, it 
does not need a large number of cases to cancel out the measurement errors as a result 
of the variations in individual understanding of the objective scale. It therefore works 
even with a small sample size (e.g. 12). Generalization of beliefs across the population 
is not a concern of Q methodology. Q pursues generalization of discourse across a 
concourse of concern (Dryzek, 1990). The participant under investigation is arguments 
and the population is the pool of opinions, not individuals. In Q, the statistical roles of 
respondents and their responses to survey questions are inverted. 
Q methodology is used for this study because it is suitable for DMV study which 
typically involves small number of respondents. Another reason is that the method is 
compatible with the core idea expressed in the previous chapters that the researcher’s 
prejudgements should be minimized. Solicitation of opinions using Q allows subjects 
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speak for themselves about their dispositions and the categories that these dispositions 
help construct in a self-referent fashion. Researchers do not hold them up against any 
measuring rod external to them. No preconceptions apply to the content of subjects’ 
dispositions. As such, conceptually Q is broadly consistent with the theory of discursive 
democracy (Dryzek, 1990). Q inquiry is attuned to post-positivism (Durning, 1999) and 
post-normal science (Swedeen, 2006). 
 
8.2.2 Procedure and analysis 
The method involves participants’ sorting a purposively sampled set of stimuli, called Q 
sample. Q sample consists of a representative set of statements (usually 40-60) related 
to the issue of concern. The Q sample should reflect the diversity of views in the 
concourse, and refer to opinions rather than facts. Each Q participant is confronted with 
the Q sample and rank-orders them within a specified distribution, which is usually 
coded with a scale from ‘most agree’ to ‘most disagree’. The rank-ordered set is called a 
Q sort. The (usually) forced distribution of the rating scale has fewer statements to be 
placed at the extremes and more in the middle. Thus Q sort takes the form of a 
quasi-normal distribution.  
Q sorts are factor analyzed. A subjective outlook on the issue is produced by 
comparing the Q participants. This is accomplished by statistically correlating 
individual Q sorts against one another. Unlike R methods, individuals, rather than traits 
or Q-sample items, are taken as variables to be correlated. The purpose of factor 
analysis is to find a smaller number of families of Q sorts that constitute coherent 
patterns among the participants. Resulting factors represent assembled points of view, or 
discourses. Each identified discourse consists of a distinct set of responses and 
represents categories described similarly by those individuals who are significantly 
‘loaded’ on the same factor. A single factor does not represent the point of view of any 
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one individual, but an idealized Q sort that is distinguishable from other subjective 
orientations uncovered. Factor loadings are essentially correlation coefficients, 
indicating the extent to which each Q sort is similar or dissimilar to the composite 
factor.  
Factor interpretation is based on the factor scores. Factor scores for each factor are 
the scores gained by each Q statement and calculated as a weighted average, where 
higher weights are assigned to those Q sorts more significantly loaded on that factor. 
The weighted scores are normalized for direct comparison by converting to z-scores. 
Individual factor scores show how each statement would have rated on a factor had it 
been measured directly. These factor scores yield a composite factor that models a 
hypothetical individual who has a 100% loading on the factor. The statements are 
substantially significant relative to the factor; the interpretation of each statement, 
therefore, is participant to the dynamic of all statements as rank-ordered by the 
respondents, i.e. self-referent. Each factor is also given by the context contributed by all 
other factors. As such, Q methodology derives opinions from the interaction of 
perspectives existing in a concourse.  
Examination of significant factors, or ‘typical discourses’, is an interpretative 
activity by Q investigators. This involves an elaboration on the overall patterns and 
interrelationships of those statements as rank-ordered in the idealized Q sorts that 
indicate distinct viewpoints and attitudes. The interpretation is advanced in terms of 
consensual and divergent subjectivity with attention given to the relevance of such 
patterns to existing or emerging theories or propositions (McKeown and Thomas, 1988). 
Possible explanations are provided for the factor arrays by taking into account how 
statements are placed relative to one another both within and between each discourse. 
As a common practice, each factor is given a label to pinpoint a particularly salient 
characteristic of the factor type and reported in the form of a narrative which 
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summarizes the viewpoints and attitudes the factor represents. 
 
8.3 ANALYSIS OF STATED PREFERENCE AND VALUE 
8.3.1 Preference ranking and WTP 
Each participant completed a questionnaire in two sessions (before and after 
deliberation), producing two sets of policy ranking and WTP response Despite the 
requirement of exclusive choice some individuals put more than one option at the same 
rank. Both before and after deliberation there was a clear tendency towards official 
carbon pricing in terms of stated preference (Table 8.1). By aggregate ranking a carbon 
tax would be chosen. It received 12 primary votes, or 50% (12/24 participants), whereas 
9 votes, or 37.5%, went to emission trading. Neither grabbed more than half and the 
former beat the latter by a narrow margin. The group was fairly divided prior to 
deliberation. Nonetheless, the majority were united in putting voluntary offsetting and 
‘no pricing’ in a low priority. These were consistently ranked as third or fourth choice, 
indicating a general endorsement of official carbon pricing. This might be an outcome 
of self-selection where most of the participants were highly motivated and committed to 
more than minimal actions.   
It is worth noting that two participants (Mike and Nancy) held completely opposite 
views. ‘No carbon pricing’ was their favourite whereas carbon tax, the most popular 
option, was relegated to the least or second least preference. While Mike seemed to 
have a softer view toward unofficial carbon pricing, Nancy effectively rejected 
everything. The different views of these two participants had been expressed prior to the 
workshop when they were contacted via email. They were prompted for explanations 
for failing to complete the email questionnaire as requested9 . The email replies 
                                                 
9
 Yet they agreed to complete the paper questionnaire administered right before the deliberation. Table 
8.1 reports their responses to this version of questionnaire. 
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suggested a belief that Australia’s contribution to global CO2 emission is minimal, 
climate change is not human induced, and it is not fair for Australia to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. The refusal to state a WTP is understood as a kind of protest 
response arising from a strong disagreement with the presumed scenario. It was not 
evident that the two participants saw global emission mitigation as unnecessary, but 
they doubted the responsibility required of the country and its citizens on some moral 
grounds (e.g. the justice of cost distribution between Australia and bigger countries in 
terms of population). Mike appeared to be more open-minded. 
The aggregate ranking did not change following deliberation. Carbon tax and 
emission trading occupied the first two ranks in most cases, reflecting a continuing 
struggle over the two possible options of official carbon pricing. Carbon tax, the most 
preferred option increased in rank following the workshop. It was chosen by more 
people as principal option, yielding a net increase from 12 to 16 votes, or 50% to 62% 
of the total10. This suggested that an agreement on preference was emerging Mike, who 
once rejected carbon pricing, has contributed to the increased support. Nancy became 
more sympathetic to emission trading, putting it at second. Support for emission trading 
declined by only one vote, leaving 31% in favour of this option. The widened 
preference gap indicated a tendency toward a particular option, although the emerging 
agreement was far from unanimous. 
                                                 
10
 One individual (Dan) ranked three options as first preference, raising the total number of primary votes 
to 26. 16/26 = 62% 
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Table 8.1 Participants’ preference ranking and willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
 Pre-deliberation Post-deliberation 
Subject Emission 
trading 
Carbon 
tax 
Voluntary 
offsetting 
No 
carbon 
pricing 
WTP 
(AUD) 
Emission 
trading 
Carbon 
tax 
Voluntary 
offsetting 
No 
carbon 
pricing 
WTP 
(AUD) 
Alan 2 1 3 4 200 2 1 3 4 200 
Brian 2 1 3 4 200 3 1 2 4 200 
Claire 2 1 3 4 50 2 1 3 4 50 
Cynthia 4 1 4 4 100 2 1 3 2 100 
Dan 2 3 1 4 500 1 1 1 4 50 
Elaine 1 2 3 4 100 1 2 3 4 100 
Florian 2 1 3 4 100 2 1 3 4 100 
George 1 2 3 4 Not specified 1 2 3 4 25 
Helen 1 2 3 4 71 2 1 3 4 80 
Howard 1 2 3 4 30 2 1 3 4 23 
Ian 1 2 3 4 100 2 1 3 4 50 
James 2 1 3 4 120 2 1 3 4 150 
John 1 2 3 4 50 1 2 3 4 20 
Kate 2 1 3 4 150 2 1 4 3 150 
Kevin 1 2 3 4 100 1 2 3 4 90 
Liana 2 1 3 4 100 2 1 3 4 100 
Mark 1 2 3 4 20 1 2 3 4 4 
Mike 4 3 2 1 Refused 3 1 4 2 20 
Nancy 4 4 4 1 Refused 2 4 3 1 5 
Phillip 2 1 3 4 50 2 1 3 4 50 
Ross 2 1 3 4 200 2 1 4 3 200 
Sarah 3 1 2 4 100 4 1 2 3 85 
Stephanie 2 1 3 4 50 1 2 3 4 50 
Wilson 1 2 3 4 100 1 2 3 4 70 
Sum of rank 46 40 70 90  44 34 71 86  
Aggregate 
rank 2 1 3 4  2 1 3 4  
Principal 
option 
(No. of 
participants) 
9 12 1 2  8 16 1 1  
 
 
The other two options, voluntary offsetting and no pricing, remained less popular. 
Some participants ranked the latter more favourably (Cynthia, Kate, Ross and Sarah). 
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This does not match their relatively high WTPs (A$100, A$150, A$200 and A$85, 
respectively), but seems to reflect a reduction in preference for the main alternatives: 
voluntary offsetting or emission trading. Contrary to usual expectations, there was no 
obvious upward movement in the stated WTP. WTP went down in eight cases and up in 
just four. The deliberation resulted in enhanced agreement to pay for emissions 
mitigation. Both of the protest bidders (Mike and Nancy) returned to a positive WTP 
(A$5 and A$20 respectively). This indicated a qualitative convergence in willingness to 
pay, a form of preference agreement where all agreed upon the same course of action, 
i.e. making financial contribution. Note that, nevertheless, ‘no carbon pricing’ remained 
the first and second preference of Nancy and Mike respectively. 
 
8.3.2 Subjective discourses 
The two sessions of survey yielded 48 Q sorts, which captured the participants’ values 
and beliefs about human-induced climate change and emissions mitigation (see 
Appendices A.2.1 and A.2.2 for individual Q sorts). The Q sorts were factor analyzed as 
a single block using principal component method followed by varimax rotation. Factor 
analysis extracted three factors11. An extracted factor represents a coherent set of 
idealized perspectives constituting a distinct discourse and is defined in terms of the 
normalized factor scores associated with each statement (Table 8.2). Each of the three 
discourses is accordingly identified with a label and described with a narrative. The 
narratives presented below are constructed based on my interpretation of the normalized 
factor scores, i.e. an interpretation of Table 8.2. (The numbers in the brackets refer to 
statement numbers in Table 8.2) 
 
                                                 
11
 The analysis was limited to three factors because an initial interpretation of the factor metrics 
suggested that extraction of additional factors led to a lack of clear distinction across two dominant 
factors.  
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Managed Marketization (Factor A). This discourse accepts the science of 
human-induced climate change as valid and sees mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions as necessary (1, 6, 18). It affirms the potential of markets and 
commercial investments in mitigation (7, 21), in favour of direct regulation (17). 
Nevertheless the market liberal discourse does not resist administrative measures. 
There is some confidence in a bigger government with no strong concern on 
transparency issues (4, 12). Compulsory contribution from households and 
businesses is supported (8, 9). An important yardstick is actual consequences 
defined in terms of mitigative effects and global influence (2, 22). The discourse 
demands that governments set agenda and enforce targets, while enabling the 
markets to meet these targets efficiently. It has captured the main features of 
cap-and-trade mechanisms, where governments set rules to utilize market forces. 
Factor loadings on this discourse are statistically higher for those who ranked 
emission trading as the most preferred option (t = 3.573, p < 0.01). This means that 
its adherents prefer emission trading to its alternatives. 
 
Strong Government (Factor B). Like Managed Marketization, this discourse 
affirms the science of human-induced climate change and stresses the need to 
respond (1, 6, 18). It runs in a different direction by holding stronger resistance to 
market-based approaches (7, 21). Preference goes to direct regulation (17), but it is 
conditioned upon the balance of regulation and bureaucracy and the openness of the 
system (4, 12). Commitment to climate protection does not depend on actual global 
impacts through influencing other countries (16) nor, at least not strongly, a 
guarantee of a level of emission reduction (2). The belief that someone has to pay 
appears slightly stronger (3, 14, 20). This discourse is intrinsically motivated and 
hostile to the markets, which are better at providing extrinsic incentives for the 
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management of public goods, as part of the solution to the climate change problems. 
State-led regulatory programmes are granted with cautions. Adherents of this 
discourse prioritize carbon tax (t = 2.686, p < 0.05). 
 
Scepticism (Factor C). Scepticism stands in contrast to the above two discourses. It 
involves a denial of the existence of human-induced climate change and refusal to 
take actions prior to scientific consensus (1, 6, 18). Compulsory contribution from 
households is categorically rejected as it would increase their economic burdens (3, 
20, 8). It seems to be a liberal discourse being pro-market (7, 21) and indifferent to 
requests for more industrial commitments (9, 11, 14). However, it generally 
supports politicians and administrative solutions (4, 5, 17). The discourse is hostile 
to global citizenship: it does not seek to influence other countries while demanding 
their initiatives (16, 22). Sceptics tend to see no need for pricing carbon (t = 6.804, 
p < 0.01).  
 
Table 8.2 Factor scores  
No. Statement 
Factor 
A B C 
1 Mitigation 
impacts 
National greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions should 
be considerably reduced. 
4 4 -4 
2 Certainty of 
impact 
An emission reduction scheme should involve a 
guarantee that a certain level of reduction will be 
achieved. 
4 2 -1 
3 Costs to 
households 
Additional costs to households should be avoided. 0 -1 4 
4 Bureaucracy A government-led reduction scheme would create 
bureaucracy and should be avoided. 
-4 0 -4 
5 Trust in politics We can’t rely on the government to reduce GHG 
emissions. I don’t trust politicians. 
-1 0 -4 
6 Scientific 
consensus 
We do not yet have consensus on the science of 
climate change and so should not take action to 
-4 -3 4 
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reduce greenhouse emissions. 
7 Efficiency Market-based approach should be used to ensure 
efficiency (i.e. lowest possible cost for a given level 
of emission reduction). 
4 -4 3 
8 Compulsory share 
(household) 
Reducing GHG emissions should involve a 
compulsory share by households 
3 3 -4 
9 Compulsory share 
(business) 
Reducing GHG emissions should involve a 
compulsory share by businesses 
4 4 0 
10 Continuity Climate policy should involve political certainty, 
e.g. not easily affected by change of government. 
4 4 4 
11 Compliance We need a system that enforces compliance of 
companies to reduce GHG emissions 
4 4 0 
12 Transparency Emissions reduction policy should be transparent 
and easy to understand by all.  
0 4 4 
13 The poor pay less Lower-income families should contribute 
proportionally less to emission reduction. 
3 4 4 
14 Industries pay 
more 
Energy-intensive industries should be responsible 
for the costs of emission reduction. 
2 3 0 
15 Cost transfer Businesses should not pass the costs of emission 
reduction on to consumers.  
0 0 0 
16 Global action We should not take action if other countries do not 
do the same. 
0 -4 4 
17 Direct regulation Direct regulation is more effective than any form of 
carbon pricing. 
-4 3 3 
18 Human 
contributions 
The effect of humans on climate is small. Reducing 
emissions is not a priority. 
-4 -4 3 
19 Fairness It is only fair that every Australian helps to reduce 
GHG emissions. 
3 4 2 
20 No tax I already pay enough tax, we don’t need a new one. -3 -4 4 
21 Profit allowed Companies should be allowed to make profit by 
reducing their own GHG emissions. 
4 0 3 
22 Global influence Our climate policy should be able to affect other 
countries’ decisions on emissions reduction. 
3 3 -3 
Eigenvalue  16.83 17.13 3.92 
Note: Level of agreement based on a 9-point scale (-4 = strongly disagree to 4 = strong agree)  
 
Main differences between the three discourses can be identified in terms of trust in 
markets and trust in science. The two pro-climate discourses, Managed Marketization 
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and Strong Government, have comparable variance as indicated by their eigenvalues 
(16.83 and 17.13 respectively). They share the view that the global climate is changing 
due to industrial activities. Managed Marketization is characterized by a more pragmatic 
environmentalism that gives more emphasis on efficiency and mitigative consequences. 
Carbon pollution is attributed to market failures. Governments should correct the 
markets through proper regulation. Strong Government presents a more conservative 
and less consequentialist environmentalism. The markets are considered inherently 
flawed, so that governments should explore alternatives to avoid repeating the failures. 
Scepticism has a much lower variance (3.92). It seems to be self-contradictory by 
containing both pro-market and pro-government elements. To the sceptics the climate is 
fine and the government has done enough. Unlike Managed Marketization, Scepticism 
does not embrace the markets per se (see the quote from Mike in Section 9.3.4 in 
Chapter 9). The disposition stems from a belief that there is no more need to get the 
government involved in emission mitigation beyond existing regulatory efforts. This is 
evidenced by the seemingly contradictory attitude toward the idea of carbon pricing 
(Statement 17 - direct regulation in favour of carbon pricing), which is based on markets. 
Although Scepticism has confidence in a strong government, this is probably because it 
does not regard the Australian government as failing to address global climate change. 
Strong Government, to the contrary, wants more from the government to redeem its 
failures, and thus remains cautious of politics. 
In summary, the three discourses can be distinguished in terms of the expected 
role of government. To Managed Marketization, governments should do more to repair 
the markets, whereas to Strong Government, they should explore alternatives to the 
markets. To Scepticism, governments should avoid taking action until there is consensus 
on science and international politics. 
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8.3.3 Agreement and disagreement on values and beliefs 
Table 8.3 presents the correlation between each participant’s Q sort and the idealized Q 
sort denoting the corresponding factor. The great majority of participants were 
significantly loaded on either Managed Marketization or Strong Government (Factors A 
and B respectively) prior to deliberation, and many were associated with both at the 
same time. Scepticism (Factor C) proved to be a zone of polarization with a number of 
negative loadings. Only three mounted on this discourse (Kate, Mike and Nancy) and 
two of them were strongly associated (Mike and Nancy, factor loadings 90 and 87 
respectively). These individuals are hereafter identified as sceptics.  
Deliberation did not change the subjective landscape dramatically. Most of the 
participants continued to struggle over the two dominant positions and many mounted 
on both. Comparing with the pre-deliberation loadings, although four more participants 
subscribed to Managed Marketization to a significant degree, two more were principally 
loaded on Strong Government. Moreover, three more participants became associated 
with two factors, rising from 15 to 18. The three sceptics remained significantly loaded 
on Factor C although loadings decreased. The number of individuals in significant 
agreement did not decline across all of the three factors.   
 The post-deliberation relationship between Scepticism and the other two discourses 
is worth noting. The two strong sceptics (Mike and Nancy) experienced a substantial 
growth in affinity for an alternative discourse. Nancy became more sympathetic, 
although not to a statistically significant degree, to the Managed Marketization 
discourse with a correlation 28, rising from -24. Mike shared with  
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Note: * denotes significance, which is determined by standard error = 1/sqrtN (Brown, 
1980), where N denotes number of statements. At the 95% level, significance cut-off is 
around 40 (1.95 x 1/sqrt22). 
 
 
Table 8.3 Participants’ Factor Loadings (x100) 
 Pre-deliberation  Post-deliberation 
Subject A  B  C  A  B  C  
Alan 34  75 * -32  56 * 70 * 4  
Brian 63 * 71 * -13  42 * 88 * -11  
Claire 73 * 59 * 18  83 * 29  4  
Cynthia 24  89 * -18  42 * 85 * -13  
Dan 37  67 * 19  49 * 77 * -16  
Elaine 58 * 49 * -29  73 * 51 * -1  
Florian 64 * 60 * -19  67 * 66 * -15  
George 73 * 39  -6  78 * 41 * -15  
Helen 54 * 77 * 1  69 * 69 * 8  
Howard 77 * 50 * 10  75 * 58 * -12  
Ian 63 * 58 * 11  71 * 54 * 5  
James 71 * 56 * -4  50 * 65 * -4  
John 80 * 32  -4  82 * 21  -2  
Kate 33  46 * 59 * 54 * 12  44 * 
Kevin 68 * 64 * 23  58 * 74 * 9  
Liana 39  85 * -13  55 * 72 * -3  
Mark 74 * 52 * 0  80 * 45 * -5  
Mike -10  -31  87 * -10  50 * 58 * 
Nancy -24  -12  90 * 28  -16  72 * 
Phillip 35  29  -24  61 * 5  38  
Ross 56 * 69 * -19  38  74 * -2  
Sarah 51 * 66 * 4  19  92 * 20  
Stephanie 70 * 59 * 2  68 * 62 * -12  
Wilson 81 * 47 * 17  62 * 64 * 23  
No. of participants 
in significant 
agreement 
16  19  3  20  19 
 
3  
Principal factor 12  8  3  12  10  2  
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Strong Government with a correlation 50, rising from -31. Other individuals appeared to 
be impressed by the sceptical perspectives to varying extents. They did not, however, 
remarkably withdraw from their pro-climate positions. Take the three observations with 
the greatest growth in Scepticism as examples. While being influenced by the sceptical 
views, Elaine and Phillip had their loadings on a pro-climate discourse increased, and 
Alan became associated with both Factors A and B. Scepticism was not swept away. 
Both Mike and Nancy were characterized by the same sceptical factor, and the reduction 
in their factor loadings was offset by the growth contributed by other individuals (see 
also Table 8.4 below). Kate and Mike (and perhaps Phillip as well) gained access to two 
competing discourses.  
Table 8.4 displays the average correlation between subjective positions. The first 
row presents the correlation between participants and a discursive position, or an 
idealized Q sort. It is computed by averaging the factor loadings on each of the three 
factors, i.e. column average in Table 8.3. These estimates measure the extent to which 
the individuals adhered to a particular political ideal. All of the average values remained 
statistically unchanged after deliberation. Overall, therefore, there was no observed 
conversion of values and beliefs leading to shrinkage or expansion of discourses.  
 
Table 8.4 Average correlations between subjective positions 
Average correlation (x100) Pre-deliberation Post-deliberation 
Between participants and a 
discursive position 
Factor Factor 
A B C A B C 
52 52 7 56 54 7 
Between pairs of participants 53 60* 
* p < 0.01 
 
Average correlation between pairs of participant is presented at the bottom of 
Table 8.4. It is computed by comparing an individual’s value ordering with every other’s, 
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i.e. correlating each participant’s Q sort to the other 23 participants individually. These 
estimates measure the extent to which the individuals shared with each other in terms of 
subjective experience (inter-subjectivity). The average value significantly increased 
from 53 to 60 (t = 5.702, p < 0.01). This shows that the deliberation has improved 
inter-subjective understanding among the participants. It nonetheless did not conclude 
with a normative consensus, as evidenced by the limited degree of convergence in 
subjective values in aggregate terms. The emergence of inter-subjective coherence did 
not go with a tendency of normative uniformity.  
In summary, the deliberation has enabled communication between competing 
discourses. None of the identified discourses diminished, suggesting that differences in 
value and belief were not erased. Instead, there was a broadening of understanding 
across discursive divide, indicated by the increasing sharing of subjective experience 
between the participants. A symmetrical communication was working, contributing to 
the enhanced recognition of competing positions. There was more support to the 
concept of carbon tax and increasing willingness to pay from the sceptical individuals. 
In other words, the improving agreement on a course of action emerged under 
persistence of different reasons and not a tendency of normative uniformity. Therefore, 
it may be explained in terms of a workable agreement.  
 
8.3.4 Diminishing inter-subjective consistency 
If a workable agreement has been achieved, one would expect a reduction in 
inter-subjective consistency. Two individuals mutually agreeing on a course of action 
for different reasons are considered inter-subjectively irrational. Preference 
economization and moralization require the sharing of subjective values as well as 
preference among individuals and expect an increasing level of consistency as a result 
of group deliberation. The present case study illustrates a deep conflict in opinions, due 
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to the presence of two sceptical participants who demonstrated strong differences from 
the rest of the groups in terms of both subjective value and preference. Inter-subjective 
rationality requires that the deliberation ends in either a perfect agreement at both levels 
(e.g. tax or emission trading chosen and Scepticism withdrawn), or the conflict 
continues to exist – or even becomes strengthened in the case of increasing 
inter-subjective consistency. 
 The data collected were then tested for inter-subjective consistency using the 
methodology developed by Niemeyer (Niemeyer, 2007; Niemeyer and Dryzek, 2007). 
The test involves plotting agreement in subjective values against agreement in 
preference between pairs of individuals. The former is computed by correlating an 
individual’s value ordering with every other’s, i.e. the dataset presented in Table 8.4. 
The same procedure applied to the preference ordering produces the latter. This yields 
two correlation values for each pairs of individuals (276 pairs in total). A positive 
relationship between these two values is expected by the theory. Since ‘preference 
agreement should be proportional to subjective agreement, an inter-subjectively rational 
situation will feature a positively sloped regression line, around which data points are 
tightly clustered’ (Niemeyer and Dryzek, 2007, p. 516). The regression coefficient (R2) 
is indicative of the amount of variation in preferences that can be explained by variation 
in subjective values, and thus taken as the indicator of inter-subjective consistency.  
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 present results for the pre- and post-deliberation surveys 
respectively. Before deliberation a fairly high inter-subjective consistency already 
existed among the participants. The main reason is that the case features deep conflict 
with the presence of strong opponents who disagreed with their pro-climate counterparts. 
The negative cluster at the lower corner of Figure 8.1 has pulled the regression line 
down and contributed to the very high R2 (0.72). All of these data points come from 
Mike and Nancy who were firmly held to Scepticism. This R2 value is even higher than 
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what was achieved post deliberation in a previous study (Niemeyer and Dryzek, 2007) 
which was used to illustrate and justify the concept of inter-subjective consistency. The 
consistent disagreement at value and preference levels between two groups illustrates 
the second possibility of inter-subjective consistency shown in the lower grid on the 
right in Table 8.2 above. 
 
Figure 8.1 Pre-deliberation inter-subjective consistency 
 
  
Deliberation did not lead to an increase in inter-subjective consistency. To the 
contrary, consistency declined and R2 went down to 0.39 (Figure 8.2). The diagonal 
clusters are replaced by dispersed spots spreading on the right hand side of the graph. 
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Along the y-axis there are both upward and downward movements. Data points at the 
lower corner moved to the right. This horizontal movement across the y-axis pulled the 
upper end of the regression line down, contributing to the decreasing slope.  
 
Figure 8.2 Post-deliberation inter-subjective consistency  
 
Figure 8.2 shows that, there was an improvement in value agreement but not a 
proportional change in preference. Note that this occurred mainly at the inter-subjective 
level. As Table 8.4 has shown, inter-subjective agreement on value and belief gained 
improvement without resulting in normative consensus. The kind of agreement 
observed in Figure 8.2 came from increasing attachment to competing positions, rather 
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than to a particular one12. Thus the finding reported here does not contradict the earlier 
judgement that differences in perspectives persisted. It reflects an outcome of a two-way 
exchange, i.e. some of the individuals became more united than before in the sense that 
different viewpoints are recognized. 
Although the preference orderings did not experience remarkable convergence , a 
consensus on one particular policy option (i.e. carbon tax) was emerging. Sarah, for 
example, was one of the main contributors to the flattening of the regression line by 
providing 8 negative preference correlations. Yet this participant was part of the 
consensus firmly held to carbon tax all the way through. The shift to the option of 
carbon tax on the part of the sceptical Mike was critical, but his preference correlations 
remained relatively low. Agreement on a single option may be independent of the 
inter-subjective agreement on the priority of the remaining ones. That is, consensus on a 
course of action does not necessarily require consensus on the ranking of its alternatives. 
Thus the lack of proportional change in preference came with improving consensus on 
the most preferred action. 
 
8.3.5 Discussion of findings 
The results of the case study may be interpreted in terms of workable agreement. There 
was an initial consensus at preference level. As a result of deliberation, the participants 
became more united around a carbon pricing mechanism, i.e. carbon tax, due to the 
increasing support from previously ETS advocates, including Helen, Howard and Ian, 
and one of the sceptical individuals, Mike. Both of the sceptical individuals (Mike and 
Nancy) came to join the rest of the group by indicating an intention to contribute to 
emission mitigation financially. The observation that carbon tax managed to secure 
majority support and protest bids disappeared deserves attention. This happened without 
                                                 
12
 Inter-subjective agreement would increase in both cases: if all individuals become subscribed to a 
single order of subjective positions, or they came to mutually recognize competing positions as illustrated 
in Table 6.1 in Chapter 6. 
189 
 
a consensus being explicitly prompted. Possible explanations are provided in the next 
chapter. 
On the other hand, divergence in subjective values remained. Reasons 
underpinning the choices of the participants have been communicated, as evidenced by 
the interactive movement in factor loadings across the two groups (i.e. pro-climate and 
climate sceptical). While the deliberating individuals increasingly leant towards a single 
proposal, they extended their recognition to a fundamentally different and competing 
discourse and some have gained access to two competing positions without entirely 
withdrawing from the prevailing one. For instance, Mike and Nancy were associated 
with a pro-climate discourse, while a few others, such as Philip, became more 
sympathetic to Scepticism. This suggests that the initial consensus was associated with 
enhanced recognition of different subjective positions, which is an evidence of a 
workable agreement at work.  
 Workable agreement precludes inter-subjective consistency. The sample of this 
study features in self-selection of participants and clear division between two groups. 
Self-selection might create a group of individuals with entrenched views and high 
motivation. Entrenched views might stem from considerable knowledge, and high 
motivation might lead to active search for information and consideration of various 
relevant issues prior to deliberation. Improvement in knowledge and all-round 
consideration, which are regarded as a desirable outcome that a deliberation should 
produce, might have been achieved ‘too early’, leading to high consistency. On the other 
hand, one would expect that the chasm would float on at the beginning of the 
deliberation and diminish at the end. Sharp difference, however, generated diagonal 
clusters graphically as displayed in Figure 8.1. Such difference is supposed to be the 
very reason to run a democratic deliberation, but under this methodology it needs to be 
understood mathematically as indicative of an ideal outcome.   
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 Although the group preference may be considered inter-subjectively less rational, 
the qualitative improvement in WTP has important implications. Climate sceptics 
paying for climate mitigation seems to be an inconsistent behaviour. As a result of 
deliberation, both of the sceptics (Mike and Nancy) turned to a sympathetic sentiment 
about climate change, but they were still bound to some key concerns that logically do 
not lead to an affirmative answer towards the WTP request. Completed questionnaires 
suggest that, for example, they remained unconvinced by the science of climate change 
and rejected a perspective tax rise. Even considering their increasing engagement in a 
pro-climate discourse, the affirmative response still implied weaker instrumental 
rationality than their original positions. From the perspective of preference 
economization, such a WTP response is a failure to address one’s own values. 
Normative consensus which is favoured by preference moralization approach also does 
not seem to be a plausible explanation of these observations. Nevertheless, the 
affirmative response is critical to the formation of a workable agreement concerning 
societal WTP. The results are consistent with the discourse-based model of DMV. This 
clearly illustrates a tension between this model and the other two DMV approaches 
discussed in previous chapters.  
Moreover, the observation that the WTP responses of the two sceptics (and also a 
few others, to a lesser extent) were underpinned by competing reasons lends support to 
the argument that a monetary WTP could preserve value pluralism. The individuals 
were not held to a dichotomy. Critics believe that such monetary expressions always 
involve a compromise of value plurality. I argue that elicitation of WTP as an 
open-ended construct may work under non-declining diversity and improving reciprocal 
understanding. 
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8.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Normative meta-consensus constitutes the conceptual basis of two competing forms of 
deliberative ideal: workable agreement and inter-subjective consistency. Analysis of 
survey responses based on Q methodology revealed two pro-climate and one sceptical 
discourses. Deliberation did not result in simple consensus at a normative level. 
Sustained divergence in subjective values came with enhanced discursive 
communication between participating individuals. There was emerging agreement on 
preference in terms of policy choice as well as WTP. This agreement appeared under 
value difference. On the other hand, inter-subjective consistency diminished. There had 
been high inter-subjective consistency due to the sharp contrast in opinions and it did 
not fall following deliberation. 
 The results provided backing to the idea of workable agreement. Monetary 
expressions supported by a workable agreement could preserve value pluralism. Yet 
there appeared to be a weak instrumental relationship between the stated preference and 
subjective value, particularly on the part of the sympathetic climate sceptics. Granted 
that this is a political ideal, one may wonder if there is any sensible reason making it 
possible. The next chapter attempts to provide some clues. 
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CHAPTER 9 
TRACKING DIFFERENCE AND CONSENSUS 
FROM VERBAL INTERACTION  
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
People communicate via language. Groups of different social and political 
characteristics gain access to each other’s discursive territory via a medium of 
communication, typically a particular sort of language. Rhetoric is one communicative 
device that can facilitate their making and hearing of representation claims (Dryzek, 
2010). By enhancing mutual understanding it can promote social cooperation and 
formation of workable agreement binding the differing individuals to collective actions. 
Indication of an effective use of rhetoric in deliberation can provide useful hints about 
the quality and causes of meta-consensus. The last chapter has provided clues about the 
presence of an initial workable agreement. This chapter aims to identify possible drivers, 
catalysts or ways of its formation. 
A fruitful way to ascertain the effect of rhetoric in a deliberative forum is to study 
the verbal interaction within the group. This chapter reports an analysis of verbal 
interaction between the participants during the formal discussions The next section 
introduces the method employed, which involves a qualitative thematic analysis of 
transcripts. A close reading of the transcripts reveals several analytical themes emerging 
from the discussions. The ensuing discussion aims to ascertain their relationships and 
significance and characterize the effect of rhetoric on the formation of agreements. 
Results are discussed in terms of meta-consensus. 
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9.2 THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF TRANSCRIPTS 
Each of the transcripts was assigned a file number, e.g. S1G1, where ‘S1’ refers to 
Session 1 and ‘G1’ Discussion Group 1 (see Appendix A.3.1 for copies of transcripts; 
see Table 7.1 in Chapter 7 for the composition of the three discussion groups). Line 
number was added for clarity of reference. The analysis also included the email 
correspondence between the author and one of the participants, Mike, which provided a 
detailed record of his opinions and reflections in relation to the theme of deliberation 
and the deliberative process. It is assigned a filename ‘EC’.  
 Transcripts were corrected and coded by the author using Nvivo 8.0, a computer 
assisted software package that facilitates the systematic coding of textual data and the 
subsequent categorization of coded pieces of text. Conversations containing creative 
and critical content were extracted and indexed. The analysis followed the steps 
described by Spencer et al. (2003) and Ritchie et al. (2003). These are summarized as 
below: 
 
1. Read the transcripts carefully to identify initial themes or concepts and label the 
data as important issues arise; 
2. Sort and synthesize the labelled data by theme or concept in search for 
coherence of content; 
3. Assign categories to themes and concepts and group them accordingly;  
4. Define category elements and dimensions and develop an initial coding scheme; 
5. Scrutinize the transcripts to refine the coding scheme. Merge, split, add or drop 
categories where necessary; 
6. Establish hierarchies and/or typologies to produce a master coding scheme; 
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7. Re-code the transcripts systematically according to the master coding scheme; 
8. Detect patterns of association or clustering and develop explanatory concepts. 
 
Table 9.1 Master coding scheme 
1 Initial Confrontation 
1.1 Perceived dichotomy 
1.2 Enthusiasm 
1.2.1 Moral responsibility 
1.2.2 International      
demonstration 
1.2.3 Economic benefits 
1.3 Scepticism 
1.3.1 Incomplete evidence 
1.3.2 Minimal contribution 
 
2 Experiencing Conflict and 
Difficulty 
2.1 Disagreement on key issues 
2.2 Sense of powerlessness or 
incompetence 
 
3 Problem Characterization 
3.1 Limitations of market mechanisms  
3.2 Lack of political commitment 
3.3 Collective action problems 
 
4 Criteria Articulation 
4.1 Policy dimension 
4.1.1 Effect certainty and accountability 
4.1.2 Trust 
4.1.3 Simplicity or flexibility 
4.1.4 Distributional fairness 
4.2 Willingness to pay 
 
5 Consensus Formation 
5.1 Medicare levy parallel 
5.2 Recognition from opponents 
 
 
The purpose of this analysis is to systematically present and explain the flow and 
interaction of arguments raised by the participants, particularly the ways in which key 
viewpoints converged. The primary focus is the dynamic of the deliberation per se, 
rather than the assigned topic, i.e. climate change policy. Analytical themes and 
categories were therefore identified and defined in terms of the deliberative process.  
Five broad themes were observed and included in the master coding scheme, 
namely, ‘Initial Confrontation’, ‘Experiencing Conflict and Difficulty’, ‘Problem 
Characterization’, ‘Criteria Articulation’, and ‘Consensus Formation’ (Table 9.1). These 
events took place on a loose chronological basis and overlapped in some cases.. These 
themes and their children categories were extracted through observing the ways in 
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which facts and opinions were perceived, concerns and doubts were expressed, and 
main arguments and metaphors were used. Each theme consists of at least two children 
categories and contains a set of thematically related text coded into one or more of these 
categories. An example coded into ‘1.2.1 Moral responsibility’ is ‘Science seems to be 
saying we ought to. Otherwise our kids and grandkids will be living in an uninhabitable 
desert.’ (S1G1, line 19-20). Text index can be found in Appendix A.3.2. Key counter 
examples or arguments were marked in italic form.  
 
9.3 STRUCTURE OF ARGUMENTS 
This section provides a descriptive account of the ways in which the participants 
interacted. First, I outline how they constructed their climate change discourses through 
giving reasons, defining imperatives and projecting boundaries to exclude non-members. 
Then, the key conflicts they encountered and shared concerns are illustrated. Third, 
drawing on these concerns I show how a set of interrelated decision criteria were 
developed. Fourth, the ways that the groups came to acknowledge a proposed initiative 
that could meet some of those requirements were detailed. Finally, I give shape to the 
initial consensus with a focus on opponents’ own evaluations. For the sake of clarity, I 
take extracts from conversations in different sessions to illustrate these interdependent 
processes. These are elaborated following the five main themes (italic text denotes 
direct quote13, bold text denotes coding category).  
 
9.3.1 Initial Confrontation 
The clear division between the pro-climate and scepticism discourses was extended to 
the group deliberation in the form of a perceived dichotomy. Many participants were 
                                                 
13
 Real names were replaced for assigned names where they appeared in the conservation. 
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well informed of the technical and policy dimensions of climate change. They were 
aware of, and concerned about, the influence of climate scepticism in Australia, perhaps 
due to media coverage over the years. One of them started the conversation with a 
cynical tone: 
 
James: No sceptics, climate sceptics here?   
Ross:  Well there are some, there are people who are sceptical about it. They 
don't believe that it's happening at all. (S1G1, line 23-26) 
 
Those who had personal experience in dealing with the sceptical individuals tended to 
be cynical or even hostile towards the opposite view. When discussing an energy 
efficiency measure, Florian described a local campaign as a ‘fight’: 
 
If the government pushes I agree, as we said we have implemented this Goulburn 
Goes Solar! project in Goulburn. But we are fighting climate change denyers. Not 
sceptics, denyers on a highest level. Several members of parliament you know. 
(Florian, S1G3, line 247-250) 
 
Kevin echoed immediately: 
 
It's not just in this area. I live in an area you may remember that I said I was a 
renewable energy activist, and in the area that I live, in Crookwell, there's wind 
farms going up. Whereas there was a vote of the people and 70 per cent of them 
were willing to have more wind farms. 30 per cent didn't, and those 30 per centers, 
a handful of those people that are very active and that are doing everything they 
can to stop renewable energy……. Yes there are small groups that are doing stuff, 
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but there are hardcore people that are against it, and they are fighting tooth and 
nail to stop anything to do with this. (Kevin, S1G3, line 252-258, 268-271) 
 
Mike, the male climate sceptic, was also able to locate himself in the debate: 
 
This has become a polarised argument amongst two distinct camps; those who 
believe that recordable global warming is not a result of human activity and those 
who believe that the emission of industrial carbon gases is directly the cause of 
irregular weather patterns……My views are more directly associated with the first 
camp. (EC, line 13-18) 
 
The two positions directly observed were generally consistent with the Q sort 
analysis presented in the previous chapter. Enthusiastic individuals constructed their 
arguments mainly around moral responsibility, indicated by phrases such as ‘we ought 
to’ (S1G1, line 19-20), ‘greatest moral challenge’ (S1G1, line 36-37), ‘it’s the right 
thing to do’ (S1G2, line 57-59), and ‘we have a responsibility’ (S2G3, line 212-215). 
Other reasons included international demonstration, i.e. making Australia a role 
model of the climate campaign:   
 
Dan:  I think we need a leader who can review all this. Go out and role model. 
You're depending too much on the… 
Howard: It demonstrates to the rest of the world. 
Dan:    We should be the leader. 
Facilitator: We need one conversation.  So you're saying that… 
Dan:  Leadership which takes the country first, forget about the world.  Okay, 
they think about Australia first and then do what we can do here and try to 
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innovate things which we can export to other countries.  The other 
countries will benefit from what we have done and slowly it will dissipate 
and mitigate.   I mean we take it. (S1G2, line 104-115) 
 
Potential economic benefits were also suggested to be an important factor: ‘I also think 
in terms of our tourist attractions and things, the Great Barrier Reef and that sort of 
stuff being impacted.  So I think from a tourism perspective and climate perspective 
there will be benefits to actually doing an eco tourism industry which is a growth 
industry in tourism.’ (Elaine, S1G2, line 49-53) 
 Scepticism was expressed as two sets of argument. The first was based on 
incomplete evidence. Perceived uncertainties and limits of our current knowledge have 
led to suspicion of the scientific propositions concerning the significance of 
anthropogenic climate change. Rather than denying the harmful effects of industrial 
emissions, Mike doubted that the current level has reached a tipping point: ‘So we have 
less of a carbon dioxide, amongst other gases, absorption, so as you industrialise and 
farm more land there's less ground absorption. So everything you say Kevin is right, but 
it's grouped up now to what extent. What percentage?’ (Mike, S1G3, line 171-177). The 
second one suggested that Australia has minimal contribution to global climate change: 
‘we are not the biggest polluters on Earth anyway, are we?’ (Nancy, S2G3, line 
207-214). Yet the opposite view that smaller polluters should respond actively was also 
supported by some (e.g. S1G2, Line 175-179). 
 
9.3.2 Experiencing Conflict and Difficulty 
The attitudinal variation began to run into discernable conflict following increasing 
perceived security and openness among group members. Disagreement on key issues 
emerged as Kevin tried to exclude the options of voluntary offsetting and no carbon 
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pricing from further consideration. Mike indicated his reluctance by saying ‘Yes, I give 
the no carbon pricing at this stage in time’ and Nancy seconded ‘I’m going with the last 
one too.’ (S2G3, line 70 and 92). Kate, who was moderately loaded on the Q factor of 
Scepticism, was too leaning toward this option on the condition that global initiatives 
were not in place (S2G3, line 71-89). 
Clear division unfolded as concerns about carbon pricing were explained. Explicit 
disagreements between the two groups, notably between Mike and Kevin, indicated 
heightened level of conflict. 
 
Mike:  No carbon pricing doesn’t mean no carbon emission. They’re two of the 
same thing really.  We can still have a cap on emission without a cost. You just 
say you won’t do it that much. 
Kevin:  There’s no way we’re going to get a reduction of carbon without a cost. 
There has to be a cost…… (S2G3, line 105-11) 
 
At this point Mike no longer challenged the evidence of harmful greenhouse effect, but 
stressed the ineffectiveness of the proposed policy measures. His reply to Kevin’s view 
concerning cost adjustment encountered a remonstration: 
 
Mike:  That’s just because you assume that there must be a punishment for the 
emission. Now, what we didn’t discuss in there is that at this relative stage 
in the industry, particularly power generation that we’re talking about, 
there’s only a technological advance we can make. We’ve virtually hit the 
valley. At this stage in time we don’t have better [inaudible], but in general 
90 per cent of the power that’s generated in Australia cannot be improved 
upon or made more efficient. 
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Kate:  Yes it can. 
Kevin:  I totally disagree with that. Totally disagree. 
Mike:  With umpteen billion... 
Kevin:  Not umpteen - well there’s a number of ways you could do it.  You can 
do it with renewable sort of energy. Well you may discount that but there’s 
a lot of people that don’t discount that. (S2G3, line 119-132) 
 
Pro-climate individuals experienced milder disagreement among themselves as the 
emission trading controversies entered into the debate in Session 2. For example, Alan 
and Elaine argued with each other on the feasibility and effectiveness of emission cap. 
The difference in perspectives was indicated by the consecutive ‘But’ that introduced 
their counterargument to the other’s comments (S2G2, line 33-55). The varying levels 
of support for an ETS were observed not only at the beginning the Session 2 (e.g. S2G1, 
line 44-56), but also near the closure (e.g. S2G3, line 289-295 and 380-385). This seems 
to suggest that disagreement persisted. Yet a closer investigation has indicated 
emergence of common grounds between ETS and carbon tax: 
 
Alan: The funny thing is that yeah, they didn’t like to announce the fact that an 
ETS is basically going to be exactly the same really, the cost on the 
consumer. So really, if there was a good education campaign by the 
Government that said look, this is ETS and carbon tax are exactly the same, 
however you want to word it is fine, but basically an ETS is just a more 
complex way of tricking the public whereas carbon tax is easier to 
administer and we’re just being up front with you and everyone’s got to 
incur costs. 
Howard: Well if you’re taking power then, either way you’ll just see it on your 
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bill. Either way the Government’s using ministry to collect tax. (S2G2, line 
253-262). 
 
Later Kevin, a supporter of ETS, also pointed out a shared feature: ‘That's the same 
thing, as I see it, with the carbon tax or the ETS - is that the government is going to 
compensate you like welfare to make up for the increased costs.’ (S3G3, line 277-285). 
The differing arguments did not rest on possible cost-distributional consequences.  
 A few participants experienced a sense of powerlessness and incompetence at the 
beginning as well as the midst of the deliberative process. An example of powerlessness 
was the perceived inability to create global impacts: ‘I also think we need to be really 
honest about Australia's ability to influence other people. It's going to be the other way 
around, it's the Chinese and Indians telling us what to do.’ (Howard, S1G2, line 67-69), 
and ‘we can only concentrate on us [Australia] really.’ (Alan, S1G2, line 67-69) 
Moreover, the lack of progress in greenhouse gas mitigation has created frustration: ‘I 
actually think adaptation is more important because I think we've lost the game on 
mitigation. My feeling is that it's all over as far as mitigation is concerned, I'm fairly 
pessimistic. I don't think we've got a chance of changing minds.’ (Brian, S1G1, line 
38-48) Note that the perceived inability and pessimism have equivalence in the 
Scepticism discourse reported, suggesting that shared concerns might exist.  
Some participants appeared lacking confidence in the arguments they made due to 
barriers to understanding. These typically stemmed from the inherent complexity of the 
carbon pricing mechanisms under discussion: ‘I’m puzzled by that. Maybe I’m wrong 
for that reason. Maybe there’s something that I don’t understand.’ (Brian, S2G1, line 
106-112) Nevertheless this might not be a common experience, as Philip argued: 
‘Sometimes it's not a question of understanding the problem.  I still don't understand 
how the emissions trading scheme works, despite the lecture this morning, it just 
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brushed straight over the top.’ (S1G2, line 301-303) 
 
9.3.3 Problem characterization 
As the deliberation progressed shared concerns over key aspects unfolded. When the 
ETS controversy was introduced to the debate, more questions were raised and 
disappointments expressed as to the limited efforts on climate protection from major 
actors, namely, businesses, governments, and the public. The expressed doubts and 
disappointments contained important shared elements and led to alliance and shared 
agreement between previously differing individuals allied. I start with an identified 
problem that remained to be controversial.  
 Concerns about the limitations of market systems grappling with emission 
trading were overwhelming. Possibility of market manipulation was the biggest concern: 
‘I’d be weary of the ETS of market manipulation.  We see how proficient traders are at 
developing new systems like what brought down, went on the global financial crisis, 
with the manipulations of the market.’ (Ian, S2G1, line 84-87) Brian held a similar view: 
‘to me all these market-based things, to me, they leave open the option of rorting14 and 
that’s what’s happened in our society.’ (S2G1, line 200-202) Another argument against 
market mechanisms was couched in terms of behavioural change and more relevant to 
voluntary offset markets: 
 
Look at the difficulty we’re in in financial markets now with debt.  You know, 
you’ve got situations even now where there are carbon credits are being bought by 
people and they’re just getting bank rolled somewhere, I mean nobody’s doing 
anything with them. They’re not stopping people travelling. When you tick that, 
nobody has said, I’m not going to fly with Qantas, and ticks the box. It’s had no 
                                                 
14
 ‘Rorting’ is a term used in Australia and New Zealand. It refers to the action of defrauding, particularly 
relating to a financial impropriety of a government programme.  
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behavioural change and no improvement on CO2. (Wilson, S2G2, line 240-247) 
 
Mike, one of the climate sceptics, was also unconvinced and this was one remarkable 
occasion where an opponent of carbon pricing joined his pro-climate counterparts:  
 
Well, that methodology [of ETS] has got a pretty big downer for me because it’s 
not controlled sufficiently by Government from what I can see. It falls out into the 
hands of the private markets and we lose control of our own sovereign rights. 
(S2G3, line 177-180) 
 
This was however not agreed unanimously. Being prompted to offer a counter at the 
closure of Session 2, Kevin summarized his view in favour of ETS: ‘My approach 
would be ETS basically because I believe that the market will come up with more 
creative ideas and I believe it’s the most efficient way of going about it.’ (S2G3, line 
280-282) 
 Disagreements became less visible when the individuals turned the gun on€ the 
government and politicians. Lack of political commitment was a widely recognized 
problem with several dimensions. One of these concerned with the incompetence of the 
government and the believed shortcomings of bureaucracy: 
 
The other thing I’m may go to too, is the emissions trading scheme. I mean, we’re 
going to have a government minister for something that’s much more complex 
than carbon. I mean, they can’t even do pink batts and you’re wanting them to 
look after an emissions trading scheme? I mean, they couldn’t even look after a 
carbon tax, let’s be exact. (Philip, S2G2, line 124-129) 
 
204 
 
Another observation was a cynical attitude toward the government resulting from the 
historical inadequacy of official promise and actions. When prompted to evaluate its 
contributions to addressing climate change, Ian responded ‘It hasn't done anything.’ and 
Brian echoed ironically ‘You're joking.’ (S1G1, line 185-186). There was widespread 
disappointment at the poor record of official response: 
 
People are leading it. I don't think the government are leading it.  I think the 
people that are driving this - the government keeps saying, oh we don't know what 
to do because there's all these sorts of...... I feel that the government's lagging 
behind, and even businesses working together in organisation, we're already 
doing things like turning the computers off every night and turning all the lights 
off.  We've got geothermal power access in the building. These are happening 
whereas the government still doesn't appear to have. (Helen, S1G3, line 212-223) 
 
The discontent was extended to politicians in general. Failure to properly respond was 
attributed to their ‘playing politics’: 
 
Ross: I just feel that they're not having enough of a go.   
Ian:   Well they're not serious about it. They were trying to damage the other 
parties and… 
Brian: Playing politics. (S1G1, line 203-206) 
 
Some contended that politicians turned to a deaf ear to the evidence of climate change, 
although some disagreed. Either case, politics rather than the global threat was seen as 
the main game: 
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Male15:  Is anybody thinking oh, you know - we talked about the increasing 
frequency of… 
Female: Extreme weather events 
Male:  These sorts of things happening but it hasn't twigged with most people 
Male: Certainly not the politicians. 
Male: I actually don't think that's true. I still reckon more than 50 per cent of 
the politicians in the House of Representatives know what we know. But 
they got these marginal seats with swinging voters and that's because 
they want to stay in [inaudible]… (S3G1, line 499-508) 
 
 The participants were a group of highly motivated individuals. Among them there 
was serious concern as to the low motivation on the part of the rest of the public. This 
pertains to collective action problems where only a segment of the society acts upon 
the collective interest. Suggested causes included lack of information and awareness: 
 
Part of the problem is I actually think the government has to lead because there's 
a wack of people out there who are not maybe willing to do anything unless 
they're led.  There's a small group of people like us who will do something and 
we'll put the insulation in our roofs, or change our life, our background stuff.  
Most people, look it's not on their radar.  It's not on their radar until a bush fire 
goes through there and destroys all their house. Then they go, shit how did that 
happen. (Brian, S1G1, line 269-276) 
 
Pervasive effects of carbon pricing would lead to general price increases. Some people 
doubted that the majority of the public would be willing to contribute in the form of 
                                                 
15
 Participants who cannot be identified from the audio recordings are labelled as ‘Male’ or ‘Female’. 
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higher bills at the expense of their personal consumption: ‘I don't know whether enough 
people are so convinced’ (S3G1, line 443-454). 
 
9.3.4 Criteria Articulation 
Major differences began to diminish as the groups moved from ‘Initial Confrontation’ to 
‘Problem Characterization’, despite not being a strictly chronological process. Having 
discerned some shared concerns, the groups were able to give insights into the criteria 
of good policy that could address those problems. Less conflict was observed at the 
level of broader principles of public policy. 
 All groups demanded effect certainty and accountability, requiring clear 
emission reduction targets, dedicated use of the raised funds, accountable allocation 
systems, and preferably guaranteed reductions. Advocates of ETS did not vote in favour 
of carbon tax because:  
 
It doesn’t give a guarantee of the emissions reduction and working out what that 
tax should be, and because while it gives economic certainty in the year, what will 
happen as you go, well okay that was a great tax, we set it at 10 per cent but that 
actually gave us great revenue but it didn’t give us the result we wanted in 
emissions… (Elaine, S2G2, line 65-69).  
 
Similarly,  
 
I tend to lean towards the emissions trading schemes as an almost guaranteed 
way of reducing a very specific amount of pollution. So we will cap it out at five 
per cent reduction and what people are allowed to produce is you know, what’s 
below that. It’s a guaranteed reduction. (John, S2G1, line 57-61) 
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 Carbon tax supporters wanted similar guarantees. Dedicated use proved to be a key 
criterion being repeated many times in all groups: ‘I think it’s a simple system and if we 
had a carbon tax and if we made it a dedicated carbon tax, dedicated meaning all the 
taxes collected from that goes to a particular cause or purpose and that cause or 
purpose, it wouldn’t go into just general consolidated revenue. That purpose then is for 
developing alternative energy sources, energy efficiency programs and those sorts of 
things.’ (James, S2G1, line 128-133)  
The climate sceptics did not oppose spending more money on the development of 
low-emission technologies. They too requested strict dedication: ‘I see that the 
government says they're going to appoint overseers to ensure the money is actually 
being spent in the right direction. What you just mentioned makes sense. This levy - is 
levied on the individuals - can we be sure that all of those levies do go towards this 
R&D and assistance in construction of wind farms or whatever it might be. Not 
disappear back into consolidated revenue.’ (Mike, S3G3, line 67-72) 
An ETS could give more certainty on emissions mitigation whereas a carbon tax 
could offer greater transparency of the use of the raised revenue. Central to both camps 
were the questions ‘where the money is going to?’ and ‘what is going to be achieved?’. 
When the discussion moved on to intended financial support to low-emission 
technologies (Session 3), advocates of ETS and carbon tax articulated these concerns 
effectively with one voice. Ian, who shifted from ETS to carbon tax, aligned with his 
carbon tax counterparts: 
 
Ian: So we'd have to have goals. So what we're going to do in - this is what 
you're going to pay and this is what you're going to get in 10 years' time. 
Cynthia: Yes, and they're measured on those targets. 
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Ian: Yes, and every five years someone has to report to the parliament on how 
close we are to achieving those goals. 
James: All the money is dedicated to establishing a low carbon economy. (S3G1, 
line 164-170) 
 
Kevin, a vocal speaker for ETS, concurred: ‘So it depends on how it's being used 
and how you can show me that it's really been of benefit to this country.’ (S3G3, line 
469-471) Florian in the same group argued for carbon tax with the same concerns:  
 
if the government can get a solution that's very clearly outlined - where does the 
money go, how much it is, who will pay how much and who will not have to pay 
because they don't have the income - then this could really be a good thing. But if 
they don't explain it properly people will probably say no - as long as we don't 
know where the money goes to, then we're not part of it. (S3G3, line 477-483).  
 
Florian would perhaps agree with Mark, an ETS advocate, who defined inappropriate 
use of money by saying ‘There should be a bit of accountability and it should not be 
about propping up an existing industry sector like coal’ (S3G1, line 212-213). It is 
worth noting that a relatively large portion of transcripts coded into this category (effect 
certainty and accountability) were suggesting its paramount importance from the 
perspective of the participants. 
 A related factor being frequently mentioned was trust – trust in government 
agencies, politicians and businesses. As emission mitigation does not have tangible 
benefits or visible consequences, assurance on the use of funds and outcomes is a 
function of the reliability and credibility of the collector and manager of the money 
required. Participants frequently appeared hesitant to endorse a policy option because of 
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the lack of trust, notably in businesses and in bureaucracies. They suggested that carbon 
pricing could provide electricity companies with a legitimate reason to raise prices. 
Many doubted that the companies would genuinely and properly allocate the money to 
tackle climate change. Willingness to contribute declined when a hypothetical ETS 
scenario was introduced: 
 
Facilitator: So the energy companies would be required to meet the 20 per cent 
target……But they could use the raised funds at their discretion. 
Mark:   In other words, would we trust the electricity generators? 
Ian:   So instead of the CSIRO instead of the government… 
Facilitator: Nobody trusts the electricity companies? 
Ian:   I have my doubts. 
Mark:   Enron was an energy company wasn't it? 
John:  I mean, they do have a vested interest in providing electricity… 
Richard:  At the highest price. 
John: ……Well, I probably wouldn't be willing to pay as much, but perhaps… 
Brian: The thing is, at their own discretion could mean that they decide that 
they're going to invest that money in some company in Brazil. You know, 
it's got nothing to do with generation at all.  I mean, if an electricity 
generating company can't … to invest in electricity. If they've got their 
20 per cent up and running and they think oh well, I like profits - let's 
go and invest in some profits because we're going to make money out of 
them, or whatever - they could just invest the money wherever they 
wanted to. If you say no strings attached - well, cigarette companies… 
(S3G1, line 284-310) 
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More generally, the notion of trading was deemed to be an inappropriate transactional 
method. As Liana explained, with agreement from Florian, ‘This trading scheme is too 
vulnerable to shonky dealing, shonky offsets, weird sort of trading loopholes and it’s not, 
I sort of favour a straight carbon tax where everyone knows it’s honest. Everyone is hit.’ 
(S2G3, line 249-253) 
 Questions raised against the promotion of voluntary offsetting were related to the 
lack of trust: ‘I was told this morning there is a suspicion that when you tick the box 
when you buy an airline ticket, like carbon credits, that money is just being banked 
somewhere it's not actually doing anything.’ (Howard, S1G2, line 325-327) The 
reliability of the market systems was called into doubt:  
 
John: I’ve sort of generally always on principle refused to buy them [carbon 
offsets].  I don’t know, I don’t know the system they’re going to.  They 
always do research into what it’s going to but I really don’t know where 
that money is going to. 
Brian: It’s a lack of trust. 
John: Yeah, I just don’t trust the system. (S2G1, line 156-161) 
 
The climate sceptic, Mike, had little disagreement on this point: ‘No. You can't trust 
business to actually take the place of government. There are certain things that 
government has a total responsibility for and one of them is the mechanism - a control 
of price’ (S3G3, line 246-248)  
 While everyone took the trust issue very seriously they gave different weights as to 
whom they trust. Although carbon tax supporters tended to be suspect of the markets, 
some of them failed to find more reassurance from the government: ‘I don't trust the 
government to - I don't want it to go into a general fund and they feel like they can 
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spend it on carbon capture, which I don't believe in.’ (Florian, S3G3, line 415-417) 
Kevin trusted the market and this factor contributed to his argument for an ETS: ‘My 
approach would be ETS basically because I believe that the market will come up with 
more creative ideas and I believe it’s the most efficient way of going about it.’ (S2G3, 
line 380-382) Likewise, Brian chose the markets in favour of the bureaucrats: ‘we can 
have a trading scheme and I’m against a carbon tax simply because the bureaucrat.’ 
(S2G1, line 104-105) 
 The importance of trust is twofold. Firstly it crucially influenced the participants’ 
policy choice. Secondly, the three groups of people, i.e. advocates of ETS and carbon 
tax and the sceptical individuals, somehow merged into two groups. As Florian 
observed: ‘I think all these things we're discussing today, the matter of trust seems 
really important. We all do not really seem to trust governments. Some of us don't trust 
the markets’ (S3G3, line 475-477). The discursive boundaries were made more 
permeable through raising concerns over trust. Mike, initially sceptical, leant more 
toward tax supporters jointly arguing against the market believers: 
 
Mike: A form of carbon tax, I think. 
Kevin:  I disagree, you can say what’s the ETS because I believe in a market. 
Helen: You could split them into four. 
Sarah:  I was just thinking about that, I thought we could actually divide this up 
a bit because that’s okay. 
Mike: I don’t trust the markets. 
Kevin: Well, I do. (S2G3, line 340-346) 
 
On trust issues the three groups interacted in ways like there were only two groups. On 
certainty and accountability issues they spoke as if a single bloc loosely coordinated. 
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This means that these terms of acceptance were not only well received, but also shared 
among the individuals to a large extent. Legitimacy of these criteria was not considered 
controversial. 
 Another factor of concern was simplicity or flexibility. The public want 
transparency which rests on simple administrative mechanisms which give people 
greater access to relevant information for scrutiny. In the large group discussion after 
Session 2, the three group representatives indicated univocally their reasons for granting 
priority to carbon tax. One of the basic principles, they suggested, ‘was that with the 
carbon tax concept we liked that it was fairly simple, it was straightforward, we could 
understand it, it was tangible’. (Helen, S2LG, line 66-69). The prospect for a 
complicated system might perhaps lead Ian to shift from ETS to carbon tax: ‘I really do 
feel though, that if we have an ETS that’s too complicated, people will rort it for exactly 
the reason that James said.’ (S2G1, line113-115) ETS supporters had little problem with 
this criterion. They differed from the other group in their personal judgment or 
experience as to what simplicity means: ‘I’m all for simplicity but I reckon that’s where 
the market is.’ (John, S2G1, line 123) 
 Distributional fairness was identified as the fourth factor. There was a general 
agreement that the potential upward adjustment in costs of living should be fairly 
distributed between the deprived and the rest of the society (e.g. S3G1, line 187-188). 
Advocates of carbon tax seemed to have less sympathy to the notion of paying someone 
to reduce pollution, i.e. rewarding major polluters for cutting emissions (e.g. Helen, 
S3G3, line 217-224), or exporting mitigation responsibility to developing countries (e.g. 
Brian, S3G1, line 421-423). At least one ETS supporter, nevertheless, shared this view: 
‘I worry about this exporting thing. It's really saying if you're in Australia and you're 
currently driving a big station wagon, it's okay to upgrade to an SUV because some 
poor peasant can put off having a life. I think we're just sort of putting off the day when 
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we are saying driving giant cars.’ (Mark, S3G1, line 416-420) The factors of simplicity 
and fairness illustrated again that some overarching principles could transcend the 
discursive divide. 
 The first two sets of criteria, trust and certainty/accountability, played an important 
role of facilitating agreement to pay for emission mitigation. These have been explicitly 
linked to willingness to pay, regardless of discursive position or policy preference. 
Kevin affirmed the causal relationship by suggesting that ‘The more transparent it is, 
the more I'd be willing to pay.  You've got to damn well make it transparent, not just 
pull my leg.’ (S3G3, line 496-497) It was articulated by Elaine in terms of guarantee of 
end use: ‘that the amount of money depends on what it's being used for.’ (S3G2, 
line176-177) In the conclusion of the last session, the other group reiterated the role of 
trust: 
 
Ian:    How much we're going to pay depends very much on how confident we 
are about what is to do. 
Cynthia: It is a trust issue. 
Ross: The government should just spend $5 billion a year as part of the 
consolidated revenue to do this sort of stuff - but it's not going to happen 
because of this trust thing. (S3G1, line 539-544) 
 
 Participants under disagreement were connected through these concerns, although 
the underlying principles were sometimes subject to different interpretations. An 
alternative could bridge the conflict among the three groups when their members were 
reassured of these shared principles being properly accounted for. There was such an 
example found to be at work.  
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9.3.5 Consensus formation 
All of the three discourses affirmed an active role of government. Although perspectives 
were split on what the government should do and why, there was a common concern 
about the reliability of the formal institutions that would need to be created to 
administer the initiatives required. The individuals grappling with variations in opinions 
converged on an institution they could trust. Connection emerged during the discussion 
on a carbon tax in a form resembling the Medicare levy16. The role of this Medicare 
levy parallel was particularly obvious in Group 3 whose members included a vocal 
ETS supporter and two climate sceptics. 
 In the second half of Session 2, a ‘Medicare for the environment’ was proposed by 
Helen, who was initially leaning toward emission trading and shifted to carbon tax: 
 
right now today we could start a Medicare levy for the environment and have it 
at a really low level, start off just getting it, and we want to call it a carbon tax 
or an environmental levy or something and it’s really low percentage wise. 
(S2G3, line 279-282) 
 
The idea soon received support from her group members and they appeared confident 
and excited when responding to it.  
 
Helen: That’s why I want this environmental tax thing to start tomorrow.  Start 
it tomorrow and the rest of it we feed into it and we grow from there. 
Florian: Medicare for the environment. 
Helen: It needs it. 
                                                 
16
 Medicare is Australia's publicly-funded universal health care system. It was introduced in 1975 as 
‘Medibank’ renamed in 1984. Medicare provides affordable treatment by doctors and in public hospitals 
for all resident citizens and permanent residents of Australia. The program is now nominally funded by an 
income tax surcharge known as the Medicare levy, which is currently set at 1.5%.  
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Sarah: The administrators are already there.  The department that governs it is 
already in place. 
Helen: The structures are in place, we know how to do deal with it, okay 
everybody will have to pay a bit more.  Immediately the Government 
will have money that can start putting in infrastructure to help renewable, 
if that has to go into communication, promotion, marketing, killing Alan 
Jones, I don’t know what it means, it can start spending money now, not 
in three years, not in six years, not in 10 years. (S2G3, line 312-324) 
 
The above quote provides some hints as to what contributed to the connection. The 
individuals were familiar with the Medicare levy and had first-hand experience with the 
system. It was trusted and deemed to be honest being dedicated to the good of the 
people (healthcare). Acceptance of the ‘Medicare for the environment’ was granted on 
the condition that the administrative system required would be designed in the same 
terms as the Medicare levy. 
 These features also pulled members of other groups into a Medicare thinking 
mode. Without anyone formally proposing a Medicare for the climate, some individuals 
referred to it as a response. For instance, when asked to what extent a returning 
recession would discourage willingness to pay, Alan responded: ‘We all had to pay the 
Medicare levy last year didn't we? Whether there was a financial crisis or not, 
everybody still had to fork out for the Medicare levy……There'll be no Medicare levy to 
worry about either.’ (S3G1, line 176-183) While some suggested that funds could be 
collected in a form of sales tax, Ross preferred this alternative: ‘Or in the style of a 
Medicare levy’ (S3G1, line 112). Later James expressed his agreement with Ross, and 
Cynthia, who immediately raised an accountability issue, was reassured of the fact that 
such a levy is dedicated to a particular purpose (S3G1, line 139-147). Reference to the 
216 
 
Medicare was also found in a conversation about cost distribution (S3G1, line 184-193). 
 The ‘Medicare for the climate’ appears to be an imaginary and rhetorical idea. 
Being income-based, the proposed levy would primarily apply to individuals, rather 
than to firms as in the case of carbon tax under discussion. It was grounded on a 
reinterpreted justification for pricing carbon without necessary compatibility with the 
concept of carbon tax being put forward in the actual debate. The participants in 
proposing a modified ‘tax’ did not explicitly address the tension between the specific 
qualities of the two mechanisms. A rhetorical reading is that the idea projected a generic 
policy framework and principles on which the subsequent endorsement of a taxation 
programme to be operated by government agencies and regulate prices was based. It 
was a creative modification of the real option of carbon tax couched in more accessible 
terms. 
 Group 2 did not come up with an explicit appreciation of the idea. But a recorded 
conversation could shed light on the discussion. Alan responded to a suggestion of ‘a 
levy on electricity bills’ in this way: ‘I've got a bit of a concern about all these special 
levies. A good example is air travel. There's all these uplifts - you don't know what they 
are and where they're going. We should trust the government - they raise revenue and 
then it's their job to appropriate it sensibly.’ (S3G2, line 303-306) He would probably 
take issue with the proponents of the carbon levy. His concern, however, was based on 
the assumption that the levy was administered by private companies, such as airlines. 
The government was trusted. The counter example suggests that trust was a limiting 
factor determining the acceptability of the levy concept. 
 The innovative proposal received recognition from opponents. They appeared 
more sympathetic to a tax system that is familiar and accountable. Signs of rising 
consensus were clearer in Group 3 where views were more divided. The idea of a 
Medicare for the climate was respected by Kevin, who favoured emission trading all the 
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way through:  
 
I’m against it but I would say that the carbon tax would be the prefer option of 
us all. (S2G3, line 338-339) 
 
Well I like the Medicare. I think if you set it at one per cent or whatever and 
everybody pays and at the end of the year it goes in … then they can deal with it. 
It's got to be able to be flexible enough to not slam the poor and not let the rich 
get off with not paying. (S3G3, line 54-58) 
 
Later the market believer reaffirmed the group consensus and acknowledged its 
potential: 
 
Female:  Is this the levy that you are proposing to - this is the carbon tax that 
goes… 
Kevin:  This is the levy that we're going to pay that would go directly for 
renewable energy. Like you suggested, it seems to make sense to me that 
Medicare possibly would be a branch of government that would handle 
that. Or whatever's appropriate. The carbon tax compensates the less 
fortunate especially, plus it encourages the businesses to cut down on 
their use or production of carbon. (S3G3, line 381-388) 
 
Established confidence in the Medicare system has been extended to the proposed 
carbon tax. This proved to be a key factor motivating the two climate sceptics. Nancy 
agreed to pay for low-emission technologies, provided that payment would be collected 
through a Medicare-like system: 
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Nancy: What is the Medicare levy used for? Is it very straightforward - we pay it 
and the government gets it and spends it only on Medicare purposes. 
Because if that's the same then one could agree with that. That they could 
then be equally safe, you know.  The money - $35 or whatever - if that 
could be only used like the Medicare levy. Does anyone know how the 
Medicare money - does that go in general revenue or… 
Female: The Medicare levy is used for Medicare purposes. 
Nancy: Only for Medicare.  Then we have a blueprint for it, you know.  So that 
could be done and could be safe. (S3G3, line 335-344) 
 
Her support was conditional upon an equivalence, that is the mechanism of the 
proposed carbon tax would be ‘the same’ as the Medicare levy and thus ‘equally safe’. 
Confidence in institution, closely related to trust and accountability, was the 
determining factor. What concerned the other sceptic, Mike, was not actually the idea of 
pricing itself, but pricing through markets: 
 
The biggest thing I thought we’d have to avoid was having the costing of this fall 
into the hands of the market that can set an artificial price.  I really do think if 
a cost is going to put on it, it’s got to be established by Government, what that 
cost does. (S2G3, line 30-34) 
 
As reported in the last section, he felt unacceptable to allocate the raised funds to a party 
that is not accountable to the people, such as giving away as an ‘assistance package to 
industry’ (EC, line 401). In the post-workshop communication, he reiterated his 
preference for a carbon levy resembling the Medicare levy, which he thought was 
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‘transparent’, rather than a carbon tax. The endorsement stemmed from a belief that 
such a carbon levy could meet two criteria: 
 
Further discussion arrived as a group consensus that agreed in this form of 
financing as being appropriate towards R&D funding. Two factors emerged in 
that there was already an established system to manage a levy as all 
infrastructure was in place and a means of collection existed…… It was stressed 
that any levy so collected from the taxable public was to be quarantined as a 
sole payment towards GHE [greenhouse emission] R&D. (EC, line 130-138) 
 
The emphasis on ‘established’ and ‘quarantined’ well reflected the two key principles 
articulated by the groups. His change in policy preference and WTP decision was 
clearly based on a prospective Medicare for the climate understood as a modified 
carbon tax. 
 
9.4 POSSIBLE ASSOCIATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 
9.4.1 A bridging effect 
The concept of modified carbon tax, or carbon levy, demonstrated a bridging effect. 
Connection of discourses was facilitated through shared principles, without a clear 
tendency of displacing alternatives. It has been pointed out earlier that the participants 
differed substantially in their experience, understanding and judgment about the state of 
global climate and the merits of different policy instruments. The Medicare levy parallel 
did not address these specific concerns by, say, affirming scepticism or ensuring 
allocative efficiency. It was not even a kind of industrial taxation like the actual case, 
and Mike did try to draw the line: ‘A levy is in no way to be construed as a tax’ (EC, 
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line 400-401). As quoted above Kevin remained ‘against it’ despite increasing 
recognition. There was no substantial overlapping between the primary preference of 
these opponents and the advocates of carbon tax. 
Instead some key policy considerations overlapped. Potentially the modified 
carbon tax could address some of the major problems identified by the groups and fulfil 
the key principles articulated. There were many associations between these three sets of 
arguments. The proposed concept was able to reach audience situated in different 
discursive spaces. In Group 3, Florian did not trust the government whereas Mike 
appeared more confident, and Kevin was optimistic about private markets but others in 
the same group seemed unconvinced. Nonetheless all of them accepted the concept of 
carbon levy, or at least acknowledged its potential. Based on an established system 
deemed to be reliable and accountable, the prospective Medicare for the climate could 
get access to the different discourses mediated through the principle of trust although 
their members might view differently about whom to attribute trust. Likewise, although 
the proposed levy might potentially provide some assurance about dedication of the use 
of revenue and transparency, it might not guarantee a level of emission reduction. Yet it 
might bring people toward the more abstract concept of certainty to which they 
recognized, although individuals such as Kevin having alternative interpretations of the 
term and emphases. The initial agreement was built upon a collective belief that the 
agreed principles would be properly accounted for. Such a belief provided individuals 
more access to other discourses, although they might hold different views as to why 
such principles were crucial and what these meant. 
Couched in such terms the Medicare levy parallel played a rhetorical function, 
bearing resemblance to the notion of ‘bridging rhetoric’ (Dryzek, 2010). It stood at the 
intersection of multiple discourses, and addressed those dimensions that these 
discourses are equally concerned about. Moreover, it did not lead to normative 
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consensus but more of meta-consensus. Reflecting on his participation in the 
deliberative process, Mike contended that the groups were able to reach an initial 
consensus: ‘Twenty randomly selected citizens representing a cross section of the 
electorate did arrive at a considered consensus. Well not quite, but close enough to form 
a probable electoral poll outcome.’ (EC, line 359-361) However, after reading a news 
article about global warming (attached in EC) a few days later, he almost withdrew from 
the consensual perspective: ‘I have almost returned to my original position of complete 
disregard for scientific evaluation after reading this rubbish article.’ (EC, line 516-517) 
The validity of the science remained questioned by the sceptic, indicating coexistence of 
competing beliefs. Kevin, too, preferred an ETS although respected the consensus on 
tax. This shows that there was no sustained transformation or conversion of attitude or 
belief to an alternative, a feature defining meta-consensus (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2006). 
Corroborating the findings of Chapter 8, there was no remarkable change at a value 
level. 
 
9.4.2 Shared experience and willingness to pay 
This explanation provides an alternative interpretation of the qualitative change in stated 
WTP. Recall that the two strongest climate sceptics changed from a zero WTP provider 
to a positive one. Both of them indicated recognition of the group preference for a tax. 
Thus there was some degree of overlapping between them and the rest of the groups in 
terms of expressed preference (more for Mike than Nancy). Survey findings and the 
above qualitative report nevertheless do not provide strong backing to the conclusion 
that the group preference adequately represented their primary, held preferences and 
values. These remained disputed to some degree. The qualitative improvement in WTP 
reflects something more than changes in their held values. 
 It bears more resemblance to a meta-consensual outcome. Confidence in a payment 
222 
 
mechanism proved to be the main factor turning the refusals to pay to positive WTPs. 
Scepticism tends to deny the need to pay for carbon. However, individuals disagreeing 
with each other on values are close to an agreement on a course of action when they feel 
that their perspectives have been respected, their voices adequately heard, and their 
efforts genuinely appreciated. Appealing to a common subjective state is the key. In the 
case study, it was the expectation that the requested financial contributions would be 
appropriately used by a reliable and transparent institution that connected the sceptics to 
their pro-climate counterparts. The notion of paying for carbon per se has not been fully 
accepted by these opponents. The unfamiliar ideas of carbon pricing and carbon tax 
were not the first preference of everyone in the workshop. Nonetheless, there is shared 
understanding and recognition of an established system. Everyone has some experience 
with the Medicare; everyone knows that it is safe and transparent, and used only for a 
good cause. Trust issues were central to the debate and the Medicare was trusted. 
Appeals to a prospective Medicare for the climate reminded the opponents of their 
shared experience with the Medicare. Perhaps paying for the climate did not make much 
sense to the sceptics, but paying through a Medicare-like system appeared appealing 
because of shared experience. A reciprocal relationship was then created, making the 
WTP questions more accessible to them. 
 Through shared experience the levy parallel helped constitute an overlapping 
discursive space ‘joining competent and reflective actors’ (Dryzek, 2010, p. 320). The 
WTP question appeared more plausible to the sceptics as they were offered terms of 
cooperation that they considered acceptable. As a rhetoric, the parallel was a particular 
rather than universal appeal, since people with no or poor experience with an equivalent 
universal healthcare system might refuse. The qualitative change in WTP was primarily 
driven by the subjectively more appealing terms of cooperation successfully bridging 
climate scepticism and enthusiasm. 
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9.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Good deliberative outcomes could dispense with normative consensus and be mediated 
via rhetoric. Thematic analysis of transcripts provided a detailed account of the 
arguments flowing around the discussion tables. Both disagreement and consensus were 
found in the deliberative forum. Conflict in opinions unfolded at the beginning but 
common grounds were found as the deliberation progressed. The government was given 
major responsibility for leading emission mitigation, whereas perspectives diverged as 
to the role of private markets. All participants held that their support and financial 
contributions to climate change initiatives depended on trust, certainty of effects and 
accountability of institutions. Articulated in similar terms, these criteria however did not 
always produce identical assessments across participants.  
 A Medicare levy parallel played the role of bridging rhetoric by making the carbon 
tax option more plausible to its opponents. One of the discussion groups that featured 
clear division reached an initial consensus based on a modified carbon tax resembling 
the Medicare levy. This option was recognized by advocates of emission trading and 
climate sceptics, who nevertheless remained held to their own arguments to varying 
extents. The increased support stemmed from the belief that the key criteria articulated 
would be properly accounted for under a Medicare system, which has been established 
and trusted. These principles and experience with the Medicare were shared. The levy 
parallel could then bridge the individuals holding diverging views through shared 
dimensions. The qualitative change in WTP couched in such terms begs innovative 
explanations. All of the individuals agreed to pay and the enhanced trust in the 
institution responsible for receipt of payment and delivery of services proved to be the 
major reason. Everyone recognized the legitimacy of this criterion although priority as 
to which party to attribute trust varied. The concept of deliberative WTP elicited under 
such a value disagreement stands at variance with previous literature. 
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PART V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
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CHAPTER 10  
THE IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE OF DMV 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION  
The first half of this thesis has provided a number of new perspectives regarding 
environmental valuation research. It is argued the deliberative turn not only introduces 
participatory procedures, but also an epistemological system at variance with the current 
practice of environmental valuation. Some of the core elements of the preferred 
discourse-based approach have been addressed and illustrated in the case study. The 
results have provided insights into the shape of satisfactory outcomes of DMV and 
possible drivers., However, the novel approach may fail to meet the economic purposes 
it is meant to serve. The findings are also at odds with the requirements of other DMV 
models. Further clarifications and justifications are therefore needed to establish its 
normative status. 
This chapter presents a discussion on the theoretical implications of the proposed 
re-conceptualizations and supporting observations in a coordinated manner. I elucidate 
the ways in which they are linked to and come into conflict with the literature, and 
outline a political, pluralistic approach of environmental valuation. The discussion is 
focused on three sets of established perspectives concerning the advantages of DMV 
over the conventional approaches. These pertain to 1) the citizen-consumer dichotomy, 
2) the requirement of consensus, and 3) the content of the monetary expression, 
respectively. Each relates to an alleged justification for the use of deliberative methods, 
which however needs substantial repairs to dispense with the incompatibilities with 
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value pluralism 
Following the discussion, I conclude this thesis by reflecting on the science of 
DMV in the broader context of deliberative economics and shed some light on future 
research. To start with I summarize the previous chapters and indicate some limitations 
of this study. 
 
10.2 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on environmental value and valuation. Neoclassical 
economics has failed to capture alternative values and motives, such as moral 
obligations and rights. Nevertheless there are different interpretations as to the failure of 
the neoclassical tradition and the nature of the communal value of the environment. This 
results in a range of remedial mesures or alternative approaches for widening the value 
basis of monetary valuation. These are classified into three approaches.  
Functional diversification involves changes mainly in terms of the substance of 
valuation (object). It focuses on the multi-dimensionality of environmental change and 
remedial policy options, and calls for wider functional consideration for a more 
comprehensive assessment. Positional modification entails changes mainly in terms of 
constituency of valuation (subject). A diversity of people’s perspectives, expertise or 
experiences is embraced, yet within a particular scope of value. The valuing individuals 
are encouraged or selected to speak for the same constituency, such as the society at 
large. In both cases, the value-articulating institutions required are given and based on a 
prior judgement on the relevance, validity or legitimacy of particular value positions 
and dimensions. This creates a set of pre-analytic rules of inclusion or exclusion that do 
not allow alternative criteria that go beyond the specified institutional boundaries to be 
embraced. 
Under these approaches the case for value pluralism is not defensible. Functional 
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diversification is benign to neoclassical economic principles, whereas positional 
modification tends to privilege one pole of a dichotomy. Both have their 
value-articulating capacity enhanced when value diversity is reduced. The third 
approach, structural reconstruction, is more appealing. It emphasizes the variability of 
value-articulating institution and does not offer a pre-definition and pre-judgement of 
values. The nature of stated money values is understood in terms of their providers 
empowered to speak for themselves, rather than specified by the researcher.  
 Chapter 3 sketches the theory of deliberative democracy. The theory assumes an 
important role of public deliberation in favour of preference aggregation. Advocates 
believe that it can recognize pluralism and complexity and still defend the democratic 
ideals of the autonomy and sovereignty of citizens. The qualities of a decision are 
sought in the reasonableness of citizens’ validity claims rather than the intensity of 
preference. Some deliberative democrats favour universally acceptable reasons as a 
basis of social cooperation. Others emphasize reciprocity and encourage the search for 
fair terms of cooperation for their own sake, such that citizen must give reasons in terms 
that those with whom they disagree can accept. Also, individuals participating in a 
public deliberation should possess a certain level of communicative competence. It 
should be organized in ways that maximize statistical representativeness to produce a 
‘microcosm’ of the population. An alternative is discursive representation; participants 
would be selected in terms of discourse which refers to a set of categories and concepts 
embodying specific assumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions, and capabilities. 
It can raise prospect for capturing the differentiated character of interaction that 
characterizes the political world of a given social issue. 
 Liberal democracy presumes the existence of self-contained and self-verifiable 
choices, and so does not see reflection upon preference as necessary. To some 
deliberative democrats, constructive contestation of values and knowledge is a 
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requirement. Public opinion is then understood in terms of the critical interaction 
between citizens rather than simply their choices. Theorists hold different views about 
the ideal venue for deliberative democracy. Some suggest that it should be reserved to 
constitutional affairs and formal institutions. Nonetheless the public sphere has gained 
support from others who emphasize the role of civil society and informal expressions of 
opinion. Consensus has been recognized as an ideal outcome, but perspectives are 
divided in terms of the basis of action agreement. Consensus democrats prize consensus 
reached through realizing a comprehensive common good, whereas pluralists seek 
consensual basis of fair terms of cooperation in the face of persistent moral 
disagreement. In contrast to utilitarianism underpinning neoclassical economics, 
deliberative democracy is a second-order theory, which is about other theories as it 
provides ways of dealing with the claims of conflicting first-order theories and does not 
affirm or deny their moral principles in a priori. 
 Chapter 4 introduces another intellectual current influencing the development of 
DMV. A specific approach to analytic deliberation is reviewed. It is advocated by 
decision scientists and behavioural psychologists who have contributed to the DMV 
literature. The starting point is the failures of public deliberation and the goal is to 
strengthen the scientific rigour of group decision-making processes. It is regarded that 
individuals lack cognitive ability to make complex decisions and elicit preferences, and 
outputs from unconstrained dialogue are too ambiguous to support policymaking. 
Analytic deliberation is constructed as a kind of ‘tutorial’, comprising a schematized 
process of clarifying uninformed values and evaluating options systematically. It is led 
by decision experts seeking to engineer preferences by providing cognitive aids. 
Participants in need of education are required to adjust themselves to the expectations of 
the decision science. 
This approach primarily aims to correct problems associated with democracy. 
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Science (decision science) is being used to rescue participatory democracy, rather than 
the other way around which happens to be a potential contribution of deliberative 
democracy. Analytic deliberation is thus departed from its democratic counterpart. For 
example, there is an emphasis on demonstration of the evidential basis of values 
whereas philosophical debate on moral values is avoided. Clarification rather than 
justification is encouraged. An engineer mentality is adopted, with a focus on individual 
rather than group, and instrumental rationalization rather than communication. Its 
democratic potential is called into doubt. 
A critical review of the DMV literature is given in Chapter 5. DMV refers to 
monetary valuation of public goods based on deliberative methods. The development of 
the method by multiple disciplines has contributed to some variety in conceptual models. 
The variations are broadly attributable to two widely discussed limitations of stated 
preference approach to environmental valuation. First is a concern within economics 
that individuals are faced by too difficult a task when being asked to value an 
environmental change in monetary terms during a relatively short interview or survey. 
Second is a concern from within and outside of economics that stated preference 
approach restrict the type of values which an individual is able to express. 
Accordingly DMV has been developed under two different deliberative approaches 
summarized above. One is preference moralization which is drawn on the theory of 
deliberative democracy and advocated by heterodox economists, philosophers and 
political scientists. It takes ethics and alternative values more seriously and favours 
group-determined WTPs. The other one is preference economization, which deals with 
the cognition and information issues and is preferred by decision scientists and 
mainstream economists. It seeks to modify the traditional economic conception of 
values without a morally critical intent and favours individual WTPs. In the former case, 
a weak conception of deliberative democracy has been taken to overturn economics, 
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while in the latter, implicitly reinforce it. Strong deliberative democracy does neither, 
but dismantles the dominance of economics. DMV theories and experiments that 
privilege or marginalize by design any single category of values should be held in 
suspicion. It is proposed that DMV should seek the values of public goods not simply 
from expressing and/or aggregating values or preferences. It is re-conceptualized as a 
mutual agreement as a result of an interactive process enabling contestation of 
discourses.  
 As far as value pluralism is concerned, the two approaches share a key limitation. 
That is, they both seek to enforce a constrained form of rationality as a criterion or 
explanation for the elicited value represented in monetary terms. Any departure from the 
specified standards is likely to be regarded as irrational or inappropriate. Alternatives 
values, convictions and beliefs can hardly be sustained under these approaches to the 
extent in which these dispositions come into conflict with the theoretical expectations 
underlying the value-articulating framework concerned. Neither, therefore, has adequate 
value pluralistic capacity. My DMV approach is ‘discourse-based’. Construed as an 
‘agreement to pay’, a WTP decision made would resemble the deliberative idea of 
‘workable agreement’, where individuals agree on a course of action while disagreeing 
on reasons. The stated value should be given an open definition without privileging the 
standard economic conception.  
Chapter 6 sets up the context on which the empirical study is based to address a 
set of theoretical problems concerning the method of DMV. The inquiry follows the 
conclusions of Chapter 5 that a WTP as an agreement to pay does not require a priori 
assumptions about the moral category it belongs to and could be underpinned by 
multiple reasons, including those that do not logically point to such an intended action. 
Such an agreement to pay can be identified and explained through observing the 
achievement of a workable agreement and effective invocation of bridging rhetoric in a 
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deliberative exercise.. The former may be driven by the latter which can facilitate the 
making and hearing of representation claims across differently situated individuals. The 
idea, however, contradicts the expectations and requirements of its alternative 
approaches, namely, preference economization and moralization, which require or imply 
a high level of inter-subjective consistency in terms of subjective values and preference. 
The methodological variation indicates different prospects for value pluralism. An 
empirical examination of these concepts allows a characterization of DMV results and 
assessment of the plausibility and relevance of the discourse-based approach. This is 
supported by the following case study. 
Chapter 7 describes the empirical study. A citizens deliberation on climate change 
policy was organized in Canberra, Australia, where the issue of carbon pricing remained 
controversial. Twenty four citizens took part in a one-day workshop focusing on issues 
around the ETS and its alternatives. Activities included group discussions among these 
individuals and presentations by four specialists. The discussions were audio-recorded. 
Data were also collected from a questionnaire administered immediately before and 
after the main programme. The questionnaire gauged the participants’ preference about 
four carbon pricing options, WTP for emissions mitigation, and values and beliefs 
assessed by 22 statements concerning various issues about climate change. 
Part of the results of the deliberative forum is analyzed in Chapter 8. These are 
examined in terms of ‘inter-subjective consistency’ and ‘workable agreement’, which 
are both built upon the concept of ‘meta-consensus’. Normative meta-consensus does 
not demand that citizens conform to others’ legitimate values nor agree on the priority 
of values. It requires agreement on the recognition of the legitimacy of a value. 
Inter-subjective consistency refers to the situation where those pairs of individuals with 
similar values and beliefs have similar preference orderings. It is regarded as an ideal 
outcome as individuals disagreeing with each other do so for inter-subjectively 
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consistent reasons. To the contrary, a workable agreement requires agreement at the 
preference level only.  
Survey results showed that, prior to deliberation, slightly more participants voted 
for the option of carbon tax in favour of emission trading. However, two sceptical 
individuals held the opposite view favouring ‘no carbon pricing’ and refused the WTP 
request. Deliberation resulted in stronger support for carbon tax including one vote from 
one of the sceptical individuals. Both of them now agreed to pay for emission mitigation. 
So there was emerging agreement on preference in terms of policy choice and WTP. 
Responses to the 22 statements were analysed using the Q methodology. Factor analysis 
extracted three factors, or discourses. These included two pro-climate discourses – one 
suspecting the role of markets whereas the other affirming, and one sceptical discourse 
that challenged the science of climate change. Deliberation did not lead to a normative 
consensus. None of the three discourses diminished, indicating a sustained divergence 
in subjective values. Discursive communication between participants was enhanced as 
revealed by the changes in factor loadings. Therefore, the initial agreement on 
preference appeared under value difference, illustrating a workable agreement at work. 
On the other hand, inter-subjective consistency diminished. There had been high 
inter-subjective consistency due to the sharp contrast in opinions and it did not fall 
following deliberation. 
Chapter 9 reports findings from a qualitative analysis of transcripts which 
recorded the group discussions. It aims to identify possible drivers of the workable 
agreement. Formation of a workable agreement could benefit from the use of rhetoric 
which helps represent a discourse to those not initially subscribing to it. A desirable sort 
of rhetoric can play the role of bridging – associating with people with different social 
characteristics and political perspectives. Rhetoric can be expressed in the form of 
language. This chapter involves a search for verbal expressions that played a rhetorical 
233 
 
function.  
Conversations containing creative and critical content were coded into five broad 
themes defined in terms of the deliberative process. Both disagreement and consensus 
were found in the discussions. Conflict in opinions unfolded at the beginning but 
common grounds were found as the deliberation progressed. The government was 
assumed major responsibility of leading emission mitigation, whereas perspectives 
diverged as to the role of private markets. All participants held that their support and 
financial contributions to climate change initiatives depended on trust, certainty of 
effects and accountability of institutions. Articulated in similar terms, these criteria 
however did not always produce identical assessments across participants. 
Participants became more sympathetic to the carbon tax option. One of the 
discussion groups that featured clear division reached an initial consensus based on a 
modified carbon tax resembling the Medicare levy. This option was recognized by 
advocates of emission trading and climate sceptics, who nevertheless remained held to 
their own arguments. The increased support stemmed from the belief that the key 
criteria articulated would be properly accounted for under a Medicare system, which has 
been established and trusted. These principles and experience with the Medicare were 
shared. A carbon levy resembling it could then reach the individuals holding diverging 
views through shared dimensions. The qualitative change in WTP couched in such 
terms begs innovative explanations. All of the individuals agreed to pay and the 
enhanced trust in institution proved to be the key driver. Everyone recognized the 
legitimacy of this criterion although priority as to which party to trust varied. Through 
shared experience the Medicare analogy helped constitute an overlapping discursive 
space joining competent and reflective actors. The WTP question appeared more 
plausible to the sceptics as they were offered terms of cooperation that they considered 
acceptable. Like rhetoric, it was a particular rather than universal appeal. The qualitative 
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change in WTP was primarily driven by the more appealing terms of cooperation 
successfully bridging climate scepticism and enthusiasm. The workable agreement was 
formed on the basis of trust. 
 
10.3 CLARIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
The present study has made some important assumptions and qualifications at various 
points. These are listed as follows: 
1. Chapter 4 is based on only one specific approach of analytic deliberation. The 
limitations identified and the variations from the democratic approach may be 
related to the nature of the environmental issues on which their arguments are 
based. These decision scientists deal with environmental risk issues which involve 
technically complex information. Strictly structured and professionally guided 
deliberation may be more helpful for the participants to develop adequate 
understanding of the issues. Deliberative democrats, on the other hand, typically 
work on moral conflicts involving cultural and in some cases religious issues. The 
key concerns are fairness, rights and justice, so that the democratic principles may 
prove more important. 
2. The deliberative workshop failed to secure a representative sample, both 
demographically and politically. Many of the participants were retired elder 
individuals and most were educated professionals. Elder and educated individuals 
tend to hold stable views. But this is not necessarily a disadvantage because deep 
conflict could provide more insights into the formation of agreement. The lack of 
demographic representativeness however raises question about real policy impact. 
On the other hand, participants were concentrated on two of the offered policy 
options, i.e. emission trading and carbon tax. Almost no one voted for the 
voluntary offsetting option, which was intended to widen the opinion spectrum to 
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provide more useful data for a study of attitudinal change.  
3. The WTP question included in the questionnaire was not designed in accordance 
with standard economic requirements. As mentioned in the Introduction and 
elsewhere, there was a deliberate attempt to avoid basing the study on the 
economic criteria. My central argument is that a pluralistic valuation approach 
should dispense with any exclusive framework of value articulation. Following 
those criteria would make it indefensible. There is no attempt to interpret the 
observed WTP as an economic construct or to assume DMV as an economic 
technique. This is nonetheless seen as an advantage rather than a problem, given 
that value pluralism is the ultimate theme of study.  
4. The Q methodology was used to analyze the data and described in Chapter 8. The 
ways it was used varied from the standard practice in two aspects. First, statements 
were freely distributed. Statistically, however, this does not dramatically impact on 
the quality of results (Cottle and McKeown, 1980). Also, the workshop lasted for 
just one day with a tight schedule and a long questionnaire was not considered 
appropriate. To keep it short, only 22 statements were employed, well below the 
standard range of 40 to 60. The discourses identified may not be exhaustive. 
 
10.4 CITIZEN-CONSUMER DICHOTOMY 
Much of the disputes in environmental valuation research are related to the 
citizen-consumer dichotomy. It is first raised by Mark Sagoff (1988) as a philosophical 
critique and later empirically examined by others (Blamey et al., 1995; Kniivilä, 2005; 
Mill et al., 2007; Soma and Vatn, 2010). The Sagoffian view, generally respected by 
critics of the CVM, is that individuals making environmental decisions act as citizens 
concerned with the public interest, rather than consumers primarily motivated by 
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self-regarding wants and interests. Environmental valuation should seek to prompt 
citizen-type considerations and deliberative procedures are deemed to be a good fit to 
this endeavour. By internalizing ethical concerns in such terms, the practitioners find 
themselves aligned with the idea of deliberative democracy and public reason, 
particularly the Rawlsian conception. Societal perspectives and plural values are being 
preserved through enforcing universality and impartiality. 
 It is counterproductive to take the dichotomy as a basis of designing stated 
preference valuation surveys. Standard CBA involves a ‘pre-emptive consensus’ (Rydin, 
1999) which assumes that everyone would accept utility maximization as a principle of 
decision making in relation to social and environmental affairs. The practitioners who 
embrace the Sagoffian / Rawlsian view effectively turn the argument the other way 
around. Criticisms of the CVM for promoting value monism could then almost equally 
apply. Eliciting citizen-type values in an exclusive fashion is morally repressive and 
contradictory.  
It is morally repressive because a pre-emptive frame of reference is imposed on all 
respondents, some of whom may consider a consumer or personal frame more 
appropriate on legitimate grounds. Soma and Vatn (2010) experimentally instituted a 
citizen’s role in a deliberative workshop and prized its potential. However, the research 
yielded evidence that individuals who invoked a personal frame felt repressed. These 
people found themselves confronting the group which was explicitly asked to adopt a 
citizen role. They were denied of a group member – ‘He does not represent the group 
opinion but his own only’, and consequently they ‘created frustration’, felt ‘unsatisfied’ 
and ‘got upset’ (Soma and Vatn, 2010, p. 36-38). These observations bore some 
resemblance to those protest responses frequently observed in CVM surveys. The 
instituted role led to a self-proclaimed demarcation from politics: ‘We as citizens can 
only say something about the main principles that are important to us, and it is outside 
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the scope of our task to criticize the local politicians’ daily practice of the law’ (Soma 
and Vatn, 2010, p. 37). Scope of valuation was constrained. With some individuals 
feeling unsatisfied and the scope being deliberately narrowed down, it is doubtful that 
such an approach would be superior to the standard economic ones in terms of opening 
up debates.  
It is contradictory because a citizen frame would render unnecessary public 
deliberation, and perhaps any form of participatory environmental appraisal. Individuals 
making a universal appeal that guarantees unanimous agreement would encounter little 
substantial conflict with other members of the society. The very reason for eliciting 
WTP or WTA then no longer exists. A social WTP couched in Rawlsian terms, prized by 
Brown et al. (1995) and Wilson and Howarth (2002), refers to the amount that the 
society as a whole would be willing to pay to avoid an environmental change. The 
problem is, if everyone withdrew from personal interest in favour of the public, no one 
would request any premium for preserving the environmental state in question. 
Monetary estimates from stated preference approach may be used to determine the level 
of ‘payment for ecosystem services’, which refer to the approach where self-interested 
or consumer-type, or economically incapable landowners are paid to take part in 
conservation activities (Kumar and Muradian, 2009). Should these individuals decide to 
act upon public interest exclusively upon deliberation they would do the job without 
asking for payment. No valuation would then be needed. Exclusive citizen frame is 
blind to the social or political conflict which necessitates monetary valuation as part of 
the solution. Enforcing the citizen-consumer distinction takes us further away from the 
actual political economy.  
A pluralistic valuation does not rest on such a dichotomy, or the notion of value 
incommensurability. As explained in Chapter 2, one might give priority to just one 
category of value among many, regardless of their difference and relationship. 
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Repressive and monistic elements could be found in neoclassical economics, as well as 
in the Sagoffian citizen frame and multi-criteria analysis design (as illustrated in 
Chapter 4). Findings from the present case study provided further support. The 
deliberative forum ended with a particular kind of consensus which was amenable to 
deliberative democratic principles and requirements of pluralism (see Chapter 8). No 
citizen’s role was explicitly required of the participants and the key driver of change (i.e. 
the Medicare parallel) was far from a universal appeal (see Chapter 9). These 
observations were assessed in terms of the ideas of meta-consensus and rhetoric, whose 
problem-solving capacity increases with actual value diversity. The Sagoffian / 
Rawlsian view of environmental valuation is unnecessarily demanding. Those 
practitioners who adopt such a distinction or demarcation (e.g. Brown, 1984; Costanza, 
2000; Douai, 2009) would find their methodology losing power when value conflict 
becomes deeper, say, when consumer value or partial interest is actually considered an 
equally legitimate basis of environmental decision. The existence of conflict makes 
value assessment important. Yet the current trend is to elicit values by silencing conflict. 
A truly pluralistic approach should dispense with rather than embrace the impartialist 
perspectives, and seek a positive rather than negative relationship between capacity of 
value-articulating institution and value diversity. 
 
10.5 CONSENSUAL BASIS OF WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
Advocates of preference moralization believe that construction of monetary expressions 
through informed deliberation requires convergence on subjective values. To be 
theoretically robust, the deliberative WTP should be derived from an agreed set of 
subjective values and involve some respondents shifting to towards a single discourse. 
The kind of consensus required is a ‘normative consensus’, and not ‘normative 
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meta-consensus’ as distinguished by Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006).  
Critics attack the idea of DMV for reducing value plurality by enforcing consensus. 
Vatn (2005, 2009), for instance, believes that the elicitation of group-based monetary 
statement presupposes an agreement on the nature of the stated WTP by asking the 
valuing agents to provide monetary estimates in accordance with economic assumptions 
and the associated moral domain. DMV is considered doomed to failure where such an 
implicit normative consensus is taken for granted.  
 Both proponents and critics have overestimated the conceptual significance of 
normative consensus. The former see the requirement of consensus as constructive, 
whereas the latter see repressive. The second group deserves some attention, because 
their attack takes issue with the hypothetical activity of pricing the environment while 
the main problem should be the underlying assumption.  
Putting a price on the environment may be acceptable from the perspective of 
deliberative democracy. The limiting factor is the neoclassical assumption of a 
warranted consent among the individuals regarding the appropriateness of pricing the 
environment in a particular way. People may refuse to trade off the environment for 
money and assign a dollar value to it, but it is part of life to express concerns as to how 
much a tax rate or public funds are needed or acceptable for policy purposes. In 
democratic societies citizens are free to express WTP for improving environmental 
quality as a form of public opinion. It is unnecessary to assume that WTP expressed in 
actual occasions is always developed out of individual economic considerations. These 
monetary expressions may be given by a wide range of reasons for paying, including 
but not limited to individual trade-off calculations. Combining monetary assessments 
with deliberation would be a problem if only the underlying economic philosophy is 
presumed to have universal acceptance. No such presumption or consensus was applied 
to the present study. Following the caveats offered in Chapter 5, I do not claim that the 
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elicited WTP represents a measure of economic welfare.  
Criticisms have been misplaced on the monetary expression while the crux is the 
assumed consent underlying the stated monetary value. What is unwarranted is a moral 
view presumed to have universal currency, rather than the economic philosophy 
specifically. The legitimacy of monetary assessment depends on its conceptual and 
experimental requirements, and it is not an imperative to tie deliberation on WTP to 
economic rules. Also it may be too rigid and unrealistic to prevent people from 
expressing preference in monetary terms for environmental reasons. Under DMV the 
concept of stated WTP needs to be reconsidered to dispense with the assumed consent 
underpinning the arguments of the two camps. 
 As a form of stated preference WTP may be elicited without explicit agreement on 
held values. Producing a universal value theory requires some degree of value 
transformation. For instance, normative consensus between citizen- and consumer-type 
respondents means one of the two groups withdrawing from their position.  Granted 
that the transformation required is technically possible without compromise, the range 
of admissible values would diminish. As particular ethics are withdrawn, eventually the 
WTP would be definable only in terms of a smaller set of values, i.e. all respondents 
willing to pay for similar reasons. Preference economization and moralization are built 
upon such a premise. Requirements of consensus or transformation at the normative 
level encourage value plurality diminishing. Consistency of subjective values between 
the valuing agents should not be seen as a necessary criterion of group-based WTP. 
 DMV may be understood as a process of developing agreement on WTP decision, 
either implicitly or explicitly. Where inaction is costly or inappropriate, some sort of 
preference transformation is socially desirable. Collective decisions require involved 
parties mutually agreeing upon a course of action, which may be expressed in the form 
of a preference order, group approval, or agreement to pay (or WTP), etc. In the absence 
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of such agreement, authorized parties may lack legitimacy to proceed with formal 
actions, leaving pressing problems unresolved and eventually producing unbearable 
consequences. The agreement being required may involve no payment to be made 
socially.  
On the other hand, consensus or convergence on subjective values is not required. 
It is more difficult and controversial to transform values than preferences, since values 
are more deeply rooted in the entirety of personhood and morally disputed. Maintaining 
a variety of values is also a generally received imperative in democratic societies. These 
principles have been demonstrated by the present case study. Participants were 
committed to seeking collective action to address climate change while respecting 
division in normative position. Consensus on preference, in the form of policy 
preference and agreement to pay, emerged without the identified discourses 
substantially diminishing (Chapter 8). Individuals might agree to pay and state a WTP 
by respect or sympathy, even though it is not their first preference to put a dollar value 
on the environment or financially contribute via a particular mechanism. An agreed 
WTP decision does not require the different subjective values to become compatible 
with each other. This conception constitutes the core element of my discourse-based 
approach of DMV, which recognize social construction of preference as well as 
reconstruction, and consensus as well as ‘dissensus’ at a different level. 
 
10.6 WELFARE INDICATOR OR POLITICAL AGREEMENT? 
10.6.1 Welfare indication as a rational objective 
In neoclassical economics, economic valuation of the environment serves to translate 
the non-marketed benefits produced by environmental goods or services into monetary 
terms. Stated monetary value is used to indicate welfare. A positive WTP means nature’s 
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contributions being viewed favourably. Ecological economists add that non-economic 
ethics and institutional factors also matter. Although the two schools of thought diverge 
as to which category of value is relevant, they generally share the view that a stated 
WTP should accord with and reflect the interest or subjective state of its provider. 
Internal consistency has been regarded as an uncontroversial criterion. As Lockwood 
(1999, p. 396) argues, ‘It is desirable that value institutions are employed to maximise 
the opportunity for participants to express assigned values in a manner which is 
consistent with their held values and cognitions concerning the issue’. This is also 
recognized as a primary objective by advocates of analytic deliberation, who seek to 
‘mirror how people naturally think’ (Gregory, 2000, p. 153) and ensure that individuals 
could identify an option or express preference in ways that could best address their 
values (see Chapter 4). Environmental valuation has been used to make inferences about 
individuals’ interest or subjective state from the WTP they state. 
 In DMV, however, the capacity of indicating economic welfare is uncertain. 
Construed as a workable agreement, a deliberative WTP may be drawn upon a range of 
relevant reasons for paying and factors associated with the act of paying. Providers of a 
positive WTP may include those who are influenced by social norms and rhetoric, those 
would not experience utility change as a result of the decision made, and those hold 
doubt as to the importance of the environmental entity being paid for or the ways that 
public funds are collected. Meta-consensus allows the situation where individuals hold 
positive willingness to pay for, for instance, greenhouse gas mitigation even though they 
are not impressed by the climate change science or might benefit from a warming 
climate. The WTP may then lack consistency with personal concerns. A 
meta-consensual monetary expression may fail to provide an accurate account of 
expected benefits or held values, at least for some of the respondents. It can then hardly 
fit into any conventional account of valuation. One may say that this approach does not 
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actually involve assessment of ecosystem contributions and encourage instrumentally 
‘irrational’ responses. This indicates a tension between the idealized objectives of DMV 
and ecosystem valuation generally.  
 The established standards of welfare indication imply preference correction. A 
model of rational behaviour is set up to strive for formalization. Assessment 
requirements are defined and measured against a set of criteria embedded into the stated 
preference techniques designed in accordance with the positivist tradition. The 
perceptional and moral content of values is drawn on the researcher’s preoccupations 
empirically confirmed. As argued in Chapter 4, the researcher’s preoccupations are the 
biggest impediment to the pursuit of value pluralism. Practitioners tend to relegate the 
loss of internal consistency to an ‘irrational’ observation, as instrumental rationality has 
been taken as a measuring rod, by which chosen option must be consistent with clarified 
values. As Costanza (2000, p. 7) suggests, ‘Valuation ultimately refers to the 
contribution of an item to meeting a specific goal or objective……one cannot state a 
value without stating the goal being served’. In reality, however, people often express 
values in an internally inconsistent manner; for example parents may disagree on but 
support an action or lifestyle that their children are committed to. Welfare indication as 
currently practised tends to marginalize observations deviating from established 
professional preferences and standards. The internal inconsistency issue reflects the fact 
that the practice fails to take seriously alternative values that are formulated or 
presented in uncommon, ‘unscientific’ or unpredictable ways. Such instrumental 
strategies are not well placed to capture values held by individuals in a plural society 
where these are multiplying, ever-changing and evolving.  
A pluralistic valuation approach would leave the definition of values open-ended - 
the core argument of Chapter 5. Subjective values, or subjective states, should be 
measured using techniques that recognize this indeterminacy, such as Q methodology as 
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has been demonstrated. A workable agreement may create a ‘weird’ situation where a 
WTP response is underpinned by a subjective state that would not logically lead to a 
positive WTP. A pluralistic approach would seek to redefine the notion of WTP rather 
than relegating those observations to irrational responses. Stated WTP should be defined 
as its providers see fit. As a scientific observation, the consistency between subjective 
values and preferences within and between individuals is useful for understanding how 
individuals behave. However, it should not be taken as a criterion for determining the 
relevance and validity of a group-agreed WTP, which should be explained in terms of 
the communicative dynamic between group members and on the basis of 
communicative rationality. Preserving value plurality in this way can make collective 
decision more tractable. Such a structurally reconstructive valuation approach involves, 
where necessary, changing the theoretical structure of value-articulating institution, 
including the established view about monetary expression to capture the entirety of 
subjective states. Welfare indication makes little room for this. 
Therefore, the present DMV experiment does not claim to indicate economic 
welfare. The findings support some of deliberative democracy principles, but appear at 
odds with those of the analytic deliberation which emphasize preference indication and 
correction, as discussed in Chapter 4. This demonstrates a significant epistemological 
gap between the two traditions, making synthesis challenging. In this regard, the 
discourse-based approach outlined here also varies from the preference economization 
and moralization approaches described in Chapter 5. A pluralistic approach must 
recognize the reality that the valuing agents may construct and express values in various 
ways we disagree or fail to predict. In the next section, stated WTP is accordingly 
conceptualized as a form of agreement.  
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10.6.2 Willingness to pay as a political or social agreement 
In economics, a stated WTP represents the preference of an individual in securing a 
state of well-being to maximize utility according to her preference ordering. In reality, 
however, individuals who pay may fail to consider or foresee the specific improvement 
in well-being as in their interest. The actual contribution may be a result of the 
acceptance of certain formal regulations or the influence of institutional norms, rather 
than out of spontaneous willingness. In some political and social relationships, 
disagreement does not preclude individuals from actually making financial contribution 
or indicating intention. For reasons discussed in Chapter 5 and above, the conventional 
model of WTP is poorly placed to portray the intention to pay expressed as a political 
outcome. As shown in Chapter 8, sceptics could agree to pay and some other 
respondents retained a high WTP while becoming more sympathetic to climate 
scepticism, which would be treated as a reason for giving protest bids in standard CVM 
surveys. The conventional model appears unfit to the observation. WTP construed as an 
economic construct cannot guarantee explanatory power where the monetary exchange 
involved is manifested as a political or social relationship.  
 As a political or social activity, the act of valuing may involve a search for 
meaning or identity or a desire to conform to social norms (O’Neill and Spash, 2000; 
Vatn, 2005; O’Neill, 2007). Sometimes this appears in ways that the valuing agents do 
not discern or admit, or in ways that contradict common sense or established scientific 
understanding. Preference economization, described in Chapter 5, endeavours to train 
individuals to the otherwise, i.e. able to discern and admit, be rational and scientific. 
The discourse-based approach I espouse accepts the fact of pluralism and adopts a 
grounded conception. Given the circumstantial variability of subjective values, 
specifying a direct logical relationship to WTP on a pre-analytic basis is not considered 
appropriate. Conventional treatment tends to inhibit surprises and variations. An 
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alternative approach should recognize the varying, ever-changing and contradictory 
elements of human’s well-being. Candidates include satisfaction of wants, defence of 
rights, desire to respect and be respected, sense of trust, etc. WTP elicitation should 
maximally recognize the subjective, evolving nature of values. 
Also it should make room for reciprocal considerations. While it has been assumed 
that individuals providing a WTP must accept the reasons for paying, the alternative 
conception is less demanding, extending to those forms of interest or well-being that 
individuals do not explicitly subscribe to. Such a WTP indicates the level of contingent 
agreement upon a course of action that would contribute to the well-being of an 
individual or group of individuals defined circumstantially. It is an actual or anticipated 
outcome of political or social interaction. Instead of ‘willingness to pay’, it should be 
labelled as ‘agreement to pay’ to highlight the actual or imagined involvement of a 
critical second party in determining acceptance, in contrast with the value concept 
formulated under the preference economisation approach which is justified in terms of a 
first party problem. In the case study, the two climate sceptics changed their WTP 
decisions when a successful communicative interaction involving a second party, 
including other group members and experts, took place. Trust proved to be a key driver. 
Agreement to pay could better describe the social nature of the improving commitment. 
Such a monetary expression is ‘incompletely theorized’, to use Sunstein’s (1995) 
term. Theorization is precluded due to the absence of shared theoretical grounds or 
principles – a positive WTP may be constructed upon perceived importance, 
unimportance or indifference. Thus epistemic generalization may not be possible. Pre- 
definition is also not permitted by the principles of value pluralism. This alternative 
approach does not actually involve quantification of values attached to the environment. 
Agreement to pay indicates how much is agreed to pay given justified reasons to 
proceed with an action leading to a change in environmental quality or quantity. The 
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monetary expression is a measurement of the likelihood and magnitude of a particular 
intended behaviour (paying). As such, this approach involves quantification of the 
intention to act upon those values however defined and constructed by the individuals. 
The expressed money value concerns what people want or agree to do about the valued 
object, whereas how its role is subjectively interpreted is not circumscribed.  
The findings reported in Chapter 8 and 9 have provided empirical support to this 
re-conceptualization, although they do not support the preference economization and 
moralization approaches. In particular, the qualitative change in WTP on the part of the 
climate sceptics has illustrated the notion of ‘agreement to pay’ proposed in Chapter 5. 
The different conception adopted, as I have argued, should nevertheless be seen as a 
justification for DMV rather than a weakness as it proves to be capable of 
accommodating plural values. DMV research not only means a different value 
elicitation method, but a different epistemology as to what constitute a normative theory 
of environmental value.  
 
10.7 THE FUTURE OF DMV 
As specified in the Introduction, this study is guided by the following research 
questions: 
1. How do the researchers who contribute to the development of DMV deal with the 
problem of value pluralism? 
a. What does a pluralistic valuation approach require? 
b. What is the role of deliberative elements in monetary valuation? 
c. Is the current practice of DMV in raising or reducing pluralistic potential? 
 
2. How do individuals’ monetary expressions change with their held values and 
preferences upon deliberation? 
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a.    What kind of consensus is produced in a divided group? 
b.    What is the possible driver of the formation of the consensus? 
c.    How can the resulting monetary expressions be explained in terms of the 
observed consensus? 
d.    What are the implications to the science of DMV in terms of value pluralism? 
 
My answers to these questions could shed light on the prospect of DMV: Capacity for 
pluralism does not grow with privilege given to alternative values. The crux is the 
excess of pre-definitions and pre-judgements. Using deliberative methods to repair or 
reject the economic conception of value is problematic. Public deliberation plays an 
emancipatory role of exposing the contested and makes room for different frames of 
reference of valuing public goods. DMV is an inquiry into the level and quality of WTP 
articulated under value difference. The deliberative elements serve to ensure that the 
processes of valuation be reflective and self-critical, on the part of the valuing agents as 
well as the researcher. In this light, the practice is regarded as lacking pluralistic 
potential as the method has been used to reinforce an established or alternative 
conception of value.  
In the case study, there was no normative consensus on values. There was an initial 
agreement on preference driven by the recognition of a communicative device that 
played a rhetorical function. Division was respected without precluding a qualitative 
convergence on WTP decision. Plurality could be preserved without compromising the 
capacity for making collective decisions. Stated WTP is construed as a political or social 
agreement developed on the basis of conflict and contradiction. It is termed as 
‘agreement to pay’ to highlight its interactive nature and variable ethical composition. 
Two important implications could be drawn from the above conclusions. First, 
DMV may run into eclecticism since there is no standard way of valuing or requirement 
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to control quality. Any explanation or theory provided would not be taken as an 
evaluative yardstick. In the absence of standard assumptions and procedures, the 
method of DMV may lack consistency and reliability. My response to the 
everything-goes concern is twofold. There are requirements, but these are granted 
within the deliberative arena where ways of valuing are debated and resolved among the 
individuals. Also, standardization is called into doubt when the ultimate objective is to 
capture plural environmental values. Consistency and reliability may be a less relevant 
criterion where the public goods under valuation do not possess stable and universal 
definitional content. People’s values attached to the complex and multifunctional 
environmental resources tend to be communicating, evolving and sometimes conflicting. 
Specifying a standard way of valuing seems contradicting the very reason for 
introducing deliberative methods, i.e. to accommodate variations. The potential of DMV 
depends on the extent that these properties are recognized. 
 Second, DMV may not be a monetary assessment as much as its name suggests. 
Since it does not guarantee an economic value, whether it could supply numerical inputs 
to a subsequent CBA is an open question. The method may then lack economic 
relevance. It should be stressed that, however, DMV is not restricted to non-economic 
valuation. Valuing in ways that accord with economic requirements is acceptable as 
long as deemed to be appropriate by the valuing agents. Furthermore, the kind of 
valuation under DMV is not a theoretical but topical one. It is not subject to the 
neoclassical economic theories or any single first-order theory (see Chapter 3 for 
definition). It is designated to dealing with WTP issues treated as a matter of monetary 
exchange in a social or political context. In other words, the subject of inquiry is 
invariably money and values, yet possibilities of theorization are seen as varying. DMV 
involves a monetary assessment not bound to the economic ambit. Still, the lack of 
economic relevance is likely to be a concern of economists who endeavour to create a 
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common currency in keeping with the dogmatic tradition. This issue can be linked to a 
larger debate about the content of the economics of public goods, to which I now turn. 
 
10.8 RETURNING ECONOMICS TO POLITICS 
Contemporary social and environmental problems are characterized by irreducible 
uncertainties in knowledge and ethics, and different legitimate ways of knowing and 
valuing (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). What is considered relevant to the conventional 
economics may not be relevant to the kind of science required today to deal with the 
uncertainties and diversity. An economics of these contemporary issues is in need of a 
new disciplinary order that could enhance the adaptive capacity of human being. Novel 
research initiatives such as DMV cannot satisfy the requirements of neoclassical 
economics. Instead, the ‘economics’ of DMV could help clarify the relationships 
between environmental and ecological economics and the kind of inquiry that it should 
be restricted to. Based on the conclusions I offer the following reflections.   
 As far as complex environmental issues are concerned, there have been calls from 
within economics for an alternative to the neoclassical economics. Some ecological 
economists remain suspicious of monetary valuation and try to develop non-economic 
theories or non-monetary assessment techniques (Zendehdel et al., 2008; Douai, 2009; 
Söderbaum, 2008; Vatn, 2009). The search for a niche area runs into a competitive 
relationship where ecological economists identify themselves as heading to the opposite 
direction to their neoclassical counterparts (Sahu and Nayak, 1994). My counter to this 
tendency is based on the argument against the positional modification approach outlined 
in Chapter 2. As a defining feature, the competitive relationship cannot provide 
motivations for turning the discipline to a pluralistic programme. To make concrete its 
identity encourages the practitioners to sharpen the dichotomy. Strengthening the 
arguments required is best served by promoting some sort of unity within its 
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disciplinary confines. The endeavour could be made more successful by all practitioners 
adhering to a particular type of methodology, eventually diminishing the range of 
methodological possibilities and hence the potential for pluralism. 
 Conceptual problems confronting the field of ecological economics are twofold. As 
the overarching theme of ecological economics, the endeavour of sustainability needs 
scientific inputs to be ecologically sensible as well as democratic processes to be 
socially acceptable. In taking elements from behavioural psychology and decision 
science, its scientific wing needs to be strengthened. In taking elements from political 
theories, it commits itself to democratic principles to a greater extent. Science implies 
more controls, rests on expert culture and works with a narrow set of values, whereas 
democracy requires reducing controls, rests on popular culture and works with multiple 
values. There are occasions where they can work with each other but no guarantee in 
others. A lesson learnt from the deliberative turn is that the requirements of ecological 
economics established upon various natural and behavioural sciences may limit the 
critical intent of a deliberative democracy. The extent in which the discipline should be 
treated primarily as a branch of science, as was the case in the 1980s, is open to 
question. 
 Developing a deliberative democracy within economics hinges on a self-critical 
intent. What is relevant to economics at a theoretical level would be envisaged as an 
open-ended question subject to a more fundamentally democratic practice. The science 
of a deliberative ecological economics would remain topical being devoted to the study 
of the interaction of economic and ecological systems. Determination of relevance 
should be driven by the object of study, rather than by theory. As a concluding message 
of this study, the following caveats are offered.  
The enemy of deliberative economics is not neoclassicism, but hierarchy of any 
kind. Countering the limitations of neoclassical economics appears to end in countering 
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the limitations of decision science or deontology. There are signs of granting privilege 
beyond redeeming the excluded. As a project of broadening democracy this is not 
justifiable on its own terms. Deliberative economics, as a demonstration of the political 
axiom ‘the force of the better arguments’, must make all of its contributing theories 
redeemable, including itself. The cure for the ailments of public value theory is more 
democratic theory – theory that is democratic in its production, and not only in its 
content17. The deliberative principles apply to the subject of inquiry (the public or 
stakeholder) as well as the inquirer (researcher). Deliberative economics involves a 
critical discourse built upon a set of principles and norms to facilitate critical encounter 
and dialogue on equal footing. It requires more than a platform to express or reinforce 
viewpoints. Of more importance is the reciprocal capacity to recognize alternative ones. 
Committed to value pluralism, deliberative economists should be well prepared to 
change their values, judgments, theories, and assumptions in ways fundamentally 
different from their preferences. Being deliberative means the more diverse the 
epistemic values and beliefs, the more important the science. Deliberative economics 
should therefore refrain from pursuing a unity of science.  
An economics incorporating any ethical imperative is still an economics. 
Broadening representation or analytical content does not warrant a sufficient condition 
for a critical turn of economic rationality towards a socioeconomic rationality. Such a 
minimalist rejuvenation is bound to the existing value hierarchy which is more a part of 
the problem than solution. A maximalist view is to advocate one which actively seeks 
forces of critical adjustment and validation also from outside the paradigm. A structural 
transformation is called for to return economics to an economy of social conflict that 
puts unrestricted generalization of particular to universal interests into doubt. A viable 
economics of public value hinges on a democratization of practice, demanding 
                                                 
17
 Adapting Dryzek and Berejikian (1993) citing John Dewey. 
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persistent self-critique and deconstruction of universal domain. Public value is then 
defined in terms of the value-articulating structure predicated on a democratized science, 
one that theorizes the political economy democratically. A truly pluralistic economic 
order is forthcoming only if unconstrained, self-critical paradigmatic norms are actively 
embraced. The enterprise involves an attempt to return economics to politics. 
 
10.9 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Psychological dimensions were not addressed in this study. It is not impossible that the 
respondents suffered from some cognitive failures that the decision scientists are wary 
of, such as the tendency to follow a majority preference uninformed. More analytic 
elements may be added to support the investigation of the changes in subjective values 
and preferences. A more aggressive strategy, nonetheless, would be to run multiple 
groups organized under different deliberative designs, or more specifically, conduct an 
empirical comparison between the democratic and analytic DMV approaches to 
ascertain their different impacts on stated WTP. Also, the respondents provided WTPs in 
the form of individual contribution. Agreed group or social payments seem to be more 
compatible to the theoretical framework being advocated and therefore may be explored 
in future research.  
Moreover, the small sample size did not permit a regression analysis which is 
commonly used in CVM studies to identify explanatory variables. A larger sample size 
(e.g. 100) is needed to make a better comparison with the CVM in terms of the impacts 
on respondents’ attitudes. Supported by Q methodology, the larger sample size would 
allow prediction of WTP by Q factor loadings to understand the relationship between 
WTP and changes in subjectivity. More generally more works need to be done to 
ascertain the motives behind deliberative WTP and across different environmental 
issues in dispute.  
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Please answer Q1 – Q10. You may send back a completed Word document or simply put 
down your answers in email text. (alex.lo@anu.edu.au) 
 
Part A. Policy Preference 
This is a question about how much you are currently willing to pay to reduce 
greenhouse emissions. In order to pay for emission reductions, three funding 
arrangements are available: 
 
A) A carbon tax. Polluters have to pay a tax on carbon emissions. The revenue flows 
directly to the government. Taxing emissions this way increases costs, but does not 
guarantee a set target of emissions reductions is achieved. 
B) An emissions trading scheme. Polluters bid for or are given free tradable permits 
that cap their emissions level. The revenue may flow to the government or polluters. 
Polluters can sell unused permits in a carbon market or buy extra permits they need. 
Such schemes fix the quantity of emissions but not the price. 
 
Note that both A and B, will have price implications for you as firms pass on the costs. 
Households will pay more on electricity bill. If you choose one of the options we are 
interested in how much extra you are willing to pay per month out of your total annual 
budget. 
 
C) Voluntary market. Voluntary payments are made to independent firms that promise 
to offset your personal emissions through planting trees for a profit (as is often done 
for air travel). Such schemes neither fix the quantity nor price of emissions. 
 
Which of the above options (A, B or C) do you prefer?: 
Q1: Most? (Please highlight your choice) 
A B C 
Q2: Least? 
A B C 
Q3. For your most preferred option only, what is the maximum amount you would be 
willing to pay monthly for the next five years? __A$_____________ 
A.1.2 
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Part B. Personal Information  
Q4. Full name:  
 
Q5. Gender:   Male   Female 
 
Q6. Education:  
A. Year 9    B. Year 11    C. High school (year 12)   
D. Technical degree E. Undergraduate degree     F. Post-graduate degree 
 
Q7. Age group: 
A. 18-25  B. 26-35  C. 36-45  D. 46-55  E. Over 55 
 
Q8. Occupation: 
 
Q9. Contact number:  
 
Q10. Postal address:  
 
A.1.2 
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Session 1 Concern about climate change (30mins)  
Topic: How concerned are you about climate change? 
 
Guiding questions (indicative): 
y Should Australia reduce its greenhouse gas emissions?  
y How important is climate mitigation comparing to other key policy areas: social 
security and welfare, healthcare, education, employment, border protection, etc. 
y Has the previous government done enough to address climate change? 
y Which party has greater responsibility to reduce emissions? (the individuals, the 
business, the governments, the community, other big countries)   
Step:  
1. Small group discussion. (20mins) 
2. Large group discussion. Present conclusions by one member from each subgroup 
(about any change and why). (10mins) 
Task material: News article, Worksheet 1 
Note: Worksheet 1 is used to facilitate discussion and not a questionnaire.  
 
Session 2  Carbon pricing (40mins) 
Topic: Which approach for emission reduction is preferred? 
i.e. 1) emission trading, 2) carbon tax, 3) voluntary carbon offsetting, 4) no carbon 
pricing is needed. 
 
Guiding questions (indicative): 
y Do you accept the idea of carbon pricing? 
y What do you know/feel about the proposed CPRS (Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme)? 
y Is carbon tax better than emission trading? (Note: my email survey shows that these 
two are the most popular options among our participants and slightly more of them 
preferred carbon tax) 
y Do you have any experience in buying carbon offsets for your personal consumption 
(e.g. through airlines)? 
 
Step:  
1. Small group discussion. (25mins) 
2. Large group discussion. Present conclusions by one member from each subgroup 
(about any change and why). (15mins) 
Task material: Worksheet 2 
 
A.1.3 
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Session 3 Willingness-to-pay (40mins) 
 
Background 
The Australian Government is expanding its Clean Energy Initiative (CEI). $5.1 billion 
will be spent over 10 years (2009-2019) in R&D of low-emission energy technologies, 
including carbon capture and storage and solar energy (announced May 2010). It 
complements the Government's expanded Renewable Energy Target, i.e. by 2020, 20% 
of Australia's electricity supply comes from renewable sources. 
Link: http://www.budget.gov.au/2010-11/content/overview/html/overview_26.htm 
($5.1 billion = ~$35 per person per year – based on working age population only) 
 
Part A: Assume the required $5.1 billion would be drawn from a new tax to be imposed 
on individuals directly by the Government.  
1. Are $5.1b/$35 enough?  
a. How about more > $5.1 for >20% renewable by 2020? (or less aggressive?) 
2. How much are you willing to contribute? more or less than $35?  
a. In which form - like GST or income-based?  
3. Why are you willing (or not willing) to contribute?   
a. What does your WTP (e.g. $35) mean to you? e.g. to ensure mitigation 
(consequence) or just for a good cause / good feeling? (which one more 
important to you?) 
b. Would you still be willing to contribute the same amount if it were certain that 
i. only max. 15% would be achieved?  
ii. 2008/09 global financial crisis would return this year? 
iii. only 30% Australians would be required to pay after some tax exemptions? 
($35 = assume only 67.5% Australians (working age population) would have 
to pay) 
 
Part B (optional): Assume that the required funds would be collected by energy 
companies through increased energy prices. The energy companies would be required to 
meet the 20% target but could use the raised funds at their discretion.  
1. How much are you willing to contribute? more or less than $35? 
a. Have you changed from your answer in A2? Why?  
b. Do you trust the energy companies? (especially if 20% is a voluntary target) 
2. Would you still be willing to contribute the same amount if it were certain that 
a. only max. 15% would be achieved?  
b. 2008/09 global financial crisis would return this year?  
c. only 30% Australians would be required to pay after some tax exemptions?  
A.1.3 
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Other optional questions (depending on time):  
1. If no official target is enforced, would you still be willing to contribute the same 
amount annually to private carbon offsetting agencies (i.e. voluntary offsetting)? 
2. Would you change your WTP decision if US and China do not intend to achieve 
20% by 2020? 
3. Should Australia officially ‘outsource’ emission mitigation to developing countries? 
(as currently under CDM, paying them to do so that the developed no longer have to 
cut emissions drastically) 
 
Task material: Worksheet 3 
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Gillard to ask the people on climate change 
July 23, 2010   ABC News  By Tim Leslie 
A re-elected Labor government would ask a new "citizens' assembly" for climate change advice, under a 
key part of the ALP's new climate change policy set to be launched by Prime Minister Julia Gillard today. 
The ABC understands Ms Gillard will outline plans to set up a committee of scientists to advise the 
Government on climate change. 
The committee will be paired with a citizens' assembly, consisting of 100-200 volunteers who will gauge 
feeling of the community on its attitude towards putting a price on carbon, and feed it back to the 
Government. 
The policy launch comes two-and-a-half months after the Federal Government decided to shelve its 
emissions trading scheme. 
Ms Gillard has signalled climate change as one of the key issues for the Government to address during 
the election campaign. 
The decision to delay the ETS until 2013 is thought to be the main reason behind former prime minister 
Kevin Rudd's slide in the polls, which led to him being dumped by the party. 
Ms Gillard is also expected to unveil a boost to efficiency and renewable energy programs. 
The Government says it is still committed to a market mechanism for putting a price on carbon, but at 
present the Greens are the only party proposing such a policy for the next term of government. 
Opposition Leader Tony Abbott has repeatedly ruled out introducing a carbon price, saying his government 
would only charge for carbon in the event of a global system. 
The Coalition has instead promoted a direct action plan to address climate change, centred on carbon 
sequestration and rebates for businesses who cut their emissions. 
The Coalition claims this policy will cut greenhouse gas emissions by 5 per cent by 2020 and only cost 
$3.2 billion. 
Mr Abbott says this policy will be funded by cuts to government spending and that no consumer should 
carry the burden of a carbon price. 
Shadow Environment Spokesman Greg Hunt says Julia Gillard's proposed "citizens assembly" will fail to 
produce action. 
He says the Opposition is promising a $2.5 billion fund to battle emissions. 
"It's a recipe for endless Rudd-type talks," he said. 
"Kevin Rudd himself would be proud of the 2020 summit meets Copenhagen. 
"Our approach is real action, direct action to clean up power stations to reduce emissions." 
But former leader Malcolm Turnbull, who was rolled over the issue, said the Coalition policy was "less than 
ideal". 
"The Coalition's policy is not the ideal from my point of view I grant you that, I'd like to see a market-based 
solution, but I'll tell you this, it does have the potential to meet the emissions reductions targets by 2020," 
he said. 
"The real question is the policy. Everyone knows where I stand, I've stuck to my principles on it. But the 
fact is, we have got a policy, Labor has nothing." 
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Worksheet 1        Participant Code:______ 
 
Discussion Session 1 
How concerned are you about climate change? 
 
Which policy area is more important? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which party has greater responsibility to reduce emissions? 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Area Rank Policy Area Rank 
Climate change  Employment  
Healthcare  Social security and welfare  
Education  Border protection  
Others:  
 Rank 
The individuals  
The businesses  
The governments  
The community  
Other big countries  
A.1.5 
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Worksheet 2 
Discussion Session 2 
Which approach for emission reduction is preferred? 
 
D) A carbon tax. Polluters have to pay a tax on carbon emissions. The revenue 
flows directly to the government. Taxing emissions this way increases costs, 
but does not guarantee a set target of emissions reductions is achieved. 
 
E) An emissions trading scheme. Polluters bid for or are given free tradable 
permits that cap their emissions level. The revenue may flow to the 
government or polluters. Polluters can sell unused permits in a carbon market 
or buy extra permits they need. Such schemes fix the quantity of emissions 
but not the price. 
 
Both A and B will have price implications as firms pass on the costs. Households 
will pay more on electricity bill.  
 
F) Voluntary market. Voluntary payments are made to independent firms that 
promise to offset your personal emissions through planting trees for a profit. 
Such schemes neither fix the quantity nor price of emissions. 
 
G) No carbon pricing on human activities is needed 
 
 
A.1.6 
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Worksheet 3  
 A.1.7  
Discussion Session  
Would you financially support the development of 
low-emission technologies? 
The Australian Government is expanding its Clean Energy Initiative. 
Additional $5.1 billion will be spent over 10 years (2009-2019) in 
research and development of low-emission energy technologies, 
including carbon capture and storage and solar energy. It complements 
the Government's expanded Renewable Energy Target, i.e. by 2020, 
20% of Australia's electricity supply comes from renewable sources. 
 
Note: 
1. $5.1 billion = $35 per person per year (based on working age population) 
2. $5.1 billion = $0.51 billion per year = 0.14% of the total estimated expenses 
2010-11 
 
Figure 1  Australian Government Budget 2010-11 
Total estimated expenses = $354.6 billion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(32.4%) 
(2.5%) (16%) 
(26.2%) 
(4.2%) (9.3%) (5.9%) (3.5%) 
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Figure 2 Per cent of electricity produced by renewable energy by country (2007) 
 
     
Austria   70%  Spain    21%  Germany  16% 
 
     
Japan    10%  U.S.   9%  Australia   7.5% 
 
      
New Zealand  7%  U.K.    6.5%  Canada        6% 
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A.1.8 
 
Australian Climate Policy Forum 
31 July 2010 
Questionnaire 
 
Participant Code (printed on your name badge):_________ 
 
1. Carbon pricing could contribute to emission mitigation. Which of the following 
scheme do you prefer? Please indicate your preference (use each number for once 
only): 
▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 
Most preferred  1        2      3       4  Least preferred 
                          
 
 
2. For your most preferred option only, what is the maximum amount you would be 
willing to pay monthly for the next five years?__A$_________________ 
 
3. When you choose between the four options, you may have considered the following 
reasons. Please indicate your agreement with them according to the following rating 
scale: 
Strongly Disagree         Neutral    Strongly Agree 
 
An emission trading 
scheme 
 Voluntary carbon offsetting 
 
A carbon tax  
No carbon pricing on human 
activities is needed 
 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Reason Statement Level of agreement (Please circle) 
1. Mitigation 
impacts 
National greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions should be considerably 
reduced. 
-4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
2. Certainty of 
impact 
An emission reduction scheme 
should involve a guarantee that a 
certain level of reduction will be 
achieved. 
-4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
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Reason Statement Level of agreement (Please circle) 
3. Costs to 
households 
Additional costs to households 
should be avoided. -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
4. Bureaucracy A government-led reduction 
scheme would create bureaucracy 
and should be avoided. -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
5. Trust in politics We can’t rely on the government to 
reduce GHG emissions. I don’t 
trust politicians. 
-4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
6. Scientific 
consensus 
We do not yet have consensus on 
the science of climate change and 
so should not take action to 
reduce greenhouse emissions. 
-4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
7. Efficiency Market-based approach should be 
used to ensure efficiency (i.e. 
lowest possible cost for a given 
level of emission reduction). 
-4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
8. Compulsory 
share 
(household) 
Reducing GHG emissions should 
involve a compulsory share by 
households -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
9. Compulsory 
share 
(business) 
Reducing GHG emissions should 
involve a compulsory share by 
businesses -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
10. Continuity Climate policy should involve 
political certainty, e.g. not easily 
affected by change of government. -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
11. Compliance We need a system that enforces 
compliance of companies to 
reduce GHG emissions 
-4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
12. Transparency Emissions reduction policy should 
be transparent and easy to 
understand by all.  
-4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
13. The poor pay 
less 
Lower-income families should 
contribute proportionally less to 
emission reduction. -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
14. The industries 
pay more 
Energy-intensive industries should 
be responsible for the costs of 
emission reduction. 
-4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
15. Cost transfer Businesses should not pass the 
costs of emission reduction on to 
consumers.  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
16. Global action We should not take action if other 
countries do not do the same. -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
17. Direct 
regulation 
Direct regulation is more effective 
than any form of carbon pricing. -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
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Reason Statement Level of agreement (Please circle) 
18. Human 
contributions 
The effect of humans on climate is 
small. Reducing emissions is not a 
priority. -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
19. Fairness It is only fair that every Australian 
helps to reduce GHG emissions. -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
20. No tax I already pay enough tax, we don’t 
need a new one. -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
21. Profit allowed Companies should be allowed to 
make profit by reducing their own 
GHG emissions. 
-4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
22. Global 
influence 
Our climate policy should be able 
to affect other countries’ decisions 
on emissions reduction. 
-4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4 
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Appendix 2 Raw survey data (for Questionnaire Part 3. Question No. 1-22)  
Pre-workshop survey 
  Helen John Brian Cynthia Florian Ian Liana Kate Elaine Phillip Kevin Howard Ross Nancy Claire Stephanie Mike Dan Wilson Sarah James George Alan Mark 
Q1 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 2 4 1 4 4 4 0 4 2 -1 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 
Q2 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 4 4 4 4 3 0 2 3 0 3 2 0 4 -2 3 3 
Q3 0 -3 -4 -4 -2 1 -3 -2 -2 -1 -4 2 -4 4 0 -1 4 0 -3 -2 -2 -3 -2 2 
Q4 -4 -3 -3 -2 -3 -2 0 -3 0 2 -4 -4 -3 0 -4 0 0 -2 -3 0 2 -4 -1 0 
Q5 0 -1 2 2 4 0 0 -2 0 2 -2 -2 2 0 -1 -2 -4 2 -4 2 -3 -3 4 1 
Q6 -4 -2 -4 -4 -4 -3 -4 -2 -4 -2 -4 -4 -4 4 -4 -3 4 -3 -4 -3 -4 -3 0 -3 
Q7 -1 4 -1 -4 4 1 -1 4 -2 0 4 4 -2 3 1 2 4 3 1 -1 3 3 -2 3 
Q8 4 3 3 4 4 -1 2 -2 -1 1 0 4 3 0 1 2 -4 4 -1 -1 3 4 3 2 
Q9 4 3 4 4 4 1 2 2 1 1 4 4 2 2 4 2 2 4 3 2 4 4 3 4 
Q10 3 3 4 4 4 2 2 4 -1 -1 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 
Q11 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 0 3 4 4 1 4 4 1 1 4 3 2 4 2 3 4 
Q12 4 -2 4 2 4 3 2 4 0 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 2 4 3 -2 1 4 
Q13 3 3 3 4 -2 1 3 4 2 -2 4 4 2 4 3 2 4 4 0 4 3 -2 1 4 
Q14 3 -1 2 4 4 1 2 4 0 2 4 4 -2 4 3 2 1 4 3 3 4 3 0 4 
Q15 0 -2 -3 -1 -4 -3 -1 -2 -2 -1 -4 1 -4 4 -2 -1 2 4 -2 -2 -3 -3 -2 0 
Q16 -4 0 -4 -4 -4 -3 -2 4 -3 3 -4 -4 -4 4 -1 -3 4 3 -2 -3 -4 -4 -2 -3 
Q17 0 -3 -3 2 1 0 2 4 -1 1 0 -3 -3 4 -2 0 4 3 -3 -2 -2 -3 2 -3 
Q18 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -3 -4 -2 -3 -1 -4 -4 -4 4 -3 -2 4 1 -4 -2 -4 -4 -4 -4 
Q19 4 2 3 3 4 2 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 2 4 3 3 3 
Q20 -3 -4 -4 -4 -4 -1 -2 -4 -2 -1 -4 -3 -4 4 -3 -2 4 0 -3 -2 -4 -4 -3 -4 
Q21 3 4 3 -4 4 0 0 2 3 2 3 4 2 4 2 2 4 2 3 3 0 3 2 3 
Q22 2 2 4 4 4 1 2 -3 4 3 0 4 2 0 3 2 0 4 4 3 2 4 3 3 
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Appendix 2 Raw survey data (for Questionnaire Part 3. Question No. 1-22) 
Post-workshop survey 
  Helen John Brian Cynthia Florian Ian Liana Kate Elaine Phillip Kevin Howard Ross Nancy Claire Stephanie Mike Dan Wilson Sarah James George Alan Mark 
Q1 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 3 -2 4 4 2 4 3 4 4 
Q2 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 -1 4 4 2 4 3 3 -1 4 2 0 -3 2 3 4 
Q3 -2 -4 -4 -4 -2 0 -2 2 -3 -1 -4 -3 -4 4 2 -2 0 0 -3 -2 -4 -3 -3 0 
Q4 -3 -3 -3 -2 -3 0 -2 -4 -1 -2 -4 -3 -4 0 -4 0 -4 1 -4 -2 -3 0 -2 2 
Q5 -2 -3 2 4 4 -2 0 2 0 -1 0 3 1 -2 -4 0 -3 2 -4 -1 3 -3 -2 -3 
Q6 -4 -3 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 2 -4 -2 -4 -4 -4 4 -4 -3 2 -4 -4 -3 -4 -4 -4 -3 
Q7 1 4 -2 1 1 2 1 4 2 3 4 4 2 4 3 2 -4 2 -2 -3 3 2 0 3 
Q8 2 2 4 3 3 0 1 -2 -2 -1 2 4 4 -4 2 2 2 4 -1 0 3 2 2 3 
Q9 3 2 4 3 4 2 1 3 -1 -1 4 4 2 4 4 2 4 4 3 2 4 0 2 4 
Q10 3 3 4 4 4 2 1 4 2 1 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 
Q11 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 1 4 4 2 4 4 3 1 4 2 3 3 
Q12 4 -3 3 4 4 3 2 4 1 3 4 4 3 4 1 0 4 4 2 3 3 1 0 4 
Q13 3 3 3 4 2 1 2 3 4 1 4 4 3 4 -4 2 4 4 0 3 3 -2 1 3 
Q14 3 -3 4 4 4 2 2 2 1 0 4 3 -2 4 1 2 2 4 3 1 4 0 0 3 
Q15 -2 -3 -3 1 -2 -2 0 -2 -3 -1 -3 -2 -4 4 -2 -2 0 2 -2 -1 -3 -2 -2 -3 
Q16 -3 -1 -4 -4 -4 -2 -2 4 -4 3 -4 -4 -4 4 -4 -3 1 -4 -2 -3 -4 -4 -2 -4 
Q17 0 -4 2 2 -3 0 1 -3 -3 -2 4 -4 2 0 -3 0 4 2 0 2 -3 -1 2 -3 
Q18 -4 -3 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 0 -4 -1 -4 -4 -4 2 -4 -3 0 0 -4 -3 -4 -4 -4 -3 
Q19 4 1 3 3 4 2 1 3 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 2 4 3 4 4 
Q20 -3 -2 -4 -4 -4 -1 -1 -4 -4 0 -4 -3 -4 4 -3 -1 3 -2 -3 -3 -4 -3 -3 -3 
Q21 3 4 2 1 4 0 1 3 1 1 4 4 -1 0 4 2 4 2 3 -1 -3 4 2 3 
Q22 4 3 3 3 4 2 1 -2 1 3 4 4 -3 2 3 1 1 4 3 0 2 3 0 4 
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Facilitator: Okay, this is really to start the discussion I guess.  What we're filing in 1 
now.  So I'm going to ask just some broad questions just to start the 2 
discussion that we're going to have.  But the first thing I want to do is 3 
call for a volunteer, I'd like to give the overall sumClaire of the group's 4 
discussion.  Is anyone happy to do that?  Because what we're going 5 
to do after our separate discussion is come together for the larger 6 
discussion with the others.  So can I call on someone to just give an 7 
overview of what they think the group's come up with? 8 
Ross: Alright.  I'll be relying on you to tell me what I have to say. 9 
Ian: We will. 10 
Facilitator: Okay, now do you want me to take notes on there or did you want to 11 
take your own notes? 12 
Ross: It might be better if you take them if you're willing to. 13 
Facilitator: Yeah sure. 14 
Ross: Put them up there so we can all see them.   15 
Facilitator: Okay so the first question which I've got here as a guiding question.  16 
Should Australia reduce its greenhouse gas emissions?  Does 17 
anybody have strong opinions on that or…? 18 
Mark: Science seems to be saying we ought to.  Otherwise our kids and 19 
grandkids will be living in an uninhabitable desert. 20 
Facilitator: Is everyone of the same view or? 21 
All: Yes. 22 
James: No sceptics, climate sceptics here?   23 
Ross: Well there are some, there are people who are sceptical about it. 24 
They don't believe that it's happening at all.   25 
Facilitator: Yes absolutely. 26 
Claire: I wouldn't' say we ought to do it, I'd say we have to do it.  We have to 27 
do this.   28 
Facilitator: Okay.  How important is climate mitigation compared to other policy 29 
areas?  This is another issue that we have to think about.  Do you 30 
think it's more important than social security and welfare? 31 
Ian: Yes. 32 
Facilitator: This is in terms of what the government should be concentrating on.  33 
Healthcare, education, employment, border protection.  Is it right up 34 
there at the top or are there other things? 35 
Mark: From my point of view I still see it as Mr Rudd saw it a couple of years 36 
ago, is the greatest moral challenge of our generation I guess.  37 
Brian: I actually think adaptation is more important because I think we've lost 38 
the game on mitigation. My feeling is that it's all over as far as 39 
mitigation is concerned, I'm fairly pessimistic.  I don't think we've got a 40 
chance of changing minds. 41 
Facilitator: You don't think so?  So we shouldn't bother? 42 
Brian: I think we should bother I think we should do everything we can, but I 43 
think adaptation is going to be the main game. 44 
Ian: Are you suggesting we won't even be able to compensate the two 45 
degrees? 46 
Brian: I don't think we've got a chance of stoping getting.  I think it will go 47 
above two degrees yeah.  I think there's no chance of it going to stop.   48 
James: Considering what happened in Copenhagen. 49 
Brian: Oh yeah. 50 
James: But there's not much happening on it.   51 
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Brian: No. 52 
James: But having said that I possibly agree as a distinction between 53 
mitigation and adaption.  Perhaps adaption is a slightly more 54 
important policy, but I'm not willing to really separate them too much. 55 
Brian: I wouldn't say it's number 10 I'd say it's number two.  My feeling is 56 
that mitigation, we have to do everything we can but I actually don’t 57 
think it's the most important thing because I think in a way we've lost 58 
the game and there's two reasons we've lost the game.  There's two 59 
reasons we've lost the game.  We've lost the game in Australia 60 
because nothing's happening and we're already about 295, I think, 61 
[parts per man] so I don't think we've got much chance there.  62 
Secondly the world doesn't seem prepared to do it and the world 63 
counts a lot more in absolute terms than Australia does.  It's not that 64 
we shouldn't be doing anything. 65 
Facilitator: You mean 390? 66 
Brian: Yes 390 sorry.  So it's like - its not that we shouldn’t be dong 67 
something because our consumption or production of greenhouse 68 
gases is higher than anybody else.  We should be doing something 69 
but I think we've lost the game really. 70 
Claire: I think adaptation measures also can mitigate.  Because when you're 71 
adapting you're also making positive contributions.  So they're very 72 
linked.  So where you put your emphasis I'm not sure it really matters.  73 
But I think just to go for mitigation now when the evidence is that we 74 
keep on increasing and the government action is so low will mean 75 
that we are even further behind the eight ball when it comes to 76 
adapting.  We're learning how to live on a different planet. 77 
Ian: Back to the original question.  Is it more important than social security 78 
policy? 79 
Brian: Yes 80 
Ian: Well I think it is because it's such a long term issue.  Social security, 81 
policy, education policy, that sort of thing, that will ebb and flow with 82 
the times and that can go through phases.  Education policy turn that 83 
around in a relatively short period of time.  But this is such a long term 84 
high impact issue that I see it as much more important than [unclear]. 85 
Mark: I would agree. 86 
Claire: It underpins and affects all those others. 87 
Brian: That's right yeah. 88 
Claire: It's like a much more underpinning reality. 89 
Mark: I think its even asking the question which is more important.  Is a bit 90 
of a wrong way to frame it,  I think they are all important, the answers 91 
I put down - if I thought of it, would I vote for a party that said we're 92 
going to get rid of education, but we'll do lots of things with climate 93 
change.  I'd say, well no I wouldn't because you get social unrest 94 
without good education.  On the other hand I wouldn't want to support 95 
anybody who was not taking action on climate change.  So trying to 96 
put them in their relativities.  If the question was which of these would 97 
be important enough to change my vote?  Again just personally I'd 98 
say that I don’t think water protection is an important issue and I don't 99 
think we 're about to get swamped.  So that's not… Whereas I think 100 
climate change is going to affect things,  but I think education and 101 
healthcare are also incredibly important.   102 
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Brian: It's a matter of degree isn't it? You might put one against several of 103 
them.   104 
Mark: I would mark down anybody who was treating climate change as 105 
crap. 106 
Facilitator: Yes, 107 
Mark: I would say that that would be just asking which is more important?  I 108 
don't like to choose but I've certainly got ones where I say, I think 109 
some of them are... 110 
Ross: I think by saying one is more important doesn't mean the others aren't 111 
important.  I think we're not going to concentrate 100 per cent on the 112 
one we think is most important.  We're still going to be developing 113 
policies in all the other areas.  But I tend to agree with you that you 114 
say if we don't put climate change as a major or the major issue, or 115 
right up there at the top anyway, the others are not going to matter in 116 
the long term.  When are they going to learn the longer term - 50 117 
years?  Are we going to worry about education if we're running with 118 
temperatures of plus five or six degrees above where we are now.   119 
Cynthia: Yes I was thinking take education.  I was thinking well you actually 120 
make climate change the kind of most important issue you would 121 
actually impact on how education was delivered the content of 122 
education, what we were educating our young people for. So we'd 123 
actually have an impact that could be positive.  It's not about getting 124 
rid of it, saying it's not important.  You could actually shape the way 125 
we educate.  Because one of the problems with climate change is 126 
educating the community about what's going on and what's going to 127 
impact us.  So I actually saw them as inter related but that climate 128 
change as number one might actually positively impact some of those 129 
other areas and shape them quite differently.   130 
Mark: I think when there was the discussion earlier from the CSIRO guide 131 
talking about timescales and difficulty is climate change is very 132 
gradual things that everybody believes is not going to make any 133 
difference in the next five or ten years.   134 
Brian: That's like fags.  That's what people say about smoking.  Smoke this 135 
next fag it's not going to hurt you know.  I'll have this fag and I’ll stop 136 
later on.  There's always that kind of thing. 137 
Ian: It's pretty hard to say to somebody who is a voter, to take action on 138 
climate change your kid will get less money for their education.  139 
Putting it in those kinds of terms it makes the path to motivate 140 
change.  I think it's partly about education, the issue, we've got to 141 
educate everybody to say we need to pay attention to things that will 142 
affect our lives in 10 years time, but we need to worry about 50 years 143 
as well.   144 
James: I think, that's the difficulty as Ross pointed out, with climate change 145 
it's a long term issue.  If we don't start doing things now and wait 146 
another 10 or 15 years, your scenario will definitely be up their tree. 147 
Ian: Up a gum tree. 148 
James: That's the difficulty.  The policy the government has in selling the 149 
issue.  It's not going to change things tomorrow or next week or even 150 
next year or five years that's going to be really noticeable guys .  But 151 
if we don't do it now… 152 
Ian: We'll really notice it. 153 
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James: Yeah, when we get down the temperatures at two, two and a half, five 154 
degrees, maybe even more.  The issue that goes with that is the 155 
tipping points we talk about, positive feedback that we talk about and 156 
no one, not even the scientists are saying they really know what's 157 
going to happen when we reach that stage.  That's frightening. 158 
Ross: Scary.   159 
James: They know a lot about the issue but they're still not sure what's going 160 
to happen once we reach positive [unclear]. 161 
Brian: Can you tell a smoker who's 25 if you have that extra fag tomorrow 162 
and then the next day and the next day, when you're 45 you're going 163 
to be buggered.  Now how do you - you'll reach a tipping point and all 164 
of a sudden your lung will collapse.  Well they're only 25 and they 165 
think, oh you know, who cares about the fag tonight I'm going to have 166 
one tonight.  I'll worry about when I get to about 35.  That's what 167 
they'll say.  I'll wait until I get to 35 and maybe I’ll stop then you know.  168 
That's kind of similar, incremental frog borne business.  How do you 169 
tell a frog, listen don't stay in there you're going to cook, you've got to 170 
get out.  He'd just think, oh it's nice and warm here you know, its okay 171 
I can handle another degree.  How do you actually?  We’re going to 172 
have to convince our people really. 173 
Facilitator: The thing is smoking, if they dramatically reduce their smoking levels 174 
over the decade. 175 
Brian: With scare tactics. 176 
Facilitator: It is possible to make a difference that maybe the same principles can 177 
be applied. 178 
Brian: That's what I'm thinking.  Scare tactics is one of them.  Scare tactics 179 
is one of the things they use. 180 
Ross: Pockets. 181 
Claire: Make it expensive. 182 
Brian: Pockets, the other one you're dead right.  Make it expensive. 183 
Facilitator: I have another related issue just to steer it, possibly differently but 184 
one of the questions here is, has the government done enough to 185 
address climate change? 186 
Ian: It hasn't done anything. 187 
Brian: You're joking. 188 
Facilitator: The problem is it doesn't win votes.  Governments want to win 189 
elections and this is a really really long term issue. 190 
Ross: The issues tie in don't they?  I mean the government is looking to win 191 
the election in a couple of week's time, for a three year term.  What 192 
we're talking about is 30 or 40 years down the track.  They're not 193 
even thinking about that.   194 
Ian: I think the government have done a fair few things.  We have funding 195 
for all sorts of things, we have departments of climate change, it is 196 
bubbling along, so I think they've tried.  I think they've played some of 197 
their cards a bit wrong by trying to, like in the run up to Copenhagen, I 198 
think Rudd was trying to get the scheme up, but he was also trying to 199 
do it and embarrass the Liberals.  By trying to do two things he's 200 
ended up embarrassing the Liberals, but he's lost the climate change.  201 
So it's over.  I don't think they achieved enough by a long shot, but 202 
they're certainly having a bit of a go.  I think where we are now is a bit 203 
of a hiccup.   204 
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Ross: I just feel that they're not having enough of a go.   205 
Ian: Well they're not serious about it.  They were trying to damage the 206 
other parties and… 207 
Brian: Playing politics. 208 
Ian: They were playing politics with it and I think it's too important to be 209 
playing politics. 210 
Ross: If you look at what they're both offering at the moment, and we're 211 
coming up to elections and they're going to want the things right now, 212 
but what are they offering in this area?  There's no long term climate 213 
change policy, really any substantial long term for either of them. 214 
Brian: That's because they're trying to appeal to a certain group of people 215 
that they're going to swing in the marginal seats in my view, that's all.  216 
I mean the rhetoric we're getting out of politics at the moment is it's 217 
only directed to a very small number of people and they're sitting in 218 
those marginal seats.  They don't really care about anybody else at 219 
this stage because that's what gets them over the line and that's why 220 
the voting process sounds so simple.  Because they run focus groups 221 
in marginal seats and they put the swinging voters and say, what do 222 
they think?  Okay we've got to appeal to them.  So everybody is trying 223 
to appeal to a small number of people that the rest of the country is 224 
just being neglected and that's just the way politics works here.  225 
Ian: Again, examples of doing something in the ACT, the new area of 226 
Molonglo is being developed to a high density, they've got planning 227 
rules that will encourage solar access and make solar access a legal 228 
right in that area.  So I think that's all good stuff, but I'm not picking up 229 
that anybody's being amazingly grateful or there's not votes in it  so 230 
it's chicken and egg kind of thing, where I think the governments are 231 
giving it a bit of a go with imaging labelling of washing machines and 232 
fridges and all those other kinds of things.  There's still not votes in it 233 
sadly.  Bottom line is I don't think they've done enough. 234 
Brian: Who knows,  there maybe, I mean we heard from the economist 235 
[unclear] that businesses, lots of businesses were already doing 236 
something ahead of being required to do it, they were doing it 237 
because they thought it was good for business and probably altruistic 238 
reasons as well.  But maybe it's just that the politicians are a bit 239 
scared to get up there with people like the ACT and  businesses 240 
already, many businesses are already doing it.  Maybe they'd get a 241 
shock if they got out there and said what they thought was good for 242 
us or what they were going to do.  243 
Claire: I mean the insulation scheme was a very big initiative.  I guess the 244 
way the media picked up some of the problems with that it became - it 245 
was almost as though every person who had that system installed 246 
had a fire and a death in the family.  It was so small, in fact there 247 
were less deaths after the insulation, proportionate, than before.  But 248 
we all came out of that thinking that was a debacle.  It was not 249 
actually.  Huge numbers of people have got more energy efficiency in 250 
their homes as a result of the government initiative.  They've backed 251 
right away from it now because of, as you said, the feedback for good 252 
stuff is fairly minimal. 253 
Facilitator: Okay well that sort of brings me to the next question.  Which group 254 
has greater responsibility to reduce emissions?  We've been talking 255 
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about governments and everything.  So is it up to the individual?  Is it 256 
up to businesses?  Government?  Community? 257 
Brian: That's a big question and is really really problematic, if you've got the 258 
government saying we need to take issue and that's encouraging the 259 
individual to take the issue.  The individual won't necessarily take 260 
action until the government's taken action.  Government might not do 261 
it unless business supports it.  They are so linked to each other it 262 
just… 263 
Facilitator: So everyone needs to do something? 264 
Ross: Yes. 265 
Ian: A whole community thing which includes business and government 266 
and individuals.   267 
Ross: Well I think that ultimately we're all individuals and therefore we, as 268 
the consumers ultimately have responsibility.   269 
Brian: Yeah, that means - I agree, one of the responsibilities is to fade out 270 
any party that doesn't take this seriously.  Part of the problem is I 271 
actually think the government has to lead because there's a wack of 272 
people out there who are not maybe willing to do anything unless 273 
they're led.  There's a small group of people like us who will do 274 
something and we'll put the insulation in our roofs, or change our life, 275 
our background stuff.  Most people, look it's not on their radar.  It's not 276 
on their radar until a bush fire goes through there and destroys all 277 
their house.  Then they go, shit how did that happen.  That kind of 278 
thing.  So in a way governments aren't leading it really strongly 279 
because of what Ian said, there's no votes in it. It's not on their 280 
horizon as much as the marginal seats.  What they want is to just to 281 
check the facts or something like that.  So in a sense we can all do it, 282 
all of us people because we actually can see what's going to happen.  283 
But what about all the punters out there where it's not on our radar, I 284 
think the only way they can help the government success, carbon tax 285 
thanks very much. 286 
Ian: That's right.   287 
Brian: Collects it and basically says, no it's not a democracy here folks, it's 288 
an autocracy we're just going to wait for carbon tax on it.  289 
Ross: The example from the past where that has actually worked quite 290 
effectively is pollution control on cars that came in, in the late '70s.  291 
The government decided right, we're going to pollution control all 292 
cars.  I remember the fuss that people made about it. Oh it's not going 293 
to be safe, it's going to use more fuel, be not as powerful and all that 294 
sort of thing.  Still it got past that and I can't imagine what Sydney or 295 
Perth or the cities must be like if we still had the same level of 296 
polluting leaded petrol that came out of engines.  But there was a 297 
government decision about it.  Right we're going to reduce pollution 298 
on cars.  All cars are going to have to have this device to reduce - a 299 
catalytic convertors and the benefit flows to everyone.  Everyone 300 
ultimately had to pay for the extra cost. 301 
Mark: Well I'm still not sure about, the questions like who has the greater 302 
responsibility is going.  I mean as a citizen I could say there's all sorts 303 
of things, everybody's responsible.  But I don't think who's got the 304 
greatest responsibility for airline safety or whatever.  Another way to 305 
phrase it would be to say, look, I would prefer or I could just leave my 306 
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life as a citizen and have breakfast and do all of that, the government 307 
will worry about its complicated issues on my behalf.  That's my 308 
preference.  Is they've got the resources and the policy skills, but if 309 
there's an important thing that they're dropping the ball on…  So 310 
responsibility you know comes either back to in a morale sense we 311 
could consume lots and maybe we should choose to consume less.  312 
But in terms of a preference of who should do all the hard work, I'd 313 
much prefer that the government did it like they did on a bunch of 314 
other issues. 315 
Ross: I think it probably has to be.  I mean we'd all like to be back in the '70s 316 
where we didn't have to worry about the atmosphere, it was all fine 317 
and nothing - just get on with our lives.  But unfortunately we're not in 318 
the '70s so someone's got to do something about it.  Individuals can 319 
make a contribution but you were saying they need a lead and the 320 
government seems the only mechanism to lead. 321 
Facilitator: I actually think we're solely lacking in leadership and I think we need 322 
really strong leadership on this.  But I think it's going to have to be 323 
driven by grass roots level by individuals, communities to make them 324 
do what we want. 325 
Ross: Tell them they're our leaders they have to catch up with us.   326 
James: I agree with Claire.  It's got to be coming from the top and coming up 327 
from the bottom and we've got to meet somewhere in the middle.  I 328 
agree with Claire it's got to be grass roots.  People who work in local 329 
government know what we what done that we're worried about.  We 330 
want certain things done and we want it done within a reasonable 331 
timeframe and it's up to the government then to give the leadership.  332 
At the moment we've got no vision in relation to climate - well  at the 333 
moment most issues.  But on climate change we need a vision and 334 
like I also said before it's a long term vision.  It ain't going to be next 335 
week or next year it's 30 years down the track.   336 
Ross: Not in three weeks on 21 August. 337 
James: Three years until the next election.  338 
Brian: But the trouble is with that James, and Claire, the problem is most 339 
punters are not going to put pressure on the government on this 340 
issue.  In my view they're not going to - I agree that the best thing 341 
would be for all of us individuals out there to say to the government 342 
you've got to do something and then the government does something 343 
and starts leading.  But the problem is they're not getting the 344 
pressure.  The whole issue is they are not getting the pressure.  Most 345 
of those people in government I think, well probably two thirds of the 346 
Parliament, the House of Representatives, know most of this stuff's 347 
probably correct.  They probably know and scientists - there's a few 348 
idiots like Minchin and Dunn but most of them I think would actually 349 
go along with the science.  They would probably go along with 350 
the fact that things are going to get really tough in the next - by the 351 
time their kids hit their 40s and 50s they're kind of thing - they 352 
probably know it.  But they won't do anything.  Because the punters 353 
out there aren't telling them to do something.  Because they're still 354 
obsessed. 355 
Ian: We've got to start to tell them. 356 
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Brian: But there's only us around the table here you know. You try going to a 357 
suburb like Penrith right and try and get them to put pressure.  Forget 358 
it.  They ain't interested in the price of fags. 359 
Claire: Given that we've got a long term view, have to have a long term view, 360 
I think it's beginning - it's not saying - well it's not happening now so it 361 
will never happen.  It's actually getting involved like we do, you know 362 
local communities to try and build that awareness to pull off some 363 
really good projects.  Project by project in a local area, like the one 364 
you - that sounds like a government initiative and could equally have 365 
been a community initiative that got that community going that way.  I 366 
just think after a while there will, hopefully, be some sort of 367 
momentum.   368 
Ian: I think the other thing to go with that I think we've got to start to sell 369 
and get the message out there with some hope and optimism.  We've 370 
gone through this period, particularly leading up to Copenhagen 371 
where it was all doom and gloom [unclear] those sorts of issues.372 
 But we need to be doing something positive, and we can do it.  373 
Energy efficiency issues, and  tell people that we can change climate 374 
change.  Using issues like energy efficiency that will bring  prices 375 
down, energy prices will come down which means goods will come 376 
down.  There's a raft of issues to get them onside. 377 
Facilitator: Excellent thank you very much for that.  I believe we're back now to 378 
the group discussion.   379 
Ross: You're okay.  Can I take it? 380 
Facilitator: Yes. 381 
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Male 1: Excuse me, what's the rating scale we are supposed to be using 1 
here? 2 
Dan: One, two, three, four, five. 3 
Male 1: It doesn't say. 4 
Facilitator: One to three I guess. 5 
Male 1: One to three?  One to two I would have thought if you've only got two 6 
choices.   7 
Facilitator: Which policy here is more important?  One, two, three, four, five six.   8 
Male 1: Oh I see.  I thought it meant one against the other.  Climate change 9 
versus employment right. 10 
Facilitator: Okay then we'll just bring to your attention what we're going to do is 11 
have a discussion about how concerned are you about climate 12 
change and then we're going to go to the [unclear] group to give that 13 
presentation in the larger group.  Just so that we can see what's really 14 
bothering people, where they're positioned in this debate and what's 15 
important.   16 
 So the first question is should Australia reduce its greenhouse gas 17 
emissions?   18 
Alan: Yes.   19 
Facilitator: Yes, don't know? 20 
Howard: Yes. 21 
Facilitator: Is that a yes or a no? 22 
Phillip: Yes. 23 
Male 3: Yes.  24 
Facilitator: Yes so we're all agreed that Australia should decrease its greenhouse 25 
emissions.  Okay, why? 26 
Alan: For one regionally we're important, we command a bit of influence 27 
over the rest of south east Asia and our nearest neighbours, we're 28 
regionally important.  Economically were important, we export huge 29 
amounts of coal so we've got large influence over the exported 30 
amounts of emissions.  Developed economy, we've got large solar 31 
resources, we can be demonstrating we already have but then we 32 
exported our technology over the state so we should be a real 33 
innovator in terms of technologies, we've got the resources and 34 
capabilities to do it. 35 
Howard: Taking your own plan to reduce you can do that and nothing else, or 36 
you can influence other people and do nothing.  I think they're 37 
separate things. 38 
George: I think you can develop mitigation techniques and export these 39 
techniques to other countries.  That would you give you a big 40 
advantage.  Technology again, but I think that was what you were 41 
talking about? 42 
Alan: So why should we?  Well that's why we should because for one we've 43 
got the type of economy and the resources so solar we should  44 
pushing an agenda on renewable technology which we then can 45 
export and the onus is on us because I think as  a developed 46 
economy. 47 
Facilitator: We've demonstrated as part of our export. 48 
Alan: Portfolio. 49 
Elaine: I also think in terms of our tourist attractions and things, the Great 50 
Barrier Reef and that sort of stuff being impacted.  So I think from a 51 
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tourism perspective and climate perspective there will be benefits to 52 
actually doing an eco tourism industry which is a growth industry in 53 
tourism. 54 
George: One of the big assets of Australia.  But if you think exporting coal, you 55 
come back to emissions. 56 
Phillip: But aren't we talking tactics here rather than the answer to the 57 
question which is why?  Because it's the right thing to do. 58 
Alan: Exactly. 59 
Phillip: That's what the catch is, it's the right thing to do.   60 
Howard: Well all these other things are putting a bold face on it to say well… 61 
Alan: The nitty gritty,. 62 
Howard: How do we do it in a way that minimises the impact on us and does 63 
the right thing like everyone else.  I think we've got to be really careful 64 
to separate those things. 65 
Phillip: I mean yeah, you can even take away the global warming, the fact is, 66 
it's still not the right thing to do. 67 
Howard: I also think we need to be really honest about Australia's ability to 68 
influence other people.  It's going to be the other way around, it's the 69 
Chinese  and Indians telling us what to do. 70 
Phillip: That leads to another question.  The question was - we - are we 71 
talking about human beings or Australia? 72 
Howard: I think it's Australia.  The right thing to do for Australia. 73 
Phillip: Was it or wasn't it? 74 
Facilitator: Well I guess where the people are active and have to live in the 75 
climate.   76 
Phillip: It's all of us.   77 
Dan: Globally. 78 
Alan: Why Australia specifically? 79 
Facilitator: Well the question is you know, should Australia reduce it's 80 
greenhouse emissions. 81 
Phillip: Why should it? 82 
Elaine: The counter side to that is if we reduce our emissions and nobody 83 
else does, what impact is it going to have?  What percentage of 84 
global emissions does Australia have.  It will still have an impact. 85 
Dan: Still depend on the global… 86 
Elaine: but I think it's got to be as part of a bigger campaign, it's not just 87 
about Australia reducing its emissions so that's it's story.   88 
Alan: But we can only concentrate on us really. 89 
Elaine: But if you look at what else we can do, you said in terms of R&D and 90 
export. 91 
Alan: Exactly yeah, so if we took a strong stance and said right, the price of 92 
coal is now going up triple, whatever, sure the markets will go, so that 93 
means as well that we will start pushing our exports onto more 94 
renewably focused technologies. 95 
Howard: What you were saying to me is whilst reducing greenhouse gas 96 
emissions it demonstrates to the world that maybe commitment to 97 
climate change is… 98 
Elaine: Yes.  I think that that's - to me it doesn't really matter what course you 99 
choose it's a matter of saying, okay we as a country are making a 100 
stand and we believe that we should be doing something about 101 
climate change.   102 
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Phillip: I'm a bit worried about the leadership role.  We’re not in a position to 103 
do it. 104 
Male 1: Leadership, role model is a question.   105 
Howard: [Unclear] 106 
Dan: I think we need a leader who can review all this.  Go out and role 107 
model .  You're depending too much on the… 108 
Howard: It demonstrates to the rest of the world. 109 
Dan: We should be the leader. 110 
Facilitator: We need one conversation.  So you're saying that… 111 
Dan: Leadership which takes the country first, forget about the world.  112 
Okay, they think about Australia first and then do what we can do 113 
here and try to innovate things which we can export to other 114 
countries.  The other countries will benefit from what we have done 115 
and slowly it will dissipate and mitigate.   I mean we take it. 116 
Alan: Also let's not forget we may say, look India and China are going to 117 
have more influence over us, but lets not forget about personal 118 
relationships between high ends of power.  So Bush, Rudd, then 119 
you've got Blair, all a coalition of the willing, we're all prepared to go 120 
to war together and things like that.  So why can't we also influence 121 
each other in saying right let's all push now for strong mitigation 122 
targets, why can't that exist if you've got strong ends of Parliament 123 
being personal friends with each other.  It could have a huge 124 
influence. 125 
Male 3: But it's hard to do that if we're not doing anything. 126 
Alan: Exactly right.   127 
Dan: Do we do it first? 128 
Facilitator: Are you saying it's a scale thing, that if we are talking about Australia 129 
we should actually be looking at the scale of leadership and politics at 130 
the moment and exports?  Is that what you're talking about at the 131 
moment? 132 
Dan: Yes I think so. 133 
Alan: But how do we operate in the global economy?  Which is the 134 
important thing because it is the globe that matters on the whole with 135 
this problem. 136 
Howard: Well that was my point.  In the interest of the argument we stop sales 137 
of uranium and coal.  If we are bothered about emissions.  We then 138 
use those to us very low cost power sources in gaining economic 139 
advantage. 140 
Alan: Uranium has very high embodied emissions for making this.  141 
Male 3: That's not the question as to why we should reduce greenhouse 142 
emissions. 143 
Facilitator: One conversation. 144 
Male 3: I think coming back to what we were saying before, it's in Australia's 145 
interests because there are effects of global warming and it's clearly 146 
shown with greenhouse gas emissions lead to over warming,  and the 147 
climate change effects on Australia could be quite serious.  Things 148 
like increasing temperatures and change in rainfall patterns, effect on 149 
tourism because it's going to have an effect on the Barrier Reef.  150 
Those sorts of effects which we try to do something about.   I would 151 
say its one of the effective, if not the most effective developed 152 
country. 153 
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Howard: That came out in the presentation as well. 154 
Male 3: Has anybody got any sensitivity and said well if these countries 155 
achieve these targets, but these guys don't bother, what happens to 156 
the picture?  Is there actually a point where there's enough people not 157 
doing anything, it's just not worth - our difference is so low, that we've 158 
got to be very careful about what are our reasons for doing it.  They're 159 
no longer the greater good of the world or even our own local 160 
environment.  Do you see what I mean? 161 
Elaine: It goes back to those international meetings doesn't it?  Where you 162 
get some agreement at that level, that one, there is a need to do 163 
something and two they're going to be compliant.  And until you get 164 
sign off on those agreements I think we're going to be struggling even 165 
if you did do projections. 166 
Facilitator: China and India the two big areas.  They're developing, they're 167 
increasing their power usage at an astronomical rate.  They are going 168 
to dominate what happens so you can't do - us,  Australia doing it is 169 
going to solve the problem.  You've got to do it for other reasons like 170 
that's the right thing to do, it's about sending a message.  We're not 171 
going to solve the problem with just have [unclear] ourselves. 172 
Male 3: Ghana addressed that - they pointed out that it's the  United States 173 
has got about 35 per cent of the world's emissions  and China is not 174 
far behind. It's above the US now is it? 175 
Elaine: It's doubling every time. 176 
Male 3: India is a close third.  They obviously are the big polluters and what 177 
they do has a dominant effect, but that shouldn't stop smaller 178 
countries.  It's no good us saying because we're only 2 per cent of the 179 
world, therefore we don't have to worry.  If everyone said that it 180 
doesn't work.  181 
Howard: [Unclear], where I was going with that is you can start from some high 182 
order thinking it's the right thing to do you can work with other people, 183 
hoping that globally something happens.  But in your back pocket you 184 
need  a plan where if they don't do it then we shift from mitigation to 185 
adaption.  So you've got to have flexible thinking here and we feel 186 
really bad about that but if it's a matter of survival as well.   187 
Male 1: I think one of the things we need to look at is the fact that there's lots 188 
of right things to do in the world, and one of the things is we have this 189 
economic disparity between us and India and China and they see 190 
themselves as having a right to develop to the level that we did and to 191 
share their contribution of pollution the same as we  more advanced 192 
economies did previously. 193 
Elaine: But that's where I think… 194 
Male 1: That's the problem. 195 
Elaine: … the technology has progressed from when it first started.  So there 196 
are options which are both environmentally friendly and cost less than 197 
coal stations. 198 
Male 1: No.  There's no energy runs that costs less that coal station. 199 
Dan: No I think what we should do, there's a lot of technologies. 200 
Male 1: It's true. 201 
Dan: At present we are exporting coal to India, China and all that in 202 
massive amounts.  Instead of that, we should have an alternate 203 
energy supply, like something like battery or solar or anything.  That 204 
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supplied to India and China, that will reduce a little bit, keep on every 205 
year, keep increasing those renewable energies for exporting, the 206 
export market, and slowly we should reduce the coal export to other 207 
countries. 208 
Elaine: I think one of the problems with places like India in particular is their 209 
population density, whereas in Australia we've got nice big open 210 
spaces. 211 
Dan: That's true. 212 
Elaine: Where you can put wind farms or solar panels or whatever, you don't 213 
have the large areas and coal stations in terms of footprint, physical 214 
footprint, are much smaller. 215 
Dan: Yes, true, that is true. 216 
Facilitator: I was just going to point out, what do we say to China and India if they 217 
say, you developed, we're trying to develop why can't we do stuff?  218 
But the point about solar panels, we know they're all made in China. 219 
Dan: Yeah it's very interesting. 220 
Facilitator: They export them to us for us.   221 
Howard: Well that's right and if you put a bunch of solar panels in the Gibson 222 
Desert you'll get no power delivered onto the grid because the 223 
distances are too great.   224 
Alan: Don't need to go that far as well. 225 
Howard: I wasn't quite sure of your point about India and China and 226 
renewables. 227 
Elaine: It's just in terms of how much of different things are an option for… 228 
Howard: Are you saying it's too expensive? 229 
Elaine: Well it's not a matter of expense,  part of it is the physical footprint as 230 
well.   231 
Howard: I don't know. 232 
Dan: A present it's too expensive.   233 
Phillip: China's got a lot of land actually.   234 
Elaine: China does, yeah India's different. 235 
Alan: Who allowed the expense of converting to renewables I think you've 236 
always got to keep in mind sure it's a short term expense but over the 237 
long run you're going to make money because 15-20 years down  the 238 
track when that has paid itself  off, return on investment has come to 239 
fruition and then you're making profits from then on.  So Germany's 240 
gone and their economy's dipped slightly as a result, but in 30 years 241 
time when they're not paying for electricity they're going to be saying, 242 
wow our solar programme and tariffs and what not were really 243 
beneficial back then.  That's just a scale of a temporal difference and 244 
if we've got the money at the moment to be able to put into high 245 
capital venture like this and we're spending billions of dollars on war 246 
in which we're not making huge amounts of difference anyway in 247 
Afghanistan and what not, and we're getting ourselves over global 248 
financial crisis through spending huge amounts of money as well, why 249 
can't all those funds be put into something more worthwhile, like this 250 
that will be better for us in the long term? 251 
Facilitator: That's good because that leads us to the next question.  How 252 
important is climate mitigation compared to other key policy areas?  253 
So do you think there's lots of right things to do, do you think we 254 
should be focussing on social security and welfare, or should we be 255 
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spending on healthcare or education?  Do you think those are much 256 
more important at this point in time to be focussing on things that 257 
affect us and our society?  That's also a right thing to do or do you 258 
think that this is the elephant standing in the room. 259 
Elaine: You can't afford to forget education.  260 
Phillip: You can't forget any of those things. 261 
Dan: Basically that's why we are still… 262 
Alan: Ultimately  263 
Howard: They're all interlinked.   264 
Elaine: Yes that was something I found going through.  I want to give them all 265 
a one and say there isn't any difference between them.    266 
Phillip: Yeah rank them one to six. 267 
Elaine: Climate change, well that's going to affect our physical environment 268 
it's going to affect our health, which is going to affect dah dah dah.  269 
There are different ways that we can do it.  Healthcare, which will 270 
have an impact on the environment, so they're all… 271 
Male 3: Isn't one of the big challenges though that you were saying about 272 
short term and long term that things like education affect people.  273 
Healthcare affects people right now and the timeframe is only a 274 
matter of a few years in terms of its impact on people.  Whereas 275 
climate change tends to be a much longer timeframe and it's getting 276 
that balance right and getting that message across to the community 277 
that they need to make investments now, otherwise we're going to 278 
have real problems in 20 years time. 279 
Elaine: But just on the education, if you get it at the kids, I know that this is 280 
not going to solve some of the other issues we've got, but if you get it 281 
at the kids, it's automatic for them to then do it.  I can give you an 282 
example, the OCT government runs or is involved in the Australian 283 
Sustainable Schools initiative.  They do waste and they do energy, 284 
but they start with waste.  The number of kids who are in primary 285 
school/preschool and going into high school, they all know how to do 286 
it and they hassle their parents at home so that improves the home so 287 
it does it that way.  So it's the same sort of thing we need to get the 288 
kids to help them to do it as well. 289 
Alan: Which is why they don't need to be seen as education is just here.  Or 290 
the environment it's just here because you can combine the two.  291 
Have sustainability, education, have sustainability in health so that all 292 
industries are working together on these common problems, common 293 
issues.   294 
Phillip: It's all holistic.   295 
Male 3: Well I think there is an enormous need for educating the general 296 
population on the sort of things that we heard today.  That the 297 
average person just hasn't got an appreciation of the impact of 298 
climate change, particularly greenhouse gases and so on.  It can be 299 
done, so if they don't understand the problem and they don't see 300 
these long term effects it's very hard to get them to vote and spend 301 
money on it.  302 
Phillip: Sometimes it's not a question of understanding the problem.  I still 303 
don't understand how the emissions trading scheme works, despite 304 
the lecture this morning, it just brushed straight over the top.  There 305 
was nothing there.  I know what a carbon tax is, but I have no real 306 
Transcript - Australian Climate Policy Forum (31 July 2010)                Session 1 - Group 2 
301 
 
idea still and I've read a hell of a lot of papers and everything else.  307 
Nobody tries to explain what an emissions trading scheme is.  Other 308 
than the fact that somebody has got to buy stuff and then they'll sell it 309 
and then you'll pay for it in the end.  The money goes round in circles. 310 
Facilitator: Do you think that's deliberate or is it a part of the way our society 311 
functions? 312 
Phillip: Well if you can't explain anything how can you get people to accept 313 
it? 314 
Howard: Well it's an attempt to do something using free market forces, not on 315 
the assumption the fact they will ultimately be the best method of 316 
doing it and I personally… 317 
Phillip: But I did do some economic study. 318 
Howard: I'm personally very sceptical about that. 319 
Phillip: That's game. 320 
Howard: Because we've not got into the situation we are through [unclear] 321 
policies.   322 
Phillip: We don't know how it works. 323 
Howard: This whole idea of buying and selling some sort of [unclear] is  so 324 
abstract it evolves.  Anything like that is open to royalty,  like for 325 
example. 326 
Phillip: Oh they're giving freebies out. 327 
Howard: I was told this morning there is a suspicion that when you tick the box 328 
when you buy an airline ticket, like carbon credits, that money is just 329 
being banked somewhere it's not actually doing anything.   330 
Dan: I don't think they even know what to do with it. 331 
Howard: Yes so that's a form of… 332 
Phillip: You sign up for green power. 333 
Male 3: That concept of a carbon trade system was modelled on the control of 334 
sulfurous emissions in power stations, in particular North America, the 335 
acid rain problem and that was solved back in the '80s using a similar 336 
sort of scheme and has worked successfully.  The track record  so far 337 
of carbon tax schemes is very poor.  It doesn't look as though it is 338 
working, though people are paying taxes. 339 
Howard: Do you know why one worked and not the other? 340 
Male 3: Well the acid rain one was very specific because there was only a 341 
small group of power stations burning acid, or high sulphur coal and 342 
so it was a much smaller scheme and targeted a much smaller 343 
number of participants.  But nevertheless it is a proven that model 344 
does work.   345 
George: There is this huge European emission trading system. 346 
Facilitator: Just one last, sorry.  One last question.  Who's got the greatest 347 
responsibility?  Do you think it should be the individual the business, 348 
the government, the community or the whole world?  What do you 349 
think? 350 
Phillip: Whole world.   351 
Alan: It's really tough. 352 
Male 1: The government. 353 
Phillip: The government yes. 354 
Dan: Tax on the individual so the individual communities, society and then 355 
the world.  So everyone knows how to limit their pollution, 356 
automatically it will take care of the world. 357 
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Elaine: My view is community but again they are all so tightly coupled.   358 
Dan: Yes they're tightly coupled yes.   359 
Elaine: By getting a developing community base you've got enough voice to 360 
have an action and have an impact, then you can influence other 361 
parties.   362 
Alan: If you consider as well that a lot of governments recently haven't 363 
actually been listening to their voters on a large scale, so you can 364 
compare to that.  So basically influencing things they see as being 365 
this is something you'll accept down the track.  Like we were sold on 366 
lies if you like to go to some wars that we've been involved in, but we 367 
think this is right for the country at this point in time and we are going 368 
to put it in and then you'll come to agreement with that afterwards.  It 369 
usually sells if governments continue with that line of thought, 370 
eventually they convince us. 371 
Facilitator: Can I wrap it up now. 372 
Howard: Sorry can I just answer that.,  I agree that it's everybody's problem, 373 
the snag is the world, communities and individuals are not going to 374 
work fast enough.  It's got to be done now, the only people who can 375 
do it are governments.  People with power. 376 
Alan: Government business. 377 
Howard: I went to an ANU session here about the aftermath of coconut 378 
because ANU sent a number of people along as observers.  One of 379 
the messages coming back from that was that there are a lot of 380 
interest groups and people trying to influence our working groups, but 381 
the key decision makers were government.  It was the government 382 
representatives who could make things happen and decide on the 383 
course of action.   384 
George: [Unclear]. 385 
Howard: Yeah well look what happened there.  I think they are all waiting for 386 
Obama.  387 
Phillip: Might be easier to achieve world peace… 388 
Facilitator: You guys just stay here I think. 389 
Phillip: Well thank you. 390 
[Over-talking] 391 
Howard: [Unclear] the world only reacts when something really catches… 392 
Phillip: Climate change might be that world pestilence problem. 393 
Howard: This is going to  sneak up on us, that's a lie.   394 
Phillip: I don't know they keep promising all these earthquakes, cyclones, 395 
tempest storms, excessive droughts. 396 
Facilitator: Was anyone interested [unclear]. 397 
[Over-talking] 398 
[Multiple Speakers] 399 
Alan: Before I accept the challenge. 400 
Facilitator: It can be what you I mean it's just a basic summary.  You don't have 401 
to refer to this. 402 
Howard: It's better coming from us though. 403 
Facilitator It is. 404 
Howard: You're biased. 405 
Facilitator: So I think just to run you through it.  We think there's lots to do and 406 
we think it's really all about the right thing to do and it's everybody's 407 
problem.  When we look at the scale of Australia it's very difficult to 408 
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see a global scale, because we're all [unclear].  There's key policies, 409 
everything seems to be linked.  We need messages, we need to work 410 
together we need to educate communities.  So that discussion is 411 
we're really looking at this as multiple scales and that might be top 412 
down or bottom up.  Alright were just going to have a shared 413 
discussion now. 414 
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Facilitator: Okay we're going to be recording this session just for Alex's 1 
purposes, for his PhD.  You've been hearing a bit of information and 2 
now it's time for a group discussion.  So I'm not going to really be 3 
taking part, just to make sure that everyone is having a say and also 4 
just to let you know what the time constraints are.  So we plan on a 5 
20 minute discussion now about what your concerns are about 6 
climate change.  So should Australia reduce greenhouse gases, how 7 
important is mitigation compared to other policy areas?  Has the 8 
previous government done enough?  Which party has greater 9 
responsibility to reduce carbon emissions, so those types of 10 
questions.  After the 20 minutes what we plan is for the group to put 11 
forward a small presentation, so just a couple of minutes.  So I don't 12 
know whether you want to use the butcher paper here, but it's 13 
probably something with about five minutes to go if you - I would say 14 
would probably be the best time to start organising collating the 15 
information that we discuss.  But if you want to do it a different way 16 
it's up to you as well.   17 
Kevin: Wasn't there some sort of a sheet we were supposed to be given on 18 
topics?  It seems to me that that's what we were talking about. 19 
Facilitator: That's the topic that you're talking about but it's more just a general 20 
discussion on - and also to rank here at the end what you think - 21 
although that's something which is probably best done. 22 
Mike: The only two topics we can talk on is the two presentations from 23 
earlier.  We can give an opinion on those.   24 
Facilitator: Well you can also bring in your own opinion as well. 25 
Helen: Basically if you want to talk about what you think should be 26 
happening. 27 
Facilitator: Yes what you think the issues are, what you think the parties are 28 
doing. 29 
Helen: What are the mitigating strategies that we would recommend. 30 
Facilitator: What actually concerns you.  If anyone at any point wants to take 31 
notes, there's some butcher paper.   32 
Helen: I'm happy to write.  I'm not afraid to have a go.  Permanent marker. 33 
Kevin: Well then the first topic was do we think that there is a need to deal 34 
with climate change?  Is that…? 35 
Helen: Yes I think that was the first.  Do we think we need to do anything? 36 
Mike: Well what can we do?  This is the world you're talking about, not 37 
Australia.   38 
Kevin: No we have to be talking about Australia.  We can't be talking about 39 
what the world's going to be able to do.  We have to talk about what 40 
we can do in the country.  To me it's as clear as - it's pollution.  If 41 
we're using coal fired power plants, it's pollution.  We should be 42 
dealing with that issue if for no other reason than we're dealing with 43 
something that's harming people's lives.  When you live near a coal 44 
fire power plant you're likelihood is to have a higher rate of lung 45 
diseases.  If you live near a manufacturing plant that spews out 46 
chemicals you will have other sort of health issues, health impacts 47 
and for no other reason in my mind, we should be dealing with what 48 
our industry does.  What we do with our cars and our transport and 49 
our general way of life for no other reason, just to make our way of life 50 
better. 51 
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Kate: So what you're saying Kevin is what we should have is the impact of 52 
different focus on what we're talking about with climate change is not 53 
that somebody is putting stuff into the air which is making things 54 
happen, or are they because there's quite a lot of talk about whether 55 
things happening or not.  But what is actually happening on the 56 
ground to people in various places.  What do we all want to do?  We 57 
all want to get away from the big city with the high pollution and the 58 
smog and everything so that we can have a better standard of living. 59 
Kevin: What happened in China when they had the Olympics?  They shut 60 
down all their manufacturing plants and what happened to the air?  I 61 
mean their air cleared up.  So you couldn't get too much more 62 
obvious that their manufacturing and their cars and all their whole 63 
way of life was impacted on their own environment and therefore it 64 
has to be their health in my mind.  It's as clear as that. 65 
Kate: You can do things like that.  They did it in Britain in the '50s and '60s 66 
the most terrible smogs  and so they said we can't live like this. This 67 
is no way to live.  So they changed it all and it made such an 68 
enormous difference just to everybody's life.  69 
Kevin: I think we lose people when we start to say when they get into the 70 
science of it al.  Now I'm on all these different sorts of chat lines and 71 
people are going this way about CO2 and it's good, it's bad and 72 
there's arguments on both sides that are very strong.  If you just listen 73 
to those arguments after a while you go around the twist.  But I think 74 
people want their lives their daily lives improved.  They see the 75 
pollution they want something done about it. 76 
Helen: Are you making a distinction between what people identify as being 77 
climate change which is invisible effectively, and what people actually 78 
physically have to deal with on a day to day basis which is pollution.  79 
If we talk in terms of pollution then we are talking about something 80 
that's very tangible.  I mean acid rain is one of those problems which 81 
was all but eliminated wasn't it, back in the '70s.  CFCs in [unclear]. 82 
Kevin: Exactly, since the '50s since Chicago, there's all these sort of different 83 
manufacturing companies,  that all this air pollution, water is polluted 84 
and when you started to deal with those you improved an entire 85 
environment and you've improved the health of the people.  Now I 86 
may be wrong that pollution is not the problem, but I don't see 87 
anything that indicates to me that it isn't the problem.  If we just clean 88 
up the pollution. 89 
Liana: Unless someone can come up with a good argument that all these 90 
emissions are good, are they good for us?  Is there an argument that 91 
says all this stuff that's coming [unclear]. 92 
Helen: Well yes, there's a very good argument.  A very good argument is 93 
people want to buy things. 94 
Kevin: I think that puts it right in perspective.  Is what we're doing good for 95 
us?  If it's not good for us lets change it and then we have to - what 96 
are the areas that we have to mitigate?  What is it here?  Are the coal 97 
fired power plants, good?  Now obviously they provide us with 98 
electricity and they have the base power that we need, but they also 99 
cause health problems.  So how do you deal with that?  You can't just 100 
shut them down.  So you have to make a transition to the future.   101 
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Mike: Mt Isa and Broken Hill in Australia had a localised problem too.  The 102 
emissions of lead all those years ago.  Now that was pollution in the 103 
true sense of the word.  It was a danger to human health.  Now it was 104 
local.  It didn't affect us here in Canberra but it certainly affected them 105 
there.  What you said about Chicago was quite right, it went to 106 
Cincinnati where I was too it was even more [unclear].  But they were 107 
the bad old days of polluting around the world.  108 
Helen: That's still happening. 109 
Mike: When you still see on your ABC smoke stacks billowing out white 110 
smoke, well that was 40 years ago.  I mean those don't exist 111 
anymore.  There is no pollution like that occurring.   112 
Facilitator: Well in Mendoza there still is.   113 
Mike: There still is? 114 
Helen: [Unclear] 115 
Facilitator: Yeah, Mendoza still has the same problem.  116 
Mike: The only trouble is I flew down to Sydney, flew my sister down,  last 117 
summer it was, it was a hazy day.  I couldn't even get past 118 
Campbelltown it was that bad.  It was just a brown out.  I had to call 119 
up for radar [unclear] I couldn't see a thing.   120 
Kevin: So it's still happening.  Maybe in certain areas it's not as bad as what 121 
we remember as kids, but its still bloody bad and we have the 122 
accumulation of this. 123 
Kate: It's very easy to identify the people who have to be sacrificed.   I think 124 
that's a very good point like yes, why don't we identify the people who 125 
will have to make a sacrifice if we stop.  I'm not talking about - well 126 
anyone.  Yeah maybe if we can increase consciousness of those 127 
people as a - I don't know, but I think that it's a very good point.  128 
Those people or organisations can be identified.,  So that awareness, 129 
maybe the whole community needs to be aware of the people who 130 
are making sacrifices or being sacrificed. 131 
Kevin: What needs to be mitigated?  I mean what actual areas need to be 132 
mitigated?  We know that I think we all agree that would be power 133 
plants, we need to do something about what's coming from them, and 134 
from the big manufacturers and from the cars we drive.  But the first 135 
gentlemen mentioned cement.  Now I assume what he was talking 136 
about was the heat that is transmitted and brought up from all the 137 
cement from all the big cities.  I don't know that for a fact.  But that's 138 
what I thought he was talking about. 139 
Kate: I think there's something in the manufacture process as well that 140 
makes cement a really nasty… 141 
Facilitator: Intense. 142 
Kate: What does it do? 143 
Florian: Well you mine the stuff first, materials, that’s one thing.  Then the 144 
processing is extremely energy intensive and when it deteriorates.  145 
Mike: Well every form of manufacturing requires energy or heat.  Heat is 146 
energy of course.  It's got to be disposed of somewhere, either into 147 
the ground, into the water or into the air.  Now what I'm not so certain 148 
about and not convinced completely yet, although I will admit our first 149 
lecturer opened my mind.  Does it all stay up there or do a lot of the 150 
solid particles come to earth, get absorbed back into the ground and 151 
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the water,  so there's really not all that much CO2 up there.  Although 152 
what is up there is obviously causing significant problems. 153 
Kate: There's supposedly an equilibrium so what comes in gets dissipated 154 
or so it seems.  But because of the present population and growth in 155 
development, it's supposedly impacting on that status. 156 
Mike: Put clouds in the diagram, it's only the tropicals, and that ends at 157 
65,000 or 70,000 ft so this carbon CO2 ban we seem to see it as a 158 
ban must exist between roughly 45,000 and 70,000ft.  Now I'm not 159 
scientific enough to know is that the truth.  I wish the little graph 160 
showed the altitudes on it and I would have known. Because I don't 161 
know whether it all falls down, dissipates out, changes its chemicals. 162 
Kate: That's a very good pint.  That's one of the areas that hasn't been 163 
scientifically analysed.  What happens in the stratosphere.  164 
Kevin: At the end of the day what it is, is the accumulation of it, and as I 165 
understand it our systems, the ocean, the trees and our natural 166 
environment are not coping with the volume of CO2, and that there's 167 
a tipping point where it's not going to be able to cope with it at all.  168 
Now I may be wrong and stand to be corrected on that, but that's my 169 
understanding. 170 
Kate: That's the argument. 171 
Mike: Well if there's oceans acidifying,  you're right.  It's not coping with it 172 
because it would have - and we do know that there's been massive 173 
clearing of trees and jungle areas around the equatorial regions.  So 174 
we have less of a carbon dioxide, amongst other gases, absorption, 175 
so as you industrialise and farm more land there's less ground 176 
absorption. So everything you say Kevin is right, but it's grouped up 177 
now to what extent.  What percentage? 178 
Kevin: I mean that's it.  In my mind, if we're thinking about this whole thing, 179 
can we figure all this out, would it be good, like the guy that had - the 180 
first speaker.  He had all that cartoon up. 181 
Helen: Does that really matter?  Shouldn't  we be doing it all anyway? 182 
Kevin: exactly.  I mean just for our own local environment for our own health 183 
shouldn't we be doing it? 184 
Female 1: Yes and we can go back a long way.  I can probably go back further 185 
than most.  This has been talked about forever.  For 50 years. 186 
Kevin: Longer than that. 187 
Female 1: Much longer than that.   188 
Kevin: I remember in the 50s being talked… 189 
Female 1: Yes.  What happens?  Well sometimes things happen as we have just 190 
been saying, the change happened in Britain with the smog and with 191 
the CFCs and things like that.  So you can actually make a difference 192 
but nevertheless there is this inextricable progression of exponential 193 
growth.     194 
Facilitator: Can I just say while you're on this point it would be interesting to hear 195 
your thoughts on how to go about doing it.  So compared to other 196 
policy areas.  How important is this policy area and who is 197 
responsible?  The individual, the corporations, the government.  How 198 
you think that should work. 199 
Kate: I think individuals have shown that they are prepared to act 200 
themselves in lots of ways.  Yeah, so I think government is wanting  201 
powerful nations. 202 
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Kevin: There has to be a lead.  To me there has to be a lead.   203 
Helen: [Unclear] it seems to me. 204 
Kevin: If the lead - it's awfully hard for us here to have a huge impact on the 205 
country of Australia.  So to me the lead's got to come from the 206 
government.  I don't think that. 207 
Helen: Can I write this down? 208 
Kevin: Yeah. 209 
Helen: People see this as a key issue that we need a lead, or some form of 210 
leadership. 211 
Kevin: Where does the lead come from? 212 
Helen: People are leading it.  I don't think the government are leading it.  I 213 
think the people that are driving this - the government keeps saying, 214 
oh we don't know what to do because there's all these sorts of...     215 
People are actually doing things, putting solar panels on schools, 216 
changing the way they're teaching children.  Things are happening 217 
anyway.  It's a bit like the mines are already self regulating 218 
themselves and showing up the baddies.  I feel that the government's 219 
lagging behind, and even businesses working together in 220 
organisation, we're already doing things like turning the computers off 221 
every night and turning all the lights off.  We've got geothermal power 222 
access in the building.  These are happening whereas the 223 
government still doesn't appear to have… 224 
Helen: They are happening yet we're still seeing this exponential growth.  So 225 
despite what everyone is doing on the ground, it's clearly nowhere 226 
near enough to halt these effects. 227 
Florian: I actually tend to disagree with you.   228 
Mike: The population as a whole, the population have accepted already the 229 
very first change.  Now if you get them to accept that we've all now 230 
got low energy light bulbs in our houses and everywhere. 231 
Florian: No we don't.  I'm sorry, I have to… 232 
Helen: There's no sacrifice being made in that regard either. 233 
Florian: This may be the case in Canberra where people have rather high 234 
education. 235 
Helen: Incomes as well. 236 
Florian: But not in the western suburbs of Sydney where Alan Jones reigns.  237 
Or in Melbourne where you have that nutcase Andrew Bolt. 238 
Liana: I think they're phasing them out so you can't buy them anymore, 239 
they're not made. 240 
Florian: Yes but still I mean it's simple. 241 
Nancy: So in fact it's not being done. 242 
Florian: You actually can buy them at K Market. 243 
Mike: It's a government decision. 244 
Nancy: It's a government decision [unclear]. 245 
Mike: People will accept that, they're used to it. 246 
Nancy: But it doesn't happen. 247 
Florian: That's right.  If the government pushes I agree, as we said we have 248 
implemented this Goulburn Goes Solar! project in Goulburn.  But we 249 
are fighting climate change denyers.  Not sceptics, denyers on a 250 
highest level.  Several members of parliament you know. That’s the 251 
level that we are starting and that's rather typical I have to say for… 252 
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Kevin: It's not just in this area.  I live in an area you may remember that I 253 
said I was a renewable energy activist, and in the area that I live, in 254 
Crookwell, there's wind farms going up.  Whereas there was a vote of 255 
the people and 70 per cent of them were willing to have more wind 256 
farms.  30 per cent didn't, and those 30 per centers, a handful of 257 
those people that are very active and that are doing everything they 258 
can to stop renewable energy.  They've convinced one of our local 259 
members for the state that a 2 km distance from a wind farm to a non-260 
participating house should be a state law.   261 
 Now in New South Wales, more than likely the Liberals and Nationals 262 
are going to get in and that's part of their policy is to have this 2km 263 
distance between a house and a wind farm.  Now that's going to 264 
make these things un-buyable.  You can only build on that in really 265 
sparse areas.  Well the thing is we've got quality wind in our area and 266 
we're not able to use it because we've got this small group who are 267 
stopping it.  That's going to spread out into the state it's going to have 268 
regulations, regulating what we can do with wind farms.  Yes there 269 
are small groups that are doing stuff, but there are hardcore people 270 
that are against it, and they are fighting tooth and nail to stop anything 271 
to do with this.  So I agree with you that there are people there, but 272 
government has got to add. 273 
Helen: So can we say that one of the key issues is lack of information 274 
perhaps?  I mean is this a big problem?  Even the wind farm thing is 275 
interesting example because there are some scientists who say that, 276 
in fact putting huge wind farms up across nations is in fact going to 277 
cause all sorts of climatic problems in themselves.   278 
Facilitator: Exactly. 279 
Kevin: But then who is running the information and how unbiased is it?  I 280 
mean if you listen to all three parties right now, you've got the Greens 281 
on one far end of it, you've got, in my mind, the Liberals on the other 282 
end of it, and you've got Labor not sure what the heck they're…  283 
That's how I see it. 284 
Female 2: What sort of information are we lacking?  I mean if we're going to talk 285 
to the group about the key issues that we face and one of them 286 
seems to be lack of information.   287 
Florian: I don't think there is any lack of information.  288 
Female 2: What do you think it is? 289 
Florian: We can source this information easily by the click of a mouse.  Like 290 
we just saw,  we can get this on the internet. 291 
Female 2: Yes but people won't click on climate. 292 
Florian: I know, the problem is…that people listen to the wrong information.  I 293 
just mentioned these two nutcases, Alan Jones and Andrew Bolt,  294 
these are the main influencers, or how do you call it in English - they 295 
influence public opinion like there is no tomorrow.  Wherever you go 296 
in the western suburbs, if you go into a shop, if you go into a 297 
workshop, Alan Jones. 298 
Helen: How do you mitigate that?  I mean what do we propose to do to get 299 
information we believe as much as they believe which is accurate 300 
information? 301 
Sarah: Into schools. 302 
Mike: Are you talking about an educational chasm there. 303 
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Florian: No you turn around the argument.  That's what we decided. 304 
Facilitator: Like if you look at the sheets, I asked different policy areas into rank.  305 
So  we're not actually expecting you to rank it.  But it's related to 306 
education but how do you think climate change - how does it relate to 307 
these other policy areas? 308 
Mike: Well nationally as far as the people are concerned, very low down the 309 
scale.  It is not important. 310 
Florian: Yes, in Australia. 311 
Kate: It's asking what we think is important. 312 
Mike: Well this is why we're here.   313 
Kate: What do we think. 314 
Mike: Going out there we've got to try and get a message through to the 315 
people who don't want to know that message because they couldn't 316 
care less about it.  So what you've got to come up with is how you 317 
communicate.   318 
Kevin: That's the whole thing that I was talking about to begin with.  Is that 319 
we're talking about something like climate change which is very 320 
complex.  It is very hard to get the message out there in a way that 321 
people are going to understand it.  To my mind we should be talking 322 
about the pollution side of things.  How it is impacting on our health.  323 
People can understand that and can grasp at that.  Then we say 324 
things that you can do or like your people are doing, producing their 325 
own energy in their schools or their recycling  their stuff, one of the 326 
main problems that a local council has is with waste.  This is going to 327 
be a growing - is what you do with all the garbage we produce and all 328 
the energy and all the facilities it takes just to deal with that.  So I 329 
mean if we put it out like that - in that sort of a platform I think people 330 
are going to understand better what we have to do.  Now that's my 331 
opinion. 332 
Florian: The other argument is money.  You get them in the back pocket, 333 
that's the issue.  That's what we try to do.  You save a lot of money if 334 
you buy this solar system.  You actually get paid by the electricity so 335 
that's one thing.  The other thing I think what we, what people who 336 
are passionate about is the fact that we are actually not losing.  That 337 
the lifestyle, we have just seen it, is only, what is it, $300 less or 338 
something like that.  People are  - if you look to Europe you have to 339 
prove that. 340 
Kate: Yes but the money that you're talking about is a very very small, little 341 
cosmos as opposed to the global problem where it isn't the same.  342 
You don't get the same terms. 343 
Facilitator: Okay now everyone's - I assume Helen you're presenting? 344 
Helen: Unfortunately I think I'm going to have to feed my baby, he's over 345 
there.   346 
Facilitator: So who wants to be assigned the presenter role? 347 
Mike: I think Kevin.  I think the media or the communicating side of it which 348 
is what we really come down to.   349 
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Facilitator: Thank you.  So I’ll ask again, who wants to be the person to do the 1 
sumClaire at the end? 2 
Male: Brian can. 3 
Brian: No, surely it should be shared. 4 
Facilitator: You did such a good job. 5 
Male: Brian was sounding like a very dominant personality just then.  He 6 
was passing the buck to you.  That almost looked like a volunteer. 7 
Facilitator: Do you want to do it? 8 
Brian: I suppose I can do it if you want me to do it.  Do you want me to do it? 9 
Facilitator: Okay.  Thank you very much.  Everyone knows what we’re going to 10 
do in this session is try and look at references for sort of emissions 11 
reduction scheme.  So you’ve all done your reading on what 12 
everything, what these different script schemes are, emissions trading 13 
scheme.  You should know anyway.  Emissions trading scheme, 14 
carbon tax, voluntary carbon offsetting or no carbon pricing or any 15 
sort of scheme is needed.  You all understand what the different 16 
schemes are or at least have an inkling of it? 17 
Male: Yep, more or less. 18 
Facilitator: Some of them are very complicated, I know.  But just some sort of 19 
general things that you can sort out.  I’ve got a few guiding questions, 20 
they’re called here, just to start the conversation going.  So do you 21 
accept the idea of carbon pricing?  Should we put a price on carbon? 22 
Male: I believe so, yes. 23 
Male: I was going to suggest we could go straight to be deleted. 24 
Claire: I don’t think Ds an option at all. 25 
Male: Well, you can have a regulatory approach that just says we won’t 26 
have coal power, we will not build anymore coal powered stations, 27 
they’ll all be just here and just pass a law to that effect. 28 
John: Is that what it’s going on about?  Is that really what it’s asking 29 
though? 30 
Brian: It’s the only other option. 31 
Male: I think D means by regulation.  [It could mean certain] things, you 32 
cannot have incandescent light bulbs.  So do a direct approach, 33 
would could actually be successful.  It could make a difference to the 34 
carbon emissions and the cost could be borne in different ways. 35 
Male: It doesn’t give people much choice in how they live their lives though. 36 
Male: No.  You’re trusting the Government to hose down the right 37 
industries. 38 
Male: Yes.  Whereas the other schemes, well the first two, there’s an 39 
incentive.  You can change your behaviours according to that 40 
[unclear] phase which are imposed on us. 41 
Male: Yes. 42 
Facilitator: Okay.  How do we feel about, do we know a lot about a carbon 43 
pollution reduction scheme? 44 
Male: That’s just the carbon tax one? 45 
Facilitator: Yes.  Sorry, no B.  Emissions trading scheme.  Does anyone have 46 
any strong feelings for that sort of thing. 47 
Claire: It seems to be one of loop holes.  A lot of loop holes.  That’s my 48 
impression. 49 
Male: Yes.  They were giving out to all sorts of people [unclear] in response 50 
to pressure groups, and it wasn’t clear to me paying half attention, 51 
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that we were actually going to reduce enough to have that having 52 
enough impact.  There just seemed to be all sorts of special 53 
pleadings.  I was trusting [unclear] became so complicated. 54 
Male: Too complicated.  Too complicated. 55 
John: I’m really happy with the emissions trading scheme, to throw that in 56 
there.  I’d say that it definitely has to be a, I mean I think we need a 57 
complex solution to what is essentially a very, very complex problem.  58 
I mean, it is between A and D for me.  But I tend to lean towards the 59 
emissions trading schemes as an almost guaranteed way of reducing 60 
a very specific amount of pollution.  So we will cap it out at five per 61 
cent reduction and what people are allowed to produce is you know, 62 
what’s below that.  It’s a guaranteed reduction 63 
Facilitator: So you know how much Australia is? 64 
John: Yeah.  On paper anyway.  That appeals more to me because the 65 
carbon tax, if it’s set at the wrong level, people either just pay it 66 
instead of reducing their emissions.  So there’s no guarantee 67 
emissions reductions with the carbon tax unless it’s sent through. 68 
James: There’d be an incentive to reduce your emissions because you’re 69 
paying this tax of course because you’re only paying tax on carbon 70 
you produce so that’s an incentive. 71 
John: But I mean, it does cost money to reduce emissions, in which case, 72 
because you have to make changes if you’re going to reduce your 73 
emissions.  In some cases, that’s very cheap so it is cost effective to 74 
do that.  But if the tax is set at the wrong level - so say it costs you 75 
$100 to reduce your emissions and the tax is $50, I don’t actually 76 
think they’re the figures, but do you know what I’m getting at? 77 
Ross: What I like about the carbon tax though, is that I agree with you, that 78 
you might set it at the wrong level but you can change it at fairly short 79 
notice. 80 
Brian: It’s fairly flexible. 81 
Ross: It’s very flexible.  Whereas the emissions trading scheme, once 82 
you’ve got permanence out of it, I’m not sure how you’d go through 83 
the process of adjusting their price in order to achieve what you’re 84 
setting out to do. 85 
Ian: I’d be weary of the ETS of market manipulation.  We see how 86 
proficient traders are at developing new systems like what brought 87 
down, went on the global financial crisis, with the manipulations of the 88 
market.  I’d be concern that that, you know, a commodities market 89 
and the future of the market and all of it combined, it’d become more 90 
of a market for making money than reducing pollution.  That’d be my 91 
worry. 92 
James: I just worry that the same forest in Indonesia that isn’t cut down will 93 
be sold to twenty companies around the world and no one will reduce 94 
pollution. …So I think that in the long run an emissions trading 95 
scheme that’s properly designed and has got all the checks and 96 
balances would be right.  But trying to design and get it all working in 97 
one go, just recently, so maybe a carbon tax today would be a useful 98 
stick towards emissions trading... 99 
Brian: Well I support an emissions trading scheme because I think the 100 
market, and I’m economically dry, the market is the best method of 101 
controlling things.  Now, we don’t have to start from scratch to have 102 
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one because the European Union has been running one since 2005 103 
and they got it wrong for three years but then they noticed their 104 
mistake and fixed it.  So we can go there in 2011 and learn from six 105 
years of experience.  So we can have a trading scheme and I’m 106 
against a carbon tax simply because the bureaucrat. 107 
But I take your point that it’s difficult to understand but one thing that 108 
conflicts me is that you have a market trading scheme which is 109 
economically dry which is supported by Government which is Labor 110 
and you have a carbon tax which is bureaucratic supported by 111 
supposedly free enterprise party.  I’m puzzled by that.  Maybe I’m 112 
wrong for that reason.  Maybe there’s something that I don’t 113 
understand. 114 
Ian: Can I just respond to that?  I really do feel though, that if we have an 115 
ETS that’s too complicated, people will rort it for exactly the reason 116 
that James said.  If somebody would say, I didn’t cut down you know, 117 
the weeds on my farm in Western New South Wales and so I got a 118 
huge carbon credit for it. 119 
John: You reckon people don’t try to evade tax? 120 
Ian: But no, if we had a much more focused emissions trading scheme 121 
that just says, let’s just trade in pollution from power stations or 122 
something.  Then at least you’d have a feel that there was a chance 123 
or... 124 
John: I’m all for simplicity but I reckon that’s where the market is.  Because 125 
they’re sorting it out among themselves.  It’s just a matter of getting 126 
the initial permit, that system right.  If you do that then business looks 127 
after it from there on. 128 
James: Can I put a case for the carbon tax?  I’m supporting Ross on the 129 
carbon tax.  I think it’s a simple system and if we had a carbon tax 130 
and if we made it a dedicated carbon tax, dedicated meaning all the 131 
taxes collected from that goes to a particular cause or purpose and 132 
that cause or purpose, it wouldn’t go into just general consolidated 133 
revenue.  That purpose then is for developing alternative energy 134 
sources, energy efficiency programs and those sorts of things.  Easy 135 
enough to do. 136 
You could have an institution something like the Reserve Bank that 137 
looks after the country’s monetary problems.  We have an institution 138 
something like that that looks after the carbon tax.  They review, they 139 
allocate the money out to various research programs and all that sort 140 
of stuff. They manage the whole system.  I think you know, what 141 
we’re doing then, we’re not putting the money just in the general 142 
revenue, but we’re actually putting it into something that’s going to 143 
give us at some stage down the track, hopefully, either a very low 144 
carbon economy or maybe zero carbon economy. 145 
Ross: Well, a similar allocation of funds is done... 146 
Facilitator: The discussion is between the ETS and the carbon tax, and we’ve 147 
kicked out D but there is this voluntary one. 148 
Brian: I haven’t kicked out D actually. 149 
Facilitator: You haven’t kicked out D?  Okay. 150 
Brian: No.  I’m still thinking about it. 151 
Facilitator: Well, I have a question here.  Do any of you have experience in 152 
buying carbon offsets for your personal consumption? 153 
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Brian: Every time you fly you have the offer. 154 
Ross: Yes. 155 
Facilitator: Does anyone do that? 156 
Ross: Yep.  I’ve bought carbon offsets. 157 
John: I’ve sort of generally always on principle refused to buy them.  I don’t 158 
know, I don’t know the system they’re going to.  They always do 159 
research into what it’s going to but I really don’t know where that 160 
money is going to. 161 
Brian: It’s a lack of trust. 162 
John: Yeah, I just don’t trust the system. 163 
Claire: It seems like a cop out.  You’re not taking responsibility yourself. 164 
James: We’re not developing anything for the nation as a whole in that 165 
scheme.  That’s why I like the carbon tax redeveloping something.  166 
We’re moving ourselves forward, moving the nation forward.  We can 167 
develop a lot of infrastructure and that sort of stuff. 168 
Mark: But you can raise money from an ETS in the same way that you can 169 
from a carbon tax. 170 
James: But we’ve got no guarantee. If we have a dedicated carbon tax we 171 
know where it’s going to go.  That’s what I like. 172 
Mark: I’m just saying you can have an ETS where you auction the permits 173 
and that money that’s raised from the auction that’s dedicated in the 174 
same... 175 
Male: If they did that, that’d change it... 176 
Male: What I’m saying is that dedication... 177 
Male: There’d be no, the Government... 178 
Mark: It was mentioned earlier, plus the cap and trade gives you control 179 
over emissions. 180 
Facilitator: The level of emissions.  You know... 181 
Mark: Which is why I thought, if it’s too hard to get up this week let’s at least 182 
do a carbon tax. 183 
John: At least that gets people into measuring of their emissions. 184 
Mark: Which means everybody’s measuring their emissions and they’re all 185 
focused. 186 
Facilitator: That was the point that Andrew brought out with the carbon tax, you 187 
don’t know how much is going to, you don’t exactly have no clear... 188 
Male: There’s no cap.  But there is an incentive there for people to reduce 189 
because then you pay less tax. 190 
Male: People start measuring.  Because at the moment businesses in 191 
Australia actually don’t know what carbon... 192 
Cynthia: So it's an incentive to learn how to measure. 193 
Male: Yeah. 194 
Brian: That would perhaps, the Government would have a set what they 195 
regard as a greenhouse gas emission. 196 
Cynthia: That’s what I mean, it would actually push for accurate measuring. 197 
Brian: Would it? 198 
Male: Well, you’d make it with your regulations so that they could tax you. 199 
Cynthia: Well, people wouldn’t be happy to be taxed on something they didn’t 200 
know or had some sort of definition? 201 
Brian: No, but I can see, to me all these market-based things, to me, they 202 
leave open the option of rorting and that’s what’s happened in our 203 
society. 204 
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Male: But say there’s a tax system, and I mean Kerry Packer praying to the 205 
Australian Senate, overpaid tax in his life, wealthiest man in Australia 206 
almost, wasn’t he? 207 
Brian: I know, that’s just supporting what I’m saying. 208 
Male: What’s the alternative, I suppose is the question.  There’ll be a portion 209 
of orders, you put enough people in the measuring control so it’s a 210 
small proportion. 211 
Brian: I go to China a bit and I know there if the Government says we’re 212 
going to do this, it gets done.  Can you imagine if China said next 213 
year, we’re going to have no greenhouse gas emissions in 10 years 214 
time you know darn well there’ll be no greenhouse gases in China in 215 
10 years time.  That’d be it.  If they say this is what’s going to happen, 216 
it happens.  That’s dirty.  That’s an authoritarian system that we don’t 217 
have and don’t want. 218 
No, no.  But we have a system where we can say the Government 219 
does pick winners.  People make mistakes for sure.  But it says okay, 220 
no more hole to be used for electricity by the year 2015.  That’s it.  221 
You guys figure out how we’re going to do it.  But we’re going to 222 
make the use of coal illegal for electric power stations in 2015 or 223 
2020, whatever it is.  Figure out how you’re going to do it, but at that 224 
date there, you ain’t going to use coal anymore and if you do, we’ll 225 
shove you in jail.  Now, that would stop it real quick, wouldn’t it? 226 
The whole thing revolves around a market mechanism and it revolves 227 
around what’s given us the global financial crisis.  That is, we’ve let 228 
these economists have their say, let’s have a dry system, let’s have a 229 
system where the market works sufficient and all that kind of stuff.  230 
I’m not so sure it is efficient.  Well it may be efficient for some people 231 
but not for everybody, or it may be efficient for achieving certain ends 232 
but this may be one of those ends that ain’t any good at it.  I don’t 233 
know.  I’m not saying that. 234 
Ian: Hypothetical question.  If say the coal mining industry ran a $50 235 
million ad campaign against the Government proposing to abolish it... 236 
Brian: That’s a political... 237 
Ian: Just hypothetically.  They might change their mind. 238 
Male: You don’t think they’d do that, do you Ian? 239 
Ian: They are all committed... 240 
Male: Extrata, the biggest coal miner wouldn’t do such a thing. 241 
Male: If you don’t like market systems, I mean you might like the system 242 
they had in the Soviet Union which would be the exact opposite and it 243 
wasn’t a hell of a system, either. 244 
Brian: No, but that’s just a black and white issue saying, either have one or 245 
the other. 246 
Male: Yes, I know. 247 
Brian: I mean, we do have a centrally controlled system here right now that 248 
says you’re not allowed to drive 120 miles per hour through a 249 
suburban street.  It’s just a rule. 250 
Male: Yeah, I mean I’m not advocating [unclear] or anything, do whatever 251 
you like. 252 
Male: But Brian, just a few examples where there has been a regulation.  253 
We do have a [unclear] incandescent light bulb that’s coming through 254 
the systems, we do have rules on energy efficient housing building 255 
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standards, so I think there is a fair bit that is being done on regulation.  256 
But as we’re saying, you have to build houses to... 257 
Brian: I just don’t think we should write that one off. 258 
Male: I agree with you on that. 259 
Brian: When you think about it, it maybe different if the scientists say, look 260 
the really big issue is coal, right.  For the next 10 years the really, 261 
really big issue, we have to stop burning coal.  That’s what 262 
Bill McKibbin says.  We just have to stop it, and we have to stop 263 
burning coal today.  If you want to get to 350 plus, coals it.  You have 264 
to stop it.  Everywhere around the world coal has to be stopped.  You 265 
can do that.  It’s really easy to do that, the Government just says, 266 
we’re not going to do anymore coal. 267 
Male: How are we going to do it? 268 
Brian: Well, put people in jail who are going to use it. 269 
Male: What are going to use as an alternative energy source? 270 
Brian: That is an issue the Government has to sort out. 271 
Male: But there’s no alternative. 272 
Brian: It can.  Yes, there is, there’s plenty of alternatives.  There are heaps 273 
of alternatives to, right now in Australia you can get rid of, if we 274 
wanted to, we could get rid of coal powered generators straight away.  275 
Not straight away, but we could make the rule that says... 276 
Male: We could phase it out. 277 
Brian: We could phase it out.  We could phase out top powered generation 278 
within 10 years if the Government decided this is what we should do 279 
and we would have to also decide to put a whole lot of money into it 280 
or encourage these companies to put a whole lot of money into other 281 
alternative systems.  It can be done.  It’s not like you can’t do it. 282 
Male: Of course, then you replace gas. 283 
Brian: You can replace it with solid. 284 
Male: The challenge is to find... 285 
Male: I don’t think you could replace it with solar... 286 
Brian: You have a look at some of the research, within a short time it will be 287 
able to be done.  Because within 10 years if you put enough money 288 
into it they can use all these new technologies, you know, picking up 289 
solar... 290 
Ian: I agree that that is the way of the future, but it’s a fair way into the 291 
future.  I don’t think it can be achieved in 10 years, solar energy.  292 
Because we don’t have, the source is there, the technology of 293 
converting it here isn’t here.  We haven’t got it.  In a market system I’d 294 
encourage people to develop that sort of way of capturing the energy 295 
from the sun.  But it wouldn’t be, I doubt that it will be within 10 years.  296 
But if someone could convince me or put up a good case that that 297 
was so, I would embrace it.  Because the obvious solution, it’s just a 298 
matter of converting. 299 
Ross: Spain’s getting closer. 300 
Male: If everyone worked on it, it would get closer. 301 
Brian: If you have a big incentive to get them to work on it, is you will be in 302 
jail if you don’t do something about it in 10 years. 303 
Male: What about shot?  What about shot?  Shot at five years. 304 
Brian: But if it became your legal in 10 years time and they really knew it, 305 
like there was absolute certainty about it, I think... 306 
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Male: Or we’d be going around in animal furs trying to read by candles. 307 
Brian: That’s right.  They don’t want to do that. 308 
Male: Well, I don’t want to do that either, so if that fails then I’m the one that 309 
will be doing it. 310 
James: I think the other question is, is it a political reality?  Would we have a 311 
Government that would do that? 312 
Brian: Of course not. 313 
Male: No. 314 
Male: No. 315 
Brian: We don’t have a political rally fit to do any of these, they won’t do any 316 
of it.  What are they doing? 317 
Male: That’s a good question. 318 
Male: I suppose there’s a couple of things.  One is in a democracy there’s a 319 
political ability to achieve that, which I personally think is not gospel.  320 
In terms of the technical ability, as many people have pointed to, the 321 
world economy was retooled in World War II and in five years people 322 
said we used to make this and we now make that and I kind of agree 323 
with you that I think if there was a will, it would be possible.  But I 324 
don’t think there’s any political... 325 
Brian: I agree.  I’m just saying that there has to be a will.  I don’t think it will 326 
happen though.  Because I think the whole cigarette smoking thing, 327 
the problem with it is, it is the [unclear].  We’re not going to get a huge 328 
bloody cyclone that’s going to destroy America in one day.  Because 329 
if that happened the whole world would think, Jesus what are we 330 
going to do.  If something really, really climate wise happened, really 331 
bad, the world would snap out of it, but it ain’t going to happen.  It’s 332 
not going to happen... 333 
Claire: If we wait for that it’s too late you see.  So my question is can it be 334 
one or the other or can it be a mixture? 335 
Facilitator: Well, this I what I’m hearing.  This idea of having a gradual or 336 
[unclear]... 337 
Brian: We actually are doing it.  Like I said, the Government actually has 338 
introduce some pissy little laws to change these things but it could do 339 
more. 340 
Male: The big ones are energy efficient housing.  You build a house, it’s 341 
there for 50 years and if you build it and it needs electric air 342 
conditioning you’re stuffed for 50 years.  If you build it right now, you 343 
are saving at your new house... 344 
Brian: Why can you mandate double glazing for example?  Is double glazing 345 
mandated?  No, it’s not. 346 
Male: But we are getting there. 347 
Male: Whatever we do of a carbon tax or emissions trading system it would 348 
have to be done in conjunction with regulations of some sort.  You 349 
can’t wipe out regulations. 350 
Facilitator: Does anyone have a particular preference for one of those that they 351 
would say is the way to go? 352 
Male: I’m going emissions trading. 353 
Male: I’m going carbon tax. 354 
Facilitator: Can we say carbon tax? 355 
Male: Carbon tax. 356 
Facilitator: Number three? 357 
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Brian: Well, I’m committed to one but I take the other if it was there.  As long 358 
as we get something. 359 
Facilitator: Emissions trading scheme? 360 
Brian: Yeah, everything. 361 
Facilitator: Emissions trading scheme, three.  Voluntary market? 362 
Claire: I think that’s part of it.  It’s just one or the other at the moment is it? 363 
Facilitator: Yeah, just one or the other.  Voluntary market? 364 
Male: No. 365 
Facilitator: No.  Okay.  D? 366 
Male: I really object to the one or... 367 
Male: We need a fifth option here.  Let’s see if we’re going to get a fifth 368 
option. 369 
Facilitator: Okay.  What about a combination? 370 
Male: Yeah. 371 
Male: Combination. 372 
Brian: Some combination because I think it would be too hard to do a 373 
carbon tax [ETS] at the same time. 374 
John: It may be possible.  Like, politically a carbon tax was easier to get 375 
through at the moment.  You’d possibly all be happy with a 376 
reasonable carbon tax, yes? 377 
All: Yes. 378 
John: Ok.  If that then lead to, because people are now measuring, they’ve 379 
got all that information and they’ve decided it is a little more efficient 380 
to have that emissions trading scheme, would you be ok with that? 381 
All: Yes. 382 
John: In conjunction with all that regulation, based like, things like housing 383 
and that sort of things, but increase those regulations. 384 
Male: Much tougher regulations. 385 
John: All happy with that sort of thing? 386 
All: Yes. 387 
Brian: So now you’ve got a speech, right? 388 
Male: I would say regulations particularly aimed at energy efficiency 389 
measures. 390 
John: Sure. 391 
Male: There’s huge savings. 392 
Brian: The Government has the option right now of doing something about 393 
brown coal in Victoria.  The Victorian Government could get rid of 394 
brown coal within five years if they made it [the rules] saying they’re 395 
getting rid of it, like they’re forcing us to go gas. 396 
Male: They should do so. 397 
Brian: They should do so. They should just say no more brown coal, you 398 
have to go gas and that’s the end of it. Because all you’re doing is 399 
replacing the boiler, you’re not really touching the generator, you’re 400 
just replacing the boiler, you’re getting rid of the coal & you’re shoving 401 
in a gas boiler instead of a generator. It’s not all that expensive to be 402 
done. They won’t do it, they’ve got no balls, they’re so gutless, they 403 
won’t be tough, because they’re not convinced it’s going to happen. 404 
Claire: You’ve got the lobby groups. 405 
Brian: Yeah, they’ve got a lot of lobby groups. 406 
Facilitator: Thank you everyone.  I believe now we’re going to go back to the 407 
bigger group. 408 
Transcript - Australian Climate Policy Forum (31 July 2010)            Session 2 - Group 2 
319 
 
Facilitator: Okay then, so the first question is, this is carbon pricing, which 1 
approach for emissions reduction is preferred?  So from the 2 
discussions that you had and your own opinions prior to coming here, 3 
did you want to start off with the first one or just - what about the 4 
carbon tax?  What was your impression? 5 
Alan: [unclear] carbon tax, only because we might achieve a bit more with 6 
the other one.  The flexibility I think [unclear], particularly this 7 
international trading.  I don’t understand how that’s ever going to be 8 
real. 9 
Elaine: See, I like the emissions trading scheme because it’s got a definite 10 
cap.  But based on the discussion today, one of the things that strikes 11 
me about that is that you could actually start it on a sector basis and 12 
then expand it out.  So you could start it with something like, just 13 
starting with the power supplies and whatever, where you’ve got more 14 
of an idea as to what the inputs and outputs and whatever are and it 15 
could have a more regular market and you’ve got you know, a bit 16 
more control. 17 
You don’t have some of the issues with who gets it because the 18 
polluters and the people who need them are the same people.  So it’s 19 
not so much of a, and you can do it based on how much they’re 20 
producing, not that you’re given the permits for.  Not based on how 21 
much energy they’re producing, not based how much pollution they’re 22 
doing.  So I still like... 23 
Alan: So that’s like a tax? 24 
Elaine: The ETS but I think probably on the sector basis then you can 25 
actually have a bit more control over... 26 
Alan: So more certainty and control? 27 
Elaine: Yep.  Some of those limitations would disappear. 28 
Dan: One thing on the ETS is that all the noise that they’re giving the 29 
permits, you know exactly how many permits there are [unclear].  If it 30 
goes beyond that then no, it is not working.  So they are doing 31 
[unclear] so that’s another advantage of that. 32 
Alan: The trouble is, there’s no mechanism to ensure it’s capped correctly 33 
in the first place. 34 
Elaine: But you can at least do your cap based on what current emissions 35 
are, which is what I’m saying.  You can say, well okay our current 36 
emissions from energy producers are this.  Worse case, that’s a cap 37 
that will stop you going higher in the future. 38 
Alan: Well, actually you’ve got to lower it because remember we’re still 39 
working against the [unclear] of some years ago. 40 
Dan: No, it has to go lower every year.  Has to go lower. 41 
Alan: Yeah, it has to go lower every year, so you can’t work on the currency 42 
coming down. 43 
Elaine: But the thing is that even setting a cap at the currency is better than 44 
doing nothing. 45 
Alan: But what it means when they certainly set the cap, you can set that 46 
global cap but what’s the cap for the different producers saying, no 47 
you just swap them all around. 48 
Stephanie: But they have to sell permissions with the trading scheme if they want 49 
to change it, so you look and say well okay, we have this much power 50 
being produced and it’s creating this many emissions but... 51 
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Alan: But the point I was making before is when you provide these licences 52 
or whatever else you want to call them, the rights to do this, the 53 
politicians have got firm control on how that’s done which gives them 54 
an awful lot of power in terms of kick backs, feedbacks. 55 
Elaine: I think it’s the same, well the carbon tax is probably less to do with 56 
that but I think with both the carbon tax and the emissions trading 57 
scheme, the devil’s in the detail.  You know, with either of them, it 58 
comes down to the particular scheme and the particular policy rather 59 
than the generics for me. 60 
George: Do you think we’ll have problems with the content then? 61 
Elaine: Well, I don’t like the carbon tax because it doesn’t, because what is 62 
it... 63 
George: It doesn’t give a guarantee of reductions. 64 
Elaine: It doesn’t give a guarantee of the emissions reduction and working 65 
out what that tax should be, and because while it gives economic 66 
certainty in the year, what will happen is you go, well okay that was a 67 
great tax, we set it at 10 per cent but that actually gave us great 68 
revenue but it didn’t give us the result we wanted in emissions so next 69 
year it’s going to be 20 per cent.  So despite the fact that... 70 
Alan: No, no.  Getting the market principle investment, [unclear] is that if 71 
you produce electricity and you put a 50 per cent carbon tax on top, 72 
you’re going to have to charge your customers extra to cover that 50 73 
per cent thing.  That’s what I mean, it’s still a market mechanism, 74 
however you handle it. 75 
Dan: But the consumer is paying the bill. 76 
Alan: The consumer always pays the bill. 77 
Elaine: There’s no certainty in it that you’ll get any reductions.  I think it 78 
unfairly targets lower income earners because the higher income 79 
earners, if you look at the price of petrol, as the price of petrol goes 80 
up, because petrol still gets sold.  The only people that reduce their 81 
dependencies on cars are those that can’t afford to fill up.  So I think 82 
people will, higher income earners will just accept the extra cost.  It’s 83 
the same with the emissions... 84 
George: A really advantage in jump in tax is that it gives certainty to the 85 
enterprise to develop like long term investments because with ETS, 86 
they don’t know.  Many [unclear] next year because the price for the 87 
allowance is really low.  So the enterprise have no certainty. 88 
Elaine: I think it’s sent in with the carbon tax because I think... 89 
George: The tax, they know the tax will be same next year or... 90 
Elaine: No, because I think if you put it on say 10% and that’s not high 91 
enough and you realise you’re not meeting your trading targets, it will 92 
go up.  Until you actually work out that steady state level where your 93 
carbon tax is enough there is no economic certainty so I don’t think it 94 
has a benefit. 95 
George: Okay.  So the Government has to tell the taxes for the next years.  So 96 
they say okay, this year... 97 
Elaine: Yeah, and you’re going to do it for three years and then you’ll have a 98 
change of government that’s going to say that this is ineffective so it 99 
doesn’t have any certainty anyway. 100 
George: Still, [three years] is better than no certainty at all about that carbon 101 
price. 102 
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Elaine: But if you’ve got certainty over what your initial permits are then you 103 
do have a degree of certainty with the emissions trading scheme. 104 
Wilson: But you’ve got that uncertainty with ETS.  Because over a period of 105 
years you’ve created an ETS market, you’ve got no control over the 106 
price that those credits are going to trade for.  Suddenly you may find 107 
that for some reason they’re dirt cheap so straight away pollution... 108 
George: I don’t think so. 109 
Wilson: Can I just finish?  They may go the other way and become so 110 
expensive they’re then passed on and you can’t afford them but I 111 
think the main concern I have with ETS is, there’s not a direct link to 112 
actually reducing something.  So for example, there are a number of 113 
contracts in Canberra, therefore in other places where there are 114 
compliance measures built into contracts.  If you don’t comply you’re 115 
fined.  Either you pay money or you don’t get what you want.  There 116 
are many examples now where it’s cheaper not to meet the obligation 117 
and to just pay the costs.  I think that George’s point is a really 118 
important one.  That you know, this is going to make people find other 119 
ways to meet their obligation, not the primary aim which is to reduce 120 
emissions.  Have I unfairly... 121 
Male: That’s on an ETS? 122 
Wilson: Yes. 123 
Phillip: The other thing I’m may go to too, is the emissions trading scheme.  I 124 
mean, we’re going to have a government minister for something that’s 125 
much more complex than carbon.  I mean, they can’t even do pink 126 
batts and you’re wanting them to look after an emissions trading 127 
scheme?  I mean, they couldn’t even look after a carbon tax, let’s be 128 
exact. 129 
Elaine: I don’t think we could do a global ETS system at the moment.  But I’m 130 
saying a sector based one might work. 131 
Wilson: So perhaps then this is the, nobody said you had to have only one.  132 
You know, you could say well, we’d prefer carbon tax but there is a 133 
role there, in your model.  Because I think you have a point.  Highly 134 
targeted like the [unclear]. 135 
Elaine: Yeah, so you can target CO2 from power stations and you can look at 136 
different targets for different industries at different times. 137 
Dan: Yeah, you can have a different base and different types of carbon tax. 138 
Stephanie: Then you get away from some of the complexities of how do you 139 
measure CO2 across the whole, or gases across, which is a problem 140 
with both of them.  I think the carbon tax is harder to do and 141 
incrementally out across different sectors but that’s just my thoughts. 142 
Phillip: I would have thought [unclear] was sort of the same difficult no matter 143 
what scheme. 144 
Alan: Yeah, but if you can’t, emissions trading scheme... 145 
Elaine: Emissions trading scheme is easier to do across a sector than a 146 
carbon tax is to do.  We’re going to have a carbon tax but it’s only 147 
going to apply to this sector and it’s a lot harder to do than to say 148 
we’re going to have an emissions trading scheme for this sector and 149 
so that’s why the emissions trading scheme... 150 
Phillip: The trouble with the sector one is though, it’s like the old customs 151 
laws, that you just move yourself into a different sector or recreate 152 
yourself to be in a different sector.  That’s... 153 
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Dan: It’s like a generic permit for different sectors.  So they can put in 154 
place, they can sell the sectors to the [unclear] same kind of sectors.  155 
[unclear]. 156 
Phillip: We’re talking about power production as a sector.  It’s not, it’s hydro 157 
electricity production sector.  It’s the coal, it’s the uranium, nuclear, 158 
they’re all different.  They’re all producing electricity but they’re not 159 
the same sector. 160 
Alan: In terms of emissions. 161 
Dan: Yeah, it has to be different permits. 162 
Elaine: No, see, I’d say that the aim of them all is to produce any - and I’d 163 
have an agricultural sector, an energy sector and a whatever, and 164 
you might not do the agriculture sector for a while because it’s hard to 165 
do but the danger I think with doing sectors is not what’s being 166 
erased.  The danger is that the easy ones to do aren’t necessarily the 167 
ones that are producing the most emissions.  So for example energy 168 
is easy to do but what were the figures today?  Was it 10 per cent or 169 
something? 170 
Alan: Oh no, coal is bigger. 171 
Phillip: Coal production produces electricity... 172 
Elaine: Was it transport that was 10 per cent or whatever?  But... 173 
Alan: Agriculture was about 10 per cent or something. 174 
Elaine: Yeah, so that’s the only issue I’ve got with the sectors, is you actually 175 
have to be smart about which sectors to choose so that they’re 176 
actually ones where you’ve got, that are making a big contribution.  177 
You don’t choose... 178 
Alan: But your coal power stations, or coal and gas, they’re the real big 179 
polluters. 180 
Phillip: The Victorian ones. 181 
Alan: Yeah.  You’d include gas because that generates a fair amount of 182 
carbon dioxide as well.  Then you could apply, you can trade the 183 
emissions trading scheme to that sector, as you were saying. 184 
Elaine: Yeah.  Then if you include all the ones that are in the, that have some 185 
wind or whatever else, I guess it’s a problem if you’ve got a company 186 
that’s involved in multiple things like ACTU where they’ve got the 187 
internet and whatever else and how do you do it, but this bit of it is the 188 
supply... 189 
Wilson: If we test your model, let’s say as a consumer buying electricity 190 
through a retail outlet, by a retailer, the act says you can have 191 
something from around brown coal plant or a nuclear plant so which 192 
of these schemes will work best to actually reduce emissions.  193 
Because you know, you may have a nuclear plant but the costs are 194 
so high, the price is pretty much the same as the brown coal 195 
generator with their credits and because there’s then no competition 196 
in the market, there’s no incentive. 197 
Stephanie: Brown coal tax versus nuclear, brown coal tax may be lower than 198 
nuclear. 199 
Wilson: But the brown coal people, they’re quite happy.  The Government’s 200 
happy because they never exceed their quota so the net 201 
environmental impact improvement is zero.  Whereas, if you’ve got a 202 
tax then there’s... 203 
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Elaine: No see, if it’s an emissions trading scheme, you’ll only have 204 
permission to make so much pollution and the coal [unclear] is open 205 
cut. 206 
Wilson: If you live within that... 207 
Alan: The cap’s too high. 208 
Elaine: The cap’s too high. 209 
Wilson: Yeah, I know. 210 
Alan: [unclear] 211 
Wilson: Or increase the tax.  Someone’s got to make that judgement call. 212 
Alan: But as you said you know, it’s hard to set the tax whereas you can set 213 
the cap... 214 
Elaine: Emissions trading scheme, particularly for a particular sector is really 215 
easy to do. 216 
Alan: I was just trying to find a model where we could kind of test the 217 
theories. 218 
Howard: What about the issue of beyond compliance?  Because with an ETS 219 
you’re not going to really get that once you’ve reached your cap, your 220 
permits, your sweetener, I’ve done what I have to do now, I shouldn’t 221 
go beyond that.  Whereas with a tax and a price, you’re constantly 222 
going to incur that price, you’re constantly looking for ways to improve 223 
and if you see that high tax at the start and you know, it’s easy to 224 
administer for one... 225 
Wilson: No, but with ETS a broker comes to you and says, I want some of 226 
your credit and I’ll pay you for it.  If I buy that new gizmo then I can, 227 
yeah. 228 
Howard: Yeah, that’s true as well. 229 
Elaine: You also like may over invest because you’re know that you’re not 230 
going to invest in the following year or whatever.  So you’ve only got 231 
to invest in the new plan or new whatever every several years. 232 
Wilson: I mean, I have to say philosophically I’m uncomfortable with trading 233 
incentives which is in a sense what tradings are, whereas a tax is 234 
crystal clear, it’s directly related to some activity.  You know, you may 235 
get it wrong and you may price it wrong and all those things, but at 236 
least in my mind I can see the link not somebody who’s whole 237 
business is just flogging [unclear]. 238 
George: Yes. 239 
Wilson: I realise money isn’t intangible.  Look at the difficulty we’re in in 240 
financial markets now with debt.  You know, you’ve got situations 241 
even now where there are carbon credits are being bought by people 242 
and they’re just getting bank rolled somewhere, I mean nobody’s 243 
doing anything with them.  They’re not stopping people travelling.  244 
When you tick that, nobody has said, I’m not going to fly with Qantas, 245 
and ticks the box.  It’s had no behavioural change and no 246 
improvement on CO2. 247 
Elaine: I think carbon tax is the same. 248 
Alan: Yes. 249 
Facilitator: How do you think the new Government roll out, the new tax on 250 
people?  Do you think they’ll be reluctant to do that if they weren’t 251 
highly taxed?  Which ones is palatable? 252 
Alan: There would be.  The funny thing is that yeah, they didn’t like to 253 
announce the fact that an ETS is basically going to be exactly the 254 
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same really, the cost on the consumer.  So really, if there was a good 255 
education campaign by the Government that said look, this is ETS 256 
and carbon tax are exactly the same, however you want to word it is 257 
fine, but basically an ETS is just a more complex way of tricking the 258 
public whereas carbon tax is easier to administer and we’re just being 259 
up front with you and everyone’s got to incur costs. 260 
Howard: Well if you’re taking power then, either way you’ll just see it on your 261 
bill.  Either way the Government’s using ministry to collect tax. 262 
George: Under distribution of the allowances, if you give it to the polluters for 263 
free in the beginning they make the money again. 264 
Howard: Yeah. 265 
Phillip: I would have thought [unclear] auction would be best. 266 
Howard: Yeah, I think so too.  That’d be the best. 267 
Alan: I think the auction would be totally unacceptable.  But my 268 
understanding’s that’s one of the problems of the European scheme, 269 
that they gave out the permits.  But didn’t they... 270 
George: But it changes. 271 
Alan: Yes, they realised they needed to auction those permits. 272 
George: It keeps changing to [unclear] and then it’s completely auctions. 273 
Howard: That’s almost giving, going right, let’s get up all future profits, bring it 274 
back to net presentation, here’s all your future profits in one hit, have 275 
it all.  That’s what it is, giving out permits in one hit. 276 
Phillip: It’s politically convenient now, with nobody objecting. 277 
Facilitator: What about the voluntary market?  You mentioned about flying 278 
Qantas and whatnot, sort of buying offsets.  Do you think that’s one of 279 
the mix, have we decided we should have a mix rather than one tax 280 
or? 281 
Howard: That’s going to naturally be there anyway.  We don’t need to state it.  282 
It’s going to be there. 283 
Dan: That’s part of the... 284 
Phillip: It’s got nothing to do with Government. 285 
Howard: It’s part of competitive advantage.  Some businesses want to be seen 286 
to be green now, others don’t.  So that’s naturally happened... 287 
Wilson: When you fly Qantas you tick a box and provide the name of your 288 
electricity company.  Qantas sends the money to them. 289 
Phillip: Well, you can actually sign up for the green electricity anyway. 290 
Alan: Facilitator, why haven’t you included on this list, what I think is the 291 
most effective way of reducing emissions, that is energy efficiency.  292 
You haven’t included measures to improve energy efficiency, which 293 
reduces the amount of energy and saves money at the same time? 294 
Facilitator: Is that the voluntary market? 295 
Alan: No.  Because it’s a Government requirement for... 296 
Elaine: The regulation is not on here. 297 
Phillip: You get a choice what to buy. 298 
Alan: The light globe for example, the home insulation schemes, the 299 
building regulations, the move from concrete which is a very high 300 
energy material, to steel and other materials which are low energy.  301 
These are the sort of things that have the potential to not only save a 302 
huge amount of energy and reduce emissions that way but to save 303 
people money. 304 
Facilitator: But won’t that happen naturally as a result? 305 
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Alan: No, because sometimes there’s vested interests which stop it from 306 
happening or certainly it happens over a very long time. 307 
Phillip: It’s also an education process though, that thing that was known... 308 
Alan: It is.  I mean, you know, how many of us for instance, if we buy a 309 
television would consider that a plasma screen churns out about 300 310 
watts and an LCD way, way less?  That’s not a reflection on anybody. 311 
Phillip: We did that on the last couple of whitegoods that we bought. 312 
Facilitator: You want footprints to be more obvious, do you? 313 
Alan: Those sorts of things.  Then you can save energies which are 314 
Government initiative schemes, like the home insulation scheme for 315 
all its flaws, I think it was very cost effective.  But you haven’t really 316 
improved that. 317 
Dan: Regular Government regulation. 318 
Elaine: Direct action as well. 319 
Howard: But that would be in there of a mix of it all.  Exactly, yeah. 320 
Stephanie: I think the star rating on appliances and things are good but the star 321 
ratings are only once you’ve got them, they don’t indicate what was 322 
used in fraction, they’re not based upon the life of the appliance.  I 323 
think that’s one of the issues that we’ve got with a lot of stuff, that our 324 
ways of representing what the carbon impact or what the 325 
environmental impact overall of different things that aren’t very good, 326 
they either look at, it’s like the fuel consumption of a car. 327 
Well, that doesn’t tell you what the environmental impact of the car is 328 
over its life.  So there’s production costs and the transport costs and 329 
everything else that go into how, what the value of something is and I 330 
think we need a good scheme for banking and be able to see what 331 
the impact of... 332 
Facilitator: In the past I think we’ve just been the recipricant of all this high class 333 
marketing to make us ongoing consumers and now what they’re 334 
claiming I guess, is that we don’t really want to be uninformed 335 
consumers, that there needs to be some more values put into 336 
consumers... 337 
Howard: The thing underlying all of this as well, is... 338 
Phillip: It’s a very useful thing and I was just talking to Andrew about that, 339 
that CSIRO for example, have got a building research organisation 340 
and can provide very useful information to manufacturers and the 341 
general public about energy efficiency and houses and that would 342 
help people make decisions.  That needs to be a Government backed 343 
scheme but we don’t see that sort of information flowing through. 344 
Howard: Let’s keep in mind as well, with all of this that one of the largest goals 345 
of businesses and firms are to have price differentials and so you 346 
can’t have easy comparisons.  They want to be able to say right, we 347 
don’t want complete life cycle analysis on old products.  So you just 348 
go right, is a Ford Fiesta better value than a Holden Commodore?  349 
They don’t want that because then you just go, right, well that’s 350 
obviously better.  The facts are there. 351 
Elaine: You won’t have to legislate the information schemes.  But they’ve got 352 
high transaction costs as well, so. 353 
Howard: Yeah, it becomes so complicated.  Then you’d have all the 354 
transaction costs of trying to work out all this extra labour going into 355 
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figuring out each different model, what’s it’s life cycle analysis.  When 356 
that effort can go into something else. 357 
Facilitator: Okay.  So we’ve sort of drifted off the main... 358 
Alan: Yeah, but we’re very comfortable. 359 
Wilson: There are two forces that seem to be at work, one is persuading 360 
creators of things, whether they’re white goods, cars, energy to 361 
reduce the CO2 in the manufacturing process.  Electricity is the 362 
simplest.  But what the consumer wants is that to be reduced but also 363 
their costs to reduced.  The thing is, these schemes can influence the 364 
manufacture, I think.  But I’m not sure about consumers.  My example 365 
is, I wanted a washing machine and I thought, well I can justify this on 366 
water consumption.  So I did the calculations and it would take 100 367 
years, even allowing for price escalation, some stupid amount, to pay 368 
the price of a new washing machine.  Because water’s so cheap.  So 369 
that’s the problem, actually power and water options. 370 
Alan: But you see here, that’s the point, isn’t it?  What if the Government 371 
legislated it to say in the area of water consumptions on washing 372 
machines, so it wasn’t up to you to try and do that sort of sum, it was 373 
just the Government said, you can’t build washing machines that use 374 
150 litres of water, you’ve got to build washing machines for each 375 
cycle only using less than 100. 376 
Wilson: Well, I think they’re starting to do that by putting energy consumption 377 
figures on which are generally... 378 
Phillip: They’re not mandatory, are they? 379 
Wilson: In this case, I have a clunker, so I was trying to do my own cash for 380 
clunker. 381 
Phillip: See, my point is that if the Government provides legislation or rules 382 
which manufacturers have to comply with the cost of that compliance 383 
can be quite low but the effect of it is quite higher.  But if you don’t 384 
have that and you leave it up to the consumer, it doesn’t happen. 385 
Wilson: But again, it’s like all of it, it’s coming up with a simple model.  I mean, 386 
in the supermarket, it would be nice to have some notion of food 387 
miles.  I could imagine that the rules for determining that would be 388 
[stink] subject to rorting.  I mean, we can’t even label what’s in the 389 
stuff, never mind the energy that went into it.  We don’t even modified 390 
labels. 391 
Elaine: But we’ve already got Australian... 392 
Phillip: Australia from imported goods. 393 
Elaine: Yeah, made in Australia.  I don’t think it’s influenced consumer habits 394 
that much.  So you’ve got, I think the point is that what you do to 395 
change business, what you do to change consumers habits, and 396 
they’re two different things potentially... 397 
Wilson: I think they’re a different mix. 398 
Dan: I think we already have a star rating on electronic items and electrical 399 
items.  That is all regulated already. 400 
Facilitator: No, a rating. 401 
Wilson: Those plasma TVs are still walking out the door, people are still 402 
saying plasma TVs are better than LCD even though they’re... 403 
Dan: No, no, no.  It is better, the new plasma has come, that is much better 404 
than LCD. 405 
Facilitator: In terms of energy efficiency? 406 
Transcript - Australian Climate Policy Forum (31 July 2010)            Session 2 - Group 2 
327 
 
Dan: The new plasma which is made by Panasonic, it is more energy 407 
efficient than LCDs. 408 
Facilitator: So what I’m hearing at the moment is you think that the general 409 
community, if it’s not too painful, are prepared to move and shift in 410 
some of their buying habits as a response but also there is a need for 411 
combination of policies at the top, either you know, sort of more 412 
tending to carbon tax, is that right, rather than the emissions trading? 413 
Wilson: Well, an example of direct action is changing of incandescent globes.  414 
Now, I suspect if you look very carefully at it it’s a joke.  Like, the 415 
clunkers, where the costs of manufacturing a new car spread over 416 
five years that I could keep, my clunker, I’m sure it just doesn’t work 417 
out.  It’s a joke.  So they’ve got to be careful how they do the direct 418 
tax. 419 
Elaine: Banning incandescent globes in new buildings might be a feasible 420 
thing to do. 421 
Wilson: Yeah, and halogens. 422 
Alan: We’ve got a bad habit putting those new globes in with low usage.  423 
We like... 424 
Wilson: Yeah, I bet. 425 
Alan: My wife bought a washing machine with the water saving and when 426 
she found out it was a 50 minute cycle she was not very happy with it. 427 
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Facilitator: So what we’re doing for this one is talking about carbon pricing.  1 
Obviously there were some options given there.  But which approach 2 
of emissions reduction do you prefer from your advice on carbon 3 
emission trading, carbon tax, voluntary carbon offsetting, no carbon 4 
price at all?  So you’ve got 25 minutes to have a general discussion 5 
and then afterwards, once again there’ll be a group presentation and 6 
I’ll only sort of like butt in if I’ve got some points here that I’ve sort of 7 
been requested to go through. 8 
Helen: When we’re rabbiting on too much, you’ll butt in. 9 
Facilitator: No, I’ll only jump in if I think it’s necessary and yeah.  Basically, if 10 
you’re rabbiting on. 11 
Mike: This will be the most contentious one I think, of the whole afternoon.  12 
Because this gets back to the nitty gritty.  This is the bit where we 13 
pay, there’s no avoiding the fact.  Every one of these schemes has a 14 
personal cost in it.  What you’ve got to accept yourself is which cost 15 
am I prepared to accept, which will be minimised or more applicable to 16 
my stance.  So I was terrified when I heard about the emissions 17 
trading scheme. 18 
I thought to myself, this is dangerous trading, this is worse than the 19 
Chicago Stock Exchange.  You could be buying and selling things 20 
you don’t own, things you have no right to, and selling it for an 21 
elevated price to someone else.  It’s like selling air, wasn’t it.  Now, I 22 
think they made a dreadful mistake with the water scheme.  Selling 23 
up the Murrumbidgee irrigation permits and things like this.  All that 24 
happened is that it did create a market of traders to trade money you 25 
don’t own and you sell it to her.  Now, you sold her nothing because it 26 
worthless but you took it from him. 27 
So this is why I came back to, I think a carbon tax is more applicable.  28 
Neither of these is totally correct in everything they laid out.  Some of 29 
the points in one were applicable to the other one too.  The biggest 30 
thing I thought we’d have to avoid was having the costing of this fall 31 
into the hands of the market that can set an artificial price.  I really do 32 
think if a cost is going to put on it, it’s got to be established by 33 
Government, what that cost does. 34 
Helen: But how? 35 
Mike: Now, we are well aware but we’re not certain yet, exactly how we’re 36 
measuring the amount of emission.  We heard that in the last lecture, 37 
that our mathematics or our own reality is not yet totally correct.  So 38 
it’s got to be adjusted.  This year your permit will give you such and 39 
such a value.  Now, depending upon technological changes and 40 
things, next year or the year after, we might hook it up. 41 
Female: But how do you decide that in the first place? 42 
Mike: That’s what I heard earlier on, just before lunch time.  We can’t at this 43 
stage, accurately, we cannot accurately say you are transmitting so 44 
much pollution in the atmosphere, we just think you are.  Now, are 45 
you going to pay money for thinking? 46 
Female: Okay.  So... 47 
Helen: I have a question about the carbon tax that someone might be able to 48 
answer and that is, why can’t a cap be applied to a carbon tax model 49 
as well as the emissions trading model?  Why is it always talked 50 
about as something that we pay a tax on, there’s no cap but why not 51 
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introduce a cap at the same time as introduce a carbon tax and 52 
dispense with the problems of the trading scheme which I think are 53 
potentially quite real, I don’t really know. 54 
Mike: We could introduce bits of one, bits of the other. 55 
Helen: Does anyone know the answer to that? 56 
Kate: Is it that you can’t measure?  If you’ve got a carbon tax you can’t 57 
measure.  You should be able to. 58 
Mike: We can in the coal station because we send so much coal in and so 59 
much out.  There’s many other industries that don’t. 60 
Kate: Well, the tax is supposedly going to actually impose a cap because 61 
people are only going to pay a certain amount for that commodity. 62 
Helen: Yeah, but as a back up measure, as a safety mechanism perhaps.  63 
You know, a bit unlike BHP debacle.  A safety cap would be a good 64 
idea. 65 
Kevin: Is it fair to say that, I mean, we’re talking about the carbon tax and 66 
emission trading scheme.  Do any people give an weight to the 67 
voluntary market or the no carbon price on the human activities at all? 68 
Female 2: No, not me personally. 69 
Mike: Yes, I give the no carbon pricing at this stage in time. 70 
Kate: I think that’s an issue as far as, if we’re talking about a global process 71 
then maybe we should be trying to, at some point, achieve some sort 72 
of carbon pricing.  If you’re talking about an Australian approach I’m 73 
not sure that we should be looking at anything at the moment because 74 
it’s too different. 75 
Kevin: I was just thinking if we could cross out a couple of things here that 76 
we’re not going to discuss here, we don’t consider are viable at all and 77 
then concentrate on the other ones.  Is everybody agreeable to 78 
cutting out voluntary, I’m sorry the no carbon pricing and are we also 79 
willing to cut out the voluntary? 80 
Kate: The carbon pricing, if we’re talking about a global carbon price, we’re 81 
looking at the whole world.  If we’re just talking about Australia as a 82 
standalone carbon price, I think we can’t do that at the moment 83 
because we have no idea what price we should be putting on carbon 84 
and if we put any price on it we will be on effectively downgrading our 85 
equity in the rest of the market. 86 
Kevin: So you’re saying that there should be no carbon pricing on human 87 
activities?  Is that what you’re saying? 88 
Kate: I’m personally saying that, unless it’s the global one. 89 
Nancy: I’m going with that too. 90 
Mike: It’s a consideration. 91 
Nancy: I’m going with the last one too. 92 
Sarah: It could be hand in hand with that though, that if we’re not going to put 93 
a price on carbon we can still have an environmental tax. 94 
Kate: Yes. 95 
Sarah: That’s what I don’t like about this little bit.  It should say, but we will 96 
still give money for this global change in the form of, because this 97 
whole part of the world... 98 
Kate: Comes back to our pollution.  Should we have a tax that goes 99 
towards that. 100 
Female: I don’t know that that’s what we’re supposed to be talking about 101 
because that sort of isn’t given an option here. 102 
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Facilitator: I think it’s relevant. 103 
Kate: I think it’s relevant. 104 
Mike: No carbon pricing doesn’t mean no carbon emission.  They’re two of 105 
the same thing really.  We can still have a cap on emission without a 106 
cost.  You just say you won’t do it that much. 107 
Kevin: There’s no way we’re going to get a reduction of carbon without a cost.  108 
There has to be a cost.  The whole question in my mind is, I want to 109 
know what I’m going to get from it.  Because I was understanding 110 
what he was talking about, the first one, the emission trading scheme, 111 
you could set a target.  You could say we want to, we’d get X result 112 
and you could control that, it seems, according to this guy. 113 
There has obvious problems with it but you know exactly what you’re 114 
going to get.  As you went down the carbon tax was a little bit less so, 115 
the voluntary market was less so and you have no idea what you’re 116 
going to end up with, as I understood it, with the no carbon pricing on 117 
human activities.  Nothing in my mind comes for free. 118 
Mike: That’s just because you assume that there must be a punishment for 119 
the emission.  Now, what we didn’t discuss in there is that at this 120 
relative stage in the industry, particularly power generation that we’re 121 
talking about, there’s only a technological advance we can make.  122 
We’ve virtually hit the valley.  At this stage in time we don’t have 123 
better [unclear], but in general 90 per cent of the power that’s 124 
generated in Australia cannot be improved upon or made more 125 
efficient. 126 
Kate: Yes it can. 127 
Kevin: I totally disagree with that.  Totally disagree. 128 
Mike: With umpteen billion... 129 
Kevin: Not umpteen - well there’s a number of ways you could do it.  You 130 
can do it with renewable sort of energy.  Well you may discount that 131 
but there’s a lot of people that don’t discount that.  You can also do it 132 
with carbon capturing sort of thing which CSIRO is actually working 133 
on.  There are, you have a lot of older sort of plants.  You have the 134 
brown coal sort of plants which are the worst emitters.  You can 135 
replace those with, and they are replacing them with gas fired power 136 
stationed.  They’re usually a combination of gas fired power stations 137 
plus wind turbine renewable energies to provide the power. 138 
Now, that’s the line that New South Wales is going on.  I’m not sure 139 
what Victoria and the other states are going on.  That’s how they’re 140 
approaching.  The whole thing is not to build anymore power plants, 141 
anymore coal powered power plants. 142 
Mike: That’s totally agreed.  But it’s the percentage of alternative power 143 
generation that’s hitting the grid outside of coal which is negligible. 144 
Florian: Yeah, because there are no incentives so far.  Once we have these 145 
incentives like they did in Germany.  In Germany you have a fantastic 146 
system. 147 
Mike: Because what was happening was exactly what could happen out of 148 
this emissions trading scheme.  The people that bought the land to 149 
put up and got the permission to put up the pylons started to sell it 150 
again.  It’s been on sold back and forth.  Now, the farmer who owns 151 
the land got up and out of it, it’s in the land initially. 152 
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Kevin: Well, that’s a very poor farmer then.  Because I know the farmers in 153 
my area and how they’re dealing with it and they’re making sure that 154 
they’re getting good out of it.  If there’s some farmer over here that 155 
isn’t equipped, those towers being there, he’s a very bad business 156 
man. 157 
Mike: What happened was, he gave the permission and sold out to the very 158 
first bidder.  Now, what happened is the price kept on going up with 159 
the value of the wind farm.  So he didn’t cop the benefits. 160 
Kevin: I mean, you may bring up some one person that didn’t do well, but let 161 
me tell you that is not how it’s happening. 162 
Mike: But it’s still going to be not enough power. 163 
Kevin: One thing I should tell you too, we’ve actually got a community of 164 
farmers who are banding together to put up their own wind farm, right.  165 
Now in my mind these sorts of activities should be encouraged.  But if 166 
there’s no carbon pricing on human activities and it’s just whatever we 167 
feel like doing, I don’t think anything is going to happen.  I have never 168 
seen people, human beings do something for the good without some 169 
sort of benefit for themselves.  I think we’re much too... 170 
Kate: This is where we were like in Copenhagen. 171 
Facilitator: Sorry, can I just hop in there while you’re sort of following on about the 172 
point?  Like, how do you feel about the current carbon trading policy?  173 
Like the ones that were proposed at Copenhagen, like the ones that 174 
were proposed ETS late last year?  How do you actually rate or feel 175 
about what those particular... 176 
Mike: Well, that methodology has got a pretty big downer for me because it’s 177 
not controlled sufficiently by Government from what I can see.  It falls 178 
out into the hands of the private markets and we lose control of our 179 
own sovereign rights. 180 
Florian: They were planning to give away these free permits.  That’s what’s 181 
really annoyed me, to the polluters.  It’s ridiculous. 182 
Mike: It still pollutes but other people make a lot of money out of it. 183 
Kevin: Actually, I’m a supporter of the ETS because I think at the end of the 184 
day people are going to, if they see a way of making a quid they’re 185 
going to reduce their energy if that’s what it’s going to mean.  It 186 
means if they’re going to make money they’re going to find a way to 187 
make money, they’re going to reduce the energy that we need or 188 
whatever.  These are the sort of goals that the Government wants us 189 
to meet.  But if they don’t have that incentive, it’s like Communism as 190 
far as I’m concerned.  The big problem with Communism is that the 191 
Government told them what to do and people didn’t do it because they 192 
don’t like being told.  So that’s why I don’t think the carbon tax has a 193 
hope in hell of working from my personal opinion. 194 
Mike: I don’t think any one of these plans is the total plan.  It’s really a bit of 195 
a mixture of all of them.  If you took away, as I say the private trader’s 196 
availability to ETS then it becomes a possible logical thing.  With the 197 
carbon tax, I’m not quite sure what the eventual meaning of that one 198 
is... 199 
Kate: If you take away the trading scheme then you don’t have that scheme. 200 
Mike: That’s right.  You say to this site that you are emitting so much 201 
carbon tax, you should improve it... 202 
Facilitator: Liana and Nancy, how do you guys feel about the different options? 203 
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Nancy: Well, I’m a bit inclined to carbon tax because you know, that would be 204 
paid by the polluter but I can also see what it says here so [I agree 205 
with these] two people that as long as Australia is a torn country, 206 
wanting to do it there’s not much point in the first place.  You know, 207 
we are not the biggest polluters on Earth anyway, are we?  Even if 208 
the export the coal in India actually polluting but not here actually you 209 
know, we have to clean this air, I think. 210 
Florian: We are the biggest per capita polluters in the world as well. 211 
Nancy: We are the biggest per capita.  I know what capita means but it 212 
doesn’t mean that the country as a whole, that’s an awful lot of 213 
pollution. 214 
Florian: That’s right.  But still I mean, we have a responsibility.  My personal 215 
view is, I go with what you say, either a carbon tax or an emissions 216 
trading scheme.  If you read what’s in the next sentence, the second 217 
sentence, households will pay more on their next electricity bill, I 218 
actually see this as an opportunity.  Obviously in both systems we will 219 
pay more for our electricity.  However, if the Government provides an 220 
incentive that we ourselves, as householders, can lower this electricity 221 
bill by investing in the renewable energy, I think that is a real incentive 222 
and obviously it hits double that because with this you’re also lower 223 
emissions.  So I think that is extremely important. 224 
Kate: Yes, but you’re not going to do it.  Certainly at the moment, we’re not 225 
up to 2050, are you going to actually lower your costs with renewable 226 
energy? 227 
Florian: Yeah, you do.  You will, yeah.  We have a system... 228 
Kate: Sorry, in some places you can do it.  But the Government is paying 229 
for that.  You’re not actually creating the cheaper energy.  What 230 
you’re getting is a pay off from the Government.  We can’t keep doing 231 
that.  It’s like, as you were saying, it’s like creating a false amount of 232 
money that you can just swan around the country. 233 
Kevin: What happens with the system that we’re talking about here is people 234 
put in solar panels and/or wind turbines.  In a combination, what they 235 
don’t need they feed back into the grid and they sell back... 236 
Kate: I know, I understand the concepts. 237 
Kevin: Now, if you have that across the country right, you have a much less 238 
need for power stations, full fire power stations.  You can rely on gas 239 
fired power stations and you can rely on renewable energy.  Now, I 240 
mean, if you get rid of using coal fire power stations or even if we cut 241 
that down by 20 or 30 per cent, that’s... 242 
Kate: But you can’t. 243 
Kevin: Yes, you can.  You do it. 244 
Kate: Not at the present... 245 
Florian: You can, yes. 246 
Kevin: But they do it.  They do it in Europe. 247 
Facilitator: What do Liana and Sarah... 248 
Liana: This trading scheme is too vulnerable to shonky dealing, shonky 249 
offsets, weird sort of trading loopholes and it’s not, I sort of favour a 250 
straight carbon tax where everyone knows it’s honest.  Everyone is 251 
hit. 252 
Florian: That’s right.  I agree. 253 
Liana: Well, it’s a pollution tax isn’t it, up front.  There’s no kind of... 254 
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Kate: If we can find a way to actually determine that tax. 255 
Liana: And put it into investments, whatever. 256 
Kevin: But the thing is, you don’t know the results, you don’t know what 257 
you’re going to get.  Like, one of the things you were saying, by going 258 
that way, you can’t measure the results that you’re going to use.  It’s 259 
a hit or miss sort of thing.  You say that, like you were saying, you 260 
don’t know how much, what level to put it in.  Whatever price you put 261 
on that tax will impact on how much... 262 
Liana: You’re going to be hurting people which it just seems it’s going to be 263 
necessary to hurt people. 264 
Sarah: As Andrew’s just pointed out, sorry Liana, I’m interrupting. 265 
Mike: I think if it was to be introduced at a level that was just too painful and 266 
drop it back to just an acceptable one and then creep it back up again. 267 
Kevin: But you’re never going to be able to know exactly how much, how 268 
many you’ve actually reduced. 269 
Liana: I think there are ways of measuring that. 270 
Kevin: According to the [unclear] what he was saying, that is the problem, is 271 
that you can’t measure it.  Now, that’s why I like the ETS. 272 
Mike: I agree with you about alternative energies.  But they’ve got to be 273 
introduced in an economical fashion. 274 
Kevin: They are. 275 
Mike: If we’re talking about 100 years, there’s no sweat.  If we’re talking 276 
about the next election, three years or something, we’re not going to 277 
get wind farms up, are we. 278 
Helen: But that’s what I think, right now today we could start a Medicare levy 279 
for the environment and have it at a really low level, start off just 280 
getting it, and we want to call it a carbon tax or an environmental levy 281 
or something and it’s really low percentage wise.  We get the, 282 
everybody’s you know, when the BAS came in, all the small 283 
businesses had a banana and it took like two or three years just for the 284 
mechanism of it all to get into place.  We could start getting money in 285 
the coffers really soon.  Okay, do it that way, say right, we’re going to 286 
have this Medicare levy start, in three or five years when we’ve 287 
decided you know, what’s the rest of the world doing 288 
I’m leaning on the carbon tax side of things, when we’ve got a better 289 
handle of how we’re going to account for this then we can introduce 290 
that and either keep this environmental level or reduce it and follow 291 
through with the more sustainable carbon capturing message 292 
accounting. 293 
Facilitator: There’s a real divide. 294 
Kevin: Yeah, well. 295 
Florian: Well, there’s a very dangerous thing in this discussion, that we tend to 296 
follow what the fossil fuel industry is telling us, that renewable are not 297 
economical, that they are not ready, they are not, this is simply not 298 
true.  This is simply not true.  These days it’s possible to run a 299 
system, and you’d know much more about this, I understand.  It 300 
certainly is possible with the right incentives to generate, as a 301 
household, to generate at least part of the electricity you’re using 302 
yourself.  Either you use it directly or you feed it back into the grid and 303 
get paid for it. 304 
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That’s clearly the case and it’s a big, big success, particularly in 305 
Germany when it was introduced a few years back.  In addition it has 306 
created enormous numbers of jobs, 300,000 jobs and it has created a 307 
new industry.  By the way, this industry was the only one that was 308 
actually not affected by the recent recession in Germany, the 309 
renewable industry.  So I definitely believe Australia is missing the 310 
boat here like there’s no tomorrow. 311 
Helen: That’s why I want this environmental tax thing to start tomorrow.  312 
Start it tomorrow and the rest of it we feed into it and we grow from 313 
there. 314 
Florian: Medicare for the environment. 315 
Helen: It needs it. 316 
Sarah: The administrators are already there.  The department that governs it 317 
is already in place. 318 
Helen: The structures are in place, we know how to do deal with it, okay 319 
everybody will have to pay a bit more.  Immediately the Government 320 
will have money that can start putting in infrastructure to help 321 
renewable, if that has to go into communication, promotion, marketing, 322 
killing Alan Jones, I don’t know what it means, it can start spending 323 
money now, not in three years, not in six years, not in 10 years. 324 
Mike: [unclear] of the renewable energy.  I had a friend who had a heated 325 
swimming pool, panicked.  $25,000.  Now, how many people can 326 
throw that sort of money out?  When you’re living in a home unit 327 
you’ve got to contribute to power reduction that way.  So what we’re 328 
talking about renewable energy can only apply to a rather small 329 
segment of the economy unless it becomes then a governmental... 330 
Facilitator: There’s five minutes to go and this is really interesting because there 331 
is sort of different opinion.  Maybe, are there some people that feel 332 
that they’re closer aligned to others that maybe can summarise their 333 
version and would sort of like to show where the debate’s at?  334 
Because like I don’t think it’s going to... 335 
Sarah: There’s the homicide faction over here. 336 
Facilitator: I don’t think it’s going to get satisfactorily resolved. 337 
Kevin: I’m against it but I would say that the carbon tax would be the prefer 338 
option of us all. 339 
Mike: A form of carbon tax, I think. 340 
Kevin: I disagree, you can say what’s the ETS because I believe in a market. 341 
Helen: You could split them into four. 342 
Sarah: I was just thinking about that, I thought we could actually divide this up 343 
a bit because that’s okay. 344 
Mike: I don’t trust the markets. 345 
Kevin: Well, I do. 346 
Mike: It’s the traders that worry me. 347 
Sarah: So we are split up, we have carbon tax. 348 
Mike: You could almost use the word modified carbon tax because we don’t 349 
agree fully with everything that’s on the board. 350 
Sarah: Alright, carbon tax concept.  Because you know, I think methane’s in 351 
there somewhere as well.  I’m sure we’re not just talking about 352 
carbon here. 353 
Kate: Well, actually carbon is the start of life. 354 
Transcript - Australian Climate Policy Forum (31 July 2010)      Session 2 - Group 3 
335 
 
Sarah: Well, that’s true.  You’re absolutely right, we’re talking carbon.  355 
You’re absolutely right.  Okay, well let’s just write a few points about 356 
the carbon tax approach and why we prefer this. 357 
Mike: Who’s is going to be levied on it.  We have a carbon tax, who?  We 358 
can only then, at this early stage, major polluters. 359 
Sarah: Yes, okay. 360 
Mike: Later on we’ll drag in everybody. 361 
Sarah: But you know, if it really came down to it, and I am running my dryer 362 
say, and I am running the heater because it’s winter, and, and, and, 363 
and, I personally don’t have a problem with paying a tax on those.  364 
Even though it’s going to diminish my... 365 
Mike: You will be paying the tax so much and the cost will be going up.  As 366 
soon as this carbon tax is initiated on say the power generators... 367 
Sarah: So when the actual supplier gets taxes those are passed on to me and 368 
if I decide to put my power back into the grid then okay. 369 
Mike: You’ll run out and hang the clothes on the line. 370 
Sarah: Yes, which is what I could do. 371 
Florian: Okay.  [unclear] produce and put into the grid. 372 
Helen: I’m doing that anyway. 373 
Sarah: Precisely. 374 
Helen: I know, some days. 375 
Mike: So all of these are a bit of a carrot... 376 
Sarah: Nappies are disposables, what do you do. 377 
Facilitator: There’s a couple of minutes.  What about, what’s your counter or 378 
amendments. 379 
Kevin: Okay.  My approach would be ETS basically because I believe that 380 
the market will come up with more creative ideas and I believe it’s the 381 
most efficient way of going about it.  You will know exactly how much 382 
carbon you’re going to eliminate from the environment.  Whereas 383 
with none of the others will you know.  As far as I’m concerned that’s 384 
important.  Those two aren’t. 385 
Sarah: You said it provides efficient... 386 
Kevin: It’s the most efficient way of regulating the amount of carbon and you 387 
know exactly how much carbon you’re going to be using or allowing to 388 
be used. 389 
Mike: Well, that’s the cap. 390 
Kevin: Yes, that’s the cap. 391 
Mike: We’re putting a cap also, aren’t we, on the carbon tax? 392 
Sarah: No, because you can’t do it apparently.  I don’t understand why.  393 
Andrew tried to explain it and I’m sorry, I just don’t quite understand it. 394 
Mike: This is why I thought it was a double level. 395 
Kate: Because it’s an economic concept that it finds its own cap. 396 
Sarah: The market sets the cap.  But if you don’t, but I worry about that, I 397 
have concerns about the carbon tax from that point of view. 398 
Facilitator: Okay, are there any other major points that anyone thinks should be 399 
raised? 400 
Mike: Well, yes.  There are many, many things in this life that you cannot 401 
minimise.  That’s it.  You’ve got to eat, you’ve got to have food.  So 402 
it’s all very, all that talk of we’ll minimise the usage of these things 403 
through increased costs.  Well, most of us can’t. 404 
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Sarah: But there are things that we can, I mean we don’t have to eat beef 405 
seven days a week, you know we don’t have to do that.  We choose 406 
to, we like to, it’s a luxury that we have in this country, but we don’t 407 
have to eat like that. 408 
Kate: Well, you could put a tax on it then it becomes very expensive. 409 
Facilitator: So what would be the question, can you minimise it?  Does it work, 410 
can you minimise it? 411 
Mike: Well, yeah.  Minimisation.  A financial tax doesn’t work.  It’s not 412 
acceptable. 413 
Florian: I just want to repeat, it’s really important, if we get this tax that 414 
increases our costs, let’s say for electricity, if we have a tool to reduce 415 
our costs in the form of let’s say, of renewable energy, that becomes 416 
an incentive, it’s very important. 417 
Helen: So you think reducing cause and reducing cost. 418 
Florian: Yes, it’s an incentive to reduce your, that’s what I mean. 419 
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John: All right. So I guess we were working through the question of which 1 
one we sort of prefer there. The group sort of was split down between 2 
- really it was between the carbon tax and the emissions trading 3 
scheme. We did a vote that was sort of if you had to go for one, which 4 
would you go for? It was three and three between the two. In the end, 5 
though, we decided that it wasn't a particularly great way to look at 6 
the problem and a combination of the - well, there were three. We 7 
sort of ruled out voluntary markets as a little bit fluffy.  8 
 But yeah, a combination where perhaps, you know, looking at it a little 9 
more pragmatically, if it's politically more viable to put in a carbon tax, 10 
if it's being more accepted by the public, then even if that wasn't the 11 
ideal solution then a carbon tax is perhaps a great way to get people 12 
in there and familiar with measuring their carbon outputs and that sort 13 
of thing, really familiar with it. Say in the future, if it became apparent 14 
that it would be more efficient to have a trading scheme then it would 15 
have laid the groundwork to move into something like that.  16 
 Regulations we thought might have been a pretty important part of it 17 
as well; regulating things like housing, especially for things like 18 
energy efficiency, so things like double-glazing, insulation, designing 19 
houses properly and that sort of thing would be great as well. Then, 20 
as I said, it was a split between the ETS and the carbon tax. The ETS 21 
did, as we were saying, have the advantage of almost guaranteed 22 
reductions, if you will, but the carbon tax was perhaps something a 23 
little more flexible, a little easier to understand, a little more simple so 24 
in that sense it might have been more accepted politically.  25 
 Is there anything else I had to add in there? 26 
Facilitator 1: Thanks John. We've got George now, is that right? 27 
George: Yes.  28 
Facilitator 1: George has some European experience to add to the flavour of our 29 
discussions. 30 
[Over speaking] 31 
George: Okay.  32 
[Laughter, over speaking] 33 
George: I think our result was pretty similar, like some would want it just for the 34 
carbon and some would want it just for the trading system and that 35 
often depends on the industry. The general advantage of the carbon 36 
tax was, for example, like certainty about price for the enterprises and 37 
especially for consumers, it's easier to grasp and it's easier to 38 
understand what is it about because even here we have sometimes 39 
problems with understanding the trading system.  40 
 Whereas for the trading system, you have a guaranteed cap, as 41 
[unclear] mentioned, that gives you better control about development 42 
of the reductions. It is more flexible, of course, and on the other hand, 43 
it was, of course, [inaudible] and the distribution is really hard to figure 44 
out who gets the allowances.  45 
 As for the carbon tax, the money always goes to the government so 46 
you could cut down on other taxes, but probably no government will 47 
ever do. There's this third measure that is the regulation. What is 48 
sometimes useful, for example, for the light bulbs or for some 49 
efficiency, for example, the washing machines.  50 
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 So it is basically, yeah, need for some kind of combination of all three 51 
measures, or if you take voluntary action as a measure, too, it comes 52 
from information about, for example, how much fuel uses a car and 53 
how is - the overall efficiency of a car or of the washing machine. So 54 
that's something you sometimes cannot regulate but you have to 55 
provide information that consumers then choose the right one. So 56 
they're all pretty similar.  57 
 Anything else with that? No? 58 
Helen:  Well, pretty much like the others, I think that we had generally split 59 
consensus. Most of us... 60 
[Laughter, over speaking] 61 
Helen: Split into two camps of consensus. These people consented... 62 
[Laughter]  63 
Helen: Okay, so this person consented... 64 
[Laughter] 65 
Helen: They're fairly - and the principles that we have formed - essentially we 66 
have basic principles that we liked. One was that with the carbon tax 67 
concept we liked that it was fairly simple, it was straightforward, we 68 
could understand it, it was tangible. Who would we say to be taxed? 69 
Well, we felt that the big polluters would be the people who would be 70 
taxed. That would then be funnelled down through to the general 71 
users. So the large power stations, for example, would be taxed. We, 72 
then, the end user, would pay higher prices. So we'd all end up 73 
paying a little more.  74 
 One of the key points that came out of that was that we felt that it 75 
would provide incentives for reducing energy emissions. So in the 76 
case of a power station again, there's great incentives there for 77 
people to think about how to create their own renewable energy, you 78 
know, at the home base. So we might put up our own wind-powered 79 
generators or we might put up solar generators and then we might 80 
cell that back into the grid. So the individual might, in fact, benefit 81 
from a system such as carbon tax.  82 
 The emissions trading scheme concept was - you know, actually, we 83 
kind of wanted a bit of both. We really wanted a little bit of each. 84 
Some of us wanted to see carbon tax with a cap but then as Andrew 85 
explained, that wasn't really going to work in a market place. So 86 
maybe that might be something that we could find out a bit more 87 
about because some of us did wonder about a cap on a carbon tax 88 
and why that might not be a nice combination of the two principles, 89 
but perhaps there won't be time for that description.  90 
 Do you want me to keep going or do you want to... 91 
Andrew: …thirty seconds. I guess, yeah, I mean the cap really is something 92 
that [inaudible] the emissions trading rather than the tax. You don't 93 
know in advance [inaudible] how much people are going to [inaudible] 94 
so how much tax they're going to pay, so there couldn't be a flexible 95 
cap with a fixed tax rather than lower price.  96 
 What we could do is still mix the two, perhaps have some of the 97 
bigger companies, say power stations or say the biggest 200 polluters 98 
in the emissions trading scheme where they have all these extra 99 
benefits such as training and flexibility within the cap specific to them. 100 
[Inaudible] the next one or two thousand polluters could put their tax 101 
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where it's simple, where there's no minimising transaction costs so 102 
you're not having to monitor - you know, several [inaudible] so there 103 
may be ways there to [inaudible]. Yeah, in many cases there are 104 
ways that they can be used… 105 
Helen: Okay, thanks, Andrew. But also as a market-based approach that our 106 
ETS supporter felt that it was also a way for efficient strategies to 107 
regulate emissions to be built in. So the market place would in fact 108 
determine and come up with all sorts of creative ideas about how, in 109 
fact, emissions could be kept low.  110 
 Now, would anyone else - Florian, did you want to say anything about 111 
the German experience you were describing? No? 112 
Florian: Well, I can. Our point is that if - it's because if we have this tax, if we 113 
get a tax, whatever kind of tax, if households get the opportunity to 114 
reduce the increased cost by generating their own power, that's an 115 
incentive but obviously at the same time it again increases our 116 
dependency on fossil fuel power generation.  117 
Facilitator 1: Yeah, there seemed, in our group as well, to still want the household 118 
involved and some incentive for people to be involved in all of this 119 
rather than it be an external tax thing or policy dumped on them. I 120 
think that's the general feeling that we've had in the room. It might be 121 
the converted here that people should be involved at some level in 122 
what's going on rather than appearing to be punitive, I'm guessing.  123 
 Now, did anyone have any more questions of Andrew since after the 124 
discussions? You know, was there enough clarity in the options and 125 
the description of the emissions? 126 
Male 2: Can I ask a sort of statement/question? If you have a tax-based 127 
system and you get it completely wrong you can change it. [Inaudible]  128 
you've got these intangibles that have some now artificial value and 129 
you've got to think about paying people out or something. Is that a 130 
real problem? 131 
Andrew: Absolutely, yes. With an emissions trading scheme what we do when 132 
we're creating property rights, so [unclear] basically form a property 133 
and you know, even if we say we can take this back at any time we 134 
see fit. You know, the Supreme Court have a funny way of 135 
interpreting these things. In other - for example, with fishery quotas, 136 
where they've done a similar sort of thing, they've put a cap - they've 137 
put a quota on how many fish can be caught and handed that quota 138 
and then decided, oh, we want to take some of it back. [Inaudible] the 139 
court and they say, no, this is property, you can't trade it back without 140 
[consultation]. So yes.  141 
Male 2: …irrigators… 142 
[Over speaking] 143 
Andrew: Yeah, it's much more difficult to pull back those [inaudible] emissions 144 
trading scheme. Once you've started it, it's - yes, it is problematic. 145 
[Inaudible] I think you're right that it should be much more 146 
straightforward to change the level or the [unclear] of a tax.  147 
Facilitator 1: But doesn't it depend on how, if it turned out successful, whether it 148 
was six months or twelve months and you could have a scheme 149 
where you had to get new ones annually, you'd have different 150 
implications to having ones that lasted forever.  151 
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Andrew:  Yes, absolutely. Yeah, there could be ways like that that could 152 
minimise some of the legal problems. I think that's still the major - it'd 153 
still happen but at least you'd have [advice] on your hands politically, 154 
[inaudible] legally yeah, you know. The emissions trading scheme 155 
[inaudible] CPIs, for example, were that once it was in place it was 156 
going to be very difficult to change it down the track. So yeah … 157 
because it's difficult to impossible to pull them back or to stop 158 
[inaudible]. So yes…  159 
Male 3: If we use the word levy instead of the word tax… 160 
[Laughter] 161 
Male 3: …change the actual structure of it? In other words, a levy can be 162 
applied, changed and removed at any time. The first initial period 163 
would be one in three [unclear]. You can appreciate our rate of gain 164 
or rate of loss, where we stand on the relationship. We're [inaudible] 165 
which is the thing that neither of these plans showed up in here; they 166 
seem to be inflexible. Our discussion was, look, we like some of the 167 
points here, we like some of the points there. Can't we pull this one 168 
out of here and tick it into there?  169 
Andrew: I mean I guess you could have a system where the tax or the levy, 170 
whatever you call it, but yeah, the government could change it so that 171 
you could perhaps get an [inaudible] of what the carbon tax is going 172 
to be for the next six months or the next twelve months. I see no 173 
economic reason why you couldn't do that. It would be subject to, 174 
shall we say, the political cycle and whether the government would be 175 
able to do this in a way that's effective for reducing greenhouse gas 176 
emissions rather than [inaudible] newspaper headlines would be 177 
difficult.  178 
 But yes, certainly a tax can have some flexibility, albeit less in terms 179 
of price. So yeah, you can change it but it wouldn't change as much 180 
as you have a market price in a garden market, for example. So what 181 
you saw where there were carbon markets when the global recession 182 
started a couple of years ago was the oil price halved, the copper 183 
price halved, the carbon price also halved… 184 
 Carbon price, you know, you could … reduction. It could be changed 185 
by government but it would be slow to respond. But yeah, certainly it 186 
could have flexibility. Yeah, [inaudible] for example, you could change 187 
it. Whether they would and whether that would be practical and 188 
whether it would … I don't know. Yeah, certainly emissions, it would 189 
be a bit of a guessing game as to where we set the tax and the best 190 
tax [inaudible] emission. They'd probably start it conservatively, 191 
probably start it low and increase it upwards … reducing emissions 192 
and whatever a rational target is … for reductions. So yeah, I think… 193 
Male 3: I guess it's early days for trying to come up with a definite ideal at the 194 
moment just because all three of them, and it should be on this, have 195 
some conceptual exact addendum … came up with the ETS, 196 
reconsidered. It fell into the hands of merchandisers. [Inaudible] 197 
money, you're probably going to get back and we had hoped that 198 
you'd say research in renewable energy projects and things like this. 199 
It just ends up in the back pockets of the wrong sort of people.  200 
Andrew: There's certainly a lot back to … markets… 201 
Facilitator 1: We just have one more question over here.  202 
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Male 4: Given that the US has committed to a cap and trade system and the 203 
Europeans have already got an emissions trading system like that, 204 
and we heard today that the Chinese have got an emissions trading 205 
scheme, how has that constrained Australia in its options on one of 206 
carbon tax versus an ETS? 207 
Andrew: Yeah. It doesn't have to constrain Australia. There are different ways 208 
in which Australia could engage with international schemes, be it a 209 
sort of global UN scheme like Kyoto or be it other nations' schemes. 210 
If, say, Australia just had the carbon tax there'd be some uncertainty 211 
about whether our emissions would be higher or lower than an 212 
international target. Potentially, the Australian government could just 213 
trade surplus [permits] with other countries or buy additional permits if 214 
they're short.  215 
 So I think having a carbon tax wouldn't stop Australia at the national 216 
level from engaging with the markets. But it would [inaudible] at the 217 
national level rather than the individual [unclear] themselves going 218 
forth and trading internationally. Yeah, so that could still be - that's 219 
what we've … we have the energy in the heavy industry sectors … 220 
emissions trading scheme in Australia, maybe that could interact 221 
directly with the national schemes. While smaller industries, smaller 222 
emitters, just pay a tax and again the government [inaudible] itself … 223 
to get that flexibility so we know wherever our emissions happen to 224 
be that we can ensure… 225 
Facilitator 1: Just one thing that struck me was that it's quite complex, it's very 226 
difficult to get the concepts across and that there's been an obvious 227 
need for the community to be more informed. Now, can you see that 228 
being a task that would be undertaken and could be undertaken, that 229 
would allow to bring the community along with... 230 
Andrew: Certainly. I think so. Just what I've seen here today - obviously for me 231 
… the conversations I've heard there's virtually nothing I disagree 232 
with. Yeah, I think people will need to have a better understanding of 233 
exactly what's being talked about, which doesn't come across through 234 
the media. The big problem is there's so many self-interested groups 235 
and so much … people that were trying push their self-interest upon 236 
us. It's coming from companies who fear that their relative costs are 237 
going to rise [inaudible] go to great lengths to [unclear] influence our 238 
opinion in ways that suits them.  239 
Facilitator 1: Is that any different to when they develop a new policy or do you see 240 
climate change being significantly different? 241 
Andrew: Well, I mean, we've probably seen exactly the same thing with mining 242 
tax, haven't we? Which again was another a tax that in economic 243 
terms of - I'm no expert on that but the … people were certainly very 244 
thorough and comprehensive in recommending it and … There were 245 
newspaper polls saying that 70 per cent of people were opposed to 246 
the tax and some people saying … That's what the next question 247 
should be: do you actually understand the tax?  248 
[Over speaking] 249 
Andrew: … They still managed to oppose … which is an interesting state of 250 
affairs. So yeah, I think they can only be the lateral … people actually 251 
understand what the scheme talked about. There's definitely a 252 
chance to do that.  253 
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Male 4: So it's a way to talk about [inaudible]. I mean why not talk about it as 254 
pollution harming us instead of this Catholic sort of system that 255 
impacts on the whole environment? Don't you think that most people - 256 
isn't there a simplified way of doing it? 257 
[Over speaking] 258 
Facilitator 1:  Okay, we'll have a cup of tea and we're going to bring it back to our 259 
tables so that we don't lose any time. So if you grab your tea, a brief 260 
bathroom break and get those yummy cakes and come back to your 261 
tables.  262 
Transcript - Australian Climate Policy Forum (31 July 2010) Session 3 - Group 1 
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Facilitator: The development of low emission energy technology. 1 
Brian: I think I'd better get into that.  2 
Facilitator: Including carbon capture and storage and solar energy. 3 
Male: Right up your alley, Brian. 4 
Facilitator: The other interesting bit is it complements the government's 5 
expanded renewable energy target.  So that is by 2020, 20 per cent 6 
of Australia's electricity supply will come from renewable sources.   7 
 Okay, so looking at the figures - $5.1 billion equates to around $35 8 
per person per year - and this is only people who are working… 9 
Male: That's Brian. 10 
Male: Working aged population. 11 
Facilitator: Yes. 12 
Female: That's not a lot of cups of coffee really. 13 
Facilitator: Okay, so you've got that as background and you've also got - it gives 14 
you some idea of what else is being spent - how much money is 15 
being spent in other areas on the other side.  It also tells you over the 16 
page what the renewable energy by country is.  Look at Austria - 70 17 
per cent of its electricity production is via renewable energy.  18 
Australia's only 7.5 per cent at the moment. 19 
Male: Austria's full of lakes up in mountains and stuff.  It must be all… 20 
Male: Austria's hydro-way.  Germany - it would just be important for 21 
electricity. 22 
Facilitator: Spain's 21 per cent.  Germany is expensive. 23 
Male: Wind in Spain? 24 
Male: Solar in Spain. 25 
Male: They have windmills there with Don Quixote turning them round. 26 
Facilitator: So we have a few questions here just to spark the discussion again.  27 
Now, assume the required $5.1 billion would be drawn from a new tax 28 
to be imposed on individuals directly by the government.  So do you 29 
think that $5.1 billion is enough?  Therefore $5.1 billion, which is $35 30 
per person per year - is that enough? 31 
Male: No.  32 
Male: No. 33 
Male: Nowhere near enough. 34 
Cynthia: Not if they're going to include carbon capture and storage, which is 35 
such a waste.  You take that out and there's not a lot left for the really, 36 
really sensible research. 37 
Male: Also, the amount is so small.  $1 a week would be $52, which is 40 38 
per cent more than that. 39 
Male: They're spending about eight times that much on the broadband 40 
rollout. 41 
Male: I think Australia could afford a lot more than that. 42 
Facilitator: So you think it should be more than $5.1 billion, which would be 43 
greater than 20 per cent renewable by 2020? 44 
Cynthia: I reckon you could sell $1 a week.  That's simple, it doesn't sound like 45 
much. 46 
Male: That's only for research and development. 47 
Cynthia: That's what we're talking about.  We're talking about that research 48 
money. 49 
Facilitator: So would you all be willing to contribute more than… 50 
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Male: But imagine, Brian, the payoff could be enormous if we capture the 51 
energy from the sun for $1 a week - imagine what the payoff would - 52 
the payoff would be forever. 53 
Male: Imagine how easy that would be to sell - you were saying that.  You 54 
were saying that - that's easy to sell. 55 
Cynthia: $1 a week. 56 
Male: This is $1 a week for the government to do research.   57 
Cynthia: Yes, that's true. 58 
Male: Not to actually solve the problem - it's just for them to research how 59 
they're going to resolve it. 60 
Male: They'd be getting… 61 
Male: But we're never going to get to a solution unless we do the research 62 
together. 63 
Male: Ah sure.  I'm not opposed to it, I'm just saying… 64 
Male: But then in relation to thermal solar, a lot of this research has been 65 
done and a lot of it's been - like you said, in Spain, it's been proven in 66 
Spain now.  So maybe some of that could go - not just into research 67 
but into… 68 
Cynthia: Its implementation. 69 
Male: Its production here.  That's the best research. 70 
Male: Of course, what no one's mentioned here yet is nuclear energy, 71 
where the research is also being done. 72 
Male: That's not renewable. 73 
Cynthia: Uraniums. 74 
Male: If uranium runs out… 75 
Male: It's low emission. 76 
Male: How long would it take for the uranium to run out? 77 
Male: About as long as coal. 78 
Male: Would it?  Three hundred years?  Three hundred years is the 79 
estimate on coal.  If we just kept using it… 80 
Male: A hundred's probably a little more accurate with coal. 81 
Male: Well that might tide us over until we got to Brian's solution.  Capturing 82 
energy from the sun. 83 
Male: You see, the thing is, this question says would you financially support 84 
the development of low emission technologies.  Tick yes.  But then 85 
the box is actually not about supporting low emission technologies, 86 
it's about doing research into developing low emission technologies.  87 
Like Cynthia said, if half of that $5 billion's going to go into 88 
researching carbon capture and storage, it's kind of like - where is this 89 
research money going to be spent? 90 
Female: It says research and development.  Does that mean building the 91 
infrastructure as well? 92 
Facilitator: Yes.  Research and development… 93 
Female: So that's the worrying thing. 94 
Male: R&D usually means just doing the research, it doesn't usually mean… 95 
Male: There is money going into a pilot project for the carbon capture and 96 
storage… 97 
Male: So part of that is going into this pilot project. 98 
Male: Yes, but it is going into developing the technology. 99 
Male: Building a pilot. 100 
Male: Yes.  To see… 101 
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Male: You know, $5 billion is what they reckon it would cost the government 102 
to build a second airport in Sydney.  Sydney airport, you know - 103 
they've been tossing around how much money would it cost to build a 104 
second airport - that's $5 billion.  That's the kind of money we're 105 
talking about now. 106 
Claire: I think we should be - you know - multiplying it by ten. 107 
Facilitator: Do you have any preference for how it should be collected?  Should it 108 
be via the GST or should it just be like an income basic tax, or… 109 
Male: Well the GST - that means people can't avoid it.  Even Kerry Packer 110 
had to pay GST. 111 
Ross: Or in the style of a Medicare levy.  112 
Mark: Hang on.  I reckon this amount of money is absolute chicken feed and 113 
once again nobody is saying what would you be prepared to - it's like 114 
the annual flu or whatever.  I reckon this is just a basic thing that the 115 
government should do.  It shouldn't be singled out as it'll be a 116 
separate levy.  We should expect the government to spend this 117 
pathetic amount of money without it - there's all other worthy causes 118 
that are not - appear extra - you know, it's discretionary.  I think they 119 
should just get on with this and I think [they'd object to that].  If we're 120 
going to have a special tax I think we should have the politicians' free 121 
air travel after they retire tax, which would appear… 122 
 So I think making it a separate levy gives it a visibility which is unfair 123 
in comparison to all the other uses of money. 124 
Male: But I think it does give it that visibility and it also provides a bit of 125 
accountability later on.  Doesn't it? 126 
Male: Where's our … Where's our $5.1 billion worth of research gone?  It 127 
just doesn't go into consolidated revenue… 128 
Male: Okay, but all we'd be forking out is 70 cents a week.  There's two lots 129 
of things here.  There's a figure that they're throwing out here, the $5 130 
billion to do some research and a bit of development.  I agree with 131 
him, they should just spend it.  They just blew $8 billion because they 132 
didn't deal with the miners, right?  They could have just [inaudible] in 133 
the $8 billion, right?  That would have been easy.  But where the 134 
really big money is needed, I think, you know like 10 times that, that's 135 
needed to actually do something rather than… 136 
 There are some things that can be done immediately that they could 137 
do if they wanted to, they could spend lots of money if they wanted to. 138 
James: …For instance - and I think Claire said it - increase that amount by 10 139 
times that, so that's $350 a year for research, development and 140 
implementation.  Now that covers the lot and it gets it out there so it 141 
just doesn't sit on the shelf - but we get it out there.  I agree with Ross 142 
about a levy. 143 
John: The Medicare levy is $1000, you know.    144 
Cynthia: But to take up the accountability - I'd like to know what that's going to 145 
be spent on, so… 146 
Male: It goes into a levy where the money is dedicated to that purpose… 147 
Cynthia: Australia's got all these resources, like geothermal, solar - that's 148 
where it goes. 149 
Ian: You have a commission of some sort that is responsible for running 150 
some sort of… 151 
Female: We set up a jury or something. 152 
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John: Constructed in a way that - the ACT solar power plant was one of the 153 
proposals last year.  We go and lobby the government and said hey, 154 
can we have some of this $5.1 billion or whatever was decided on for 155 
this project and they say have a million dollars.  You've got that 156 
system that federal funding, the community based projects or even 157 
state government projects.   158 
Facilitator: So it sounds like you're all saying - see if there's agreement - that 159 
you'd prefer to pay more than $35 per working person per year. 160 
Male: A lot more. 161 
Male: But I think there is a bit of fine print… 162 
Facilitator: But talking about what it's going to achieve if you're going to do that. 163 
Ian: So we'd have to have goals.  So what we're going to do in - this is 164 
what you're going to pay and this is what you're going to get in 10 165 
years' time. 166 
Cynthia: Yes, and they're measured on those targets. 167 
Ian: Yes, and every five years someone has to report to the parliament on 168 
how close we are to achieving those goals. 169 
James: All the money is dedicated to establishing a low carbon economy. 170 
Facilitator: Okay.  Would you - say you wanted to pay more than that - I don't 171 
know how much more because that comes in the survey - if you 172 
wanted to pay more would you still be prepared to do that if there was 173 
say a global financial crisis or something like that?  Should it be 174 
changed if we go into recession? 175 
Brian: We all had to pay the Medicare levy last year didn't we?  Whether 176 
there was a financial crisis or not, everybody still had to fork out for 177 
the Medicare levy. 178 
Cynthia: Unless they're in a private health fund. 179 
Brian: Everybody still had to fork out that, so why not? 180 
Claire: Really there will be an environmental crisis if we don't act urgently 181 
and then there will be no economy to worry about. 182 
Brian: There'll be no Medicare levy to worry about either. 183 
Facilitator: So someone mentioned $350 per person a year. Would you still be 184 
prepared to pay that if, say, only 30 per cent of Australians would be 185 
required to pay [inaudible] taxes?  Would that still be okay? 186 
Male: You mean low income earners?  I think it would be fair to exempt 187 
some people from it. 188 
Male: Well, the Medicare levy works on a percentage and you could work it 189 
out such that it works out as an average of $350 per person across 190 
Australia, but through the Medicare levy arrangement where it's a 191 
percentage of your income, so the lower income people would pay 192 
less and the higher income people would pay more. 193 
Male: So link it into incoming earnings. 194 
Facilitator: Okay, so the government's saying … tax, yes, I believe that was what 195 
was planned.  So the government's saying by 2020 20 per cent of 196 
Australia's electricity supply would come from renewable sources if 197 
we pay this amount.   198 
Male: They're not saying that are they? 199 
Facilitator: This apparently is part of their standard renewable energy target. 200 
Male: So this is the target, yes. 201 
Facilitator: So would you still be prepared to pay that amount if only 15 per cent 202 
of our electricity supply came from… 203 
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Male: Well I think - isn't what we've told here is that $35 per person is 204 
enough to get Australia to 20 per cent. 205 
Female: So if we're going to do 10 times the amount… 206 
Male: Ten times the amount - I'd expect it's a bit more. 207 
Female: A bit more bang for the buck. 208 
Mark: I'd make it conditional that if we're going to be investing in research it 209 
should be genuinely research, you know - the patent should end up 210 
being owned by the Australian people so we can get a payback on 211 
our research.  There should be a bit of accountability and it should not 212 
be about propping up an existing industry sector like coal - because I 213 
think they can do that, they've got a financial stake in it. 214 
Female: The 20 per cent is just a target, they may not reach that.  But we have 215 
to start somewhere.  I'd be happier if it was a higher target. 216 
Female: It doesn't seem huge, does it, by 2020? 217 
Male: Well, look at Spain already at 21 per cent. 218 
Male: No … it's already doing seven per cent … of the hydro power down 219 
here and in Tasmania.  We're already at seven per cent because of 220 
the hydro power. 221 
Female: We haven't done much more 222 
Male: No, we've done stuff all since then.  So we're already getting seven 223 
per cent and we've been getting seven per cent for the last 20 or 30 224 
years. 225 
Male: No, it's probably been 40 in fact. 226 
Male: Yes, so in fact - 20 per cent of that looks big but in fact it's only 13 per 227 
cent on top of what we've been doing for 20 or 30 years. 228 
Female: So it's pretty small. 229 
Male: So it’s not exactly a huge leap. 230 
Male: But the problem you run into though is you still have to have the 231 
baseload power, and that baseload power is going to be provided by 232 
gas and coal and nuclear. 233 
Male: No, you can do it other ways. 234 
Male: In what way? 235 
[Over speaking] 236 
Male: A hell of a lot more than $5.1 billion. 237 
[Over speaking] 238 
Male: …R&D funding.  Construction funding is a different issue.  I think 239 
maybe it's worthwhile reminding ourselves that we've got either a 240 
carbon tax or emission trading scheme which is … to move to … 241 
economy.  So that already motivates them to think about… 242 
Male: Are you going to use some of that money from the carbon tax to fund 243 
this research and development? 244 
Male: Why not? 245 
Male: Well, if you're making money from a carbon tax this is a question of… 246 
Male: Well we've got to do something with it.  If it's going to go into 247 
consolidated revenue it might as well go into this. 248 
Male: If we're going to have a carbon tax I think it all should be dedicated to 249 
this. 250 
Male: It's a lot easier … to sell. 251 
Male: To dedicate … So you don't have to have a levy then. 252 
Facilitator: As it's no longer new technology, the prices will come down for things 253 
like… 254 
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Male: I mean we hadn't even had any of this [unclear] stuff four years ago. 255 
Male: No. 256 
Male: Three years ago.  Now they're starting to … and do baseload with 257 
solar.  They're trying one in California.  Arnie over there has said 258 
we're going to do this folks, we're not going to talk about it, we're not 259 
going to discuss it, we're not going to have focus groups - we're just 260 
going to do it.  He's like the Chinese.  He says we're going to have 261 
this and they do it.   262 
Male: Spain's currently [willing] aren’t they? 263 
Male: They voted for the guy, you know?  He said well you voted for me 264 
because I said I'm going to do something about carbon. 265 
Male: California has sunshine.  We're different here. 266 
Male: Arnie is from Austria. 267 
Facilitator: How has Austria done that? 268 
Male: Hydro. 269 
Male: It's hydro, yes.  A lot of hydro. 270 
Male: It is impressive though, isn't it? 271 
Male: They might have water.  We have sun and [salt]… 272 
Facilitator: Okay, I have some more questions here, just to get some discussion 273 
out of you, some ideas.  Assume that the required funds would be 274 
collected by energy companies through increased energy prices.  The 275 
energy companies would be required to meet the 20 per cent target 276 
but could use the raised funds at their discretion.  How much are you 277 
willing to contribute - more or less than the $35. 278 
Male: Could you read that again please Facilitator. 279 
Facilitator: Assume that the required funds would be collected by energy 280 
companies and not the government. 281 
Male: Is this for R&D? 282 
Male: Is the $35 per person per year? 283 
Facilitator: Yes.  So the energy companies would be required to meet the 20 per 284 
cent target.  So the 20 per cent target is still there, it's going to be - 285 
Australia's electricity supply comes from regular resources.  But they 286 
could use the raised funds at their discretion. 287 
Mark: In other words, would we trust the electricity generators? 288 
Ian: So instead of the CSIRO instead of the government… 289 
Facilitator: Nobody trusts the electricity companies? 290 
Ian: I have my doubts. 291 
Mark: Enron was an energy company wasn't it? 292 
John: I mean, they do have a vested interest in providing electricity… 293 
Ian: At the highest price. 294 
John: I mean, that's a good point as well.  They're also competing with each 295 
other.  In some ways competition can produce that sort of thing.  296 
Especially - private research and development can be very, very 297 
focused and can produce outstanding results, especially by way of 298 
electric cars.  They've done a great deal of research in terns of that 299 
sort of thing.  The problem you get is that they then……Well, I 300 
probably wouldn't be willing to pay as much, but perhaps… 301 
Brian: The thing is, at their own discretion could mean that they decide that 302 
they're going to invest that money in some company in Brazil.  You 303 
know, it's got nothing to do with generation at all.  I mean, if an 304 
electricity generating company can't … to invest in electricity.  If 305 
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they've got their 20 per cent up and running and they think oh well, I 306 
like profits - let's go and invest in some profits because we're going to 307 
make money out of them, or whatever - they could just invest the 308 
money wherever they wanted to.  If you say no strings attached - well, 309 
cigarette companies… 310 
Mark: The thing that bothers me about - we're paying all this money for 311 
goodies in the future - one of the reasons people often don't introduce 312 
energy efficiency measures in their own house is that it's going to cost 313 
them four grand now that they don't have - for a little bit of savings in 314 
the future.  So I think part of the mix should be for your schemes 315 
where the power company says to save us having to build a new 316 
power plant for $4 million, we would rather give you $4000 to have 317 
double glazing and you can pay us back out of your utility bills.   318 
 So - while we're talking money, I think there's lots of money things 319 
that are around reducing our need for energy rather than trying to 320 
invent ways to do energy more cheaply, which I think ought to be part 321 
of the money [unclear].  Nobody wants to do double glazing for four 322 
grand this year when it saves you $50… 323 
Female: Does that introduce conflict of interest for the energy company 324 
because they will sell this energy? 325 
Male: Sorry, maybe they wouldn't provide it but that issue will - can you 326 
encourage people to spend a bit of capital now to save money in the 327 
future. 328 
Male: But you know I said the difficulty with getting power companies to do 329 
that - it's in their interest to sell more, not less. 330 
Male: Well yes and no.  But they don't like having to spend $6 million to 331 
build a power plant to cope with two hours of air conditioning every 332 
fortnight, when they'd be giving some people a bit of solar shade 333 
panels… 334 
Facilitator: Okay, well, the background of all these questions is because the next 335 
stage is to give you all a questionnaire about how much you're willing 336 
to pay.  I think we should get actually a … we need to ask about that - 337 
I think that's a good question, though, is it just R&D or whether - 338 
because they're talking here about actually reducing the emissions - 339 
the target is 20 per cent.  It doesn't sound like it's just R&D. 340 
Male: They've used the word complements though, so it sounds like there's 341 
two separate proposals and this one's just complementing that one. 342 
Facilitator: Yes, it's a good question. 343 
Male: I think with the shift to the higher renewables target of 20 per cent. 344 
Facilitator: It sounds like the issue - what it actually is that you're paying for is 345 
very critical - you want to know what you're going to get. 346 
Male: I think that is. 347 
Facilitator: So one of the questions here is if no initial target is enforced, would 348 
you still be willing to contribute the same amount annually to private 349 
carbon offsetting agencies, that is in terms of voluntary… 350 
Claire: No. 351 
Ian: No, no target no deal.  It could wander anywhere. 352 
Mark: I've lost faith in how people account for all of these little offsets.  I 353 
think I'll give my money to a … baby. 354 
Cynthia: Just feel a bit better. 355 
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Mark: So I can … whatever the money was going to.  So for me that trust 356 
issue is really … I would pay a lot of money if I trusted but if I thought 357 
some horrible deluded was just getting off scot-free and flying around 358 
the world with his jet on my money - I'd be saying no, not a bean.   359 
Facilitator: I guess the detail in the scheme as well… 360 
 Okay, so would you change your willingness to pay decision if the US 361 
and China did not intend to achieve 20 per cent? 362 
Male: No. 363 
Female: Not if we had good targets, good accountabilities here - that would be 364 
enough. 365 
Mark: I personally, I can afford it, and I'd be thinking we have to set an 366 
example at least to China… 367 
James: There are a lot of long-term benefits in doing this to the country, 368 
whether other countries do it or not. 369 
Facilitator: You're paying for this and you're in Australia reducing our emissions, 370 
but other countries are putting out more.  So globally it's not making… 371 
John: Yes, I'd still do it because I think in the end - if there were certain 372 
countries setting an example and doing it - and actually getting results 373 
- it's worth doing.  What … it's like that cartoon he had up there - you 374 
know, it's going to be for the country anyhow. 375 
Mark: What … make the world better for no good reason? 376 
James: The other countries are eventually going to have to do it anyway.  It's 377 
inevitable.  It's just us getting in first and … the others can follow. 378 
Ross: Certainly this idea that we should wait until the US does something or 379 
China does something - not interested. 380 
Claire: I personally despair that there will ever be international agreement 381 
and I think we can be the leaders, you know?  Then we can actually 382 
sell our technology around the world and help other countries. 383 
James: Look at what would do for national pride as well.  National pride is a 384 
valuable thing, if we are a flagship for doing this stuff. 385 
Male: We are already behind our peers in the United Nations.  We vote with 386 
the bloc we compare ourselves with called WEOG - Western 387 
European and Others.  The European Union already has an emission 388 
strategy scheme - we don’t.  So we're not going to lead, we're trying 389 
to catch up with the people we consider our peers - internationally. 390 
Male: They don't wait around to see whether China's going to do this or 391 
India's going to do this. 392 
Male: They didn't do too well for three years but then they changed it and 393 
now it's better.  We haven't done anything. 394 
Facilitator: Okay, well this brings me to the last question we've got here.  Should 395 
Australia officially outsource emissions mitigation to developing 396 
countries as currently under the Clean Development Mechanism 397 
[unclear] so that the developed no longer have to cut emissions 398 
drastically?  So we're paying other countries actually to cut their 399 
emissions so as we don't have to. 400 
Male: I don't think it's a bad scheme if it's… 401 
Female: In addition to… 402 
Male: In addition to… 403 
Female: But the question is instead of… 404 
Male: No, if it was just an alternative I wouldn't do it. 405 
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John: There is something to be said for sustainably developing countries 406 
that are … to the stage where they might be putting on … maybe that 407 
does make more sense in the short term, to invest in developing 408 
countries, because it's going to cost us a lot of money to switch.  In 409 
the long term - I'm not proposing that we just do it there and then we 410 
just don't do anything.  It's going to take a huge change of culture for 411 
us to switch over, whereas if we can sustainably develop countries 412 
that are about to switch …a lot of technologies that we do already 413 
have, where we rely on - I mean maybe then that's not such a bad 414 
idea. 415 
Mark: I worry about this exporting thing.  It's really saying if you're in 416 
Australia and you're currently driving a big station wagon, it's okay to 417 
upgrade to an SUV because some poor peasant can put off having a 418 
life.  I think we're just sort of putting off the day when we are saying 419 
driving giant cars.  420 
Brian: It also isn't all that good for the person in India because they're 421 
thinking well I don't actually have to do anything because someone 422 
else is going to do it for me.   423 
Male: I'd be happier if we said let's fund solar cookers for India so they don't 424 
need to cut down the forests for firewood.  Just do that as an aid 425 
measure. 426 
Male: In addition to… 427 
Male: In addition to [inaudible].  I reckon we are rich enough. 428 
Male: In a way we have already committed ourselves to do that under the 429 
Copenhagen Accord.  We're … to that Accord that came out that 430 
we're going to… 431 
Male: Fork out some money. 432 
Male: Yes.  So at least in a way we're… 433 
Male: If that is actually implemented that's still got a question mark, you 434 
know.   435 
Male: If I could make an analogy, it's like Homer Simpson saying he doesn't 436 
need to go on a diet because some person in India is not eating 437 
doughnuts on his behalf.  It's absurd that Australia… 438 
Facilitator: So I think we've answered the question here.  Would you financially 439 
support the development of low emission technology?  It's just a 440 
question really of how much you should pay.  The discussion has led 441 
into the survey - that comes up next.  We've still got five minutes. 442 
Male: I've got a personal … that I'm not going to spend more money 443 
because I'll do some things less - you know, I'll go the shops five 444 
times in the car - a lot of these things are about cost increases. A lot 445 
of it's discretionary - are you going to have a 10 minute shower or a 446 
five minute shower. 447 
Male: Are you going to walk instead of drive? 448 
Male: It's a change in behaviour, but for many people it's driven by 449 
economic reasons. 450 
Male: But I think most people aren't going to change their shower length 451 
because it's costing them three cents.  You actually need to 452 
popularise that having a shorter shower is better. 453 
Male: I don't know whether enough people are so convinced. 454 
Male: …Unless you have a coin-in-the-slot shower - most people will say 455 
I've enjoyed this, I'll put another dollar in. 456 
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[Laughter] 457 
Claire: The problem is, we might well be prepared to pay - but the average 458 
Joe on the street probably won't be, and how do we sell it to them? 459 
Cynthia: It's like the GST or anything else. 460 
Brian: It's like the cigarette tax.  Just whack the tax up - everybody moans 461 
but they stop smoking so much. 462 
Claire: That party won't be elected because the opposition will sell it as a 463 
great big new tax. 464 
Male: That's right.  You've got to have bipartisan support for this kind of stuff 465 
before a cyclone devastates half of Europe or something like that and 466 
everybody wakes up to themselves.  I can't see any other way.  The 467 
thing is, what Rudd should have done is he should have slapped all 468 
this stuff on five minutes after he got elected, like when Whitlam… 469 
Female: Before everyone blinks. 470 
Male: The first two weeks.  They didn't even have a parliament sitting and 471 
they just whacked the whole stuff through and then - it didn't all work 472 
necessarily but they got into it, they did it early enough rather than 473 
waiting for three months before another election - you know, 474 
announcing a tax on … A real smart move. 475 
Male: Some of this is going to take a long time because some of our cities 476 
in Australia are designed in a way that consumes huge amounts of 477 
energy… 478 
Male: Or aren't designed in a way that consumes - it does take a while to 479 
say well now we're in a position that you can actually do your grocery 480 
shopping without needing to drive and… 481 
Male: I remember that [Canberra] was designed specifically with the car in 482 
mind. 483 
Male: So it's going to take a while to… 484 
Male: …timeline for what we do early and what we [unclear] for later - 485 
bridges and suburbs or whether it's what the farmer's going to grow - 486 
which crops. 487 
Male: The penny will drop for people when we have three hot summers in a 488 
row, when there are electricity brownouts at a time that they really 489 
wanted their air conditioning to work.  Then people will say maybe I 490 
need to spend money on that awning so… 491 
Male: I don't know.  I think that's the boiling frog syndrome.  I think it's too 492 
late by the time it gets to that stage. 493 
Male: They had that big fire in Victoria 18 months ago - and that was a 494 
hellishly hot summer and the result was this huge fire.  I don't know 495 
what's happening down there, whether people have sort of thought 496 
oh, this is a bit… 497 
Male: We had one here just seven years ago.   498 
Male: Is anybody thinking oh, you know - we talked about the increasing 499 
frequency of… 500 
Female: Extreme weather events 501 
Male: These sorts of things happening but it hasn't twigged with most 502 
people 503 
Male: Certainly not the politicians. 504 
Male: I actually don't think that's true.  I still reckon more than 50 per cent of 505 
the politicians in the House of Representatives know what we know.  506 
353 
 
But they got these marginal seats with swinging voters and that's 507 
[unclear] because they want to stay in… 508 
Male: It wouldn't surprise me to find that the electricity system will not cope 509 
with hot summers. Because we're not building any new electricity 510 
plants. 511 
[Over speaking] 512 
Male: …in Canberra. 513 
Male: There was a brownout. 514 
Male: Yes, absolutely.  I mean it's a huge issue because everyone thinks… 515 
Male: What are they going to say?  Are they going to say let's build another 516 
power plant? 517 
Male: Well that's what John [Sutton] wanted to do.   518 
Male: They don't suddenly think oh hang on, those sort of signals people 519 
were talking about 10 years ago and five years ago and one year ago 520 
are starting to happen… 521 
 The frog gets a bit warmer and he says oh, I can cope with it, you 522 
know. 523 
Male: …the oil all over the ocean, when the act of putting that pump into 524 
your car is what means that they're there.  People don't make the 525 
connection - that's something to… 526 
Male: I still think we've got to have Arnies, you know - they've got… 527 
Male: Brian, on really hot days you could turn the electricity off from 10:00 528 
o'clock till five and people would realise that they got hot because of 529 
the sun shining on the glass and they couldn't put their air cons on, 530 
therefore they had to do something about it. 531 
Male: Maybe the best thing that you can do is just turn your air conditioning 532 
right up and black out the whole of Canberra, brownout the 533 
politicians.  Then maybe people would realise… 534 
Male: Or pay someone in a power station to just flick the switch off - see 535 
what happens. 536 
Facilitator: Okay, well that's all.  We've got another minute till we come back … 537 
survey. 538 
Ian: How much we're going to pay depends very much on how confident 539 
we are about what is to do 540 
Cynthia: It is a trust issue. 541 
Ross: The government should just spend $5 billion a year as part of the 542 
consolidated revenue to do this sort of stuff - but it's not going to 543 
happen because of this trust thing. 544 
Male: It's happening now because most of it is going into carbon capture 545 
and the money that was allocated for solar has now been put into 546 
cash for clunkers. 547 
Female: So everyone's buying up old cars… 548 
Male: That's basically … policy … everyone's buying clunkers so… 549 
Male: It's nothing to do with the environment… 550 
Male: Although the figure that was quoted - costing $10,000 a ton. 551 
Male: I mean, she's just looking around for somewhere where there's spare 552 
cash - oh I know, we can pull it out of there and whack it in here and 553 
that will get our votes, you know.  In some ways it will serve her right 554 
if it doesn't work - even though I… 555 
Male: Well the definition of work is winning votes. 556 
Male: That's right …seats. 557 
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Male: That's actually how politics works - focus groups and… 558 
Male: Your comment earlier about cups of coffee … All the money we're 559 
talking about is… 560 
Female: A few cups of coffee. 561 
Male: I mean, we're having this giant debate about … go to the movies… 562 
Male: That's the tragedy of it. 563 
Male: People don't even think about it.  They just go okay, if that's the price 564 
of going to the movies and getting popcorn. 565 
Male: $8?  I wish.  $20? 566 
Male: No, for the popcorn. 567 
Male: If you want to see movies check the … it's only seven bucks there. 568 
Interviewee: …six bucks for students on a Tuesday. 569 
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Facilitator: So I guess looking at the flags, that's the percentage of electricity 1 
produced by renewable energy.  So it looks like we're commonly 2 
amongst the developed countries, aren't we - and some other nations, 3 
largely in Europe, are making a greater effort for renewables. 4 
Male 1: Austria gets 70 per cent.  That's got to be nuclear is it? 5 
Male 2: North Korea, though, is 100 per cent.   6 
Interviewee: Austria would have a lot of private… 7 
Male 2: A couple of Honda JetRangers out the back. 8 
Facilitator: Okay, so we're going to start discussion three and it's would you 9 
financially support the development of low emission technologies?  10 
So the scenario is the Australian government is expanding its clean 11 
energy initiative and so that's an additional $5.1 billion.  What does 12 
that mean to anyone here?  Is it difficult to sort of imagine what that 13 
is? 14 
Stephanie: I like the notes, the notes made it easy.   15 
Facilitator: The notes?  Okay.  So we've cut that down and that's over 10 years.  16 
So this complements the target, the energy target of 20 per cent of 17 
Australia's electricity supplies.  So that translates to $35 per year.  I 18 
think most of us could probably afford that. 19 
Alan: A dollar now in 10 years' time will be worth 50 cents, if that.  So taking 20 
into account inflation, this is actually a very miserly amount of money. 21 
Dan: Yes, $35 is nothing. 22 
Facilitator: So when you have a look in terms of the Australian government, 23 
we're looking at - well what would 0.2 per cent of the whole budget be 24 
in relation to what they spend at the moment?  The majority is spent 25 
on social security and welfare.  It would be more similar to - the 26 
smallest amount is community services and culture.  So we're not 27 
looking at a large amount of money, are we, comparatively to what's 28 
being spent now? 29 
Male 2: I'd probably have no problems with the amount, only that they're 30 
spending a great bulk of it on inventing another low emission motor 31 
vehicle or something when everyone else is doing it it's a waste of 32 
money. 33 
Alan: It's called clean coal. 34 
 The other thing as well is - just because this is a little bee in my 35 
bonnet - if you also put in here NBN - in probably less than five years 36 
they've only spent $43 billion on NBN with no justification. 37 
Facilitator: NBN?  The National Broadband Network. 38 
Alan: So you look at that.  I mean that money would keep health going for 39 
almost a year.  It would keep CSIRO going for 50 years.  So when 40 
you look at that money, where there's no attempt to quantify or 41 
measure or report back on positive outcomes of that expense, this is 42 
an incredibly miserly amount of money, given you've got to be able to 43 
very clearly see the outcome of this… 44 
Facilitator: Given now, from the presentation today, the enormity of what might 45 
be ahead of us, then you were trying to put it into a perspective.  So 46 
the first question is, is it enough?   47 
Male 2: I'm not sure, because this is only the government's contribution to it.  48 
There's a lot of commercial money going into this very same question, 49 
probably even more than that.  Because there is a commercial 50 
advantage for anyone who develops the low emission technology.  I 51 
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mean if you can invent the technology that … low emission coal, you 52 
know [unclear] coal - you'd be worth billions. 53 
Dan: [Unclear]? 54 
Facilitator: Yes, I assume that the $5.1 billion, which becomes $35 per person 55 
per year, will be drawn from a new tax to be imposed on individuals 56 
directly by the government.  So if this is an individual's tax of $35 per 57 
year for the next 10 years, do you think that's enough? 58 
Elaine: It depends on what else is happening at the time.  If you've also got 59 
an emissions trading scheme or a carbon tax, then it probably is.  If 60 
this is all that's going on it probably isn't. 61 
Dan: Twenty per cent is not enough I think.  In countries like Spain and 62 
Germany, they're already there.  So 20 per cent we are looking at 63 
2020.   64 
Elaine: Oh, the target. 65 
Dan: Yes, the target is 20 per cent, it's not good enough. 66 
Facilitator: So that means that perhaps we might need to crank it up a bit? 67 
Dan: Yes, another $50 per year and then we… 68 
Facilitator: So is there anyone else with an opinion on that? 69 
Male 2: Well, I wonder whether the question is better put by saying is it 70 
enough, could - would - people be prepared to spend more?  I think 71 
that people would be prepared to spend more than - what have we 72 
got - $35 per person per year.  So I think if you put it that way you 73 
could say you could increase the $5.1 billion. 74 
Male 1: Could I come at it from another way though?  You've got to spend this 75 
on something, you've got to give it to people, you've got to give it to 76 
researchers or developers, and it's an awful lot of money for a small 77 
select group of developers and researchers. 78 
Dan: Is it? 79 
Male 1: I would think so. 80 
Facilitator: Well it would go into infrastructure wouldn't it, in terms of… 81 
Alan: It says here on research and development… 82 
Male 1: That's a lot of money. 83 
Dan: Half of $500 million a year. 84 
Male 1: What do you reckon Stephanie?  You're in that field. 85 
Stephanie: CRCs commonly get between $20 million and $40 million of 86 
Commonwealth money over seven to 10 years.  That's just a 87 
research grant.   88 
Male 1: So half a billion dollars would be… 89 
Alan: Commercialisation is at least 10 times the cost of research. 90 
 So for every dollar you put in to R&D to actually get it to a usable 91 
product, it's at least 10 times that. 92 
Male 1: Yes, you've got to look at - it's not a lot of money because - you're 93 
putting development in this as well as… 94 
Alan: If you take the $5 billion and use my rule of thumb, so you divide that 95 
by 10 - so that's about half a billion dollars going into research over 96 
10 years because the rest of it's going to be spent on actually getting 97 
… to market as a working thing...  So given CSIRO was about a 98 
billion dollars a year last time I looked, it's actually not a big - certainly 99 
upfront it's a crap investment and I don't think it will pay for 100 
commercialisation … gut feel.  You CSIRO people know how difficult 101 
it is to get something to market. 102 
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Facilitator: Yes well, I guess we've got patent systems and things like that … it's 103 
very hard to get new innovations into the market, it's very expensive. 104 
Male 2: Do CRCs do much development or are they… 105 
Stephanie: It depends on the CRC but it would go between more esoteric type 106 
stuff like climate and weather risk, that's an application in this current 107 
round - so they're looking at that sort of the stuff - to the ones that do 108 
widgets, like the CRC for Polymers does widget and has done 109 
ceramic stuff for around cables.  So when a fire hits it just turns into a 110 
ceramic. 111 
Alan: So if the government put in $5.1 billion, how much would you get from 112 
industry for the CRCs and not just… 113 
Stephanie: You'd at least match it, and to be competitive in the CRCs these days 114 
in the selection round you need to be putting in at least three times 115 
that. 116 
Alan: Industry? 117 
Stephanie: Industry. 118 
Alan: So the $5.1 billion would be multiplied to probably get a total of about 119 
$20 billion.   120 
Male 2: But that's assuming the industries… 121 
Male 1: If you get serious about it, industry … income out of.  They're already 122 
into it, you know. 123 
Alan: If the … wants to reduce their carbon taxes… 124 
Male 1: No, I was meaning the industries that produce the … gear, like the 125 
solar panels. 126 
Alan: There's two players.  Those who want to turn it into services of 127 
products for them to make money, but also the people that… 128 
Male 1: You've got to have both, yes. 129 
Alan: So there's a couple of people in the value chain. 130 
Male 2: There's probably [unclear], though, in the system isn’t there, if you've 131 
got this 20 per cent target for renewables for instance, plus the 132 
prospect of some sort of carbon tax or carbon trading - I think there's 133 
an incentive for industry to put money into this type of research. 134 
Alan: Guess where that would come from?  So you know, whether you 135 
would pay $70 directly or $35 directly and $35 indirectly… 136 
Male 1: You've got to remember that part of the question was that it would be 137 
an additional tax, when in fact the government would have no trouble 138 
finding $500 million out of the current… 139 
Facilitator: I know that in previous discussions we've had, people were keen to 140 
be involved in the whole scheme and thought it was important and 141 
that climate change should be mitigated or that there should be some 142 
adaptation.   143 
 I'm guessing this would allow some strategies to create mitigation or 144 
some adaptation, but when it comes down to willingness to pay and 145 
an actual amount for each individual it's much harder then isn't it to 146 
understand.  Are you completely prepared to pay anything that the 147 
government asks you to in order for that to occur or would you… 148 
Alan: Can we rephrase that? 149 
Elaine: It depends on what they're going to do with the money. 150 
Alan: I believe we have no choice - I wouldn't argue with $35.  If that was it 151 
was and it achieved 20 per cent I'd be buying some French 152 
champagne.  So I would very happily pay $35.  Now if you then asked 153 
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me a supplementary question, at what level would you start 154 
complaining?  In my case, I'm being honest, it would probably be 155 
more like $1000.  The point is, that figure I think could be higher.  So 156 
if the question is would you pay 35 bucks?  Everybody would say yes. 157 
Male 1: Not necessarily for this.  I would quite happily pay $100 extra a year 158 
to go on my electricity bill for more research into how to power 159 
electricity rather than what could be esoteric nonsense floating 160 
around. 161 
Alan: Isn't that just how - you have more confidence in that getting results. 162 
Male 1: I know what research the money's going to. 163 
Alan: That's a separate question. So would it be true to say on the table - 164 
aside from those who genuinely can't afford it - 35 bucks is no sweat 165 
at all and easy … times that before anyone would complain.  But 166 
there are concerns about the mechanism.  There's more concern 167 
about the mechanism of a direct tax administered by the government 168 
than there is about … tax or levy or… 169 
Elaine: Is it just for R&D or is it really about getting systems out there?  Are 170 
we looking at 20 per cent when we might get there by other means 171 
anyway, or is it - if we're going to be taxed extra we want it to be a 172 
higher target?  Like you, I'm happy for $1000 a year, but not for 20 173 
per cent target.  I want a much higher target for that amount of 174 
money. 175 
Alan: Wow, you're a tough voter. 176 
Male 1: I don't think the two are necessarily linked, though, because… 177 
Elaine: No.  But that's what I'm saying, that the amount of money depends on 178 
what it's being used for.  If it's R&D over a 10 year programme I'm 179 
going to see - and if that's just for getting concept demonstrators out 180 
there and there's no change to our emissions for 10 years because 181 
we've got this great initiative to do more R&D - I'm sorry, I don't want 182 
… because I don't think it's a good initiative.  If it's actually about 183 
getting more renewables out there within that 10 year period, then 184 
yes, I'm willing to pay for it.  So it depends on the details. 185 
Alan: Probably a lot would be spent through CRCs and similar 186 
organisations like that because they're really our main research and 187 
development organisations. 188 
Male 1: They've already put money into research for the hybrid motor vehicle. 189 
Alan: They will, but if you're going to attract industry money, and as 190 
Stephanie said it's typically three to one - industry won't invest in R&D 191 
unless they can see some real practical applications and a return on 192 
their investment in the long run.  I think that's your guarantee that you 193 
are spending the money as efficiently as you can. 194 
Dan: I've been doing research on solar panels for the past six months… 195 
Facilitator: Hang on a sec guys - one conversation. 196 
Dan: I've been doing research on solar panels for the past six months.  197 
What I've noticed is nothing made in Australia is available.  198 
Everything is either made in China, Germany or Japan. So where the 199 
money's going to doing research and development?  Where the 200 
money is going?  Are they going to just buy things from outside and 201 
then sell them to us again?  Is this what they're going to do? 202 
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Alan: Probably, because that's what happens is - the R&D - particularly 203 
when there's industry money - gets to a point and then somebody 204 
takes the IP and manufactures it in other cities. 205 
Dan: Yes, that's what … they will set up a factory in China or somewhere 206 
and then… 207 
Facilitator: We're outsourcing a lot of manufacturing.  It doesn't mean that… 208 
Dan: Outsourcing is okay.  These are things made in China, Japan and 209 
Germany - I can't find anything made in Australia. 210 
Female: Does it matter? 211 
Alan: We had a solar panel industry - people were making solar panels, 212 
you'll remember, a few years ago.  Then they closed their plant down 213 
because they just couldn't… 214 
Dan: Yes, they couldn't afford it… 215 
Alan: But if we do the R&D and we own the IP and then … licensing of that 216 
IP - that's just with Australia being a clever country isn't it, that we 217 
have the IPs and low cost manufacturers don't underplay… 218 
Male 2: So we have it manufactured in the country with an excellent record of 219 
respecting IPs. 220 
[Laughter] 221 
Elaine: That's why CSIRO took everyone to court about the wifi. 222 
Facilitator: At the beginning we said that we wanted to reduce emissions 223 
because it was the right thing to do.  So the issue of where it's 224 
manufactured and the economic benefits and whatever is a different 225 
question to… 226 
 Do we want to invest in getting better methods to solve the problem 227 
or are we only willing to do it if it's manufactured and all the benefits 228 
go to Australia? 229 
Dan: I'm talking about the research.  They're spending money on 230 
research… 231 
Stephanie: Just to give an example, with CRCs part of their remit is that they 232 
have to maximise benefit to Australia.  It doesn't say it has to be 233 
manufactured in Australia, just maximise benefit to Australia. 234 
Male 2: That's pretty vague. 235 
Facilitator: They have been [unclear] a few times. 236 
Alan: Can I chuck a spanner in the works and say well, you know, let's 237 
assume that all our developed nation colleagues are thinking along 238 
the same lines as us.  Our paltry $5 billion is a drop in the ocean.  239 
Why don't we let them develop the technologies?  What we will do is 240 
focus on adaption technology … in other words accept the fact that 241 
the world is unlikely to meet these targets, but there will be useful 242 
products coming through.  Let someone else develop those and we 243 
put our money into basically coping with the fact that we're not going 244 
to reach 20 per cent. 245 
Male 2: I think that's a bit negative. 246 
Alan: Sure it is. 247 
Male 2: Because I think you're underestimating Australia's R&D potential 248 
here. We do have some really unique advantages in solar technology, 249 
for instance - and opportunities there, which other countries - northern 250 
hemisphere countries - probably don't have.  So we've got the 251 
opportunity to be world leaders.   252 
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 Already there are some breakthroughs - this technology being used in 253 
California at the moment, which is solar thermal technology 254 
developed in Australia.  They couldn't get a backer in Australia and 255 
moved offshore.  But it is Australian technology.  Geothermal's 256 
another one which is very, very much - it has to be local and that is to 257 
be developed here.  There's a lot of research and development 258 
needed there. 259 
Alan: So is the caveat in this then that - in developing this IP - because this 260 
is research and development, not commercialisation - I'm reading into 261 
it.  The caveat is that you know that's got to be - something can be 262 
commercialised, preferably in Australia and well within this timeframe 263 
of 10 years. 264 
Male 2: Well, I guess that that would be up to whoever's administering the 265 
funds, and CRCs have been looking into this - and if the funds fly to 266 
CSIRO I would imagine they'd be doing the same, wouldn't they, in 267 
terms of prioritising the research and development? 268 
Facilitator: Yes, well you can only get people thinking about some cash.   269 
[Laughter] 270 
 So as you were saying, have we got sufficient brains trust in Australia 271 
to get bang for your buck, I guess.  Was that it as well? 272 
Alan: Well, it's just that what we've got could be applied to a problem that 273 
other people are not going to be thinking about.  Other people are 274 
going to be thinking about low emission and energy production.  Let 275 
them do that and we'll have another niche that we focus on.  I'm not 276 
pushing it, I… 277 
Male 2: There's plenty of niches, I'm saying, in solar energy especially where 278 
Australia could be a world leader. 279 
Male 3: I'd like to see Australia be a solar world leader, that's for sure. 280 
Dan: A lot of sunshine. 281 
Interviewee: Sunshine?  That's right, yes. 282 
Facilitator: Those guys are in the dark for six months aren't they, over in northern 283 
Europe? 284 
Male 2: Could I come back to the amount that people are prepared to spend?  285 
Because I think that's an interesting one.  You've got your figures of 286 
$35 per person per year and in responding to that questionnaire that 287 
was sent out before today's session, I responded like you did - around 288 
about $100 a month.  It wasn't clear to me in the questionnaire 289 
whether you were talking about per person or per household.  A lot of 290 
bills come in - like an electricity bill is per household and not per 291 
person.  So I've tended to answer it on a per household basis. 292 
Dan: I think it was more about … money because this is only for the 293 
working people. 294 
Alan: Yes, you should put this in lay terms. It should say two packets of 295 
ciggies or a slab of beer. 296 
Facilitator: You're right, one of the questions is would you prefer it to be GST or 297 
income based - if you did want to collect that amount of money, which 298 
might be more than $35, up to $1000 a year, is that right? 299 
Male 1: Just do whatever the normal taxation we pay now.   300 
Male 2: I don't think it is, but… 301 
Facilitator: So that would be income based, so that would be fairer? 302 
Male 2: What about a levy on electricity bills? 303 
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Male 1: Yes, I don't mind that. 304 
Alan: I've got a bit of a concern about all these special levies.  A good 305 
example is air travel.  There's all these uplifts - you don't know what 306 
they are and where they're going.  We should trust the government - 307 
they raise revenue and then it's their job to appropriate it sensibly.  308 
They reckon this is the right number - let them find it out of the 309 
general revenue and if that's not enough make some cuts, change 310 
some services or change the tax rate. 311 
Male 1: But not a special one. 312 
Alan: Because then there's an administrative overhead.  I mean the ATO is 313 
struggling to cope with tax … I mean Henry said let's simplify it and 314 
the government said oh, uh. 315 
Elaine: Well it's too scary.  We want those votes. 316 
Male 2: Yes, I agree with you.  I think that it's much simpler to just draw it out 317 
of consolidated revenue and - just like the other programmes.  318 
Male 1: We're talking about a minor amount, really, from the consolidated 319 
revenue. 320 
Facilitator: Did you want the R&D to ensure mitigation occurred?  You were 321 
mentioning that it had to be targeted but would you be happier if you 322 
felt that you contributed that amount of money and you knew where it 323 
was going and it led towards litigation rather than going in a big fund 324 
of taxation?  Is that important to you? 325 
Alan: No, because we don't make those judgements about all this stuff 326 
here.  I think everyone said earlier on, things like education - in many 327 
people's minds - are as important if not more important than climate 328 
change, but we don't say I want to see that $10 per child goes in the 329 
… there has to be some level of trust. 330 
Facilitator: So you'd just accept yet another tax, is that what you're saying?  But 331 
in your mind you knew what was going… 332 
Male 2: Well it's included in the… 333 
Male 1: In the normal consolidated revenue. 334 
Facilitator: So you don't think the general community needs that linkage, that 335 
they're actually contributing directly?  Because some of our 336 
discussions earlier meant that you wanted people more involved? 337 
Alan: No, but I'll tell you why - it's because then when there are optional 338 
schemes you'll say well no, I've done my $35, I'm not going to tick the 339 
box … If the government's doing its bit on our behalf, then there's 340 
more that we can do. But the moment government makes us do 341 
something, that reduces our discretionary - in our minds - our 342 
discretionary spending on… 343 
Facilitator: So you'd like it brought up like a Medicare levy? 344 
Stephanie: No.   345 
Facilitator: No? Just some magical calculation and you got less tax back? 346 
Stephanie: If they want to increase the tax rate or whatever else, but they just do 347 
it as funding this, this and this initiative, and this is to happen… 348 
Elaine: Because we don't know which fraction of our income goes to 349 
education or health or anything.   350 
Male 2: No.  I mean apart from… 351 
Facilitator: Would you be willing to contribute the same amount of money if only 352 
15 per cent of the energy target was achieved through the 353 
contribution that you made rather than 20 per cent?   354 
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Male 2: That's a bit of a silly question… 355 
Facilitator: But it's to complement - the R&D will complement the electricity 356 
supply, so I'm guessing it might be something like solar panels or 357 
whatever, which would contribute to the grid or something.  So that 358 
would be alternative energy into the grid and the target is 20 per cent.  359 
So if it dropped down to 15 per cent do you think that's still - you know 360 
- or should it go up to 25 per cent? 361 
Alan: Unfortunately, if it's only one per cent difference it makes, so be it.  362 
Then we have to do our utmost. 363 
Male 1: Yes, it's all a punt but we've got to do it. 364 
Male 2: Yes, we've got to do our utmost. 365 
Dan: …how much?  15, 16, 17, 18, 25 - if it goes up to 50 I'll be very 366 
happy. 367 
Facilitator: So you need the momentum and… 368 
 What would happen if the global financial crisis returned and people 369 
found a lot of pressure again about… 370 
Elaine: It's not going to return?  It's always going to happen. 371 
Dan: …to get the stimulus package. 372 
Elaine: The whole cash for schools and all of this sort of stuff - the 373 
government spending stimulates the economy and this is just another 374 
way of stimulating the economy, which has got future benefits.  This 375 
and infrastructure investment is what I think the government should 376 
be doing in the event of a global financial crisis because it's creating 377 
jobs and ensuring future prosperity by investing today, so… 378 
Alan: Yes, I think the potential impact of climate change if we do nothing 379 
makes GFC look like a walk in the park.  You know, my mate who lost 380 
$200,000 on the stock market with GFC - well, when his beachfront 381 
house worth $2 million falls into the sea I kind of think economically 382 
that's going to hit him harder. 383 
Male 1: If he's that rich I won't feel sorry for him. 384 
Elaine: I was going to say he probably loses - you know if he loses his 385 
waterfront property he probably only owns half of it and the bank 386 
owns the other half, so that he goes to being that much in debt rather 387 
than… 388 
Male 2: …big insurance payout. 389 
Alan: I got the sense today - and I have to say it sort of enlivened me in a 390 
sense - that there's such a positive feeling here that doing something 391 
is not optional.  You have to do it and you have to do it now.  Nobody 392 
is arguing against that. 393 
Elaine: It really doesn't matter what we do and if we get it wrong - like it's not 394 
an optimal solution - it's still got to be better than doing nothing. 395 
Facilitator: What if only 30 per cent of Australians contributed because the others 396 
were tax exempt, if you wanted to go the income based … Would 397 
that… 398 
Male 1: That happens anyway.  It's just like any other government 399 
expenditure or programme, isn't it?  Why single out the research on 400 
this particular area because the government's spending a huge 401 
amount on other research and development and this is just the same 402 
- it's just a question of the priority… 403 
Facilitator: Do you think all Australians should be asked to pay? 404 
Male 1: Good heavens, no - not pensioners. 405 
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Male 2: It's no different to research into, say… 406 
Elaine: I think with this sort of stuff - it's like saying well we're not going to 407 
educate poor kids.  You don't say I'm sorry, you can't have an 408 
education - your parents don't earn enough.  Everybody puts in for 409 
the good of the country and everything else. 410 
Alan: What I would be in favour of is nationalising poker machines and 411 
doubling the tax on ciggies. 412 
 That goes straight to a CRC.  There's a CRC called Casinos 413 
Australia. 414 
Male 2: I take it you're not a smoker or a gambler? 415 
Alan: How did you guess? 416 
Facilitator: What about the alcohol tax?  You didn't mention that. 417 
Alan: That would hurt too many people. 418 
Facilitator: Okay, so part B here.  Assume that the required funds will be 419 
collected by energy companies through increased energy prices.  420 
Okay?  So you're already contributing.  The energy companies would 421 
be required to meet the 20 per cent target but could use the raised 422 
funds at their discretion.  How much are you willing to contribute? 423 
Alan: Nothing. 424 
Facilitator: So is that lack of trust in the - it's a private company.  Basically 425 
instead of the money going to the government in taxes it would go to 426 
the… 427 
Male 1: The company would ... money any way they liked. 428 
Stephanie: Yes, but they've still got to meet a particular target. 429 
Elaine: So they could use it to invest in infrastructure or whatever else… 430 
Alan: If you had a trading scheme they'd just use the money to buy offsets. 431 
Male 2: Or pay higher profits. 432 
Male 1: No, it's [not going to increase to the 20 per cent]. 433 
Male 2: But what happens if they could do that without incurring a huge extra 434 
cost and we were contributing more through higher energy prices in 435 
the expectation that they would invest in R&D for a very significant 436 
long-term benefit, and they're not doing it? 437 
Male 1: It's not a concept that anyone would seriously consider.  If we're 438 
going to pay them the extra money it's got to go to - there's no 439 
discretion… 440 
Elaine: I think it should have discretion in terms of do they use it for R&D, do 441 
they use it for infrastructure, do they use it for that - but it has to be 442 
targeted towards renewable energy in some way or form. 443 
Facilitator: So you'd have trust in private companies?  Is that it?  Or… 444 
Male 2: It's still dodgy because they'd use that money to buy a new generator, 445 
which they were going to buy anyway, which means they pay a higher 446 
dividend to the shareholders - because they didn't have to buy the 447 
generator.  When people complained they'd say oh, energy efficient 448 
generator. 449 
Male 1: I think the thing we've got to realise is that the company is there for 450 
the benefit of shareholders.  The result is that their decisions rightfully 451 
have got to be made for the benefit of the shareholders - as well as 452 
being a good citizen - they've still got to be a good corporate citizen.   453 
Elaine: It must be invested rather than returned to the shareholders. 454 
Male 2: That actually does raise the very important issue that hasn't come up 455 
- is the European model, particularly the multiple bottom line model, 456 
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where you're not just accountable to your shareholders as the bottom 457 
line but others - so that is now - so there is [inaudible] there.  Then 458 
this sort of thing can conceivably be rolled into… 459 
Facilitator: So you'd like more accountability if you were to give… 460 
Male 2: The difficulty I have is that if a utility charges higher energy prices and 461 
then that goes into their revenue, there's no mechanism for the 462 
government to then stipulate how they spend that money unless the 463 
government introduces special legislation or something.  But at the 464 
moment governments can't tell companies how they spend their 465 
dollars on R&D, they do that themselves. 466 
Elaine: I think it depends on whether it's a levy which is collected by the 467 
organisations or whether it's just they say - well in order to meet these 468 
targets we need to put up the rates this much.  There's a difference in 469 
there.  So if they said well to meet these targets we have to put it up 470 
by $35 and they make the argument, people then go and pay it 471 
because they don't have a choice really - but that's okay.  Whereas if 472 
it's a levy which is a fixed amount that they are collecting which 473 
doesn't have anything to do with their bottom line, I think that's a 474 
different… 475 
Facilitator: The question is are you prepared to spend the $35 or up to $1000 476 
that you were prepared to contribute to the government?  Are you as 477 
prepared to contribute that to the electricity company? 478 
Male 2: No I'm not. 479 
Male 1: Hold on, if they put it in my bill what choice have I got? 480 
Facilitator: Because it's not related to how much electricity you use - it's just 481 
which group - do you think an electricity company would be more able 482 
to use the funds to become more efficient in its own industry, or 483 
should it go through the government and R&Ds and you know - 484 
where's the efficiency, I guess is the question. 485 
Male 1: I think that would be more a research organisation, not… 486 
Alan: Also, as well, a direct levy raises the issue of well, I can't afford to pay 487 
- sometimes rightly so, sometimes not.  So then the administration of 488 
it becomes problematic - and getting them to account for it.  There's 489 
too many holes in it. 490 
Facilitator: The electricity company? 491 
Elaine: Yes.  I think as a levy - if electricity prices went up $35 because 492 
everybody decided that that's what you needed, I'd pay it.  If it was 493 
more to reach a 50 per cent target, I'd pay that too. 494 
Alan: The reason is because there may be alternative suppliers - if they're 495 
all getting the $35 where's the… 496 
Facilitator: So you're not at all prepared to invest through one of the… 497 
Elaine: Not as a levy.  If it is an increased cost and they said we're going to 498 
increase your electricity cost to this much, and for that money we're 499 
doing this - I'd be happy to pay it. 500 
Male 1: I've still got the choice to go to another supplier. 501 
Elaine: But I've still got the choice to go to another supplier who may not 502 
charge that extra amount and may not be using renewables… 503 
Facilitator: So would you be prepared to give the $35 to the government and pay 504 
more to your electricity as well to try and… 505 
Elaine: I'm happy to do that. 506 
Facilitator: Have a couple of options, is that… 507 
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Male 2: Well the electricity companies - AGL and I think others do have this 508 
green energy program where subscribers can choose to pay a higher 509 
rate on the understanding that that amount of electricity is… 510 
Alan: I do. 511 
Male 2: I do too.  I pay a little bit more and there are other benefits in terms of 512 
[bundling] and so on, but the idea is that you can choose to buy green 513 
energy. 514 
Dan: How do you know you're getting green energy? 515 
Male 2: Well I hope it's … green energy. 516 
Alan: You watch it as it's coming in on the wire. 517 
[Over speaking] 518 
 In this are you considering [inaudible] things - like one of the things 519 
that I've no idea … CO2 - food marts for example.  I mean what we've 520 
got now is - the food system is based on a hub and spoke model and 521 
getting it from the cheapest market.  What about there are levies in 522 
supermarkets where stuff that's produced within 500 kilometres ends 523 
up being cheaper than something that's produced… 524 
Male 1: There already is a levy on it - it's called the transport costs.  Often it's 525 
not because they get it where it's cheapest, they get it where it's 526 
growing - at this particular season. 527 
Facilitator: I think this question was more linked with electricity - because we've 528 
been in other areas of discussions of this today.  Did you want to say 529 
something? 530 
Dan: I've got a disagreement actually.  How do we know we are getting the 531 
green energy at home when we sign up? 532 
Facilitator: You said you are? 533 
Dan: [Unclear]. 534 
Male 2: Well they don't necessarily guarantee that the electricity that's arriving 535 
in your house is the green electricity, but what they say is if 50 per 536 
cent of Australians went 10 per cent green energy then they'll work 537 
out exactly what percentage that should be out of the total electricity 538 
mix.  Then they'll guarantee that that percentage of green electricity 539 
that's being bought by the Australian people will actually be produced 540 
by renewable… 541 
Elaine: Like actual accounts of their stuff - so okay, this is how many people 542 
we had and this is how much green energy we had to produce.  This 543 
is how much green energy we actually produced. 544 
Alan: If you believe that, I've got some watches and rings you might be 545 
interested in. 546 
Elaine: It's like free range eggs.  There's more free range eggs sold in 547 
Australia than there are actually free range chickens. 548 
Male 2: The thing is, these are the best … we've got at the moment, so if 549 
you're not going to trust them then don't trust anything. 550 
Male 1: Good advice. 551 
Facilitator: So we're just about to get some forms, again just to complete that 552 
questionnaire, and then you're free.  So thank you so much for your… 553 
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Facilitator: We've got about 40 minutes for discussion for the next section.  We'll 1 
break it into three parts.  The first part is the Australian government is 2 
expanding its clean energy initiative. 3 
Female: Is it really or is this just a scenario? 4 
Facilitator: No, it really is - $5.1 billion will be spent over 10 years in research 5 
and development for low emission energy technologies, including 6 
carbon capture, storage and solar energy.  That was announced May 7 
2010.  It complements the government's expanded renewable energy 8 
target - by 2020, 20 per cent of Australia's electricity supplies will 9 
come from renewable sources. 10 
 So the question is, assume that the required $5.1 billion will be drawn 11 
from a new tax to be imposed upon individuals directly by the 12 
government.  Is $5.1 billion enough?  That accounts to about $35 per 13 
person, so how about more or less or - what's the opinion? 14 
Kevin: How would you possibly know? 15 
Female: Exactly.  I'd like to know what it's going to cost to get us lower than 16 
that amount, but if that's… 17 
Kevin: What does that $5.1 billion then give us?  What does it actually do? 18 
Facilitator: Well it's research and development. 19 
Kevin: In these different areas, is that it? 20 
Facilitator: It's in… 21 
Female: Carbon capture… 22 
Facilitator: Carbon capture, storage and solar. 23 
Female: Apparently geothermal's in there as well and [unclear] hydro. 24 
Facilitator: So there will be probably others as well… 25 
Female: Does this $5.1 billion guarantee a 20 per cent reduction in… 26 
Facilitator: Well, I don't think they can guarantee… 27 
Kevin: Is that its goal? 28 
Florian: They think they do something with this carbon capture crap, you 29 
know… 30 
Facilitator: I guess the question is, maybe going around, how much would each 31 
person be willing to contribute to research and development on these 32 
type of schemes? 33 
Female: This is only $35 a person? 34 
Facilitator: Yes. 35 
Female: Much more than that. 36 
Female: That's a pittance isn't it?  Nothing - it's ridiculous. 37 
Mike: I'd have to look at this on a monthly income basis. 38 
Kevin: Well, $35 is like $2… 39 
Female: $1 a day. 40 
Kevin: It's less than that. 41 
Female: It would have to be - people on pensions - my mum would struggle 42 
sometimes finding $35 to pay. 43 
Kate: We were talking earlier about the equivalent of a Medicare levy, 44 
which I think isn't a bad way - when I was thinking about it before I 45 
came, I sort of thought about what people pay for private health 46 
insurance - and that's quite a bit more than that.  It's more than you 47 
pay for your Medicare.  Medicare is - like a percentage of your 48 
income, so… 49 
Facilitator: So maybe the discussion should turn to how much and how?  The 50 
individual, who pays… 51 
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Florian? Shall we go around? 52 
Facilitator: Yes, or however you feel… 53 
Kevin: Well I like the Medicare.  I think if you set it at one per cent or 54 
whatever and everybody pays and at the end of the year it goes in … 55 
then they can deal with it.  So that's my [inaudible].  It's got to be able 56 
to be flexible enough to not slam the poor and not let the rich get off 57 
with not paying. 58 
 So I think that an annual sort of one per cent or two per cent or 59 
whatever - probably one per cent I would think.  It wouldn't bother me 60 
but it will impact on others. 61 
Female: It will also create jobs - you know, that kind of money is… 62 
Kevin: Well, that's what it should do. 63 
Female: I'm not sure how much of the Medicare levy actually goes towards … 64 
One would want the levy or whatever we call it - looking that it is 65 
actually … levy but that it does go actually to the R&D… 66 
Mike: I see that the government says they're going to appoint overseers to 67 
ensure the money is actually being spent in the right direction.  What 68 
you just mentioned makes sense.  This levy - is levied on the 69 
individuals - can we be sure that all of those levies do go towards this 70 
R&D and assistance in construction of wind farms or whatever it 71 
might be.  Not disappear back into consolidated revenue. 72 
Female: Yes.  Can I ask a question about the levy?  If you are on a very, very 73 
low income, chances are you're reducing your emissions anyway just 74 
because you're probably not using your clothes dryer and other 75 
things.  You may not have a vehicle, you might be on public transport.  76 
So a levy - a 1.5 per cent levy, which is what we all currently pay on 77 
Medicare - the chances are most of us are going to use at some point 78 
or another the health care system in some way or another.  If you're 79 
on a very low income is it fair to expect people on very, very low 80 
incomes who perhaps already are reducing their emissions… 81 
Mike: We can exempt them. 82 
Female: So do we have a… 83 
Female: Medicare has an exemption for low income earners, so I would 84 
assume one could talk about it being levied in exactly the same way. 85 
Facilitator: I have a stat here which is only 30 per cent of Australians would be 86 
required to pay tax after tax exemptions.  So if it's done through 87 
that… 88 
Female: Okay, so do we say something as per Medicare provision, Medicare 89 
rules or regulations, that kind of thing? 90 
Kevin: I'm sorry, could you clarify that again?  You said 30 per cent what? 91 
Facilitator: Thirty per cent of Australians are required to pay tax after tax 92 
exemptions. 93 
Kevin: Oh, I see what you're saying.  But that's income tax, that's not 94 
necessarily Medicare levy. 95 
Female: …pay a Medicare levy although they don't pay the other tax. 96 
Facilitator: So this $35 assumes only 67.5 per cent of Australians would have to 97 
pay. 98 
Kevin: I think it should be more like a 1.5 per cent Medicare levy where 99 
there's a cut-off - if you don't earn above a certain amount you don't 100 
pay anything. 101 
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Mike: That's sensible - I mean, obviously cut out pensions and things like 102 
that - there's no point in… 103 
Kevin: If you're on pensions?  Yes, I think that's a good idea. 104 
Female: Now we're talking about this as opposed to a carbon tax or anything 105 
else - this is a separate thing? 106 
Facilitator: Well, if it was to be drawn from a new tax, that's right. 107 
Mike: It's just a tax by another name, isn't it?  But we quarantine this one so 108 
that… 109 
Female: But it has nothing to do whether we have a carbon… 110 
Kevin: This only goes for renewable energy. 111 
Florian: I just wanted to say - the question is how it's spent - if it goes into 112 
things like carbon capture, which has already been proven to be very, 113 
very difficult to achieve, if ever.  Certainly in Canberra it's such a 114 
showcase - they start it here to silence the critics of the coal industry.  115 
But if it really goes into - prove me wrong - but anyway that's not the 116 
issue.  If it really goes into renewable energy and the development of 117 
new technologies, like it did in Germany - as you can see here - 60 118 
per cent, which I think is a rather conservative number, very 119 
conservative - but it's already two years old, or three years old.  So if 120 
it's… 121 
Female: The Australian one … forestry… 122 
Facilitator: On that point, they say it's for 20 per cent - is the target to reduce 123 
electricity supply.  With the uncertainty how would you feel if it was 15 124 
per cent - you know, if they said 20 per cent is what you're paying for 125 
but you only actually get 15 per cent reductions? 126 
Mike: Well, what worries me is the actual figure, where you arrive at a 127 
percentage.  To me it could be anywhere between five per cent and 128 
15 per cent or 20 per cent - but I'd need further information to assess 129 
[unclear] and I'm not getting it, I'm just getting people banding 130 
numbers at me without any true validity as to… 131 
Female: Well we talked earlier, it wasn't - yes, okay.  Why 20 per cent? Why 132 
has the government set this 20 per cent figure?  Do you know the 133 
answer to that?  No. 134 
Kevin: I think when they're talking about renewable energy a lot of the 135 
European countries believe that it's capable of bringing their systems 136 
up because there's the power lines involved, there's all the generators 137 
or the things that transmit the power. They reckon that 20 per cent is 138 
a reasonable sort of target to reach - just because that's what their 139 
systems can deal with.  Because you have the infrastructure - where 140 
you put in a wind farm - you've got to have that tied into the grid.  So 141 
there's all these sorts of restrictions on how that's done.  I don't know 142 
all the technicalities of it. 143 
Female: It's very arbitrary.  Your question's a very good one because it is an 144 
arbitrary number.  This is a problem [with everything]… 145 
Kevin: I'm not sure it's that arbitrary though.  I think pretty much what - they 146 
figure that the infrastructure that they have in place that deals with 147 
giving us our power are capable of dealing with it.  Now there's 148 
probably pluses and minuses depending on how much you upgrade 149 
the infrastructure.  Like your power lines.  What they're aiming at now 150 
is a lot of locally produced energy that goes into small sort of areas.  151 
Instead of sending your electricity down power lines all across the 152 
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state or all across the country, which loses a lot of power, they're 153 
thinking now in terms of having local… 154 
Female: But that's initially very expensive. 155 
Female: The thing of expense - we've got this little graph underneath saying 156 
defence is going to spend $21 thousand million in one year - this is a 157 
budget for one year.  We're deciding is $5.1 billion over 10 years 158 
good enough for - like I don't see it's a big problem that we're a little 159 
bit hazy on is it going to reduce it by 20 or 10 per cent.  We're only 160 
asking for $5.1 billion.  All of these other things - in one year nothing 161 
even comes close to just that piddly little amount.  We're quite happy 162 
to spend… 163 
Florian: It shows the priority this country has. 164 
Female: Yes.  So is it going to be 20 per cent or is it going to reduce it by only 165 
15 per cent - just get on with it, let's try and do it - we're fighting 166 
around the edges at the moment. 167 
Facilitator: What about Liana?  What do you think? 168 
Liana: Yes, I do agree with you, get on with it.  A 20 per cent figure - well.  Is 169 
there a particular question you want me to answer?  I'm sort of 170 
listening and agreeing. 171 
Facilitator: Nancy?  Do you have any opinions? 172 
Nancy: No, nothing particular. 173 
Female: So the question is would we financially support the development of 174 
low emission technologies?  We've said yes we would.  We like the 175 
idea of a levy that would perhaps be on top of the carbon tax, is that 176 
right? 177 
Mike: I thought it was substituting it… 178 
Female: Yes, that's what I'm wondering.  Is this a substitute or is this on top of 179 
- is this a levy that we as the citizens of Australia pay on top of the 180 
carbon tax that presumably the biggest polluters pay? 181 
Mike? What was the initial estimation of the carbon tax … what was the 182 
calculation? 183 
Facilitator: Well it's raising $5.1 billion - where's that money coming from?  If it's 184 
paid through a tax who pays?  Just say there's another financial crisis 185 
and more people are being pushed to the edge and this extra 186 
money's - you know - how would you feel about that? 187 
Mike: Well you've got to suspend things at some time… 188 
Female: Take it from developments… 189 
Kevin: Again you would have it on how much people were earning.  If there 190 
was another financial downturn a lot of people would be earning less 191 
than possibly the level that you set it at.  So they wouldn't be paying 192 
this levy.  Maybe the levy of 1.5 per cent is a bit excessive, actually, 193 
thinking about that - in my mind it should just be for renewable energy 194 
to get that up to 20 per cent.  Say maybe a half a per cent or 195 
something like that.  But enough to do the job properly.  I mean $5.1 196 
billion… 197 
Facilitator: How much is enough?  How much would… 198 
Kevin: How would we possibly know?  I'd be willing to spend $100 a month, 199 
but that's me. 200 
Female: This is what I was saying, you know - I'd be prepared to pay what I'm 201 
paying now for private health insurance.   202 
Facilitator: What would be your expectation for others? 203 
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Female: Well, you see, this is where it becomes very difficult because … it's 204 
alright for me because I can afford to pay it, which is why something 205 
along the lines of the Medicare levy, which actually then takes into 206 
account incomes and things like that, is to me a more sensible way to 207 
go about it. 208 
Mike: A levy can be placed on business as well as individual people, so … 209 
1.5 per cent to ourselves - but what about we start to think of the levy 210 
more towards … that are causing the greatest pollution?  We may 211 
well be making them … technologically to improve themselves … The 212 
technology may not be there to actually improve themselves.  A levy 213 
gathered from all around - it makes an awful lot of money for the 214 
CSIRO and the ANU and organisations that can start to make a 215 
definite benefit. 216 
Helen: You know, from a policy perspective, if you're a huge polluter and 217 
you're a guy that has a business that only deals in green energy - 218 
he's going to be really pissed off that you're paying 1.5 per cent when 219 
BHP down the road that's burning brown coal or whoever it is - is 220 
paying 1.5 per cent as well.  Just to complicate things further, is the 221 
concept of rewarding - or increasing for big polluters, and rewarding 222 
for low … I know this is really complicated but these are exactly the 223 
policies… 224 
Female: We're only talking about $5.1 billion is only $35 a year per person. 225 
Female: We are, but I think we've all decided - haven't we all decided that yes, 226 
this is just a - like frankly - a piece of piss and anybody - we can do 227 
this, we agree with this. 228 
Female: I don't know whether we need to, like, for this one… 229 
Female: The question is, would you financially support - they're asking what… 230 
Kevin: That's the question, yes. 231 
Female: We've said yes and we've taken this into a whole new level of 232 
conversation where now what we're doing is - we're creating an 233 
entirely different policy space to work in, where we're talking about… 234 
Female: Having said we're prepared to pay this amount of money, which I 235 
personally have said is like health insurance - what if on top of that 236 
you're also paying a fairly large increase because of some carbon tax 237 
that's been imposed as well?  So are you happy to go with both of 238 
those? 239 
Female: Would we have to?  There's just not enough information here. 240 
Facilitator: Well, just say for example there was the energy company's …What 241 
would that do to prices?  Increase them.  So if the energy companies 242 
are required to meet the 20 per cent target and they can use funds 243 
through increased prices to do that, do you trust the energy 244 
companies to make those changes? 245 
Mike: No.  You can't trust business to actually take the place of government.  246 
There are certain things that government has a total responsibility for 247 
and one of them is the mechanism - a control of price … Now if 248 
government is going to give industry monies in the form of rebates 249 
and all these things that we're talking about … then they've got to be 250 
certain that the monies that they're giving are getting some 251 
economical benefit in this country. 252 
Kevin: I thought the whole point of both the carbon tax and the ETS was not 253 
only to price the carbon but also the … to raise money to possibly 254 
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compensate those that will be impacted by the increase of prices.  255 
Well, that's as I understood - that it was part of that whole thing.  256 
That's what the money was going to be used for.  Those that didn't 257 
have the dosh to pay for extra electricity - they were going to be given 258 
a certain amount.  Now is that accurate or is that… 259 
Female: Well, that was one of the things that… 260 
Kevin: Yes, that's what I thought. 261 
Female: I mean, we don't have a policy… 262 
Kevin: Well, when they raise the ETS and when they raise the carbon tax, 263 
part of the money that was going to be raised was going to be used to 264 
compensate people.  But they don't have it. 265 
Female: But the ETS is no longer on the books. 266 
Kevin: Well nothing is on the books and we're trying to come up with ideas 267 
that could be on the books.  So I think people are going to be 268 
compensated by the increase in prices if they have a carbon tax or if 269 
they have an ETS - the government's going to raise some money.  As 270 
I understood it, they were going to compensate. 271 
Mike: But one of these things was meant to be income neutral, in other 272 
words they took from Peter and they gave to Paul. 273 
Kevin: That's what I'm saying. 274 
Mike: So nothing changed around really in the cost of everything.  You paid 275 
more for your power but … I don't understand how that's working. 276 
Kevin: Well, if you earn $100,000 a year you pay X number of dollars in tax.  277 
Now, if I'm on a wage of $20,000 a year I don't pay any tax.  But you 278 
compensate me to go to Medicare, you compensate me to drive the 279 
roads, you compensate me to use the other government sort of 280 
facilities that the government develops with your tax dollars.  Or you 281 
even pay me welfare… 282 
 That's the same thing, as I see it, with the carbon tax or the ETS - is 283 
that the government is going to compensate you like welfare to make 284 
up for the increased costs. 285 
Facilitator: So is the consensus that something like an individual tax like a 286 
Medicare levy would be better than taxing the polluters? 287 
Kevin: What we're saying with the Medicare levy is, if you want to get some 288 
money for renewable energy specifically for that - and the money has 289 
to go for that - you give a levy depending on - certain people would be 290 
- because their wages weren't enough - would not have to pay it.  But 291 
everybody else would have to pay say five per cent or a half a per 292 
cent.  That would go into this - to raise this $5.1 billion. 293 
Florian: I just have to remind my friends here that we really have to be very 294 
careful what we spend the money for.   Carbon capture and storage is 295 
not a renewable energy.  It's basically to bury the dirt that the coal 296 
powered - coal fires - you know what I mean - produce, and it's a 297 
totally unproven technology.  This is really - I'm more than happy to 298 
pay much more than $35 if I know it really goes towards the 299 
development of renewable energy. 300 
Mike: Didn't we have an R&D program on clean coal or something? 301 
Florian: Yes, that’s exactly that one. 302 
Facilitator: To say you can't be sure where the money goes - you want to… 303 
Florian: That's my problem.  I want to know that this money really goes 304 
towards… 305 
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Facilitator: So it's got to go somewhere but then you've got to raise the money - 306 
so the difference between taxing mining companies versus personal 307 
income tax if you're not sure - does that make a difference to who 308 
should pay, if there is that uncertainty?  Also uncertainties of global 309 
financial crises, other things within the system that can happen - like 310 
where do we get the money from? 311 
Female: That's right.  I mean I thought the question was asking us whether we 312 
were prepared to pay something personally. 313 
Facilitator: Everyone seems to, but then the next part of the question is how?  314 
Through higher prices, through… 315 
Female: Well, it will be an extra cost to the individual as I understand it, 316 
something that the government is not taking out of the present 317 
revenue to do the R&D that we think possibly needs to be done. 318 
Kevin: There are a certain number of us that would really like to exclude 319 
things like carbon capture and storage because we don't see that - 320 
that is not renewable energy.  That is doing something with the coal. 321 
Nancy: They should do that themselves. 322 
Florian: That's exactly it.  They should finance that. 323 
Kevin: If we're talking about renewable energy then it's got to be renewable 324 
energy. 325 
Female: I think we should be saying development for anything that actually 326 
can improve the efficiency of energy.  Maybe all sorts of things. 327 
Florian: Yes, but there's a lot of questions about carbon capture. 328 
Female: They haven't listed everything.  I've got a lot more renewable 329 
energies than could be listed here. 330 
Kevin: So if we're talking renewable, yes.  But you've got to be specific what 331 
it's going to be for.  Exactly what it's going to be for.  There can't be 332 
wriggle room where you can put another… 333 
Facilitator: Well maybe we should start breaking that down a bit. 334 
Nancy: What is the Medicare levy used for?  Is it very straightforward - we 335 
pay it and the government gets it and spends it only on Medicare 336 
purposes.  Because if that's the same then one could agree with that.  337 
That they could then be equally safe, you know.  The money - $35 or 338 
whatever - if that could be only used like the Medicare levy.  Does 339 
anyone know how the Medicare money - does that go in general 340 
revenue or… 341 
Female: The Medicare levy is used for Medicare purposes. 342 
Nancy: Only for Medicare.  Then we have a blueprint for it, you know.  So 343 
that could be done and could be safe. 344 
Female: Medicare could administer it.  Medicare is set up to do it.  It's already 345 
there.  Medicare administers a whole range of programs, not just 346 
Medicare programs - as does Centrelink. 347 
Mike: …I believe they're already there.  Earlier on they had a gentleman on 348 
stage who left a job this afternoon, or yesterday afternoon or 349 
something, and starts the new one on Monday.  He's from the 350 
Department of Climatology.  They do have a structure.  It's got to be 351 
enlarged of course if we do all this, but only people… 352 
Kevin: I think the other issue that you raised, what companies pay - I mean, 353 
that has to go - in my mind that has to go onto mechanisms that 354 
reduce the energy… 355 
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 The majority of people here feel that a carbon tax - if you put a carbon 356 
tax on an industry - I assume what you're hoping is that that industry 357 
then will find ways of reducing the carbon that it produces so that it 358 
can lower its tax.  My feeling is that an ETS would do it better 359 
because it's more - there is a … setup.  So we're talking two different 360 
things.  The carbon tax goes for industry to encourage them to cut 361 
down the use of carbon and to help pay for those that are impacted 362 
by the increase in prices.  Now is that how you guys would like it to 363 
work?  I mean how we'd like it to work and what's going to work are 364 
two different things. 365 
Female: I think so. 366 
Kevin: I mean in a nutshell - I'm sure that it's more complicated. 367 
Female: …carbon tax than people who are in business to make money.  So 368 
they are going to be very keen on reducing that cost as much as they 369 
can.  Maybe they have their own R&D. 370 
Female: Yes, and they also have a legal requirement to ensure that they raise 371 
enough profits to pay dividends to shareholders.  They have to work 372 
within those legal parameters so they will be reducing their costs 373 
wherever they can. 374 
Female: I assume that that… 375 
Female: Well, just in terms of incentives, it's definitely a key incentive.   376 
Kevin: Does everybody agree with that - is that the right sort of premise?  377 
How about you Nancy, do you agree with that?  Is it the right 378 
premise? 379 
Nancy: Yes. 380 
Kevin: We could maybe make a note of that. 381 
Female: Is this the levy that you are proposing to - this is the carbon tax that 382 
goes… 383 
Kevin: This is the levy that we're going to pay that would go directly for 384 
renewable energy.  Like you suggested, it seems to make sense to 385 
me that Medicare possibly would be a branch of government that 386 
would handle that.  Or whatever's appropriate.  The carbon tax 387 
compensates the less fortunate especially, plus it encourages the 388 
businesses to cut down on their use or production of carbon. 389 
Female: I need to know the first half of that carbon tax statement - it 390 
compensates the less fortunate. 391 
Kevin: Well prices are going to increase with the carbon tax. 392 
Female: I see.  So you think that might get fed into the welfare system. 393 
Kevin: In some way.  To compensate those that are going to be most 394 
disadvantaged, is how it see it. 395 
Mike: Even in industry most disadvantaged because as I said they've 396 
reached their technological barrier, they can't improve themselves 397 
any more.  Are we going to put a cap on them that's beyond their 398 
achievement and then fine them for not… 399 
Kevin: So then the business is closed down and they you've got… 400 
Female: Are we only talking here about this $35 per person per year figure? 401 
Facilitator: How much you'd be willing to pay.  But it's towards this 20 per cent 402 
target - which you don't believe - it should go all parts of what's being 403 
funded.  But just say the target wasn't being officially enforced.  So 404 
they've got this figure - 20 per cent … Would that affect your 405 
willingness to pay? 406 
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Mike: If it wasn't being enforced… 407 
Female: The caveats are enormous I think here.  We're talking about caveats 408 
really - this whole conversation isn't about caveats - but a lot of what 409 
we're saying is that well yes, we'd do it but only under these 410 
circumstances, and we'd do it only those circumstances, and we're 411 
not going to do if it this is happening.  So we're creating really closed 412 
parameters around what we would be prepared to pay and how.  Is 413 
this something that we want to write down on here?  Do we want to 414 
put these things down?  Do we want to put those parameters in? 415 
Florian: Yes, I do, because I don't trust the government to - I don't want it to 416 
go into a general fund and they feel like they can spend it on carbon 417 
capture, which I don't believe in. 418 
Nancy: …going to achieve 20 per cent.  We don't know now … in 2020 will 419 
they refund our money because they haven't achieved… 420 
Female: That's right.  There's some poor scientist trying to make this new 421 
battery cell work and it's 2019 and he can't get it to work.  But in 2020 422 
he finally gets it and all the problems of the world are solved.  I think 423 
there's a little bit of give in this.   424 
Female: I think you're … telling them to get on with it or you're not. 425 
Florian: I think our concern is not just about … in science.  Of course some 426 
technologies will be successful, others will not. But they are all 427 
renewable energy.  This one is not one.  It's something completely 428 
different. 429 
Female: So I guess you say define renewable energy. 430 
Florian: That's extremely important.  So people really know their money is 431 
going towards development of real solutions.  Even if some of these 432 
solutions are not really solutions. 433 
Female: If they want to do carbon capture then they get it from somewhere 434 
else - they get the money from somewhere else. 435 
Kevin: Well, like the carbon tax. 436 
Female: Why do you pick on poor old carbon capture because I mean - you 437 
know, everybody's going off looking for new technology. 438 
Kevin: Because that's one of things they've got listed. 439 
Female: But you don't call it renewable energy.  You don't get energy from 440 
carbon capture.  It's not renewable. 441 
Kevin: No, it's a storage system. 442 
Female: Regardless of if it works or not, it's not a renewable energy. 443 
Facilitator: This was spoken about before and a lot of you raised this as a 444 
potential issue - but just say the US and China are not pulling their 445 
weight.  Does that affect your willingness to pay? 446 
Female: No. 447 
Florian: Sorry? 448 
Facilitator: If the US and China aren't pulling their weight… 449 
Florian: They're actually pulling their weight - China does.  The US probably 450 
don't. 451 
Facilitator: Are you willing to pay more - $100, $200, whatever - so it doesn't 452 
affect… 453 
Female: No. 454 
Kevin: For me it doesn't affect because what I see it - as improving my 455 
quality of life here.  This is where I'm living - here.  Okay, it may not 456 
save the globe - - probably won't if Australia is 100 per cent green 457 
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and China and the United states aren't - but at least my immediate 458 
vicinity is as safe as I can make it for my family and myself. 459 
Facilitator: How do you feel about offsetting - using the money to offset… 460 
Mike: No. 461 
Facilitator: In developing countries. 462 
Mike: Not this $5.1 billion we're talking about.  We're only talking about - we 463 
in Australia are prepared to allocate it for levies towards R&D - within 464 
the emerging low emission technology.   465 
Kevin: I don't know.  It depends again on how it's going to be handled.  I 466 
mean, you've raised a general sort of question.  Would I be willing to 467 
give this lady $100 if I knew it was going to improve her life?  Well 468 
probably I would because I kind of know her.  But would you just want 469 
me to throw out $100 - probably not.  So it depends on how it's being 470 
used and how you can show me that it's really been of benefit to this 471 
country - to these other poor countries.  That's a big problem with 472 
foreign aid - you don't have a clue on what's happening. 473 
Female: As a principle, though … responsibility to … developing countries who 474 
don't have - whose people don't have the comforts that we do. 475 
Florian: I think all these things we're discussing today, the matter of trust 476 
seems really important.  We all do not really seem to trust 477 
governments.  Some of us don't trust the markets and - I mean, if the 478 
government can get a solution that's very clearly outlined - where 479 
does the money go, how much it is, who will pay how much and who 480 
will not have to pay because they don't have the income - then this 481 
could really be a good thing.  But if they don't explain it properly 482 
people will probably say no - as long as we don't know where the 483 
money goes to, then we're not part of it. 484 
Facilitator: Have they explained it properly so far?  Do you feel that they have? 485 
Florian: No. 486 
Facilitator: So how do you feel about being asked to pay without it being 487 
explained? 488 
Female: It's the same as the rest of our taxes. 489 
Female: It is.  No different, yes. 490 
Female: …what happens to them?  You know, it gets paid out for very peculiar 491 
things at times. 492 
Facilitator: So how much more would you be willing to pay if you actually knew - 493 
like some of the caveats that you're speaking about - how much 494 
would that fluctuate depending on… 495 
Mike: …five per cent Medicare fee. 496 
Kevin: The more transparent it is, the more I'd be willing to pay.  You've got 497 
to damn well make it transparent, not just pull my leg. 498 
Female: The easier it is to pay - if you're making it hard to pay then it just 499 
doesn't happen.  The thing is, too, you have to know where it's… 500 
Female: Yes, it's the key difference isn't it, between this and say Medicare - 501 
that when you go to the doctor and you get a prescription for some 502 
antibiotics because you're got a terrible flu, you can see your 503 
Medicare dollars at work.   504 
 With this, what are we measuring here?  We live in Canberra - there's 505 
no pollution here, we can't tell what's going on.  We know that the 506 
summers are a bit hotter - big whoop.  We are completely - I'm being 507 
facetious of course, but we don't see the tangible results of our dollars 508 
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if they go into an R&D.  But as soon as we all get solar panels on our 509 
ceilings and wind turbines in our back yards and we're paying less for 510 
our electricity - then maybe people will start thinking ah, okay.  It will 511 
take time for those dollars to start coming back, if they do, and that's 512 
when people will be more prepared to - because they'll see the 513 
tangible benefits. 514 
Mike: …to start with is the way to go, to get … it's convincing the people 515 
again where it's coming from.  Just little bits at a time, thank you.  516 
Given them a big lump of $5.1 billion over 10 years - you've got to be 517 
joking. 518 
Female: But what do we want to see?  If we get up there in front of those 519 
people in this room and we say yes, we'd be prepared to pay, and 520 
then they'll say okay what are you prepared to pay? 521 
Facilitator: I'll give you a hint, you don't need to get up at the end.  It's a good 522 
way to sort of get ideas. 523 
Female: But if we were and if we - what are we actually prepared to pay for 524 
here?  Seriously - because Alex is going to write this stuff up and 525 
he'll… 526 
Kevin: I expect them to meet the goal of 20 per cent renewable energy.  I 527 
want to see… 528 
Female: By 2020 - or earlier? 529 
Kevin: No - 2020 or earlier. I want to see them producing evidence that they 530 
are proceeding that way.  I don't want them just to hide it.  I want to 531 
know on a regular basis, on an audited basis, what they're using the 532 
money for, where it's going and what's happening. 533 
Female: So if it costs 10 times $5.1 billion and it means we have to pay a 1.5 534 
per cent levy, we are prepared to do that to see 20 per cent reduction 535 
by 2020 - is that what we're saying here? 536 
Female: Yes, but do we know what the renewable energy actually is? 537 
Female: Well these are the caveats. 538 
Kevin: Right now there's a variety of renewable energies on the sideboard 539 
that haven't really taken hold because they don't have the sort of 540 
money to invest in the sort of R&D that they'd need to do for it.  Wave 541 
technology, using gas from waste dumps and all these sorts of things 542 
- there's a whole slew of things out there but they need money for 543 
R&D to get a… 544 
Mike: So would they be private enterprise or would they be government? 545 
Kevin: Well, that's a big question.  I mean, the Commonwealth Bank - that 546 
was government to begin with but then got handed over to the private 547 
section.  Now to my mind that's a reasonable sort of - as I understood 548 
the Commonwealth Bank - that's a reasonable sort of way to 549 
approach it.  What is it - there's a betting - wasn't there - New South 550 
Wales had a betting sort of thing that the state started and then they 551 
flogged it off to the private market.  That's how I see it. 552 
Mike: Don't forget the New South Wales state lottery was originally set up 553 
purely for the customers… 554 
Kevin: that's like the Sydney Harbour Bridge. I used to work as a controller at 555 
Sydney Harbour Bridge and we were collecting that toll for a long time 556 
and paid off the bridge a lot sooner than they took off the toll. 557 
Facilitator: I'd like to thank everyone for the three discussions, and now I think 558 
there's a questionnaire that Alex wants people to do. 559 
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(Identifiable information removed by the author 1 
----- Original Message -----  2 
From: "[name]"<[name]@bigpond.com> 3 
To: "Alex Lo" <alex.lo@anu.edu.au> 4 
Sent: Tuesday, July 13, 2010 10:54 AM 5 
Subject: Re: Australian Climate Policy Forum 6 
 7 
Dear Alex 8 
I submit an attached virus free document in reply to the questionnaire, I think you will 9 
realise that I could not possibly answer the questions directly as per selections. 10 
My personal details are; 11 
 12 
This has become a polarised argument amongst two distinct camps; those who believe 13 
that recordable global warming is not a result of human activity and those who believe 14 
that the emission of industrial carbon gases is directly the cause of irregular weather 15 
patterns. 16 
 17 
My views are more directly associated with the first camp. Whilst I certainly consider 18 
that unmitigated expulsion of enormous quantities of co2 into the atmosphere as a 19 
result of industrialisation can have a negative effect on atmospheric composition, 20 
there is as yet little credible scientific evidence of this phenomenon.  I believe that 21 
climate and associated change is cyclic and can only be considered in relation to a 22 
million years or more.  There must be global warming to have ended the ice age and 23 
man had nil effect on  a transition from cold to warm and vise versa.  24 
 25 
Having stated my views, how can I approve of any form of financial taxation as 26 
having the slightest effect on climate?  Given that there is a significant proportion of 27 
cause and effect attributed to carbon emissions, how does taxing such emissions 28 
reduce their output.?  A form of taxation that goes back directly into research and 29 
development of clean burning coal technology, thermal efficiency, nuclear power 30 
generation, wind farm technology, tidal generation and solar energy may have some 31 
credence. A substantial cost increase of power to the population does not. 32 
 33 
Increased costs will not deter mankind from economic, cultural, industrial and social 34 
usage and production of energy. All energy produces heat, heat is dissipated in the 35 
atmosphere, the ground and the seas; likewise co2.  Carbon in it's many forms 36 
eventually returns to the soil and sea.  Foliage absorbs carbon so does water, both 37 
impart carbon back into vegetation, animals and creatures of the waters. That included 38 
man.  The most alarming aspect of world wide reduction in co2 absorbing vegetation 39 
has been the wide spread destruction of tropical forest without a re planting program. 40 
Almost without exception this has been and is being carried out in tropical regions for 41 
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grazing pasture or low density agriculture.  Western world clearing of forests for 42 
agriculture occurred many hundreds of years ago, little has been cleared in several life 43 
times. 44 
 45 
Australia has no impact nor authority beyond it's shores, an international joke in fact. 46 
What! 22 million inhabitants! Cairo has more as well as many other cities. Should one 47 
perform the ridiculous exercise of dividing land mass by population, Australia has 48 
virtually no polluting effect on the globe. All co2 emission originating from Australia 49 
are carried south east by the westerly air flow into the antarctic oceans to be absorbed. 50 
The localised concentration of any gaseous output is indeed more serious, Australia's 51 
population live largely in just 5 cities and a few large towns, 22 million divided by 5 52 
is a far more dense number than an entire empty country divided by 22 million.  53 
So to be fair I cannot endorse either A,B, C or any reason to tax the population.  As 54 
for paying to plant trees! Where, in what quantity, who will dedicate valuable 55 
agricultural land? Bush fires annually burn down much native forest suited to an 56 
infertile, drought stricken interior. Scrubby low branched narrow leaved shrubs only 57 
grow along the sand dunes or swampy coastal strip.  There is no tree growing space 58 
left to plant this dream other than the already established conifer plantations located 59 
on mountain slopes. 60 
 61 
The Federal Government has just announced a delay of some years for the 62 
introduction of a Carbon trading scheme. The reasoning is why pay some and punish 63 
others who are in fact moving with industrial science to improve performance? A 64 
polluter does get fined if caught and Industrial Australia is under the strictest 65 
observation. Apart from accidental discharge, there is no preventable pollution 66 
occurring.  Emissions from motor vehicles are constantly reduced by law and 67 
technology, coal burning power stations are at this time in technology unable to 68 
greatly reduce co2 emission.  There cannot  be and there is not any consideration to 69 
reduce our way of life and dependence on electric power generation.  The ALP is 70 
adamant in refusing any acceptance or discussion of nuclear power. 71 
 72 
The whole economic argument is a dead duck, no form of economic punishment is 73 
acceptable to the Australian electorate. No one will pay a cent more for an already 74 
expensive product, most quite simply cannot. Substantial inflation would be the result, 75 
all Government pensions, grants, benefits, and otherwise payments would need be 76 
increased to meet living costs.  Financial curtailment of university placement and 77 
elimination of pHd research funding perhaps. Cost of living increases will escalate 78 
union demands for increased pay, the entire economic system would be thrown into 79 
chaos with not a single benefit to anyone and not one iota less generation of so called 80 
greenhouse gases.  This is the simple reason why no other country on earth has 81 
adopted such a policy, nor will they ever, certainly not India, China, USA and 82 
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Europe.  All will gradually improve efficiency and reduce co2 emission as much as is 83 
technically possible.  So will Australia. 84 
 85 
My views are not locked onto the improbable, I am always open to enlightenment and 86 
will defer to the scientifically technical possible. I am an aged pensioner, how could I 87 
be expected to shoulder any increase in costs? No! I am not prepared to pay a cent 88 
more for power, nor will I get rid of the car and ride a bike, detest from meat, lie 89 
rugged in bed sheltering from the Canberra cold winters, denied of heaters.  The 90 
whole episode is becoming more impractical daily. There is no identifiable single 91 
cause towards global warming, Australia is the least polluting nation on earth, the 92 
third world does not count, they produce nothing, consume nothing and cause very 93 
little else relevant to the discussion. 94 
 95 
The outcome of an economic argument lies in the political sphere, delay! That is the 96 
message.  Wait and see what the rest of the developed world do, if and when. The 97 
electoral poll suggests that no carbon tax is acceptable, no offset tax, no carbon 98 
trading scheme, none of the above mentioned. Perhaps a levy towards research into 99 
technical solutions that can only go towards minimising, not eradicating carbon 100 
emissions. 101 
 102 
----- Original Message -----  103 
From: "[name]"<[name]@bigpond.com> 104 
To: "Alex Lo" <alex.lo@anu.edu.au> 105 
Sent: Friday, July 23, 2010 1:40 PM 106 
Subject: Re: Australian Climate Policy Workshop - Map and Programme 107 
 108 
Alex 109 
The PM has upstaged you on this forum with today's announcement of a "peoples 110 
forum" from the Uni of Qld. Keep up the faith and hard work and do not allow the 111 
politics to discourage or hi jack your efforts. My views are in line with what now 112 
seems to be a majority position, I look forward to hearing real disclosure and skilled 113 
opinion on the whole subject. It is a pity that the electorate cannot view a televised 114 
edition from such eminent academics.  I think it may well come down to that 115 
eventually as millions are pushed into the ANU/CSIRO think tank. 116 
 117 
----- Original Message -----  118 
From: "[name]"<[name]@bigpond.com> 119 
To: "Alex Lo" <alex.lo@anu.edu.au> 120 
Sent: Monday, August 02, 2010 10:07 AM 121 
Subject: Re: Australian Climate Policy Workshop 122 
 123 
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Dear Alex 124 
In reply to your query I offer the following: 125 
The discussion group to which I was attached further regarded the comment I had 126 
made to the assembled forum in including a form of levy as an alternative to a form of 127 
taxation.  128 
One member immediately suggested that a well understood levy already existed at 129 
Federal level, the Medicare levy.  Further discussion arrived as a group consensus 130 
that agreed in this form of financing as being appropriate towards R&D funding. Two 131 
factors emerged in that there was already an established system to manage a levy as 132 
all infrastructure was in place and a means of collection existed. The figure of 1.5% 133 
was based upon the Medicare levy. It does not by any means indicate the eventual 134 
levy obligation1. A levy, as does the Medicare levy, would cut out at a certain 135 
minimum income. Pensioners and low income recipients would not be affected. It was 136 
stressed that any levy so collected from the taxable public was to be quarantined  as a 137 
sole payment towards GHE R&D. Consolidated revenue was not to be considered as 138 
was future interference by alternative government. Enshrined in legislation in all 139 
probability.  140 
My group considered both proposals of ETS and a carbon tax as well as no action. 141 
The ETS was unilaterally rejected due to questionable benefit, risk of fraud, no real 142 
reduction influence and a seemingly abjection by government of responsibility. Some 143 
aspects were considered of value but the overall package was deficient. The carbon 144 
tax whilst not by any means the ideal solution at least targeted the major emissions, 145 
identified them and disallowed market manipulation and profiteering. Both schemes 146 
were in serious need of further research. It was a case of the stick and the carrot or the 147 
best of two incomplete ideals. So it was agreed that a carbon tax, albeit a reduced 148 
financial obligation be placed upon the major business emitters, say organisations 149 
with gross profits above $20 million or so, who knows, that is for economists to figure. 150 
Under this scheme business or to put it accurately, commerce in all it's forms will 151 
make a contribution towards a GHE taxed at a lower level than previously indicated, 152 
and the public as a whole would contribute towards the development costs of 153 
technical innovation. This model includes producers and users of energy to equally 154 
contribute towards a longer term solution. The actual charges to both groups is in the 155 
realms of Treasury. Due to the lack of a technical aspect during the forum, actual 156 
possibility and probability scenarios were absent from conclusive evidence. There is 157 
no point in establishing time frames, established quantities, or targeted industries if it 158 
is in fact, at this stage, technically impossible. I feel this last factor weighs heavily 159 
upon industrial concepts, the concern of being pilloried and punished for factors 160 
outside their control. The idea of a public levy  quarantined towards R&D will 161 
alleviate this discord greatly. No one had any real concepts of the composition of 162 
global GHE, where they originated, from what sources, geophysical distribution, 163 
                                                 
1 This participant was a pensioner exempted from the Medicare levy. 
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climatic intolerance or in fact, apart from coal fired generation, what makes GHE. A 164 
considered technical response was impossible, that is also the opinion of the media 165 
and public. What was possible and did occur was that a group of non technical people 166 
did establish a frame work of cooperation and submitted opinions worthy of 167 
professional consideration. If any outcome was more apparent it is for a government 168 
funded and controlled public information scheme, what is a few years in a millennium? 169 
Big report on the forum being written by myself, your copy in a few days. 170 
 171 
  172 
----- Original Message -----  173 
From: "[name]"<[name]@bigpond.com> 174 
To: <kim.alexander@csiro.au> 175 
Cc: <alex.lo@anu.edu.au> 176 
Sent: Monday, August 02, 2010 12:09 PM 177 
Subject: Australian Climate Policy Forum 178 
 179 
Dear Kim 180 
A resounding success! Pleas feel free to distribute my comments to all involved at 181 
CSIRO and ANU. I will email Alex direct, he has already requested certain 182 
enlargements on date presented. One could write far more on the forum but it is 183 
enough to state that a model for an enlarged symposium has been established. 184 
Dr Ken Alexander PhD Bsc(Hon's) 185 
Social Scientist 186 
CC; Please distribute to all ANU/CSIRO participants. Alex has his own copy. 187 
Dear Ken 188 
The Climate Policy Forum was a success in as much as the professional presentations 189 
were quality and delivered at a level consistent with a non academia or scientifically 190 
trained audience. To attempt such explanations of a multi discipline subject matter in a 191 
restricted time frame and expressing only major salient points is nigh on impossible. 192 
There was of course two distinct agenda intended, some of us were quick to recognize 193 
this at the very beginning when a trained social scientist introduced a group 194 
participation game. Behavioral science as expressed as human psychology was the 195 
purpose, as this defined group attitudes, problem solving technique, self expression, 196 
leadership, ingenuity and much of the cognitive outcome that could be expected from 197 
a similar wider group of the population. There were no definitive attitudes present, the 198 
group as a whole accepted the most plausible solution, each adding or confirming an 199 
individual attitude. The eventual sum of the whole was a general consensus towards 200 
the most efficient outcome. 201 
 202 
Bravo Oh!, that is exactly what was the Objective of the exercise; viz: To make 203 
recommendations to the Australian Government on emission reduction policy.  It was 204 
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anticipated that the response to this vexing dilemma would in fact indicate a parallel 205 
opinion across the electorate. In that direction anyway.  206 
 207 
In one way it was unfortunate that this ideal was not reinforced by presenters, though 208 
Steve Hatfield-Dodds and Andrew Reeson did go to lengths to explain that they would 209 
not introduce a political opinion.  However in the real world there is always a 210 
political opinion, but academically that does not mean an opinion restricted to either 211 
of the Australian political parties. Such suggestions are the realm of the sensational 212 
press.  A political opinion is the opinion of the electorate.   213 
 214 
Mark Stafford Smith certainly awakened my ignorance of reality, private discussion 215 
with Mark assured me for the first time that statistical data gleaned from an 216 
international input and diagnosed or interpreted by Australia's leading scientific minds 217 
(a group encompassing all allied associates and culminating in a CSIRO expressed 218 
opinion) is justified and independently verified. There is now no doubt in my mind 219 
that global warming is occurring. However! Mark did not state categorically that this 220 
was totally due to GHE but was an as yet unqualified major contributor. I respect the 221 
analogies that comprise computer modeling but the available data and the authenticy 222 
of mathematically extended outcomes as per illustrated graphs used by Mark Stafford 223 
Smith and Steve Hatfield-Dodds leaves me feeling somewhat mistrustful. This will 224 
also be the impressions of the public at large. Problem number one! Give credence to 225 
computer modelling. 226 
 227 
The rate of change is as yet unproven but again is a computer generated worst case 228 
scenario, alter the algorithms and a differing result is generated. It seems .005 makes a 229 
whole world of difference to an outcome. Quite simply we cannot accurately predict 230 
outcomes because change creates change in itself, this is called evolution.  231 
The evolutionary changes, minute as they may seem have the capacity to render 232 
advance computer modelling obsolescent well before the suggested outcome.  233 
Retrograde computer modelling if it could be performed would quickly show up the 234 
inaccuracy of many long held concepts. Still one must run with the ball you have, not 235 
the ball in the next oval.  So like the public out there, the electorate to be precise, I 236 
am not convinced or hold much belief in the ultimate global disaster the computer 237 
dictates.  It is the shorter term calculations that hold credibility, measurable quantities 238 
of GHE already established as being produced over the next twenty years or so will 239 
have a detrimental effect on global climate. How large an impact? Neither I nor any 240 
one else has a clue. Too many media calamities are localised. Fire flood, famine, 241 
earthquake, volcanic activity  have always occurred in the same localities. Discount 242 
earthquake and volcanic eruption, that can and only will occur at catastrophic scale 243 
along known fault lines. The frequency and intensity of the climate generated 244 
disasters has been the moot point with climate change philosophy, Again there are too 245 
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many contributing factors to the seriousness of calamity and calamity is only calamity 246 
when loss of life occurs. Flooding in China and Pakistan is only causing calamity due 247 
to improper land usage. Building and living in a known flood zone is hardly 248 
conductive to disaster avoidance. This is simply overpopulation. Like wise in 249 
Australia's recent history, fire ravaged regions is due to misguided land occupation, 250 
building and living in what was always seen as a high fire risk area. The heat waves 251 
that caused bush fires have occurred many time before, 1939 was as bad, 252 
unaccustomed persistent high temperatures in SE Australia are a result of stronger 253 
than usual high pressure troughs lingering over the Tasman and inducing strong 254 
heated northerly winds down the eastern mountain barrier. I cannot see a correlation 255 
between GHE and seasonal high and low pressure systems generated in antarctic 256 
regions. Avoid the media driven tripe that allocates all phenomenon to associated 257 
GHE. Pity BOM was not invited. 258 
Steve Hatfield-Dodds had access to Treasury generated data presented in graphical 259 
form. The economics of presumed outcomes is again a product of the computer. A 260 
computer lacks intellect, emotion, sense or the capacity to reason. A computer can 261 
only generate an intended outcome. The old saying! rubbish in, rubbish out. There are 262 
degrees of rubbish, much is quite correct and accurate but it only takes one little 263 
fragment of inaccuracy to misinterpret the whole analogy. Steve's presentation was on 264 
the whole enlightening and does show an economic national likely outcome, but the 265 
graphical conclusions reach too far into the future. A cut-off point around 2020 might 266 
have had more authenticy. Again, a print out handed around would have been of value, 267 
time to assimilate the content was too brief.  I did query the probability of offshore 268 
relocation of Australian manufacturing given repressive economic disadvantages due 269 
to forms of GHE taxing. Concessions and advantages would be awarded to Australian 270 
corporations who relocated to non compliance nations. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, 271 
Philippines and Fiji are all candidates for Australian investment. Economically 272 
speaking introduction of any form of corporate carbon taxing will most certainly have 273 
a detrimental effect on employment and investment. On that basis alone it is almost 274 
enough to sound the death knell. The failed point to be established from the 275 
economists, was the rate and extent of any proposed economic sanctions.  Far too 276 
much emphasis was given to achieving a non achievable dream in a ridiculous short 277 
time frame. 5%? reduction! Who in industry has admitted that the technology and 278 
economics exists to achieve this result? No one was invited from the technology prone 279 
industries to explain how a carbon reduction can be performed. I have no idea how 280 
industry will remove GHE from the production cycle.  281 
The only analogy bandied around the forum was of the obvious and well published 282 
deficiency in the use of brown coal to minimise GHE. The only brown coal fired 283 
power generators are located in Gippsland, Vic. Neither can be eliminated, neither can 284 
switch to any other form of heat generation unless a natural gas pipeline is provided. 285 
The proposed NBN $47 billion can certainly provide for that eventuality. In about ten 286 
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years. Whilst conversion to gas fired generation would reduce GHE, by how much 287 
and at what cost? Would this also make a worthwhile impact on overall Australian 288 
GHE? Bit like the farting cows and pigs syndrome, it is nature, no one cares nor wants 289 
to curtail cow farting. We like to eat them too much to tax them or reduce their 290 
numbers. That stupid concept really did put the public offside. Steve Hatfield-Dodds 291 
contribution was educational but reliance on Treasury concepts smelled of 292 
manipulated outcomes. 293 
Hayley Stevenson is a good and informative presenter of her discipline in the 294 
International forum. Hayley revealed a positive body language , she sent the message 295 
out clearly and concisely. Speech delivery was rapid and kept one in a catch-up mode. 296 
Hayley led one into an insider camp, we heard revelations and positions being taken 297 
in the international arena, sociopolitical stuff, kept from the public by the media. So I 298 
learned that in reality no other country is doing much more than what they have 299 
already been doing, no surge or expanse of projects, no hair tearing or breast beating 300 
and little popular demand for increased actions from their governments. In other 301 
words most of the western world is satisfied with their ongoing efforts towards GHE 302 
targets. However most of the countries involved are geographically much smaller than 303 
Australia, have vastly different transport, and infrastructure in place and with 304 
concentrated populations. It is easier to achieve an outcome if much of the work has 305 
been done. Industry is much newer, more efficient and selective. Nuclear power 306 
generation also removes coal as a major emitter. Petro-chemical industries are 307 
predominant but are mainly provided with power from nuclear generators. Replace 308 
coal fired power stations in Australia with nuclear energy and the GHE would achieve 309 
a 20% reduction in the allocated time frame. How can we win if the games rigged and 310 
the goal posts are shifted for convenience? Ok so Hayley virtually conceded the 311 
Liberal Party position of wait and see what they do. Not exactly that concept but a 312 
more sedate and achievable goal. Scale of production is also a driving force, it 313 
provides an economic base to draw down needed capital. Every other industrialised 314 
nation on earth has more capital to drive a program and is better positioned than 315 
Australia to introduce a GHE policy. Stop being so pessimistic, Australia has  little 316 
true avoidable GHE, none by wanton disrespect for the clean air act, inspectors are 317 
forever watchful. The matter of coal fired power stations has a 100 year history and it 318 
may take half of that time frame to eliminate them. Care more about industries that 319 
can introduce technologies to trap and reduce formations of GHE. But! And I reiterate, 320 
But! Give due credence to the practicability and availability of such technology. GHE 321 
will not cease because you want it to do so, nor because there are evil polluters out 322 
there, but only because it can be done.  Copenhagen, Mexico, South Africa! I haven't 323 
a clue what they did, said, promised, denied or pretended at these forums, I do not 324 
care and am not interested and what's more I have no impact on any outcomes. 325 
Neither does the rest of the world, that has been demonstrated. Australia just does 326 
what it reasonably can for it's own satisfaction and benefit. Australia will make no 327 
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impact on GGHE, we emit so little but as one member said, our health may improve. 328 
Enough said! 329 
Andrew Reeson introduced the political aspects of choice or evaluation of the two 330 
projected schemes. The ill fated ETS or the disputed Carbon tax. Herein lies the 331 
political tiger. Labor backs the ETS path and Liberal reluctantly pursues a carbon tax 332 
scenario. Both parties would be quite happy for the whole pressure can to go away 333 
and die a death of disinterest.  For the first time I actually became aware of the 334 
composition, methodology and shortfalls of both schemes. At this point I became 335 
acutely aware of the value of the forum.  This is the whole crux of the matter, few if 336 
any, including the members of parliament have a clue as to what either scheme really 337 
means. The public are totally disinterested apart from the Greens. The media cannot 338 
adequately describe the content of these schemes, leaving the public confused, 339 
ignorant and finally unconcerned. 340 
The debate amongst my group was more direct and heated with this topic than any of 341 
the previous subject matter. A consensus was rapidly reached with only the one 342 
distrainer, that the proposed ETS was a dud and a fraud. The carbon tax scenario was 343 
selected as the better of two inadequate schemes. At this point a third alternative was 344 
introduced, a levy imposed on all taxpayers to create an R&D project. The terms and 345 
conditions of this levy are now with Alex Lo. Due to my loss of hearing and Andrews 346 
softly spoken voice I admit to missing much of his commentary. I had to rely upon the 347 
power point outlines.  Andrew was more direct than previous speakers in admitting to 348 
doubts within submitted policy. I began to see a convergence of opinion bordering 349 
upon my own and the electorate in general. Wait a minute I thought! This whole 350 
shebang is going off too fast, far more involvement needs be done by either party in 351 
government before anything is locked down. Andrew put up a good case for jumping 352 
in deep water now, probing around with sticks to test the depth or doing little until the 353 
others goes in the deep water first. Andrew wisely left it up to the individual to decide 354 
upon the best course of action, he only indicates the depth. 355 
There it is, my impression of the Australian Climate Policy Forum convened jointly 356 
by the ANU and CSIRO in aid of Alex Lo's PhD project.  Let's not be shy about this, 357 
the forum was in fact a preview and litmus test of the proposed Julia Gillard citizens 358 
committee. If so, it would work!. Twenty randomly selected citizens representing a 359 
cross section of the electorate did arrive at a considered consensus. Well not quite, but 360 
close enough to form a probable electoral poll outcome. The catalyst was information. 361 
People can make rational decisions once informed. Political parties and the media 362 
presume the mushroom philosophy , kept in the dark and fed bullshit! The enormous 363 
dissent towards a citizens committee is in the title, the supposed aims, and the 364 
prejudicial outcome. In other words the truth is lacking and if Danielle Cronnin from 365 
the Canberra Times had been present or had a comprehensive press release from the 366 
CSIRO/ANU Forum, perhaps, if it is now politically relevant, the media may at last 367 
explain the advantages of a public debate. Sorry to disturb you at CSIRO and ANU 368 
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but if this did occur then all of you are the only logical candidates and have a grueling 369 
twelve months ahead.  Polish up the convention a little, include technologies, 370 
authenticate computer modelling and a science caravan is on the road.  Move over 371 
Questicom! 372 
 373 
----- Original Message -----  374 
From: "[name]"<[name]@bigpond.com> 375 
To: "Alex Lo" <alex.lo@anu.edu.au> 376 
Sent: Monday, August 02, 2010 1:38 PM 377 
Subject: Re: Australian Climate Policy Workshop 378 
 379 
Alex 380 
As an aged pensioner the 1.5% allocated figure does not apply to me but if it did, it 381 
approximates $5 per week.  The aged pension, inclusive of added amounts equals 382 
$701 per fortnight. All deductions are based on the base rate of pension which is 383 
around $670 per fortnight. The pension is aimed at 25% of the adult award minimum 384 
pay so a taxable income level at 4 times pension or roughly $1300 a week applies. 385 
However, the proposal is only for a levy to be introduced at a cut off rate equivalent to 386 
incomes in the annual $50,000 and upwards bracket. I am not sure but this is 387 
somewhere near the Medicare levy bracket. Find out for sure how Medicare works 388 
and you have the answer to the GHE levy. Again a definitive figure of 1.5% was only 389 
a throw in to establish an initial level. It may be that a levy of less or more is required. 390 
Also the CPI adjustments will alter the fiscal amount. As an economist, you know that 391 
national salary and wage levels are available, it is easy to calculate how much a levy 392 
could generate by adding or subtracting from a starting point of 1.5% net, not gross, 393 
income. A gross income allocation seems unfair and excessive to me however I am 394 
not an economist. If so, then for a start, make it 0.5% of gross income. The levy is 395 
transparent, deducted along with PAYE at place of employment and paid in to 396 
government much as sales tax was. Annual tax logements simply increase the gross 397 
amount payable by the allocated levy. It happens automatically with Medibank. A levy 398 
involves everyone in contribution other than those whose incomes are below the cut 399 
off income. To expect commerce to shoulder the entire load will never succeed. A levy 400 
is in no way to be construed as a tax or an assistance package to industry, a levy is to 401 
be quarantined and only available for R&D. Temporary levies have been used by 402 
government in the past, an introduced 3 year levy may at least start the ball rolling. 403 
Extend it or scrap it as conditions dictate in the future. 404 
 405 
  406 
----- Original Message -----  407 
From: "[name]"<[name]@bigpond.com> 408 
To: "Alex Lo" <alex.lo@anu.edu.au> 409 
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Sent: Wednesday, August 11, 2010 8:42 AM 410 
Subject: Re: Australian Climate Policy Workshop 411 
 412 
Dear Alex 413 
When one changes one's view it is generally due to additional data influencing the 414 
cognitive process. The major consideration in my case was the Mark Stafford Smith 415 
lecture, creating an entirely believable scenario. In other words media generated 416 
decisions were irrelevant, distorting and somewhat fraudulent. Factual information 417 
straight from the scientists mouth in the first person, beats panicky sensationalism 418 
generated by the press. Andrew Reeson virtually cemented my change in attitude by a 419 
balanced, factual and objective appreciation of the problems ahead. 420 
Lesson one for government; create and manage a factual and non hysterical 421 
communication campaign.  Only then will the public come on board for a positive 422 
outcome. (Alex! this is what I meant by Australianised assistance in dismembering 423 
journalistic articles. There is always a deeply entrenched unique national 424 
psychological mood involved, a deep river of discontent that only an observant 425 
Australian detects. It is our way, same as you are able to discern a Gungzhou element 426 
of reaction). I changed my mind because I learned truth. 427 
The second element of variance with nominated question response is more in line with 428 
review thought. One day is inadequate to assimilate and positively decide a position 429 
on these elements.  Regard what I have written and communicated since the forum as 430 
being my considered opinion. Will probably learn even more of the reality eventually 431 
and firm opinions on enhanced information. I am not skilled or informed sufficiently 432 
to become involved in the causes, effects or responses to GHE, I am not a scientist, 433 
have absolutely no political convictions on this subject, fail dismally as an economist 434 
but poses the shrewd  insight into electoral outcomes of rash economic decisions. 435 
Apart from a vocal minority, mostly of the Green variety, few Australian really care 436 
about GHE, the hyped up consequences, whether the world drowns, ice bergs collapse, 437 
polar bears roam far and wide and any other issue that does not actually hit the wallet 438 
pocket nerve (An Australianism!) The electoral, voting population is disinterested in 439 
GHE warming, they have been exposed to too much sensational rubbish from the 440 
media. Labor backed off an ETS because it will not be electorally supported. Liberal's 441 
carbon tax is an inadequate, poorly explained scheme and economic elements are 442 
misconstrued. I do not have the written eloquence of a PhD in literature so my 443 
ramblings are often incoherent, thanks for listening anyway.  I can't spell either and 444 
coin words to suit, quite incorrect, but it suits; Australianism is such a non existent 445 
word. 446 
 447 
----- Original Message -----  448 
From: "[name]"<[name]@bigpond.com> 449 
To: <kim.alexander@csiro.au> 450 
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Cc: <alex.lo@anu.edu.au> 451 
Sent: Saturday, August 07, 2010 8:53 AM 452 
Subject: Victoria's brown coal 453 
 454 
Dear Kim 455 
Alex gets a direct copy although I feel he may need Australian originating economic, 456 
political and commercial input to ascertain the gist of this article in the Age. This 457 
subject is right down Andrew Reeson's alley. Most of my contentions expressed in the 458 
forum and at the group discussion and also in private with yourself, Andrew and Alex 459 
stipulated the same problems. The economics of change and rectification, not the need 460 
to apply change to environmental reform. Who pays when the producer cannot 461 
possibly meet rectification costs ? Providing the cost of supply to the market does not 462 
increase due to GHE rectification, then the public are not concerned. Both political 463 
parties are agreeing to a $300 million per year gradual coal to gas changeover plan. 464 
This is to be funded from consolidated revenue with consequent subtraction from 465 
other environmental programs. My theory of a taxpayer funded levy goes some way 466 
towards assisting this imbalance. There is now no escaping the fact that billions will 467 
have to be provided towards GHE rectification over the next decade. This can come 468 
from increased taxation, a levy or manipulation of company tax rate in these 469 
industries, a bail out subsidy or straight out nationalisation of power generation. 470 
Ownership of generation to revert back to the Crown. Price will have to increase but 471 
can also be subsidised by taxation revenue. In all scenarios it is impossible for the 472 
market to be excluded from cost recovery. A taxpayer levy now seems appropriate and 473 
will generate the income required to achieve a changeover. Of course rectification 474 
must be in line with national affordability and any levy must be acceptable by the 475 
payee. The producers simply cannot shoulder the burden of transfer of fuel input, 476 
there is not the income generation to allow commercial decisions. Read the article, 477 
consider the economic and political ramifications, introduce the levy argument and 478 
determine the best course of action.  479 
 480 
 481 
----- Original Message -----  482 
From: "[name]"<[name]@bigpond.com> 483 
To: <alex.lo@anu.edu.au> 484 
Sent: Thursday, August 12, 2010 10:39 AM 485 
Subject: Media hype 486 
 487 
Dear Alex 488 
This is a typical example of ignorant media scare mongering. Dr Church of CSIRO 489 
should have known better than to be associated with an article penned by a 490 
commentator from the Guardian. The Guardian is a major left wing, radical 491 
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newspaper established over 100 years ago in the midlands region of England. Workers 492 
of Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds etc are the main readers. It is in all probability a 493 
stooge paper of the Murdoch empire by now. 494 
The Greenland glaciers have been collapsing into the Arctic sea, Naires Straight to be 495 
exact, for millenniums. Recorded sea levels have not risen to a discernable degree. Ice 496 
in the sea, as is an ice berg, has already displaced it's volume in seawater. Ice that has 497 
been totally land bound and hence has no displacement value, will upon entering the 498 
sea, displace it's own weight in sea water. Only land bound ice can contribute towards 499 
rising sea levels. Glaciers are not static, to be static is an ice cap, not a glacier.  To 500 
even suggest that Greenland will or can entirely melt is fantasy of the most absurd 501 
kind. The glaciated ice of Greenland will continue to erode into the sea, just as in the 502 
past hundreds of thousand years. A modest rise in sea level can be expected over the 503 
next thousand years. Big deal! The current panic driven descriptions of the Manhattan 504 
size ice berg are crap! This berg, will like all others, be broken into smaller and 505 
smaller relics until fetched up shore bound as gradually melting ice shelves. Several 506 
hundred years perhaps. Little berg ice will traverse the Baffin basin to enter or even 507 
endanger shipping, far to the south off New Foundland The ice berg that caused the 508 
sinking of the Titanic originated from pack ice flowing south from the Icelandic sea 509 
within Denmark Straight.  All glaciers must disintegrate once the ice mass, or portion 510 
of, slides over the fulcrum point of elevated land mass into lower level sea mass. 511 
Weight of ice breaks off the mother glacier in the method shown by satellite image as 512 
a long continues crack. The length depends on the outlet width. The outlet width 513 
depends upon the terrain form. Narrow glaciated valleys produce frequent smaller ice 514 
calving. A wide plain such as the Petermann forms expansive shelving. 515 
I have almost returned to my original position of complete disregard for scientific 516 
evaluation after reading this rubbish article. See what I mean! How do you expect to 517 
get a public on side with this sort of hysterical nonsense. Even the blue collar workers 518 
of Sydney's western marginal electorates are not that dumb. CSIRO should have 519 
censored input from an employee, claiming CSIRO backing. If so why was he not an 520 
invited speaker? All these overseas senate committee revelations are just that, 521 
offerings of fools in an effort to sway congress. The congress is not that stupid either, 522 
just hypotheses, possibilities if unlikely scenarios occurred. Little factual evidence. 523 
Ask the CSIRO sea level experts why the tide tables for Sydney Harbor have not 524 
changed in 100 years! Neither have the Admiralty charts that the entire worlds 525 
shipping depends upon for safe passageway. 526 
 527 
(below is a news article attached to this email) 528 
Huge rise in sea levels forecast if global warming ignored 529 
BEN CUBBY 530 
August 12, 2010 531 
 532 
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Sea levels could rise by up to seven metres (23') if greenhouse gas emissions were not 533 
scaled back, a panel of leading geoscientists has told the US Congress. 534 
The warning came as a vast ice shelf, about 260 square kilometres in size, continued 535 
to fall away from Greenland's Petermann glacier, the largest iceberg shed by the island 536 
in half a century. 537 
The geoscientists told Congress Greenland might cease to exist, with the island 538 
rapidly approaching a tipping point that would see much larger masses of ice melting, 539 
pushing up the average level of oceans around the world. Temperature rises of 540 
between two and seven degrees Celsius - which are considered likely by the end of the 541 
century due to human-induced carbon emissions - would force the change, they said. 542 
A leading Australian sea level rise researcher, Dr John Church, broadly agreed with 543 
the US assessment. ''We are seeing something significant, and it's something our 544 
coastal cities have not experienced before,'' said Dr Church, a lead author of the most 545 
recent global assessment by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. ''We're 546 
beginning to move outside the range of what we have become used to seeing as 547 
normal variability, and see an acceleration of both greenhouse gas levels and sea level 548 
rise.'' 549 
But there was still a great deal of uncertainty about the timing and extent of the 550 
disintegration of Greenland's ice sheets, Dr Church said. 551 
''We are looking at a process that will be going on for centuries,'' he said. ''It may be 552 
that we do cross that threshold relatively soon, but there is a lot of uncertainty around 553 
it, in my view.'' 554 
Professor Richard Alley, a geoscientist at Pennsylvania State University, told the US 555 
House of Representatives committee on energy independence and global warming a 556 
sea level rise of seven metres was a realistic possibility. 557 
''Some time in the next decade we may pass that tipping point, which would put us 558 
warmer than temperatures that Greenland can survive,'' Professor Alley said. 559 
The current threshold at which Greenland would melt is a temperature rise of between 560 
two and four degrees, according to the UN's current estimate. 561 
The Australian government is currently planning for a sea level rise of 90 centimetres 562 
by the end of the century. 563 
Dr Ryan McAllister, a scientist from the CSIRO's climate adaptation division, said 564 
planning for sea level rises needed to become more flexible to take uncertainty into 565 
account. 566 
''We also need to broaden our perspective on planning so we can adapt to different 567 
stages of climate change as they emerge,'' Dr McAllister said. 568 
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Coding Scheme with Reference 
Coding Category 
Line Number 
S1G1 S1G2 S1G3 S2G1 S2G2 
1. Initial Confrontation      
1.1 Perceived dichotomy 23-6  247-72   
1.2 Enthusiasm      
1.2.1 Moral responsibility 19-20; 36-7 57-9    
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demonstration 
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1.2.3 Economic benefits  49-53; 234-8 332-35   
1.3 Scepticism      
1.3.1 Incomplete evidence   101-22; 147-52; 171-7;   
1.3.2 Minimal contribution  175-9     
      
2 Experiencing Conflict and 
Difficulty 
     
2.1 Disagreement on key issues   101-22; 147-52; 224-37 44-56 33-55; 253-62 
2.2 Sense of powerlessness or 
incompetence  
38-48; 367-71  67-9; 86-8; 102-3; 301-3  36-40; 204-5 106-12  
      
3 Problem Characterization      
3.1 Limitations of market 
mechanisms 
   84-90; 98-105; 198- 
202; 225-31 
240-7 
A
.3.2 
  
 
392 
Coding Category 
Line Number 
S1G1 S1G2 S1G3 S2G1 S2G2 
3.2 Lack of political 
commitment 
74-7; 182-6; 193-206; 
209-12; 328-35; 337-53 
 212-23 309-16 124-9; 339-44 
3.3 Collective action problems 269-76; 337-53    308-11 
      
4 Criteria Articulation      
4.1 Policy dimension      
4.1.1 Certainty or guarantee of 
purpose 
   57-61; 169-70 62-70; 85-7 
4.1.2 Trust  325-7  156-61  
4.1.3 Simplicity or flexibility    44-53; 76-83; 113-5; 
123; 127-34  
124-9 
4.1.4 Distributional fairness     78-83 
4.2 Willingness to pay      
      
5 Consensus Formation      
5.1 Medicare levy parallel      
5.2 Recognition from opponents      
Notes:  
1) ‘S’ refers to Session, ‘G’ Group, ‘LG’ large group presentation in Session 2;  
2) italic form denotes counter examples or arguments;  
3) ‘EC’ is the electronic conversation between one of the participants (Mike) and the author. 
 
  
 
393 
Coding Category 
Line Number 
S2G3 S2LG S3G1 S3G2 S3G3 EC 
1  Initial Confrontation       
1.1Perceived dichotomy      13-8 
1.2 Enthusiasm       
1.2.1 Moral responsibility 212-15   387-92   
1.2.2 International demonstration   366-7; 370-5; 381-5    
1.2.3 Economic benefits       
1.3 Scepticism       
1.3.1 Incomplete evidence      18-24; 91-2 
1.3.2 Minimal contribution 207-14     46-9; 92 
       
2   Experiencing Conflict and Difficulty      
2.1 Disagreement on key issues 66-92; 105-9; 119-32; 
148-70; 172-94; 225- 
47; 289-95; 338-46 
   277-85  
2.2 Sense of powerlessness or 
incompetence  
392-4 36-40     
       
3 Problem Characterization       
3.1 Limitations of market  
mechanisms 
30-4; 177-80; 249-53; 
338-46; 380-2  
     
3.2 Lack of political 177-80  458-69; 499-504; 505-8    
A
.3.2 
  
 
394 
Coding Category 
Line Number 
S2G3 S2LG S3G1 S3G2 S3G3 EC 
commitment 
3.3 Collective action problems 168-70  311-5; 443-54; 458-9; 
488-91; 499-504 
   
       
4 Criteria Articulation       
4.1 Policy dimension        
4.1.1 Certainty or guarantee of 
purpose 
108-10; 257-62; 382-5 21-3; 36- 
40 
145-6; 164-70; 212-4; 
249-50; 348-54 
143-9; 157-62; 176-7;  67-71; 298-305; 465- 72; 
477-83; 496-7; 500-13 
 
4.1.2 Trust 30-2; 177-80; 249-53; 
312-20; 338-46; 380-2 
 212-4; 284-310; 324- 
30; 356-9; 539- 44 
415-29; 437-40; 441-9 246-8; 415-7; 475-7  
4.1.3 Simplicity or flexibility  23-5; 36- 
40; 66-9 
    
4.1.4 Distributional fairness   184-8; 406-23  73-81; 217-24  
4.2 Willingness to pay    176-7 465-72; 477-83; 496-7  
       
5 Consensus Formation       
5.1 Medicare levy parallel 279-88; 312-24  108-12; 139-47; 
176-83; 184-93 
302-9; 336-43;  44-9; 54-8; 73-85; 
335-344; 381-6 
130-8 
5.2 Recognition from 
opponents 
338-9    335-344 130-8; 200-1; 215- 
20; 359-61; 516-7 
 A.3.2 
